This message was too old and has been purged

[Sapereaude]

I see, a constructive debate is not possible within this community.
Sad, that people just close their eyes and "believe" instead of "knowing".

Anyone who is at least a bit technically educated should see the problem here. I mean come on, it is not that hard, is it?

1. Inputs always unsorted
2. Outputs shuffled
3. Next transaction inputs unshuffled again which allows you to reassemble the original order in previous transaction
4. Multiple Amounts/Denominations allow only a few combinations how the original transaction looked like
4. Done!


I wish that someone could post something technical, instead of the typical "troll" posts. How boring that is.

Go on do it, go backwards four rounds and show us this holds up. First however you should actually find a transaction where mixing occurs because all I see is the wallet being broken down into smaller pieces for mixing and not actual mixing.

[1714861791]

1714861791

[1714861791]

1714861791

[Evil-Knievel]

This message was too old and has been purged

[Evil-Knievel]

This message was too old and has been purged

[stonehedge]

I'm a fool to know that these threads only appear when other coins getting pumped ?

I don't care about any pump, I am neither invested in DRK and I also do not plan to do so.
I was hoping that it is possible to discuss here about technical details and question the techniques which are sold to us as "anonymous".
But from the replies that I read here, I begin to understand why the markets are full of non-rational panicksters who blindly fall for every pump and dump. Why? Because the others "say something".

Haven't you guys learned to question things? Are you always believing what someone tells you?
I guess you have not even tried to follow what I have written.

Sad stuff.

Ed Duffield and the dev team area aware of your claims.  Expecting non technical people to have a technical view of what you have done is unrealistic.

[Evil-Knievel]

This message was too old and has been purged

[toknormal]

Sad stuff.

It's not sad stuff.

You may have discovered an interesting angle on de-anonymisation and you may not have. But your posting it on bitcointalk, not an MIT science blog. As a previous poster already pointed out, statistically speaking there are about 100 FUD posts to every genuine "questioning post" as you put it.

I'm also interested to see this technical discussion develop, but I'm not surprised that people go on the defensive if you post this out of the blue with no history of discussing the technology in other themes.

[eduffield]

Interesting approach, although the input order isn't random, it's randomly generated from multiple transactions on the client side. Even if it was completely not random, that doesn't allow you to "jump" the mixing transaction and know which outputs belong to which inputs.

Source TX:

http://explorer.darkcoin.io/tx/9ad01adae3814abf9a9731f0003d95a0f9bf701d055152f7b54ee4b6be47bfca:

Notice the inputs reference 5 transactions, but there's 3 participants. You can't tell where one stops and the next begins. Also, it's possible that multiple clients in this transaction were actually in 5bafee7a5397ad505658b1e37af812e64ebb2834601224e4f6f6675b4a25728b or b4534361c8247abcc6b428fd85a17546f23413b2777f3e3f372578d100b20c4e for example.

http://explorer.darkcoin.io/tx/5bafee7a5397ad505658b1e37af812e64ebb2834601224e4f6f6675b4a25728b#o39
http://explorer.darkcoin.io/tx/b4534361c8247abcc6b428fd85a17546f23413b2777f3e3f372578d100b20c4e#o40
http://explorer.darkcoin.io/tx/1c1769d578f4632971dd699987931cf676a7356196a5b122c60d737fce3c836e#o76
http://explorer.darkcoin.io/tx/7e452c1c5229fbbfdc1b4fc1d8577a6b9d0932bf5f00030d28ec7759dd9273ea#o61
http://explorer.darkcoin.io/tx/3fba31e9cc32cd5e2c002ad4a8bd6908f3a76321e2d892f046265eb14352676e#o60

One more thing to note is that after coins are mixed through multiple sessions, there are "final" outputs that are just spent randomly. That can happen in any session, which causes more randomness. You most definitely can't map those randomly spent outputs to the inputs at all. That's what you should be trying to do, you need to be able to show anonymously spent coins and their original source funds.

Nice try though

PS. If you believe it's really a weakness you need to map the outputs to the inputs and show who's anonymously spending money on what. I'm not sure it's worth the time though, because masternode blinding randomizes the input order anyway.  

[g4q34g4qg47ww]

I am betting all my 500 BTC on it, are you in? I would also accept an escrow.

