Darkcoin is not anonymous either. It only mixes your transaction with a few others. It offers better privacy than other coins, but that is about it.

I asked Gnosis about the time frame - no reply
I also asked Meeh - no reply

As you are an anoncoin developer, do you have contact with Gnosis and Meeh? They told us that the test net would go live about two months ago, but since then, there has been complete radio silence. In Meeh's March blog entry, a lot was promised, but nothing has yet materialized.

We all understand that these things usually take longer than planned, and we would of course like them to get things right, but a simple update from time to time doesn't seem like too much to ask for. I am not asking them to pump this coin with propaganda in any way like darkcoin, but their disregard for the Anoncoin "community" (if you can call it that, you just need to read this thread and count the number of people who have become disillusioned) shows a complete lack of professionalism. Sure, perhaps this is just a small side project for them, but if that were the case, Meeh should not say on the official Anoncoin website that this is his full time job.

If Zerocoin is implemented, that would be great for Anoncoin in the short term. Nevertheless, other copycats will certainly follow. Ultimately, I will chose to use that coin which has the best community, and which has the best development team that is committed to implementing new features. I really doubt that the real winner in the end will be Anoncoin. I hope to be proven wrong, because I am truly impressed with how knowledgable the developers are.

Ring sigs are not 100% anonymous. They only offer decent privacy.

For info, here is a response I got from gnosis on redit about a couple of questions I had.

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I have read the Zerocash paper and while it has some very cool ideas, it has one serious weakness: the requirement for a trusted setup. This makes it not much better than a coin laundry like Bitfog: the owner of a coin laundry can steal everyone's coins if they so choose, and the same possibility exists with all the anonymized money in circulation in Zerocash. The only strategy to reduce a user's risk is to reduce the time their money is anonymized, but that reduces anonymity.
Anyway, to answer your questions:

1. Will it be possible to use zero-knowledge-SNARKs to reduce the size of the zerocoin proof? The authors of the paper are not too clear on this point.
Probably not.

2. Will it be possible to choose the initial setup parameters for zerocash without relying on trusted third parties, such as with RSA-UFOs as has been proposed for Anoncoin's version of zerocoin?
Probably not for years. This would be a major breakthrough if cryptographers could find a way to do this.

3. It is my understanding that the total amount encoded into zerocash can not be calculated, as the amount is hidden in the zerocash coin commitment. Would it be possible to create new coins (or perhaps double spend) without getting caught if the initial setup parameters were known? Or would this just let the person steal existing zerocash coins?
Yes, the former. If the entity who setup the initial parameters was dishonest and did not delete the data they were supposed to delete, they could create new money without being detected. The currency would experience massive inflation.

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If its really possible to setup the original Zerocoin protocol without trust, but not Zerocash, then I think that Anoncoin will have much more to offer than other competing coins...

Now that the paper is published, I am curious if someone could answer a question about the setup of the initial zerocash parameters and trusted third parties.

Concerning the original zerocoin paper (which is supposed to be implemented in Anoncoin), it has been noted that the initial setup could be done using RSA-UFOs, without trusted third parties. Before the zerocash paper came out, the Anoncoin developers claimed that this could not be done with zerocash. Is this still true? Given the similarity in the original zerocoin and zerocash approaches, it is not immediately obvious why this would be the case.

CryptoNote technology (including BitMonero, BCN, etc.) is an interesting approach for increasing privacy, but Zerocoin provides better (i.e., proven to be perfect) anonymity.

In CryptoNote, the user decides how many people will participate in the ring signature: the more that are used, the more difficult it is to track transaction histories in the blockchain. However, even if this form of anonymity is good enough for most people today, blockchain analysis techniques are likely to become very sophisticated in the coming years. If you value your privacy, or if you have something to hide, the only truly anonymous solutions at this point are Zerocoin and Zerocash.

Ring signatures, CoinJoin ("darksend"), and stealth addresses are not perfect. If you use them, you do so at your own risk. I admit that these are the best solutions that are implemented in code today, but the anonymous altcoin scene will change dramatically before the year is over.

Also, Zerocoin (the original paper) does not need to trust a third party: As Gnosis has described elsewhere, this can be accomplished using RSA-UFOs. It is not clear to me if the same thing applies to Zerocash: Gnosis says no, but I would like to hear his opinion now that the paper is published.

Quick question about an old post: Have you thought about using peershares for the initial ipo/coin distribution?

Here is the short answer (to the best of my knowledge):

Zerocoin (original paper): User 1 "buys" zerocoins, and this transaction can be seen by everyone, including the amount. When user 1 spends the zerocoins to user 2, the amount can be seen by everyone, but it is cryptographically impossible to link user 1 and 2.

Zerocash (new paper): In addition to breaking the link between user 1 and 2, as in the original zerocoin paper, this also hides the amount of money being transferred. This protocol also allows to transfer a zerocash coin directly to the second user without having to redeem it in the base currency, as well as split and merge zerocash coins. What is bound to cause confusion is that the authors are calling the coins in zerocash "zerocoins", just like in the original paper, even though they are not the same thing.

Darkcoin: They use a modification of CoinJoin, which they call "darksend". This is a simple coin mixing service. However, given the limited number of coins that are mixed, as well as other problems, such as with change and trust, it is possible to de-anonymize at least some transactions if you really tried to.

