Usually the land is already teeming with wildlife and inferior human subspecies. However, because the existing occupants don't have an identical culture involving guns and convoluted paper-signing rituals as the invaders, the man-apes cannot evict the 'new owners' in a way that would be both clear and polite. In some cases, the old inhabitants don't have the same concepts of ownership, and don't realise that the first few settlers are just a trickle ahead of a flood. This makes things much easier for the settlers. Historically, stronger groups have always taken whatever they want from weaker groups. The challenge with any attempt to concentrate force to prevent this from happening is that such concentrations can very easily be subverted into perpetuating it. |
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What is the correlated risk you are talking about is it GLSBE? GLBSE is one unforeseen correlated risk. Another is that a large number of borrowers were actually borrowing to invest in Pirate and thus many loans would go bad if Pirate went bad. This was especially disastrous because many people assumed they could use these kinds of loan portfolios specifically to diversify themselves against Pirate exposure. Hashking was a similar issue -- people specifically expected to use him to diversify to protect against Pirate exposure but actually only got themselves more Pirate exposure. It's possible that GLBSE's collapse is actually tied to the PPT collapse. So it may all tie back to unforeseen Pirate exposure. If so why would people borrow money at a 2% compounding interest rate to invest in flakey unregulated businesses on there when most of them yielded less than that and how is that the depositors fault? It's the depositors' fault because they refused to appreciate this risk even while folks like me were screaming in their faces that they were idiots to invest with Patrick because of these kinds of risks. And it's Patrick's fault because he continued to take deposits and make loans even while folks like me were screaming in his face that his business model made no sense. There is equal fault on both sides, I think. |
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I don't believe Patrick ever explicitly stated that these funds were vulnerable to any risks from the depositors perspective. In most countries any ambiguities in contracts favor the person who did not write the contract, I.E. depositors. He would have needed to explicitly state that these funds were vulnerable and he did not. I'm not arguing that there's an ambiguity in the contract. I'm arguing that there's a common mistake underlying the contract. The analogy would be two people who both believe that a ship sank in a particular place who contract to have one party recover the ship for a fixed fee. If it turns out that they were both incorrect and the ship was actually someplace else that is either more expensive or less expensive to recover, the disadvantaged party could not be equitably required to comply with the terms of the contract. The exception, of course, would be if the contract explicitly assigned this risk to one party or the other. The failure to assign this risk doesn't make the contract ambiguous, it just doesn't address this possibility because neither party to the contract considered it likely. In this case, the common mistake was the belief that the loans were not subject to significant correlated risk. The contract doesn't appear to assign this risk to either party. It's not that it's ambiguous about who bears this risk, it simply didn't include assigning that risk inside its scope because neither party considered that risk likely. |
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I call for a scammer tag for pay.btc - here is my post in BitcoinMax thread less than 24 hours ago why no scammer tag to pay.btc? like icebreaker said paybtc had no right to deprive me of the opportunity to negotiate or whatever directly with pirate. That's why he deserves a scammer tag. on top of that....pay.btc hasn't even responded posted in this thread for roughly 2 months (since September 06). On TOP of that he has disabled his website... (without any explanation AFIK) perhaps pay.btc was scammed just as hard as us lenders...but i don't believe for a second he hasn't made major $$ with his venture and i don't think it is acceptable for him not to keep us posted here in his thread with info. i only put an initial 10 btc in. probably got under 2 BTC back from interest gathered - that puts me in the hole for <8btc. I know this is probably negligible to 90%+ of other users.... but pay.btc should take the total amount he MADE from our INITIAL deposits from every user (and subtracting any interest payed ) then dividing that amount by total amount of accounts and send that figure to each user. Am I out of line here? As I've argued elsewhere, pay.btc would have breached his agreement with his depositors had he forwarded anyone's information to Pirate. His agreement with his depositors was not in default and is not in default. That agreement still controls how repayments from Pirate are distributed. As for the lack of communication, not only is there nothing to say, but there's not even the remotest chance this has harmed anyone. There's been no recovery from Pirate yet. I agree with you that he probably should return some profits to his depositors, but I don't see how him not doing so could be considered scamming. |
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Im a Newbie and now checking how this really works; so I wanted to send 0.00053165 but my wallet transaction process said I need to pay a +0.001 BTC for tranzaction fee what is the duble of the ammount what I wanted to send.
Then I sent 0.00003165 and payed 0.0005 BTC for teh fee so I used up all my bitcoins.