Interesting thread

[Evil-Knievel]

This message was too old and has been purged

[eduffield]

Notice the inputs reference 5 transactions, but there's 3 participants. You can't tell where one stops and the next begins. Also, it's possible that multiple clients in this transaction were actually in 5bafee7a5397ad505658b1e37af812e64ebb2834601224e4f6f6675b4a25728b or b4534361c8247abcc6b428fd85a17546f23413b2777f3e3f372578d100b20c4e for example.

I do not agree on this actually.

From the transaction 5bafee... for example you can be sure that the inputs belong to one person only, as there is only one change output in the outputs list. (2 people would indicate two change outputs).
Other input transactions can be analyzed the same way.

Those transactions are a bad example of what I was saying.
5bafee7a5397ad505658b1e37af812e64ebb2834601224e4f6f6675b4a25728b and http://explorer.darkcoin.io/tx/b4534361c8247abcc6b428fd85a17546f23413b2777f3e3f372578d100b20c4e aren't mixing rounds at all. It's clients creating darksend compatible inputs.

For example, this transaction http://explorer.darkcoin.io/tx/b649ff67a9863a9757049e6d6acc722043030b386d052f75839410f1f32bf3e5#i16 has 11 source transactions:

http://explorer.darkcoin.io/tx/396016fb9d48cd648cbd46df016614128ca6ff71451548a64ef7cfd1bd6b86df#o19
http://explorer.darkcoin.io/tx/7fdd4b736c9a9a78e5d09bdd5137c87af5d82c20035cbb4cbaf9970ea7f4b129#o45
http://explorer.darkcoin.io/tx/aa87251f58213e5999d56fcd80fc5d4ddab0317af76bcb58751756fc27e05f7a#o12
http://explorer.darkcoin.io/tx/7098889f50598e8e385e8f6108bcffbe4b9284165fb14f3d435c42a6fad50552#o50
http://explorer.darkcoin.io/tx/50ce277e21dda233620163d2818a4998280381c937681d5ca1617ebc4d95ff9b#o35
http://explorer.darkcoin.io/tx/b4534361c8247abcc6b428fd85a17546f23413b2777f3e3f372578d100b20c4e#o11
http://explorer.darkcoin.io/tx/e0891c5fbebb9547cd86858646883fcd2d889c5a1f000b680ea06581a987f9c2#o8
http://explorer.darkcoin.io/tx/8410744e1ab1f7a4e992031cd8f023fb00f65cf8271aecbe3aae0056c034cf99#o57
http://explorer.darkcoin.io/tx/e0891c5fbebb9547cd86858646883fcd2d889c5a1f000b680ea06581a987f9c2#o4

It's possible that 1-3 participants are submitting funds from 4a067e00c76ccb554638c0d14d20e8f501f094ce9093fbf598c358c0835d77e5, it's impossible to tell otherwise.

[Automatic Monkey]

Interesting approach, although the input order isn't random, it's randomly generated from multiple transactions on the client side. Even if it was completely not random, that doesn't allow you to "jump" the mixing transaction and know which outputs belong to which inputs.

Source TX:

http://explorer.darkcoin.io/tx/9ad01adae3814abf9a9731f0003d95a0f9bf701d055152f7b54ee4b6be47bfca:

Notice the inputs reference 5 transactions, but there's 3 participants. You can't tell where one stops and the next begins. Also, it's possible that multiple clients in this transaction were actually in 5bafee7a5397ad505658b1e37af812e64ebb2834601224e4f6f6675b4a25728b or b4534361c8247abcc6b428fd85a17546f23413b2777f3e3f372578d100b20c4e for example.

http://explorer.darkcoin.io/tx/5bafee7a5397ad505658b1e37af812e64ebb2834601224e4f6f6675b4a25728b#o39
http://explorer.darkcoin.io/tx/b4534361c8247abcc6b428fd85a17546f23413b2777f3e3f372578d100b20c4e#o40
http://explorer.darkcoin.io/tx/1c1769d578f4632971dd699987931cf676a7356196a5b122c60d737fce3c836e#o76
http://explorer.darkcoin.io/tx/7e452c1c5229fbbfdc1b4fc1d8577a6b9d0932bf5f00030d28ec7759dd9273ea#o61
http://explorer.darkcoin.io/tx/3fba31e9cc32cd5e2c002ad4a8bd6908f3a76321e2d892f046265eb14352676e#o60

One more thing to note is that after coins are mixed through multiple sessions, there are "final" outputs that are just spent randomly. That can happen in any session, which causes more randomness. You most definitely can't map those randomly spent outputs to the inputs at all. That's what you should be trying to do, you need to be able to show anonymously spent coins and their original source funds.

