new entity
percentages are not determinable
power of VETO
What it has sounds like an ALTCOIN. Why not create your ALTCOIN based on your ideas? Ha Ha, you really are as blind as a SPV Miner. What I described is what Bitcoin is doing currently, what you are saying is an Altcoin. To prove me wrong, you have to go hardfork at 51% Consensus, but the whole Bitcoin community already knows you don't have the balls, that is why the Bu Miners are using the BU Validator Node Network. You can not hardfork without it. Miner's ability to deploy their own nodes doesn't matter since the others will still VETO.
As far as I know all wallets only count positive confirmations, ignoring the others. So what you say is not possible. Confirmations are irrelevant. It is number of decentralized independent ledgers all signalling for their choice, then either approving or negating the proposed changes. Confirmations has nothing to do with what I am saying. I would like to point out and thank you for not addressing anything else I have stated, but that you only take small snippets of my overall argument and only address those. That isn't how normal conversations or arguments are performed, and are usually done by those who are not interested in learning but just propagandizing or FUDing. |
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When ASICs were created, those miners split their power with the
validator nodes that do not mine.
Meeeeeeec. Error. ASIC did not split the power. It only lifted computer power to a new level. Bitcoin is not proof-of-network, it's proof-of-work. You are very short sighted and incapable of thinking outside of the box. You do not understand what I am saying. Your brain is already biased. No one said anything about Proof of Network, though it could be argued that the reason why miners can not hardfork on their own, like you believe, is because a form of Proof of Network does indeed exists, metaphorically speaking. When BU made that invalid block a few weeks ago, the nodes rejected it
because the miners DO NOT control.
Nodes cost only $40/month or less. If you're correct, how come no one has thought to buy a few thousand nodes for a few hours in the cloud to gain control of Bitcoin? They can and that could be a likely future. If there were no Validator Nodes, Miners COULD do whatever they want, in theory. The Validator Nodes PREVENT Miners from hardforking WITHOUT network Consensus. You don't understand this or purposefully spreading misinformation to noobs. ASIC Miners inadvertently gave half their power to Validator Nodes back in 2011.
You say half the power? Exactly 50%? Why? You should assume that the miners have the technical and economic ability to deploy the nodes as necessary. In theory, yes they gave away half their power away, to a new entity. In a very basic sense, since percentages are not determinable, it is like saying that miners gave validator node operators the power of VETO. If a miner does something, the validator nodes can, if they disagree with that action, VETO that miner's action. If majority of Validator Nodes all VETO, that Miner's action is negated entirely. The Miner's power is contingent on the Validator Nodes not using their VETO. A softfork, as opposed to hardforks, prevent validator nodes from VETO. Since BU Miners are using a hardfork, out of necessity, there is the ability to VETO. Miner's ability to deploy their own nodes doesn't matter since the others will still VETO. Miners would need to operate about 150k (or more, IDK) nodes for a few months to year to override. |
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Consensus.
The consensus to which Satoshi refers in point 12 is only to the miners possessing calculation power. What is Point 12? No, Satoshi was talking about the network at the time. When ASICs were created, those miners split their power with the validator nodes that do not mine. You are reading Satoshi literally and not how the ecosystem is today. When BU made that invalid block a few weeks ago, the nodes rejected it because the miners DO NOT control. It is the validator node's rule set that controls. ASIC Miners inadvertently gave half their power to Validator Nodes back in 2011. |
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... but negotiation between different parties.
In my opinion that "negotiation" has failed. You do not understand. The "negotiation" is Consensus. You are saying Consensus is broken or failed, so now the Miners are going to break Satoshi's rules and make their own rules. If they have resistance, they will attack others as they attempt to gain total power. That breaks the system and makes bitcoins worthless. Miner's attempts to gain power makes the whole system less secure and valuable. |
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...
