Interim Report 23 September 2013
Executive SummaryIn light of the pending closure of the BTC-TC exchange, and the immediate and negative impact which Burnside's announcement has had on listed assets across the board, we are releasing an interim report on the current state of the fund and our options going forward.
Taking a snapshot of our current holdings across all platforms, and estimating values on BTC-TC using
bid values current as of this writing, the fund's NAV has fallen to .0812 BTC per share, a decrease of 19.731%.
We are currently evaluating ways forward. As of this moment, closure of the fund -- with the option to re-open it in future on another exchange -- appears to be the leading candidate, but if another exchange should step in very quickly to provide a clear plan for picking up the pieces of BTC-TC, that assessment could change.
Exchange Closure, Options and RisksI was just on my way to BTCT.co to post a notice that we'd be publishing our next report early, on 1 October, so as to bring our reporting in line with calendar months, when I saw Burnside's notice about shutting down the site. During the brief seconds I have been able to access the site reliably, before it failed again, it has been apparent that assets have been hammered across the board.
The shutdown does not appear to me to have been organised or planned particularly well from the standpoint of an orderly winding down of operations, and it is likely that when the dust has settled, the fund's NAV will take a significant hit.
It is too early to say for certain whether it will make sense for another exchange to step in and pick up the pieces again, but it appears we'll have three options, none of which is especially attractive:
- move the entire fund management infrastructure to another exchange
- close the fund entirely via the exchange's forced buyback procedure, with an option to re-open again on another exchange at a later time
- run the fund manually
The last option -- running the fund manually -- is not something I'm prepared to do for a fund of this size.
The first option -- moving the fund to another exchange -- would likely introduce significant delays and limitations on liquidity until such time as the new structure was up and running, but it would provide the benefit of keeping things running.
Closing the fund entirely and using the exchange's forced buyback procedure would provide participants with the greatest liquidity and flexibility, but at the risk of having to trust BTC-TC long enough to hold all our coins safely and execute the buyback reliably.
Of the three,
I believe that as of this moment -- without having yet had any word from other exchanges about efforts to step in and pick up the pieces --
the option of closing the fund entirely for the time being would best serve the interests of participants. If we move forward with this option, I believe it should done relatively swiftly, to guard against the risk of the exchange's problems becoming any worse than they already are and compromising its ability to effect a buyback reliably.
If another exchange should step in very quickly to provide a clear plan to move forward, that assessment could change.
Fund Performance -- Abbreviated -- and NAVUkyo.Loan and Related DebtIMPORTANT: This section ("Ukyo.Loan and Related Debt") was written
yesterday in preparation for a report in one week's time, but I include it here in unmodified form because it still applies.
Many participants will have seen that since our last report, the Ukyo.Loan's notice about extra dividends connected with the success of the BitFunder site has been removed.
Nonetheless, it remains among the most credible of such loans. There is at least some indication not only of how the loan can be serviced (e.g., what source of BTC-denominated income is covering the interest) but also of significant assets to offset the loan liability (namely, the exchange itself). This stands in sharp contrast to some loan/debt opportunities offering little or no indication of how income is generated to service the loan or how/whether it will ultimately be repaid. The loan also continues to offer a 110% buyback provision, and in terms of
effective interest rate, it is superior to all comparable listed debt except for Graet.Loan, which trades closer to face value and therefore has a higher effective interest rate (despite carrying the same base .05% daily rate).
The CipherMine.B1 bond is not directly comparable, as its effective interest rate fluctuates due to an unhedged peg to fiat; notably, it is also 'secured' on a wasting asset (mining hardware), and unanswered questions remain about the issuer's understanding of the seniority of debt relative to equity and its willingness to honour that seniority. It
may ultimately prove to offer great total returns, but it is not directly comparable.
Finally, Just-Dice is among the most talked about opportunities available in the Bitcoin space. Much has been said about the mathematics of the 1% house edge, but generally speaking many market participants still appear to focus most attention on expected return -- with less attention to variance -- and continue to treat Just-Dice as if it were the perfect example of a transparent, low risk, high yield investment. As of 22 September, the site had managed to lose
all of its entire profit that had been generated since its inception in June, and it went into the red. That does not
necessarily make lending to the bankroll a poor investment, but it does demonstrate the power of variance over expected return, and the potentially overpowering influence of a comparatively few 'whales' in the mix. The fund has lost significant capital due to lending to the Just-Dice bankroll, but we are in that position with eyes wide open and an awareness of inherent weaknesses of the model; we are not at all counting on it to be some sort of fairy godmother of 'safe' returns.
BTC Trading/LTC Global PassthroughYes, seriously -- our report next week was going to include a whole section about the fundamentals and risks of the company, together with the bizarre trading dynamics of the passthrough. I've deleted all that.
BTC-TC AssetsAs of this writing, our assets held on BTC-TC appear to have been hammered. Going by the
current bid values, the BTC-TRADING-PT is now effectively worthless, and our fortunately tiny holdings of the CipherMine.B1 bond are also very close to worthless. (The fund traded profitably in this bond earlier in its history, but our holdings are currently just 111 shares.)
Other assets have taken a hit ranging from a few percentage points to a little over 40%.
Net Asset ValueTaking a snapshot of our current holdings across all platforms, and estimating values on BTC-TC using, again,
bid values current as of this writing, the fund's NAV has fallen to .0812 BTC per share, a decrease of 19.731%.
Note that this figure is liable to change, perhaps significantly, as the fallout from the exchange's closure becomes more clear. I am putting a specific number on it
right now so that participants in the fund know exactly where they stand in terms of the underlying assets of the fund.
This figure includes at face value 7 BTC of debt which is due to be repaid over a 90-day term. If the fund is closed via buyback prior to that time, I will personally take over this debt from the fund at face value.