All you have to do is look at your nearest bureaux de change to understand that fees are 100% the issue. Nearly all bureauxs de change will advertize zero fees. Even many remittances providers claim zero fees on international transactions. Why? Because the masses are easily fooled. They see zero fees for these services, credit cards, banking, paypal, etc and they assume it's a free lunch. So they fill their boots on these services. Having deployed a currency product aimed at consumers, I can, with 100% certainty, tell you this is the case. General consumers have no clue that all the profit margins are made on the currency conversion; and if they try to check it, the rates are too confusing to work out, so they just look a the big sign that says zero fees and off they go. The average remittance value is $200/month, and its sent by people, on average, with little or no education. Fees are a deal breaker for mass adoption. Which, to stay on topic, is a deal breaker for Bitcoin demand and therefore its price; especially in one of its biggest markets: $600bn/year remittances. In the end of the day, what matters is how much you sent and how much the other party got (or how much you got, when the other sent them). When the other party tells you that "hey you have sent 1000$, but I only got 950$ so you need to send another 50$", at that point you learn about the hidden fees. Or when you sell something through paypal for 100$ and you end up getting 97$, it's pretty visible too. With bitcoin fees of $0.00x to $0.1x , at least we don't have such worries. If paypal isn't a deal breaker with its 35 cents + % on each payment, and bank wires and western unions aren't deal breakers with all their charges, then why do we even bother with the near-zero fees of bitcoin? The actual fees attached to bitcoin are all connected to the legacy and centralized systems (fiat conversions, exchanges, etc). |
|
|
|
Obviously. But that's the bigblocker counterargument right there: "Who are you to tell me that my transaction is spam/dust/invalid/not worthy" etc etc... They continue by saying "if I pay fees, I must get included!!!". They could also say, in the above scenario, "I'm paying 100% fees over the transacted amount, while others are paying 0.x% in percentage... is this fair?" etc etc. I don't really know. I don't make the rules. The fee rules are in the code and in the nodes that run on it, the miners, the whole network. The rules are based on the size of the transaction and the priority of the unspent inputs. That's the other bigblocker counterargument: "Fuckin' blockstream, they have put limits on small txs, they want to make Bitcoin a settlement network and they are killing bitcoin for not including my 0.00x$ tx !!!"  The devs probably did the math, saw that if small spammy transactions are in high demand, coupled with practically zero fees, then virtually any block size can be full. Monero implemented an adaptive block size which increases as more demand is applied, and where did that lead? To a spamming of the network, to kill the blockchain through bloat... and devs running to patch it with high fees per tx to prevent the ongoing attack. What more can you do? It's either limited block size, or high fees. I've seen a variation applied in STEEM, where they use rate limiting for spammy txs, avoiding the block size vs high fees tradeoff, but that's because txs are tied to an account, so this becomes more possible (in bitcoin it wouldn't be). |
|
|
|
The network is at capacity. How is that FUD? The evidence is there. Look at it. Or, are you looking at testnet or something?
What you're basically saying is:
The train is full. You can get on this train if you pay more and we'll pull someone off the train. They'll have to wait for another train, or pay more than you offer.
With that sort of attitude, users will just continue to use banks and credit cards. They don't bump users transactions.
There should be 100m people using bitcoin right now. Stop making it a niche application and giving banks time to adjust and offer something shitty, but will give customers a reason to not move over to Bitcoin.
Fees are not the problem, nor a barrier to entry. https://bitcoinfees.21.co/Which fee should I use?
The fastest and cheapest transaction fee is currently 70 satoshis/byte, shown in green at the top.
For the median transaction size of 226 bytes, this results in a fee of 15,820 satoshis (0.08$).And that's the 1-conf transaction. For conf after several blocks transaction (which is still way faster than a SWIFT), it drops down to 0.01$ or less. 34.000 txs in the last day were in the 0 - 9 satoshi/byte range, which for a 230 byte transaction means 0$ - 0.01$. As a reminder, paypal charges flat 0.35$ + percentage over the payment. And SWIFT wires, western union etc, take A LOT of money. |
|
|
|
Suppose I create a faucet.
I am willing to pay 1 satoshi for fees per transaction (250 bytes).
So for every user who wants 1 satoshi, I pay 1 to him and 1 to fees.