Yes, you are basically correct. It is much more complicated, but essentially over time, when miners and nodes split into two separate systems, the power was split between them. A new action can not be done on the network without the other approving, in theory. Today, it works like this on the power scale: (1 = most power / 5 = least power) 1) Users, Traders, & Investors 2) Exchanges & economies using Validator Nodes 3) Independent Validator Nodes 4) Miners using Validator Nodes 5) Miners using SPV and etc. Unfortunately, no one has educated the miners that they are last in line. They may have the most financial interest, but that doesn't equate to power to dictate within the network. They are only block builders who MUST build in compliance with the networks collectively agreed upon rule set. If a Miner attempts to assert more power than is allowed, that is a malicious miner. They are no longer considered "honest" and become a threat to the whole. The whole system works because everything is inter-dependent in ways, but ultimately is a type of "separation of powers". |
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Why is everyone saying we can trust miners now?
... If the number of nodes influences something, explain me how and I will take control of Bitcoin this weekend. In addition, if the number of nodes were relevant, the miners would organize to assume the cost and protect their investment. Please, you must understand that the miners have the power. They determine the correct blockchain. And they can also override blockchain if they have enough computing power left over. Corestream, markets and the nodes together can not challenge the miners. The miners will defend their interests, which are those of all.  This crisis will serve to understand who has power and who does not. If you were correct, BU supporting miners would not need BU nodes, nor need to wait. They could in theory hardfork now without the markets or nodes, and everyone will follow very shortly in your belief. Your statements are misguided at best and malicious at worst. If you were correct, you don't need to post your garbage now, they could have hardforked yesterday. So what are they waiting for exactly? If miners are waiting now, then they don't have power like you think. |
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U mean making the way of 51% attack?
Yes. 50% for the true blockchain. 25% to neutralize the incorrect mining empty blocks. This will resolve the conflict in days and with the minimum risk. There is no other remedy. Spoken like a good little Maoist. "The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds well universally, for China and for all other countries." Your whole belief system contradicts Satoshi's Consensus Mechanism. It is not a form of war, but negotiation between different parties. Stop talking about Satoshi. He is spinning in his grave every time you talk. |
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That article (with fabricated quotes) shouldn't impact coins for which the public address has never been revealed.
Even if ECDSA is ever broken, you still would need the public key in order to crack the private key and to get the public key, you need a way to produce a valid public key that when hashed matches the address.
Or did Satoshi use public keys to pay himself? (I don't know).
But basically, value is only in danger when the public key is known and it isn't known from a Version 1 address unless you have spent outputs that used that address.
What you are referring to does not apply to Satoshi's coins and other early coins. They used a tx format that has been discontinued since v0.8 that used IP addresses. See the following: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=9334.msg134753#msg134753My understanding is that P2IP is vulnerable to quantum computing (in theory). Theymos statements as to "Satoshi's Coins" originally was because his are the only "addresses" remaining today that are the most vulnerable to QC, as well as the most likely to get selected for cracking by QC (If I recall correctly). |
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The miners decide the blockchain.
And the miners are directly linked to the market price for their own interest.
The interest of the miners is the same as mine: a good bitcoin, nice and cheap.
I trust the decision of the miners.
When the miners hit the table, everyone will understand.
No. The miners build valid blocks. The validator node network (non-miners) decide the blockchain. The miners are directly linked to the market price through exchanges. The base interests of the miners is being kept in check by Consensus. In Bitcoin, no one is supposed to Trust anyone, especially the miners. Byzantine General's problem was that you CAN'T TRUST the generals (miners). Satoshi designed an answer so we do not need to trust the miners. Why is everyone saying we can trust miners now? Everybody needs to go back to Bitcoin School and remember why we are here. |
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...
