Wasabi Wallet - Total Privacy For Bitcoin

[Kruw]

Why not just make every client have an encrypted indexer?

Wasabi is a light client, you need a full node to build an indexer.

(Unless I'm misunderstanding your post, the rest of the context confuses me)

[NotATether]

Why not just make every client have an encrypted indexer?

Wasabi is a light client, you need a full node to build an indexer.

(Unless I'm misunderstanding your post, the rest of the context confuses me)

Basically I'm assuming that the output of an indexer is just a list of silent payment addresses that it is aware of, along with some supplementary metadata.

The rest of the post is just a design idea on how to encrypt that list so that it can be saved on to light clients without compromising privacy.

[alani123]

I kinda understand why so many Devs supporting bitcoin's decentralisation quit or disappear from the public eye.

Here's some DeFi idiots trying to frame wasabi wallet as supposedly being implicated in DPRK hacks.



 These defi idiots want to ruin decentralisation for everyone.

[Coinjoiner21]

It is not inherently bad to publicly post your analysis.  Chain analysis companies already know those bitcoin have been coinjoined through Kruw's coordinator. 

Bitcoin privacy should not be at stake just because one entity ever might shutdown.  God willing, future releases of Wasabi Wallet will come with a coordinator list that allows you to select any coordinator advertised over Nostr, without leaving the app.  I am working on this.

[BlackHatCoiner]

One problem with this wallet is that an observer can examine all the coinjoins of a coordinator and de-anonymize people based on timing patterns.

For example, Bob receives his weekly payout on an address, and Alice receives her monthly payment on another address. If across 1000 coinjoins, we notice that Alice and Bob coinjoin at the same coinjoins, there is a high probability that Alice is Bob.

I know about the coin isolation feature, but I'm afraid this does not fully address the problem. It is certainly better if those two addresses coinjoin at different rounds, but it is still trivial to detect how close their rounds are and still arrive at the same conclusion. For example, if across 1000 coinjoins, Alice coinjoins at rounds 401, 405, 750, 753 and 890 while Bob coinjoins at rounds 402, 406, 751, 752 and 889, there is strong correlation between those two identities.

Wouldn't it be better if Wasabi allowed the user to randomly schedule when the coins will join? The user would have to leave the app running for a lot longer, though.

[JollyGood]

One problem with this wallet is that an observer can examine all the coinjoins of a coordinator and de-anonymize people based on timing patterns.

For example, Bob receives his weekly payout on an address, and Alice receives her monthly payment on another address. If across 1000 coinjoins, we notice that Alice and Bob coinjoin at the same coinjoins, there is a high probability that Alice is Bob.

I know about the coin isolation feature, but I'm afraid this does not fully address the problem. It is certainly better if those two addresses coinjoin at different rounds, but it is still trivial to detect how close their rounds are and still arrive at the same conclusion. For example, if across 1000 coinjoins, Alice coinjoins at rounds 401, 405, 750, 753 and 890 while Bob coinjoins at rounds 402, 406, 751, 752 and 889, there is strong correlation between those two identities.

I have a question about this matter. Regarding de-anonymising people based on timing patterns (as you have stated), how is the de-anonymising process affected if coinjoin settings are changed to increase or enhance privacy thus raising the anonymity score from the default settings.

Wouldn't it be better if Wasabi allowed the user to randomly schedule when the coins will join? The user would have to leave the app running for a lot longer, though.

Basically, does increasing the anonymity score have any effect on the de-anonymising process at all or is your suggestion about users randomly scheduling coinjoins a better solution?

[lontivero]

Whoever says that Wasabi can be deanonymized is laying. And to prove you this is true, I offer anyone to participate with a coin in only one round and then you have to tell me which outputs belong to me, in other words, you have to track my coin. I don't need tens, hundreds or thousands of rounds, just one.

There had been many challenges like this before and nobody have never accepted them, why? because they are not fools, they think that you are a fool. Many have offered significant amounts of money for those who track Wasabi but even tho, nobody have never accepted it, ever.

* https://x.com/ob_hodl/status/1300429481711153152
* https://x.com/snaxion/status/1642337824820305922
* https://x.com/Kruwed/status/1300635613037813761

Of course these challenges are from poor community members, if you can track Wasabi then you could do a lot of money selling that service.

[FinneysTrueVision]

One problem with this wallet is that an observer can examine all the coinjoins of a coordinator and de-anonymize people based on timing patterns.

For example, Bob receives his weekly payout on an address, and Alice receives her monthly payment on another address. If across 1000 coinjoins, we notice that Alice and Bob coinjoin at the same coinjoins, there is a high probability that Alice is Bob.

I know about the coin isolation feature, but I'm afraid this does not fully address the problem. It is certainly better if those two addresses coinjoin at different rounds, but it is still trivial to detect how close their rounds are and still arrive at the same conclusion. For example, if across 1000 coinjoins, Alice coinjoins at rounds 401, 405, 750, 753 and 890 while Bob coinjoins at rounds 402, 406, 751, 752 and 889, there is strong correlation between those two identities.

