We sometimes don't talk much about it especially when the network is working smoothly and no obvious signs of congestion. But we later go back to same problem when TX fees increases, and so many pending transactions are all seated at the mempool waiting to be confirmed, at this point in time, those who are able to pay higher fees get their transactions ahead of others, but for how long are we going to continue like this ?.
You misunderstood how bitcoin was designed to run in the long term, where a state of congestion and high fees is the desired state, whereas lack of congestion is the problematic state. When the block subsidy becomes insignificant in a decade or two, the only thing that will keep bitcoin secure is high total fees for every block, and that can only be achieved by keeping the network congested. |
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That wikipage claims This decreasing-supply algorithm was chosen because it approximates the rate at which commodities like gold are mined.
But this is what global gold production actually looks like:  Over bitcoin's lifetime, Gold's emission much more resembles a fixed rate than an exponentially decreasing one. |
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Are you equating N to the number of servers in each set or is N equal to the amount of organizations?  One coinswap service is offered by N organizations each employing one server. Even if 51% of N are colluding, they would learn nothing about any coinswap they choose to complete. The worst that can happen is one server going down and the protocol cannot complete. Then there could be multiple coinswap services being offered, each with its own set of organizations. That sounds pretty decentralized to me. |
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There is no such thing as "semi" centralized. Either it is centralized or not.
Then please tell us: if mixing is done by a set of N servers each with its own published public key, and belonging to N different organizations from all over the world, then for which values of N is it centralized, and for which is it not? Assume that mixing is done in such a way that privacy is compromised only if all N servers collude. |
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One of the reason is probably the mixers and coinjoin services would lose there income as people stopped using them.
No; people would still want to obfuscate the transaction graph, which MW by itself doesn't do (transaction boundaries are visible in the mempool). But they'd use an MW-specific mixer design [1] that offers many advantages over bitcoin mixers. [1] https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=567625.msg56288711#msg56288711 |
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If anything, those things should be wrapped into existing transactions, to hide the fact, that someone is even trying to use MimbleWimble (the principle of "always was there, since 2009" is a good method of activating things, to hide them properly).
There's no need to hide that fact if all txs use MW. if you want privacy, then everything should be visible in plain sight (except for things like private keys)
If you want privacy, then obviously everything should be confidential. And with MW, you're not explicitly trying to hide; you're using a more scalable blockchain protocol that just happens to come with significant privacy benefits. there are 100 people, each having 0.01 BTC, and doing 100-of-100 multisig? Or to have 100 separate outputs with unknown amount, marked as "confidential"?
Why not have a 100-of-100 multisig on a confidential amount, where nobody knows there are 100 ppl involved? |
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Worldcoin? Isn't that the one created by Sam Altman (the founder of OpenAI)? I wouldn't call it a "privacy coin", especially when it used to collect biometric data from users.
He didn't claim it as a privacy coin, but as a fairly distributed coin. I strongly disagree however, since worldcoin founders can allocate arbitrary amounts to themselves, with or without making up fake identities. Not even the original Worldcoin project (with ticker WDC) has privacy features. Only GRIN and Monero have.
The chart at [1] compares privacy features (and scalability) of various coins. Zcash offers the most, but (like Monero) at significant cost in scalability. [1] https://forum.grin.mw/t/scalability-vs-privacy-chart/8114 |
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https://bitvmx.org/> Secure, Extensible, Open-Source BitVMX is a new framework to optimistically execute arbitrary programs in Bitcoin based on the N-party disputable computation paradigm pioneered by BitVM. BitVMX framework provides the foundations to run any CPU on Bitcoin, with a focus to run a fully-compliant RISC-V processor programmable using a standard compilation toolchain. > Our vision is to create a secure, extensible, open-source, peer-reviewed and sidechain-agnostic framework that can be used to develop blockchain bridges, aggregator oracles, and SNARK/STARK verifiers. As soon as BitVMX is able to run a SNARK verifier, a myriad of new use cases can be brought to Bitcoin, from ZK-rollups to crazy use cases such as Zero Knowledge Contingent Payments (i.e. autonomous bug bounties paid for disclosure of vulnerabilities). > How Does BitVMX Work ...
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if you look at forum.grim.mw there's less trolling
As you would expect on a moderated Grin forum. I just created a moderated Grin topic at [1] where one can also enjoy troll free Grin discussion... [1] https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5493511.0 |
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SBB generates secure and anonymous receiving wallets, ensuring confidentiality in transactions.