Yes, I see now what I was not accounting for. So simply, you are saying that when you have a slight advantage of hash over your nearest competitors, that slight amount actually has a compounding effect that allows that advantaged miner the "ability in theory" to get all 2016 blocks. So, what this really means is that the term "difficultly" and "difficultly adjustment" really is incorrect as it applies to the mechanism of mining. "Difficultly" in this sense is a "re-balancing of the scale". Is it not a literal "increased level of burdensome work". The work is always the same (in theory), but the competitors hashes is what is really changing over time, thus why they are "competing against each other and not the difficulty". I think I understand now what I was overlooking. (If what I'm have now stated is correct.) Thanks for showing and explaining what I was missing. |
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...
What makes a blockchain-type of DB more secure than the others?
...
The blockchain was designed for a specific purpose. If you can determine the purpose, then you can answer your own question. Comparing the blockchain to a type of database, is really the most basic layer of it. See Wikipedia for their input: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BlockchainI was said I could not base a serious research on Wikipedia. In my opinion, Wikipedia is nice and I have personally experienced how much effort/validation it takes to publish any text there, but I cannot help if the scientific society has doubts about it. Could you suggest any professional article that compares the blockchain type of DB to the others? Also, the question remains. How probably is it that there will be a more secure design than blockchain soon? Yes, Wikipedia is not a scientifically approved cite-able source, but it is the collective work of the community in an attempt to understand what the blockchain (and Bitcoin) is. If you look at the bottom of the Wikipedia page, you should be able to find all the sources they used and as such should be able to guide you toward answering your own questions. Some of those sources cited will be scientific and etc. But simply, the difference between a "blockchain" and a "database" comes down to a very simple aspect: Trust. A blockchain is a DB where no one trusts each other and all parties can write to the database without causing conflicts to other parties entries. What is the probability that there will be new system better than the "blockchain" soon? Not very high, but maybe in the far future it will be replaced with something that is unimaginable now. |
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I understand this, but did I contradict this in a prior statement?
But, you do agree that there are "different pools doing their OWN work. competing
against each other" but their independent correct answers is based on the prior 2016
block collective, that is used for difficultly to scale back to a 10 minute average, right?
So for example, if a pool 1 has 99% hash and pool 2 has 1% hash of the total network
hash, and Pool 1 (99%) "drops off" the network, Pool 2 (1%) is still trying to find the
10 minute average block based on a nonce/difficultly that accounts for the total
network hash prior to the Pool1 (99%) "drop off". So Pool 2 has no competition
and they will "always find the blocks first now", but it will take them much longer
on average to find the blocks in general.
In the above para, if Pool 1 (99%) dropped off, then it will take Pool 2 (1%) about
144 days in order to make 144 blocks (1 block per 24h). To get to the difficultly
adjustment, it would take at maximum 2016 days, which is 5.5 years.
Are we in agreement, or am I still missing your point?
the 2016 blocks has nothing much to do with hashrate. for instance. pool A could have 500petahash and pool B has 480peta - not that important to state this and you will see why this would give A a few second advantage..however. this does NOT mean expect 1109 blocks for A...... 907 for pool B infact pool A could be lucky enough that EVERY block which A makes is just 2 seconds faster than pool B meaning A gets ALL 2016 blocks. then if there was a split. they are both making blocks at nearly the same times on 2 chains. yet the activation 2016 blockcount says that A has 100% power.. it does not mean that because A has 100% block winning that B will take hours to make blocks. But it DOES mean to expect 1109 blocks for A and 907 block for B, it is just that since luck is involved it will be close to those numbers. Could be 1078/938, or 1176/840 or whatever, but it will always tend down to "1109/907" though. I think the issue is that on the AVERAGE it IS linear. But in real time at any given moment, it could be anything, even 2015/1. Your comments ignore mining through time, right? And that is why we have a misunderstanding? as for the network hash rate
now imagine there was pool C with 480peta
and imagine there was pool D with 480peta
this changes nothing for pool A. pool A still does the same work at the same time with the same 500peta
but B,C,D are all just unlucky.
the network hashrate going from 980peta to 1,940peta again does not affect pool A's work in the slightest.