Nice try though

PS. If you believe it's really a weakness you need to map the outputs to the inputs and show who's anonymously spending money on what. I'm not sure it's worth the time though, because masternode blinding randomizes the input order anyway.  

It doesn't look like it would fully deanonymize it, but it could weaken the plausible deniability somewhat, and given the public ledger common to all cryptocurrency I think just a very high level of PD is the best we can hope for. The ideal level of PD would be one where all users of the system have the same level of it for each transaction, and thus could equally be held responsible for a particular transaction.

What's not clear to me is how Darksend is different than just sending BTC through a mixer, or several unrelated mixers. Is it just the relatively large number of Darksend nodes that makes the difference?

[Evil-Knievel]

This message was too old and has been purged

[eduffield]

It's possible that 1-3 participants are submitting funds from 4a067e00c76ccb554638c0d14d20e8f501f094ce9093fbf598c358c0835d77e5,
it's impossible to tell otherwise.

Then I just made the impossible possible,
I know that these are exactly 2 people.

When looking at
http://explorer.darkcoin.io/tx/b649ff67a9863a9757049e6d6acc722043030b386d052f75839410f1f32bf3e5

There are exactly two sorted blocks from the 4a06 transaction appearing in the sorted input list of b649ff...  which do not appear directly under each other
They must have been submitted from two different people at two different times.

Code:

7 	4a067e00c7...:59 	0.100001 	XgVS4zvMm4ikZDtN2DSFgSgrrTrD2w5pq5 	71:3044...8081 33:03f3...d69d
8 	4a067e00c7...:11 	1.00001 	XmAEq7k7n2spMATZbN2CpyPT6U4hNiefbr 	72:3045...b981 33:03c4...ab69
9 	4a067e00c7...:41 	1.00001 	XmnDvUgBM8kQze5RATyozfkA9bazyWQ1W3 	71:3044...2181 33:021a...a289

and

Code:

12 	4a067e00c7...:55 	1.00001 	XvaXzvnWTwHRMfzLricVyxa3FtMqJvohRR 	72:3045...8881 33:02b1...33f4
13 	4a067e00c7...:20 	0.100001 	XmHZ4DvHbBLmrHTHWCXYahp4n2SfnxWugt 	72:3045...f081 33:02dd...b541
14 	4a067e00c7...:50 	1.00001 	XbXrsJLGZSeW839LEHQh4K8HS7AvDRXjr6 	71:3044...2d81 33:0231...538f
15 	4a067e00c7...:7 	0.100001 	XxdCZkeNWnUzkQfG13greKNXEzzQFwzxx9 	72:3045...5681 33:0358...d9ea
16 	4a067e00c7...:3 	0.100001 	XqvRbqBQMtxRdQMpJCCY3qYT62USrZtAqw 	72:3045...ef81 33:0271...3602

I think you're misunderstanding the random behavior of the client. It takes multiple transactions and submits them like this. Masternode blinding makes this whole conversation meaningless though, inputs will be random.

Something like this:

(This isn't deanonymizing the TX, I don't know who submitted what, it's just an example)
Client 1:

Code:

0	396016fb9d...:19	0.100001	XmEdFdQi99xwqn4SvZ47GQTgGWrwr8wGCj	72:3045...ad81 33:0322...86ef
1	7fdd4b736c...:45	1.00001	Xrw1JYmX2DgQ3GZ6g4EzpqigWrN7PFgmre	71:3044...ac81 33:039e...cee5
2	396016fb9d...:21	0.100001	XhyqpyLSRFWQrP2LuZup5XqZQ7o5qP4jvq	71:3044...8c81 33:0261...21a2
3	aa87251f58...:12	10.0001	Xg9cD2y8UVviaFLst3xESqt1gNPzfHxq25	72:3045...e881 33:02a8...6d95
4	7098889f50...:50	0.100001	XqKzxHmJT1V2p4mUFQVp4tRMoKuiY5ooTU	72:3045...ed81 33:02fe...8220
5	50ce277e21...:35	0.100001	Xged1P2SQ9Ntdb4yFxpiMHmuDCUkFbcwwS	71:3044...f881 33:02bf...eda9
6	b46f161497...:13	0.100001	Xyrz9y6J7633ZMRdsh7r5gY9ZVjQLRr9UL	72:3045...e981 33:023e...07d2
7	4a067e00c7...:59	0.100001	XgVS4zvMm4ikZDtN2DSFgSgrrTrD2w5pq5	71:3044...8081 33:03f3...d69d
8	4a067e00c7...:11	1.00001	XmAEq7k7n2spMATZbN2CpyPT6U4hNiefbr	72:3045...b981 33:03c4...ab69
9	4a067e00c7...:41	1.00001	XmnDvUgBM8kQze5RATyozfkA9bazyWQ1W3	71:3044...2181 33:021a...a289
10	b4534361c8...:23	1.00001	Xmi5ZRQUhV5eBicMYg3kLeVtgUYFtdPuco	72:3045...0381 33:0364...0ed3
11	b4534361c8...:11	0.100001	XvjDt1hjmNeX8Te2BSHMMrx794S3RW2UBh	72:3045...5681 33:03fb...f75f
12	4a067e00c7...:55	1.00001	XvaXzvnWTwHRMfzLricVyxa3FtMqJvohRR	72:3045...8881 33:02b1...33f4
13	4a067e00c7...:20	0.100001	XmHZ4DvHbBLmrHTHWCXYahp4n2SfnxWugt	72:3045...f081 33:02dd...b541

Client 2

Code:

14	4a067e00c7...:50	1.00001	XbXrsJLGZSeW839LEHQh4K8HS7AvDRXjr6	71:3044...2d81 33:0231...538f
15	4a067e00c7...:7	0.100001	XxdCZkeNWnUzkQfG13greKNXEzzQFwzxx9	72:3045...5681 33:0358...d9ea
16	4a067e00c7...:3	0.100001	XqvRbqBQMtxRdQMpJCCY3qYT62USrZtAqw	72:3045...ef81 33:0271...3602
17	b4534361c8...:30	10.0001	XfKGmCRBgC7ihLjyLhu3yjcvyobZNXof96	71:3044...6281 33:0317...a427
18	e0891c5fbe...:8	0.100001	XjvmB3XF6tfQW4TpZHFmmb5VpSdJfz63VU	71:3044...3881 33:0342...8b7b
19	9d96213345...:22	1.00001	XwUav8pZke2CJCBwZNQJwQVqcsVfLT9J13	71:3044...1981 33:0303...94ca
20	9d96213345...:27	10.0001	XcCvifmjfKvqNSpF83k61QyEosAQaWTRAg	72:3045...d981 33:0206...99ac

Client 3

Code:

21	8410744e1a...:57	0.100001	Xkj7CsXf9umYCTGSXH36UMV15Uyb4bFR1Z	71:3044...b981 33:0357...185e
22	e0891c5fbe...:1	0.100001	XbNQNmpa7ewvXkx6hrZH6bnJd7u5wNxB6S	71:3044...e081 33:020e...afa2
23	8410744e1a...:37	0.100001	XtDvF85gLNht6hKJpTFqgttYLimp3QfTti	71:3044...9381 33:03dc...7413
24	396016fb9d...:49	0.100001	Xs677i24pRnNFDdTXJNdwRiD9Vxx9HqUsb	72:3045...3f81 33:0313...0491
25	e0891c5fbe...:4	1.00001	XvUis97P6tRiWKCwF7cKf2DdsNfhGhEELg	72:3045...2881 33:032d...386c

Example 2:

Client 1:

Code:

0	396016fb9d...:19	0.100001	XmEdFdQi99xwqn4SvZ47GQTgGWrwr8wGCj	72:3045...ad81 33:0322...86ef
1	7fdd4b736c...:45	1.00001	Xrw1JYmX2DgQ3GZ6g4EzpqigWrN7PFgmre	71:3044...ac81 33:039e...cee5
2	396016fb9d...:21	0.100001	XhyqpyLSRFWQrP2LuZup5XqZQ7o5qP4jvq	71:3044...8c81 33:0261...21a2
3	aa87251f58...:12	10.0001	Xg9cD2y8UVviaFLst3xESqt1gNPzfHxq25	72:3045...e881 33:02a8...6d95
4	7098889f50...:50	0.100001	XqKzxHmJT1V2p4mUFQVp4tRMoKuiY5ooTU	72:3045...ed81 33:02fe...8220
5	50ce277e21...:35	0.100001	Xged1P2SQ9Ntdb4yFxpiMHmuDCUkFbcwwS	71:3044...f881 33:02bf...eda9
6	b46f161497...:13	0.100001	Xyrz9y6J7633ZMRdsh7r5gY9ZVjQLRr9UL	72:3045...e981 33:023e...07d2
7	4a067e00c7...:59	0.100001	XgVS4zvMm4ikZDtN2DSFgSgrrTrD2w5pq5	71:3044...8081 33:03f3...d69d
8	4a067e00c7...:11	1.00001	XmAEq7k7n2spMATZbN2CpyPT6U4hNiefbr	72:3045...b981 33:03c4...ab69

Client 2

Code:

9	4a067e00c7...:41	1.00001	XmnDvUgBM8kQze5RATyozfkA9bazyWQ1W3	71:3044...2181 33:021a...a289
10	b4534361c8...:23	1.00001	Xmi5ZRQUhV5eBicMYg3kLeVtgUYFtdPuco	72:3045...0381 33:0364...0ed3
11	b4534361c8...:11	0.100001	XvjDt1hjmNeX8Te2BSHMMrx794S3RW2UBh	72:3045...5681 33:03fb...f75f
12	4a067e00c7...:55	1.00001	XvaXzvnWTwHRMfzLricVyxa3FtMqJvohRR	72:3045...8881 33:02b1...33f4
13	4a067e00c7...:20	0.100001	XmHZ4DvHbBLmrHTHWCXYahp4n2SfnxWugt	72:3045...f081 33:02dd...b541
14	4a067e00c7...:50	1.00001	XbXrsJLGZSeW839LEHQh4K8HS7AvDRXjr6	71:3044...2d81 33:0231...538f
15	4a067e00c7...:7	0.100001	XxdCZkeNWnUzkQfG13greKNXEzzQFwzxx9	72:3045...5681 33:0358...d9ea
16	4a067e00c7...:3	0.100001	XqvRbqBQMtxRdQMpJCCY3qYT62USrZtAqw	72:3045...ef81 33:0271...3602
17	b4534361c8...:30	10.0001	XfKGmCRBgC7ihLjyLhu3yjcvyobZNXof96	71:3044...6281 33:0317...a427

Client 3

Code:

18	e0891c5fbe...:8	0.100001	XjvmB3XF6tfQW4TpZHFmmb5VpSdJfz63VU	71:3044...3881 33:0342...8b7b
19	9d96213345...:22	1.00001	XwUav8pZke2CJCBwZNQJwQVqcsVfLT9J13	71:3044...1981 33:0303...94ca
20	9d96213345...:27	10.0001	XcCvifmjfKvqNSpF83k61QyEosAQaWTRAg	72:3045...d981 33:0206...99ac
21	8410744e1a...:57	0.100001	Xkj7CsXf9umYCTGSXH36UMV15Uyb4bFR1Z	71:3044...b981 33:0357...185e
22	e0891c5fbe...:1	0.100001	XbNQNmpa7ewvXkx6hrZH6bnJd7u5wNxB6S	71:3044...e081 33:020e...afa2
23	8410744e1a...:37	0.100001	XtDvF85gLNht6hKJpTFqgttYLimp3QfTti	71:3044...9381 33:03dc...7413
24	396016fb9d...:49	0.100001	Xs677i24pRnNFDdTXJNdwRiD9Vxx9HqUsb	72:3045...3f81 33:0313...0491
25	e0891c5fbe...:4	1.00001	XvUis97P6tRiWKCwF7cKf2DdsNfhGhEELg	72:3045...2881 33:032d...386c

Example 3:

Client 1:

Code:

0	396016fb9d...:19	0.100001	XmEdFdQi99xwqn4SvZ47GQTgGWrwr8wGCj	72:3045...ad81 33:0322...86ef
1	7fdd4b736c...:45	1.00001	Xrw1JYmX2DgQ3GZ6g4EzpqigWrN7PFgmre	71:3044...ac81 33:039e...cee5
2	396016fb9d...:21	0.100001	XhyqpyLSRFWQrP2LuZup5XqZQ7o5qP4jvq	71:3044...8c81 33:0261...21a2
3	aa87251f58...:12	10.0001	Xg9cD2y8UVviaFLst3xESqt1gNPzfHxq25	72:3045...e881 33:02a8...6d95

Client 2

Code:

4	7098889f50...:50	0.100001	XqKzxHmJT1V2p4mUFQVp4tRMoKuiY5ooTU	72:3045...ed81 33:02fe...8220
5	50ce277e21...:35	0.100001	Xged1P2SQ9Ntdb4yFxpiMHmuDCUkFbcwwS	71:3044...f881 33:02bf...eda9
6	b46f161497...:13	0.100001	Xyrz9y6J7633ZMRdsh7r5gY9ZVjQLRr9UL	72:3045...e981 33:023e...07d2
7	4a067e00c7...:59	0.100001	XgVS4zvMm4ikZDtN2DSFgSgrrTrD2w5pq5	71:3044...8081 33:03f3...d69d
8	4a067e00c7...:11	1.00001	XmAEq7k7n2spMATZbN2CpyPT6U4hNiefbr	72:3045...b981 33:03c4...ab69
9	4a067e00c7...:41	1.00001	XmnDvUgBM8kQze5RATyozfkA9bazyWQ1W3	71:3044...2181 33:021a...a289
10	b4534361c8...:23	1.00001	Xmi5ZRQUhV5eBicMYg3kLeVtgUYFtdPuco	72:3045...0381 33:0364...0ed3

Client 3

Code:

11	b4534361c8...:11	0.100001	XvjDt1hjmNeX8Te2BSHMMrx794S3RW2UBh	72:3045...5681 33:03fb...f75f
12	4a067e00c7...:55	1.00001	XvaXzvnWTwHRMfzLricVyxa3FtMqJvohRR	72:3045...8881 33:02b1...33f4
13	4a067e00c7...:20	0.100001	XmHZ4DvHbBLmrHTHWCXYahp4n2SfnxWugt	72:3045...f081 33:02dd...b541
14	4a067e00c7...:50	1.00001	XbXrsJLGZSeW839LEHQh4K8HS7AvDRXjr6	71:3044...2d81 33:0231...538f
15	4a067e00c7...:7	0.100001	XxdCZkeNWnUzkQfG13greKNXEzzQFwzxx9	72:3045...5681 33:0358...d9ea
16	4a067e00c7...:3	0.100001	XqvRbqBQMtxRdQMpJCCY3qYT62USrZtAqw	72:3045...ef81 33:0271...3602
17	b4534361c8...:30	10.0001	XfKGmCRBgC7ihLjyLhu3yjcvyobZNXof96	71:3044...6281 33:0317...a427
18	e0891c5fbe...:8	0.100001	XjvmB3XF6tfQW4TpZHFmmb5VpSdJfz63VU	71:3044...3881 33:0342...8b7b
19	9d96213345...:22	1.00001	XwUav8pZke2CJCBwZNQJwQVqcsVfLT9J13	71:3044...1981 33:0303...94ca
20	9d96213345...:27	10.0001	XcCvifmjfKvqNSpF83k61QyEosAQaWTRAg	72:3045...d981 33:0206...99ac
21	8410744e1a...:57	0.100001	Xkj7CsXf9umYCTGSXH36UMV15Uyb4bFR1Z	71:3044...b981 33:0357...185e
22	e0891c5fbe...:1	0.100001	XbNQNmpa7ewvXkx6hrZH6bnJd7u5wNxB6S	71:3044...e081 33:020e...afa2
23	8410744e1a...:37	0.100001	XtDvF85gLNht6hKJpTFqgttYLimp3QfTti	71:3044...9381 33:03dc...7413
24	396016fb9d...:49	0.100001	Xs677i24pRnNFDdTXJNdwRiD9Vxx9HqUsb	72:3045...3f81 33:0313...0491
25	e0891c5fbe...:4	1.00001	XvUis97P6tRiWKCwF7cKf2DdsNfhGhEELg	72:3045...2881 33:032d...386c

[Evil-Knievel]

This message was too old and has been purged

[eduffield]

Okay, agreed on this.
However, as you have provided the original outputs sent by the clients we see that we at least have the correct order of them.
And the point is that I do not think that it is important to know whether it is 1,2 or 3 people. As long as we have the correct order, all three trails will eventually lead to the originator.