Wouldn't it be better if Wasabi allowed the user to randomly schedule when the coins will join? The user would have to leave the app running for a lot longer, though.

On Kruw’s coordinator there are only about 1 or 2 coinjoins per hour. If two forum users get paid at the same time because they are with the same manager, and they each open their wallets soon after, within an hour of each other, chances are they are occasionally going to participate in the same or adjacent rounds. It wouldn’t necessarily mean they are the same person. You would have to consider other factors to make that determination.

Regardless, somebody exposing their alt account(s) can only happen if there is user error. It’s not something that is entirely preventable by simply using Wasabi Wallet.

[BlackHatCoiner]

I have a question about this matter. Regarding de-anonymising people based on timing patterns (as you have stated), how is the de-anonymising process affected if coinjoin settings are changed to increase or enhance privacy thus raising the anonymity score from the default settings.

Wasabi comes with a toggle setting that is enabled by default, and allows the wallet to coinjoin only up to 1 non-private input in each coinjoin. A non-private input is one that has never joined a coinjoin round before. This is enabled so that you do not mix separate identities into one coinjoin.

Basically, does increasing the anonymity score have any effect on the de-anonymising process at all or is your suggestion about users randomly scheduling coinjoins a better solution?

My suggestion is simply to randomly schedule when each non-private input gets coinjoined, so that there is no timing correlation between many non-private inputs. Being able to see they coinjoin at around the same time is very telling.

Whoever says that Wasabi can be deanonymized is laying. And to prove you this is true, I offer anyone to participate with a coin in only one round and then you have to tell me which outputs belong to me, in other words, you have to track my coin. I don't need tens, hundreds or thousands of rounds, just one.

You must have misunderstood. I didn't say I can track your coin once coinjoined. I said, given that Alice and Bob, two public identities, coinjoin at around the same time, there is strong timing correlation they are the same person. This is irrelevant to where their coins go after.

Regardless, somebody exposing their alt account(s) can only happen if there is user error. It’s not something that is entirely preventable by simply using Wasabi Wallet.

This is completely beyond having an alt-account. There are far too many activities an Internet user might do to make money.

[Kruw]

Wouldn't it be better if Wasabi allowed the user to randomly schedule when the coins will join? The user would have to leave the app running for a lot longer, though.

This was a feature in the BTCPay Server coinjoin plugin.

Wasabi used to have a "feature" that would randomly skip rounds, but it didn't inherently solve the problem (while making the UX very annoying).

Basically, does increasing the anonymity score have any effect on the de-anonymising process at all or is your suggestion about users randomly scheduling coinjoins a better solution?

Higher anonymity score target = more remixing. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kmwmo86MgvQ

[BlackHatCoiner]

Wasabi used to have a "feature" that would randomly skip rounds, but it didn't inherently solve the problem (while making the UX very annoying).

I understand that the UX is the primary problem of this feature, but what about this: at Wallet Settings -> Coinjoin, below "Anonymity score target", a second text field by the name "Skip remixing for up to these hours" (0 by default).

Each time a round was successfully finished, the wallet would select a random value between 0 and that value, and skip remixes for those hours. It would be for those who seek extreme levels of privacy.

[Kruw]

I understand that the UX is the primary problem of this feature, but what about this: at Wallet Settings -> Coinjoin, below "Anonymity score target", a second text field by the name "Skip remixing for up to these hours" (0 by default).

Each time a round was successfully finished, the wallet would select a random value between 0 and that value, and skip remixes for those hours. It would be for those who seek extreme levels of privacy.

Maybe something like that can be built with https://github.com/WalletWasabi/WalletWasabi/pull/14042

[Wind_FURY]

I kinda understand why so many Devs supporting bitcoin's decentralisation quit or disappear from the public eye.

Here's some DeFi idiots trying to frame wasabi wallet as supposedly being implicated in DPRK hacks.



 These defi idiots want to ruin decentralisation for everyone.

?

Although, the hackers did move the stolen funds through Wasabi, no? There's actually nothing bad about that. It merely shows that the protocol actually works, which is a positive in my opinion.

DPKR bridged to Bitcoin through Thorchain, then bridged it back to Ethereum to mix again in Tornado Cash.

  ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

If the government goes after Wasabi and Tornado Cash, I'm very confident that they'll never shut those protocols down.

[alani123]

?

Although, the hackers did move the stolen funds through Wasabi, no? There's actually nothing bad about that. It merely shows that the protocol actually works, which is a positive in my opinion.

DPKR bridged to Bitcoin through Thorchain, then bridged it back to Ethereum to mix again in Tornado Cash.

  ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

If the government goes after Wasabi and Tornado Cash, I'm very confident that they'll never shut those protocols down.

The implications here are different.