But, the addition of B,C,D will affect Pool A's work after the next difficultly adjustment. The newly adjustment difficultly will make Pool A's 500petas weaker than the prior difficulty. all it means is now there are 3 competitors agains A so A may not always get so lucky.
but again this does not mean suddenly A is only making ~500 blocks.. A could still get all 2016.
this is what has been known since 2012 as the risks of a 51% attack. where one pool just has the little edge against the rest to be able to potentially control all the blocks produced.
I understand that. I just don't undesatnd why you would say that Pool A could still get 2016 when more pools enter that are close to their hash power. In thoery, over time and averaged Pool A should not be able to get close to 2016 blocks, and should lose more so tend down to an average around 504 block. It might be 623/539/445/409. But, 623/539/445/409 should average to 504 for Pool A. Anything over 504 is luck (ignoring that Pool A has a few petas more than B,C,D, I state this in general). So am I correct here or am I still misunderstanding what you are intending to mean? |
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The issue is that exchanges are incentivized by profits.
So, is it more profitable for them to have one token on their exchange or two tokens?
Some may choose only to list one token because of future value loss/belief/ideology,
but other exchanges may not.
Exchanges make profits if people EXCHANGE coins. The more you can exchange coins, the more profits they make. They don't care about "picking the right coin" - they don't speculate on coins, they win from users exchanging coins. The day bitcoin splits, every bitcoin holder will have two coins, one on both chains. Most users will be polarised, and want to get rid of one to obtain more of the other. Essentially the WHOLE BITCOIN MARKET CAP will be exchanged. No exchange wants to miss out on such an opportunity of exchanging coins ! Crypto is a joke where there is fresh meat (called "users") paying for a whole ecosystem of industrials, from miners to exchanges. And the funny thing is, the users pay for all this because they think they will get rich that way! Yes, but that assume there will not be major financial loss in Bitcoins Market Cap due to allowing two separate coins on two separate chains to "fight it out". You are assuming that the prices of both coins will either be leveled or higher than the current Bitcoin Total Market Cap. Some do not think this will happen and we will have major losses for a few months to years. Don't compare Altcoin splits being traded on exchanges to Bitcoin splits traded on exchanges. In the Altcoin version, the average person doesn't care, but in the Bitcoin version, it is a possible coin failure from the foundational Satoshi principals. That is why it is important there is no two fighting chains. It damages the whole ecosystem. Exchanges are forced to accept a split because of profits and demand, but it could cause them all to go out of business within the next year if things go very bad. Their companies success assumes Bitcoin will not be a failed coin in the future. |
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The Bitfinex bet is really: What are the chances that BTU chain dissolves?
Current Bitfinex answer: currently 70% chance of loss.
That's not the Bitfinex answer. It is the result of traders who are stupid enough to gamble on a one-sided bet. Yes, you are right. I will correct my wording. It is not Bitfinex's answer, but it's users current answers. Thanks. |
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... I'll link BIP 134 here as well (that is the right one, isn't it?), which I'm only just starting to read myself. At least that should give some detail of the inner workings of it all. From my simple reading and superficial understanding of the BIP. 1) FlexTrans uses the hardfork mechanism, so all old nodes will need to upgrade to this version or die. SegWit tries to address some of this issues while not allowing the old nodes to "die". Obviously, SegWit is using the softfork mechanism. 2) Also, it states "The idea is that we give each field a name and this means that new fields can be added or optional fields can be omitted from individual
transactions.". This seems like it could introduce possible new attack vectors that currently don't exist. New field choice could allow the creation of "clean coins", which would render all non new flagged coins as "dirty coins" by omission. This could assist miners in determining what txs not to mine, from data already contain within the blockchain itself. For example, imagine in a future world where governments mandate that your tx can not be mined unless you place your Real Name or Government ID Number within the new field option of your tx. Miners at this point in time, would be obligated by law not to include your tx or face jail time or penalty. In places like China, this is a very likely possibility and everything we should be against, if we're supporters of liberty. Creating more "flexible options" creates more "possible attack vectors" that may not be fully addressed or anticipated now. 3) If SegWit allows for new optional fields, I would be equally opposed based on my same reasoning in (2). "Security and Non-Regulatability" are more important than "Flexibility and Options". |
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Token Trading T&C's https://www.bitfinex.com/cst_token_terms1.6the “Contract Period” starts on March 17, 2017 and ends at 11:59:59 pm UTC on December 31, 2017;
1.7“Contract Settlement” means 11:59:59 pm UTC on December 31, 2017;
3.Settlement—Generally & BCCs: At Contract Settlement, CSTs shall be converted on a 1:1 basis to Digital Tokens on their respective blockchains. In the case of BCC, the blockchain shall be defined by the latest release of Bitcoin Core.