I am pretty sure that a transaction deanonymizer, which does this order reversal, could walk his way all the way back to the transactions where people started to denominating their funds, and get the # of users from the change outputs.


Also, what I just thought, you can surely know which outputs belong together. Its just a little bit of bruteforce work from now on.

As you said, those input belong together:


0   396016fb9d...:19   0.100001   XmEdFdQi99xwqn4SvZ47GQTgGWrwr8wGCj   72:3045...ad81 33:0322...86ef
1   7fdd4b736c...:45   1.00001   Xrw1JYmX2DgQ3GZ6g4EzpqigWrN7PFgmre   71:3044...ac81 33:039e...cee5
2   396016fb9d...:21   0.100001   XhyqpyLSRFWQrP2LuZup5XqZQ7o5qP4jvq   71:3044...8c81 33:0261...21a2
3   aa87251f58...:12   10.0001   Xg9cD2y8UVviaFLst3xESqt1gNPzfHxq25   72:3045...e881 33:02a8...6d95
4   7098889f50...:50   0.100001   XqKzxHmJT1V2p4mUFQVp4tRMoKuiY5ooTU   72:3045...ed81 33:02fe...8220
5   50ce277e21...:35   0.100001   Xged1P2SQ9Ntdb4yFxpiMHmuDCUkFbcwwS   71:3044...f881 33:02bf...eda9
6   b46f161497...:13   0.100001   Xyrz9y6J7633ZMRdsh7r5gY9ZVjQLRr9UL   72:3045...e981 33:023e...07d2
7   4a067e00c7...:59   0.100001   XgVS4zvMm4ikZDtN2DSFgSgrrTrD2w5pq5   71:3044...8081 33:03f3...d69d
8   4a067e00c7...:11   1.00001   XmAEq7k7n2spMATZbN2CpyPT6U4hNiefbr   72:3045...b981 33:03c4...ab69
9   4a067e00c7...:41   1.00001   XmnDvUgBM8kQze5RATyozfkA9bazyWQ1W3   71:3044...2181 33:021a...a289
10   b4534361c8...:23   1.00001   Xmi5ZRQUhV5eBicMYg3kLeVtgUYFtdPuco   72:3045...0381 33:0364...0ed3
11   b4534361c8...:11   0.100001   XvjDt1hjmNeX8Te2BSHMMrx794S3RW2UBh   72:3045...5681 33:03fb...f75f
12   4a067e00c7...:55   1.00001   XvaXzvnWTwHRMfzLricVyxa3FtMqJvohRR   72:3045...8881 33:02b1...33f4
13   4a067e00c7...:20   0.100001   XmHZ4DvHbBLmrHTHWCXYahp4n2SfnxWugt   72:3045...f081 33:02dd...b541


The blocks of the same color are in the correct order.
The only open question is which of the blocks comes first, which second.
For this we have 10*9*8*7*6*5*4*3*2 possibilities,

SO TO CHECK HOW THE OUTPUTS WERE ORDERED IN THE PREVIOUS TRANSACTION
... we have to think.

If the first input in the last transaction had a value of 0.10, only 5 of these blocks are candidates to come first.
... and so on!

It is really easy and in a simple python test most transactions could be uncovered this way.

You should try to build the python deanonymizer. I'd like to see what kind of results you get.

[g4q34g4qg47ww]

lol

[stonehedge]

lol

Doesn't somebody owe somebody else 500BTC?

[winteriscoming5]

https://i.imgur.com/tt5YZmm.jpg

[BrainShutdown]

lol

Doesn't somebody owe somebody else 500BTC?

I didn't have time to move mine from the cold wallet. Damn non-instantX bitcoin transactions...  

[Longenecker]

We should set up a BTC donation fund for Evil-Knievel to build a Darkcoin python deanonymizer!

I pledge 1 BTC if Evil-Knievel successfully builds a Darkcoin python deanonymize.