CryptoNote coins: User 1 sends user 2 money, but the transaction is signed by X users in a ring signature. User 2 receives money, which is visible on the blockchain with the amount, but all that can be said is that it came from one of the X members that participated in the "ring signature". The amount of anonymity increases as the number of members in the ring signature increases. For low values of X, it is possible to de-anonymize some types of transactions by a block chain analysis.

Darkwallets: Not sure. I think that this is just CoinJoin for Bitcoin. These exist only because Bitcoin refuses to implement suitable privacy measures.

So, if you had to rank them: Zerocash is the most anonymous, Zerocoin (original) is next, Cryptonote is close behind, and Darkcoin and Darkwallets are poor-man alternatives. All are better than nothing.

Nevertheless, you need to put this is perspective and consider some practical aspects: Darkcoin is working, CryptoNote coins are working but with no graphical interface, Zerocoin (original) does not exist now and will likely be implemented in Anoncoin in about 1 month, and the authors of Zerocash claim that it will be released in 3-6 months. It is possible that another existing coin will implement zerocash first (such as Anoncoin, after they release their implementation of Zerocoin). In terms of practicalities, Darkcoin is easy to use, whereas for the others, you either need to set up some parameters (such as the number of signatures in a ring signature), or make an intermediate step by buying zerocoins.

I should note that another aspect of anonymity is hiding the physical location (i.e., IP number) of where the transactions took place. Anoncoin allows users to send their transactions via i2p, which effectively hides your IP number, and it is the only coin that supports i2p to my knowledge. I think that most coins allow you to send transactions via TOR (which would achieve the same thing), but this is not set up by default, and I couldn't get this to work on my computer after 30 minutes, so I gave up.

There are potential problems with zerocash (the paper was just published): you need to trust someone to set up the initial, one-time, secret parameters and then forget them (there is a trick to fix this in zerocoin); you also can not count the number of zerocash coins as the amount is hidden. There is thus a scary possibility that someone could break the code (or learn the secret parameters), that would allow them to mint coins without anyone ever finding out. This would have the effect of inflation.

Finally, people tend to forget that it is extremely difficult to achieve anonymity when you convert any cryptocurrency for fiat: Banks and exchanges will always be the weakest link as long as fiat is the "default" currency.

If I made any mistakes, please correct me.
 

Hi gnos1s,

After skimming the Zerocash paper, I wonder if you could clear up a few points for us:

First, in your opinion, will it be possible to use zk-SNARKs to reduce the size of the zerocoin proof? The authors are not too clear on this point.

Second, will it be possible to choose the initial setup parameters for zerocash without relying on trusted third parties, such as with RSA-UFOs?

Finally, it is my understanding that the total amount encoded into zerocash can not be calculated, as the amount is hidden in the zerocash coin commitment. Would it be possible to create new coins (or perhaps double spend) without getting caught if the initial setup parameters were known? Or would this just let the person steal existing zerocash coins?

In my opinion, we need to do a very good job at explaining to the community the strengths and weaknesses of Zerocoin and Zerocash. If zerocash is released (which seems very likely), there is likely to be a mad dash to ditch zerocoin/anoncoin for zerocash. Many people are already referring to zerocash as "v2", with the implication that v2 is better than, and makes obsolete, v1....

 

For info, here are the links to the zerocash project and paper. Have't yet had time to read them yet

http://zerocash-project.org/

http://zerocash-project.org/media/pdf/zerocash-extended-20140518.pdf

Hi Arlic, I am glad to see this enthusiasm! Nevertheless, I would just like to warn you that the developers do not appear interested in "promoting" this coin, and they seem to be unwilling to delegate PR to an outsider. (Conversely, they appear active in developing the code  ). I in fact suggested a similar thing as you about a month ago.

I am still a believer in this coin, but from my perspective, the community will have to take the lead on PR without any contribution from the core developers.

I think that the best way to proceed would be to create a new, community based, web site that is 100% divorced from the developers. One possibility, which is still available, is anon-coin.org. From this web site, we could ask for donations, from which we could offer bounties on the prioritized list you mention (there is no donation address on the official website...). Of course, we would need someone to organize all this: I would be happy to provide the text for the web site, but that is about it. Perhaps n00n would be willing to do the web design... Is anyone willing to buy the domain name and host such a site?

Here is the most recent tweet from Darkcoin


Ring signatures, as far as I understand them (see https://cryptonote.org/inside.php), offer an interesting way to achieve anonymity that is easier and more practical than Zerocoin: all transactions are anonymous, without the need for a separate step to mint zero coins.

Have the developers considered implementing this in anoncoin?

Perhaps you should remove the sentence "darkets, exchanges, and coin mixers..."

I don't think that there any "ANC coin mixers", and even if there were, these would always be less secure than using zerocoins.

If you open a ticket, they will resolve this in about 24h. I've had this happen several times, and it worries me alot: Either they are running a fractional reserve racket, or their software really sucks. In either case, I will not trust them until they get an external audit done.

besides a fair rollout, and not being massively premined in secret by the developers? I guess not much

Interesting concept....

What he says is verifiably true.

So its "storage". Ok, but its not obvious...

I have a stupid question: How do you pronounce "Storj"?

Could someone add a link to this blockchain explorer on anoncoin.net?

http://ancblockchain.com/chain/Anoncoin

The two links on the website don't work....