4.Settlement—BCUs: In the case of BCU: the blockchain shall be defined by the latest release of Bitcoin Unlimited; and, the blockchain shall be deemed to exist only if has diverged incompatibly from the blockchain defined by Bitcoin Core. If no Bitcoin Unlimited blockchain exists pursuant to these T+Cs, BCU tokens shall be deemed to have a value equal to zero and shall be confiscated and destroyed by Bitfinex. Any settlements of BCUs shall be to BTUs.
Important: Settlement of any BTUs may be delayed in Bitfinex’s sole and absolute discretion. If the BTU blockchain is destroyed, reorganized, or experiences a technical malfunction, in any manner and by any party or source, before settlements have been completed, BTU tokens shall be deemed to have a value equal to zero and shall be confiscated and destroyed by Bitfinex. In my opinion, anyone trading these tokens need their head examining. Ah, answer to my question ! No wonder BTU is lower price !!! Big manipulation: one token is redeemable for real bitcoin, the other one is to be destroyed. Anyone trading BTC for BTU is risking to lose them ; on the other hand, all those trading BTU for BTC will IN ANY CASE be able to withdraw full BTC if they do it before the split (say, two hours before). It is even amazing that BTU has any score at all under these asymmetrical conditions ! Just so you know, since you post a lot without knowing. If the BU hardfork fails in maintaining majority hash, BU chain dissolves and all work and txs on that chain is lost. The margins between the BTC and BTU is lower not because BTU coins will be destroyed by Bitfinex, but because BTU coins are destroyed by the network's Miners themselves. The Bitfinex bet is really: What are the chances that BTU chain dissolves? Bitfinex Users' current answer: currently 70% chance of loss. Edit: see below comment from AngryDwarf |
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...
they could all be seconds apart but because red won, that round only red counts so no one cares about the other 3 tables times.
next round, starts again, this time the brown and blue table both get it but based on how many shakes to get it was just one extra shake in favour of brown. they are shown as doing the slightly miniscule extra amount of work so they win.. other 3 table are not counted.
now then.. if you evict the red and blue from the room.. this does not suddenly make the groups any slower. infact it helps them as there is less competition to beat them by seconds. so now brown and purple can get more blocks more often because there are less competitors to lose against by seconds
..
also a note
the difficulty is not set by "network hashrate" nor is the speed of say red table or blue tables shakes/dice helping brown or purple.
they all have different dice and doing their own work
infact the faster red and blue shake the less chance brown and purple get because red and blue could beat them by seconds.
its not the faster red and blue shake the more thy help brown and purple. (increase of network does not help the work of a single team)
in short
when antpool wins a block. its because of the work done by antpool and antpool only... the other hashrates of the other pools did not jump into their pool to help antpool. antpool alone made a bloke with thir own 600peta. not the networks many exa..
when red wins a diceround. its because of the work done by red and red only the other shakes of the other tables did not jump into the red table to help the red table. the red table alone shook the correct dice combination first with their own teams hands not all the hands of the room.