How is this at bigger rates? the fee get Bigger adn Bigger? So I should send my BTC's dirrectly to my MTGox account?
Very small transactions, transactions using very new coins, or transactions that have to pull in coins from lots of other transactions, look like spam. Fees for typical transactions are either 0, .0005BTC or .001BTC. This works out to at most a penny at today's rates. |
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er actually the CPU IS application specific.
It takes a finite number of preprogrammed states and produces predictable outputs for those states.
The fact that you can "re-arrange" those states EXTERNALLY to perform another task, does not make the CPU non 'application specific'
The same way that an ASIC inside a software radio, does not work with only one type of spoken language.
Infact Intel take it a step further, in that the CPU is an ASIC that can be re-arranged via a microcode insert.
HC
You are using the term "ASIC" differently from the way everyone else is using it. If you are doing this deliberately, then you are a malicious jerk out to waste everyone else's time. If you are doing this inadvertently, then you are an ignorant fool claiming to correct those who know more than you do. I don't know which, but either way, it's not too good for you. The difference between an ASIC and a general-purpose component like a CPU is that an ASIC is specifically designed to be used in a specific application whereas a general-purpose component like a CPU is designed to be flexible and find use in many different applications. |
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I understood Patrick's guarantee to mean that my funds were guaranteed regardless of whether any or all loans went bad, correlated or uncorrelated. Any other kind of guarantee isn't a guarantee, it's pointless. I don't believe you. If you have any evidence to suggest that you understood that there was a real risk that the loans were correlated, and that this risk was allocated to Patrick, please present it. All the evidence I have suggests that people either never considered that risk or rejected it as implausible. If you have any evidence that might change my mind, I'd be glad to take a look at it. |
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Uuuhhh do you know that every hardware piece is an "asic"? Your cpu, your graphic card etcetcetc
No. Your CPU is not application specific. And do you know that if you make a ram intensive algo with cpu and gpu you can make an asic optimized for it without problems, exactly like now?
No. Making an ASIC that's significantly more efficient than commodity hardware at accessing large amounts of memory is qualitatively different from making an ASIC that's significantly more efficient at bit twiddling tasks that don't require unpredictable branching or large amounts of memory. These two tasks are not at all exactly alike. One can easily make ASICs that are thousands of times faster than commodity CPUs at SHA256. One cannot easily make ASICs that are even ten times faster than commodity hardware at accessing large amounts of memory. |
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I don't agree that that's an obvious risk. A big reason I deposited with Patrick is because he is assuming the risk of loans going bad. If I knew that his guaranteed deposits really meant "guaranteed unless loans go bad", then I never would have deposited with Patrick. If I wanted to assume the risk of loss (and thus potentially higher profit), I could have made loans to other people myself. I think you're misunderstanding my argument. It isn't about the foreseeable risk that loans would go bad. I agree that Patrick assumed that risk. You're saying I couldn't have foreseen the possibility of Patrick's loans going bad, and thus Patrick shouldn't have to pay me back. That's false. I did expect there was a possibility Patrick's loans could go bad. That's the whole point of depositing with Patrick: he guarantees his deposits against that scenario. I agree. I'm talking about the risk that the loans were correlated, that is, that a common event would make a significant number of the loans go bad at the same time. If you have some evidence that you and other depositors considered that specific risk or that this risk was allocated to Patrick, I'd like to see it. All the evidence I've seen suggests that both Patrick and his depositors (at least those who spoke on the issue) either denied that this risk existed or never considered it. By the way, this was the same type of missed risk that resulted in the mortgage collapse. People who thought they were "diversified" didn't realize that a significant fraction of their assets were vulnerable to a drastic drop in the housing market because they were all ultimately tied to residential mortgages. It always seems obvious in hindsight. |
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Nothing specified what would happen in the event of a coordinated payback (everybody paid their loans back to Patrick, giving him more profit than he expected). Thus, in this hypothetical case, Patrick should equitably split all profits with his depositors (above and beyond the stated rate)? I've never heard of equitable mistake being applied to an unforeseen boon. If you think equitable mistake should apply to a boon, then you could make this argument. Though I'm not sure how it would result in more profit than expected, but if you accept that for the sake of argument. Patrick guaranteed his deposits and did not place any conditions on that guarantee. Obviously one of the risks to Patrick is that many loans default at the same time, possibly because they are correlated. That is an obvious risk that a lender faces. I don't agree that that's an obvious risk. In fact, I can show you places where many people (including people who invested with Patrick) denied that such a risk existed. Patrick is one of the few people trying to make good on his obligations. I respect Joel, but I don't see why he is now encouraging Patrick to turn into a scammer. Even Patrick hasn't suggested that he should renege on his guarantee. I'm not sure what you're arguing here. Are you saying I should keep my mouth shut and not say what I honestly believe because it might cost people money? I'm not telling Patrick what to do. I think it's time for Patrick to respond. Patrick, are you going to stand by your guarantee and be the honest person most people believe you to be, or are you going to let Joel turn you into a scammer? It's not scamming for Patrick to equitably allocate an unforeseen risk. I'm going to go out on a limb here and speculate that you have some connection to someone Patrick owes money to. |
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Joel, you aren't using the word "transmit" according to its legal definition. It doesn't mean the same thing as "trade". It means something like "trade via a third party." It is not the traders who are regulated. It is the third party "transmitter" who is regulated, for the benefit of the traders.