When we're talking about the theft of multi millions, saying funds were laundered through x service and naming it's developer is not a good look. Some people in DeFi don't seem to want decentralisation at all because to me these attitudes seem to want to attribute responsibility to developers of autonomous and decentralised platforms.

Supposedly the clarity act could have some clauses to protect developers but I don't see FEDs using it in favour of anonymous transaction system Devs, especially on BTC. I won't believe anything positive from the US gov until I see samurai Devs out of jail.

[Wind_FURY]

?

Although, the hackers did move the stolen funds through Wasabi, no? There's actually nothing bad about that. It merely shows that the protocol actually works, which is a positive in my opinion.

DPKR bridged to Bitcoin through Thorchain, then bridged it back to Ethereum to mix again in Tornado Cash.

  ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

If the government goes after Wasabi and Tornado Cash, I'm very confident that they'll never shut those protocols down.

The implications here are different.

When we're talking about the theft of multi millions, saying funds were laundered through x service and naming it's developer is not a good look. Some people in DeFi don't seem to want decentralisation at all because to me these attitudes seem to want to attribute responsibility to developers of autonomous and decentralised platforms.

Supposedly the clarity act could have some clauses to protect developers but I don't see FEDs using it in favour of anonymous transaction system Devs, especially on BTC. I won't believe anything positive from the US gov until I see samurai Devs out of jail.

Should we actually be mad at that? SO WHAT if those stupid people "implicate" Wasabi. It's a DECENTRALIZED protocol. Who would they actually try to "implicate" in this matter?

Because if those hackers from DPKR used Bitcoin, then should Bitcoin be "implicit"?

It's a stupid question.

 

[alani123]

Should we actually be mad at that? SO WHAT if those stupid people "implicate" Wasabi. It's a DECENTRALIZED protocol. Who would they actually try to "implicate" in this matter?

Because if those hackers from DPKR used Bitcoin, then should Bitcoin be "implicit"?

It's a stupid question.

 

You're a couple years to late to that realisation tho.
Wasabi Devs quit mixing over 2 years ago. Samurai Devs got arrested, sentenced and charged etc.
The precedent is already quite bad. We don't need to wait for new developments to draw the conclusion that feds will go after decentralisation developers. It has already been happening.
Maybe the clarity act could help but I doubt feds will interpret any of its clauses as giving mixing a pass.

[NotATether]

It's funny. Because when a coordinator or swap service moves dirty money, they get tarred, feathered, nailed onto a cross, etc etc

But when a DEX does it they are like "we have many expert researchers inspecting our DAO and DeFi contracts, nobody worry" and nothing ever happens to them.

This game is just about how much money you bribe this government with. That's why Bybit operators are not in jail, even though their criminal negligence in monitoring their systems was directly responsible for the largest theft in history.

[alani123]

It's funny. Because when a coordinator or swap service moves dirty money, they get tarred, feathered, nailed onto a cross, etc etc

But when a DEX does it they are like "we have many expert researchers inspecting our DAO and DeFi contracts, nobody worry" and nothing ever happens to them.

This game is just about how much money you bribe this government with. That's why Bybit operators are not in jail, even though their criminal negligence in monitoring their systems was directly responsible for the largest theft in history.

Bybit, tether, binance execs are not in jail at the moment, not just because they bribed, but also because they're useful to the government apparatus.

In practice, even KYC can't prevent money laundering through centralised exchanges.
New ISIS cells are literally using Tether USDT funnelled through Binance. This is well documented and widely reported.

However, when it comes time to track something and shut it down, CEXs can do it at the press of a button.
The mere existence of bitcoin mixing as a decentraloozed serviced is annoying to FEDs because in spite of small volumes and niche usage, they can't be shut down. CEXs actually are much easier to use and due to their large volumes passing from common wallets, more effective at mixing funds. But since they're openly collaborating with governments, they're now best buddies with FEDs.

Seriously, binance and big exchanges in general have reached a point where they'd gladly cooperate with dictators in order to keep access to certain markets.

[NotATether]

Bybit, tether, binance execs are not in jail at the moment, not just because they bribed, but also because they're useful to the government apparatus.

In practice, even KYC can't prevent money laundering through centralised exchanges.
New ISIS cells are literally using Tether USDT funnelled through Binance. This is well documented and widely reported.

However, when it comes time to track something and shut it down, CEXs can do it at the press of a button.

I get you, but CEXs are not about to shut themselves down, though I wish they would.

The mere existence of bitcoin mixing as a decentraloozed serviced is annoying to FEDs because in spite of small volumes and niche usage, they can't be shut down. CEXs actually are much easier to use and due to their large volumes passing from common wallets, more effective at mixing funds. But since they're openly collaborating with governments, they're now best buddies with FEDs.

Seriously, binance and big exchanges in general have reached a point where they'd gladly cooperate with dictators in order to keep access to certain markets.

Key point: It's merely annoying to the feds, but the actual crime goes through their best buddies' networks, not through mixers.

We don't pay the feds, so they get angry at our existence and try to shut us down.