its a competition of different pools/tables doing their OWN work. competing against each other.. not a collusion of a single pool/room all shaking/hashing one thing
I understand this, but did I contradict this in a prior statement? But, you do agree that there are "different pools doing their OWN work. competing against each other" but their independent correct answers is based on the prior 2016 block collective, that is used for difficultly to scale back to a 10 minute average, right? So for example, if a pool 1 has 99% hash and pool 2 has 1% hash of the total network hash, and Pool 1 (99%) "drops off" the network, Pool 2 (1%) is still trying to find the 10 minute average block based on a nonce/difficultly that accounts for the total network hash prior to the Pool1 (99%) "drop off". So Pool 2 has no competition and they will "always find the blocks first now", but it will take them much longer on average to find the blocks in general. In the above para, if Pool 1 (99%) dropped off, then it will take Pool 2 (1%) about 144 days in order to make 144 blocks (1 block per 24h). To get to the difficultly adjustment, it would take at maximum 2016 days, which is 5.5 years. Are we in agreement, or am I still missing your point? |
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Why talk about it? It's not about what we in the crypto slums think, it's about what the big colluding Chinamen miners think. If they want 100mb block sizes, go ahead. All 99% of those who come in this forum care about is the price of their precious. So go ahead, centralize the shit out of it.
That doesn't even make sense, the nodes matter just as much as miners and even then China doesn't hold >50% of the current hashrate. no nodes doesn't matter like miners man, what you are talking about? node count nithing, only miners and exchange have a word here, because if exchange do not listen the new for miners can't sell, they are both with the same importance You are incorrect. Good exchanges usually have their own Validator Nodes, they do not defer to Miners. Validator Nodes maintain and enforce the protocol, not miners. Miners build blocks based on the node enforced protocol. Miners play by the Rules they are told to follow by the Nodes. A forked protocol change, changes the Node Rules. Where is all this misinfo about Nodes being worthless coming from lately? Pretty sad. This is a fundamental Bitcoin understanding. If it wasn't true, then Miners have absolute free will and that has not occurred in the past nor currently. It is my first time reading this kind of information and it enables me to think deep and do some research. If the exchanges have a validator nodes then there is no need for the core developers and BU to go against its other and there is no longer need for a consensus. If the exchanges can make the miner follow by the rules then the exchanges should set one universal code so that the miners will not have a conflict anymore. In theory you are correct. The issue is that exchanges are incentivized by profits. So, is it more profitable for them to have one token on their exchange or two tokens? Some may choose only to list one token because of future value loss/belief/ideology, but other exchanges may not. Exchanges will follow what their users would "want", and that is usually "choice". So Exchanges do not need to follow miners, but they do need to follow their users. The miners are not the markets, it is the exchanges and users. |
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I am not sure that this section is right to post my thread . my question is : since it was already fixed by the bitcoin owner network that 21 millions bitcoin can exist in the whole internet But now I heard that now the mining of the bitcoin will be unlimited , I mean unlimited bitcoin will generate by the bitcoin network . If this is real news then the value of the bitcoin will go down speedly It is because the supply is unlimited so it is simple to say that bitcoin price will no more increase rapidly ., so no more profit what's your thought guys  Bitcoin Unlimited does not increase the number of coins. Under this new client, there will only be 21 million coins. The reason why it is called unlimited is because it allows the potential to create a block that has more transactions in it. Current protocol has a limit of 1MB. This new client can be 1MB to unlimited, if the network participants wish it to be so. Bitcoin Unlimited does not increase coin supply. Also, this thread was posted in the wrong section. Please move this to "Bitcoin Discussion" or "Beginner Section". On the bottom left of your thread, there is move button where you can move your thread to those sections. This is the Legal Section and your question does not pose any legal aspect. You mean the supply of the bitcoin remain maintained in the market according to the demand to make the stable market of Bitcoin . ... What I am saying is, Bitcoin (Core) now has 21 million total coins allowed to be mined. "Bitcoin