The established notion of confidential transactions [1] requires hiding the amounts involved. Since SBB doesn't hide amounts, it has no confidentiality. [1] https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Confidential_transactions |
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One thing that sets Grin apart from other cryptocurrencies is its design for decentralization.
One (anonymous) author came up with the unique Mimblewimble design.
Another (anonymous) author started the original implementation in Rust.
Another author came up with the unique graph theoretic, memory hard yet trivially verifiable, Proof of Work.
Other anonymous and less anonymous authors helped the implementation.
All 4 hard-forks were pre-planned before launch and executed at *exact* multiples of a half-year height.
None of its creators got any portion of the supply, and (unlike all other coins) early miners were disadvantaged by huge difficulty.
Its soft total supply gets evenly distributed to miners in the first 100 years, not giving a huge advantage to early miners like *every* single other coin.
No one can make any consensus changes unless there's near-universal consensus.
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Nobody trusts a coin with failed trasnactions and full of wallet bugs since genesis block. All wallet developers left GRIN.
Nobody trusts a poster contradicting himself. Over the years that have passed Grin has made many innovations and improved itself.
now has multiple wallets working properly.
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No coins can achieve it because all of them has a centralized control over the chain through the team that hold most of the coin supply which affects the voting for the development.
With 100% of coins being mined, and difficulty starting sky high, "the team" can do no better than mine like others, or buy on the open market like others. PoW coins have no voting for development anyway. Only non-controversial consensus changes should be made, just as with bitcoin. Is there even a cryptocurrency that is simpler than Bitcoin? I don't think it gets any simpler than this.
It can get simpler: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5309951.0The most we can have is equal opportunity
Exactly; and a fixed reward, like one coin per second forever, is the most equal of opportunities, even across generations. |
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Bitcoin is certainly unique in being the first cryptocurrency.
But other coins can have unique qualities that Bitcoin can never adopt.
One such quality is simplicity. Although Bitcoin may be far less complex than some other chain like Ethereum, it still contains a nontrivial amount of complexity in itself, as witnessed by the over 10,000 lines of code in libbitcoin-consensus.
Learning all the Bitcoin consensus rules in detail is quite a challenge, one that not many people have undertaken.
A lot of complexity resides in its Bitcoin Script language, even though none of that is needed to support
the vast majority of transactions. Even things like multisig, atomic swaps, discreet log contracts, and bidirectional payment channels can be implemented with just Schnorr signatures and timelocks.
Consensus rules can only ever grow in complexity, since they must be used to verify the full transaction history.
Another such quality is fair distribution. While Bitcoin had a relatively fair one, with no premine, it still did not decentralize wealth as much as one might like. Or rather, as future generations might like, since each successive generation only gets to mine 1/32 time as much as the previous one.
Of course, the huge advantage given to early miners/adopters, and lack of dilution, is great for speculation. But perhaps less so for actual use as currency.
Only one cryptocurrency combines a unique focus on simplicity with a uniquely fair coin distribution of 1 coin per second forever.
It also happens to feature a unique spam resistance; only a few bytes of arbitrary data can be inscribed into the chain with each transaction.
Of course, its uniquely high dilution (in initial decades) also make it uniquely uninteresting for the readers in this forum, that are almost exclusively interested only in speculation.
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How is deterministically assigning prime numbers to four buckets going to solve the task?
Not 4 buckets, but 48 buckets, since primes > 7 cannot be divisible by 2,3,5,7, leaving only 1 11 13 17 19 23 29 31 37 41 43 47 53 59 61 67 71 73 79 83 89 97 101 103 107 109 113 121 127 131 137 139 143 149 151 157 163 167 169 173 179 181 187 191 193 197 199 209 as possible remainders modulo 2*3*5*7 = 210. |
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After igno, no serious development.Period.
Only a troll would state such utter falsehood with such certainty... There have been many major changes since Igno left in Aug 2019, including two new PoW, a new DAA, a new fee model, hardware wallet support, a new syncing mechanism, and a mw mixnet prototype. |
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Use of the apparent difficult has been proposed many times before-- it and other schemes that result in a unique value for each block which is calcuable by the block finder immediately lead to a withholding attack
The withholding attack also reduces bitcoin's stochastic finality: a tx 6 blocks deep still has about a 1% chance of being reorged. One has to wait much longer before a tx can be considered finalized. The scheme has other downsides as well: Anytime two blocks are found in short succession, with the later one having a lower hash, it causes the earlier to be reorged, when that earlier one has already been relayed across most of the network, wasting bandwidth and causing unnecessarily many small reorgs. |
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