Sorry if I did not make this clear in my examples, but that's the reason I chose MtGox codes. In the case of MtGox codes, BitInstant acts as a third party "transmitter" between MtGox and the purchaser. In the case of Bitcoin, well, there is no third party since Bitcoin is just a communications protocol. The two parties, the buyer and seller, are simply engaging in trade, which the US at least has no jurisdiction to regulate.
Here is the full regulation (emphasis added): Money transmitter:
(i) In general.
(A) A person that provides money transmission services. The term “money transmission services” means the acceptance of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency from one person and the transmission of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency to another location or person by any means. “Any means” includes, but is not limited to, through a financial agency or institution; a Federal Reserve Bank or other facility of one or more Federal Reserve Banks, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, or both; an electronic funds transfer network; or an informal value transfer system; or
(B) Any other person engaged in the transfer of funds.
(ii) Facts and circumstances; Limitations. Whether a person is a money transmitter as described in this section is a matter of facts and circumstances. The term “money transmitter” shall not include a person that only:
(A) Provides the delivery, communication, or network access services used by a money transmitter to support money transmission services;
(B) Acts as a payment processor to facilitate the purchase of, or payment of a bill for, a good or service through a clearance and settlement system by agreement with the creditor or seller;
(C) Operates a clearance and settlement system or otherwise acts as an intermediary solely between BSA regulated institutions. This includes but is not limited to the Fedwire system, electronic funds transfer networks, certain registered clearing agencies regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and derivatives clearing organizations, or other clearinghouse arrangements established by a financial agency or institution;
(D) Physically transports currency, other monetary instruments, other commercial paper, or other value that substitutes for currency as a person primarily engaged in such business, such as an armored car, from one person to the same person at another location or to an account belonging to the same person at a financial institution, provided that the person engaged in physical transportation has no more than a custodial interest in the currency, other monetary instruments, other commercial paper, or other value at any point during the transportation;
(E) Provides prepaid access; or
(F) Accepts and transmits funds only integral to the sale of goods or the provision of services, other than money transmission services, by the person who is accepting and transmitting the funds.
Read as you suggest, exceptions D and F would make no sense. A person who actually had more than a custodial interest in the currency wouldn't be a money transmitter, since they'd be moving their own money. Yet the exception specifically excepts only those who have a mere custodial interest -- that is, it excepts those who are moving other people's money but includes people who are moving their own money. And sale of goods or provision of services wouldn't be covered at all. The regulations do cover people who take funds from one person and then deliver them to another person, even (in fact, especially) if the funds become theirs in the process. That's why it has to except the sale of goods and the provision of services. |
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If you believe the contract implicitly allocates that risk to Patrick, then equitable mistake wouldn't apply.
Patrick explicitly allocated the risk to himself. Thus, equitable mistake doesn't apply. I read this as allocating the risk that individual loans will default, not the risk that of correlated default. He can't have explicitly allocated a risk he didn't know existed. I know there are some risks involved and potential to lose serious money on some of the loans I have out in the wild.
This is talking again about the risk of individual loans defaulting, not coordinated default due to common risk. I... carry the risk from bad loans and the timing of requests. Again, in context, this referred to the risk that individual loans would default. As coinft points out, if the loans had done better than expected the excess profits wouldn't have been equitably split, they would have gone to Patrick.