Unlimited" if becomes the main implementation will maintain the 21 million total coins allowed to be mined. If both Bitcoin (Core) and Bitcoin Unlimited exists at the same time, there will be two chains each with their own 21 million coins, BUT it is expected that after a short amount of time, only one of the two chains will continue to exists. In this case, there will not be 42 million coins in the entire economy, but back to the 21 million coins in the entire economy. So, the supply of the bitcoin remaining in the market according to demand will change temporarily UNTIL this situation is finally resolved and only one of the two bitcoins wins. If both exist at the same time, the prices and demands will go up and down depending on different information. The bitcoins will be two different ones (BTC & BTU) temporarily. When this happens, no one really knows what will or will not happen with the value and supply in the markets. Some people are making bets on what will happen, because there are different opinions and no one really knows. I hope this answers what you were asking. |
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... Very high consensus can't make two surviving chains. actually it can. an altcoin can be made by just 1 node deciding it wll do its own thing if it wanted to. an altcoin can be made by majority banning and splitting that last 5% minority. but then that minority have to ask themselves is there a good enough reason to try keeping it going. (so many scenarios running through my mind.. kinda hard to summarise it all) a few things we are sure of 1. BU wont trigger unless safe majority of node and pool (no threats, no time bombs, no blackmails. just plod along and let nature handle it) 2, core will have the triggers, time bombs and threats and could trigger while things are contentious, forcing the issue still too early to tell If a handful of non-mining nodes are still active, that does not count toward chain status. In the event we are talking about, there must be some miners. If there is 1 miner/pool with a "reasonable" amount of hash power, where that single miner has the ability to mine till a difficultly adjustment within the next year or so, then it is still alive. The question then comes down to whether they can afford to do so. The answer is very likely that they can not and as such, the minority chain will die. If it takes that single miner 500 years to get to the difficultly adjustment, even though the whole community likely left them behind, that chain survives and will work its way out of the "difficulty snare". Bitcoin versus Altcoin status can not be determined on "longest chain/most work" because one day that could be used against the community in an obviously malicious way, IMO. i think im going to drive your mind crazy now..  sorry in advance 5% of pool consensus of blocks does not mean 5% hashpower. 5% of pool consensus of blocks does not mean 20x longer to make a block once going at it with 95% less competition... No, I know that. This is "luck at finding the nonce" versus "raw hash computation". the maths does not work that linearly.
EG if there are 4 pools of equal hash. it does not mean take one away and the time moves to 20 minutes.
No, I know that. The time would in theory be an average 12.5 minutes per block for the last three. because the competition may have only been only seconds behind getting their own solution.
bitcoins are not mined based on the combined hashpower of the network.
Now I am losing you. The difficulty that exists is based to an average 10 minutes, from prior 2016 blocks. This can help estimate the networks hash rate. The nonce is based on this "combined hashpower of the network". This is my understanding. Are you talking about "luck"? each pool makes their own effort. and the "75%" [others] mentioned [as threshold] is not 1 pools.
No, I know that, but the 75% is still trying to find the nonce with the difficultly that assumes the missing 25% would filling in the time gaps and balance the blocks back to 10 minutes on average. In theory, over a 24 hour day with 144 blocks each around 10 minutes, if 25% "dropped off", then over the same amount of 24 hours, the 75% should only be able to mine about 115 blocks. Until the difficultly readjustment, that loss in block work will compound, which leads to less supply of new coins, regular txs, and fees would be slowed and restricted. here this image will make it a bit clearer  as you can see 75% of blocks is just HALF the network hashrate in this example,(top half of image) but the block timings still are reasonable whichever way you play it(bottom half when they have split) ... I'm not following now. are you saying that if 75% of the hash power leaves the competition, that does not affect the remaining 25% to find blocks within the average 10 minutes over time? What is the significance of this in relation to my comment that this was a response to? I'm not following. |
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