That's true, but I don't see why that matters. The issue is whether and how they agreed to allocate the risk of coordinated default. I agree the contract allocates any "excess" profit to Patrick. But that says nothing about whether or how it allocates the risk of coordinated default. It was a common mistaken belief that the loans were not correlated and that there did not exist a common event that would or could cause a significant fraction of loans to default at the same time. The question is whether the contract allocated this specific risk. |
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I do not quite agree with the contract being risk neutral. The contract implicitly allocates the risk on Patrick's side by promising only a fixed and capped rate. In the opposite event of this business going better than expected there'd be no doubt the excess goes to Patrick for the risk taken. If you believe the contract implicitly allocates that risk to Patrick, then equitable mistake wouldn't apply. I don't think it allocates the risk that a large number of loans will fail at about the same time due to a hidden interdependency. I believe the contract was premised on a shared understanding that the loans were fundamentally sound. |
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It's the Ponzi's victims who are the victims of the usury because it's their money that's used to pay the usurious interest rates. The Ponzi operator normally doesn't have any of his own money invested that gets paid to anyone. |
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Why isn't gold regulated in this manner? (Especially, since you even have legal tender gold coins...)
They are. Thanks to the Patriot Act, gold dealers are financial institutions and are subject to FinCEN AML regulations. Thanks, I should have googled first. A quick google search reveals there's a threshold of $50,000 for gold / jewelry dealers to be covered by the regulations. I'm not sure if this has since be amended. http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/html/faq060305.htmlI believe there are similar exceptions for small business of various kinds. There might even be one for small money transmitters that might make selling bitcoins as a small business perfectly fine. |
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Why isn't gold regulated in this manner? (Especially, since you even have legal tender gold coins...)
They are. Thanks to the Patriot Act, gold dealers are financial institutions and are subject to FinCEN AML regulations. |
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Someone mentioned about all the property currently being owned. First, why would you respect current property ownership after a transition to AnCap, knowing that much of it was gained unjustly? Because there's really no way to do any better. You can't right past injustices because most of the victims are dead. A transition would be disruptive enough without such a massive change in ownership, and the vast majority of people who own property today acquired it at fair market value. Second, as the book myrkul linked pointed out, you would need to distribute government property somehow. Right, that's one of the issues with transition to an AnCap society. Most likely, you'd need to auction most of it to cover the costs of transitioning. I don't think anyone can predict in advance how to transition to an AnCap society or what such a transition would be like. It will depend enormously on what technology is available at the time and how much people are willing to do and when. Land not substantially improved could be opened to homesteading. It's value would be very low anyway. |
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I'm going to miss Rarity posts. Every time I read one, I imagine it was written like this:  |
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Would it be even remotely possible to force the change in sha256 bitcoin algorith to something else that asic and fpga devices couldnt compute?
No. For one thing, ASICs and FPGAs can be constructed for any computable function He didn't say it would have to be something a CPU could do, did he? He just said something an ASIC or FPGA couldn't do. For example, an algorithm that required 1TB of memory could not be computed by a CPU, ASIC, or FPGA. (Without additional hardware that would determine the performance and be the same for all three implementations.) ie, anything a CPU can do, an ASIC can be constructed to do it more efficiently. That's not true either. As a silly counter example, consider this algorithm: "Given a sequence of x86 assembly instructions, run them until they return, and tell me what's in the registers". You really think you can make an ASIC that's faster at that task? It's just a question of whether it's worth the development cost. Exactly. What matters is not theoretical but practical. Whether it is worth the development cost depends primarily on how big an advantage the ASIC would have over a CPU. If the algorithm were constructed such that CPUs were already nearly-optimal (for example, if it required lots of branches and lots of memory), there would be no cost justification for developing an ASIC. Instead, miners would just use lots of CPUs. I think if we had it to do over, we'd pick a mining algorithm that requires lots of memory and lots of branches. But I don't think it's at all possible to change things now. |
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So, now it's time for the OP to tell us what scenario he *actually* described to them. Because this doesn't at all sound like "selling Bitcoins on my website."
Once again, the legal position of Bitcoin is very simple. "Money" is that which has future value. "Currency" is that which has current value. Bitcoin is a currency, with no guarantee of future value. FinCEN regulations only requires that you transmit "currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency". Transferring Bitcoins to the buyer transmits currency (or value that substitutes for currency). This has nothing to do with Bitcoin. Bitcoins can't be regulated, because they come with no implied guarantees of future value, no backing and thus no counter-party risk to regulate. But *selling* Bitcoins has counter-party risk for the buyer. The seller might take his money and not provide him the Bitcoins. This is precisely the reason (or at least, the supposed reason) money transmitters are regulated. |
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