If you do that, the transaction won't get forwarded to any other nodes. You're under the threshold for "dust". Obviously. But that's the bigblocker counterargument right there: " Who are you to tell me that my transaction is spam/dust/invalid/not worthy" etc etc... They continue by saying "if I pay fees, I must get included!!!". They could also say, in the above scenario, " I'm paying 100% fees over the transacted amount, while others are paying 0.x% in percentage... is this fair?" etc etc. |
|
|
|
If bitcoin, the network, is open accessed - by that i mean that anyone can jump into the mining race (for the probabilistic chance to create the next block. PROBABILISTIC(!)) -, and bitcoin the currency unit is valued by - alas semi - the free market, and any central bank **insert evil bank cartel here*** can buy/sell it with free air printed fiat -, than all those hypothetical "sinister powers would be" should have been able to strangle it in the crib already, if they have wanted to/capable to do it. AKA, bitcoin would be dead.
Since bitcoin is still alive, and the aggregated network security is at an all time high, price is stable and obviously on a long term uptrend, none of the above has happened/can be done despite the intent -> hypothetical attacks have failed/can't be done as of yet.
I am a bit tired of all these "but what if...[insert totally unrealistic scenario] things happens, and kills bitcoin..."
The mere fact, that they did not happened in the last 7 years - despite the enormous incentive of the legacy system to act upon it - shows us that it can not be done, or they could not have found a way to do it so far (but yeah, they have tried, like - terrorist, drug dealers, ponzi, etc bullshit).
Most people would say that because their thought isn't Machiavellian enough. A dumb hacker might think along the lines of " oh I just found an exploit, let's go out and use it". Not the Elite. The Elite has an arsenal of attack vectors for any given situation. They will strategically deploy these, as needs arise, and only as a last resort. This is necessary to protect their arsenal. They don't use it mindlessly. An attack will be wasted if it's launched early, because, in our case, such an attack will have a small effect, BTC can be patched and continue. The attacks become more potent the more "established" BTC becomes. Thus the cost/reward ratio for early attacks doesn't compute in its favor. Instead, attacks would be better deployed later to cause maximum damage. It's not the same attacking bitcoin while it has a 1-2-5-10bn marketcap, and when it's, say, 100bn marketcap. The "crash'n'burn factor" multiplies. The same attack can be more catastrophic later. That's why the rationale " if it hasn't been attacked so far, it won't be later" isn't valid. Because early attacks don't make sense (they waste an attack vector for dubious results). For the Elite, it's better if the cryptoanarchists, say, build an ecosystem for 10 years, and THEN go in and kill it. Then, until they regrow something different, from the lessons learned from the first iteration, they'll let them for a few years to slowly grow AND THEN kill the next project. If the Elite acted in "panic mode" and had kill-cycles of one month, then in 3 years the cryptoanarchists would be in the 37th iteration, having patched 36 attack vectors. The Elite's job would be far more difficult to keep finding attack vectors to a constantly patched system that circumvents them. If I were the Elite, even if I had 10 bitcoin kill-switches, I would have no incentive to activate anyone right now. I'd have to let it grow more and then trigger a switch. Or play around with something like a half-switch, for entertainment value (panic). Or even 0.25x switches, like bloating, where you slowly make it unusable and centralized.... or instigating community division where you let bitcoiners rip one another apart while you laugh for triggering the fire. Under no circumstance would I want the kill cycle to be fast because it depletes my arsenal of attack vectors faster than I can replenish it, creating a very hardened rival that will inevitably become impossible to kill. As the Elite, I do not want to bring the inevitable closer to the present. I want it to be towards the future. As a bitcoiner I'd like bitcoin to have this hardness right now, not after I go through multiple kill cycles. In order to do that, the best way to go about it is pre-empt possible attacks by making the worst assumptions possible about the hostile environment that we are operating, thus closing possible attack vectors that could manifest. If assumptions of a hostile environment aren't in place, then I have no reason to even be invested in Bitcoin. It would be a jokecoin surrounded by wishful thinking instead of actual security. |
|
|
|
either
1. the hypothetical bad miners are consciously, permanently jeopardizing the blockchain, which would only make sense if the amount they are being paid for attacking it is superior to their total investment + expected returns. these are not "extremely small costs" but very large amounts, given the already concentrated nature of mining.
Remember that ample blockchain space reduces the fees needed. Plus the "costs" are nothing if the external actors are involved in the trillion dollar market. Every day 1800 bitcoins are mined. These cost only 1 million bucks. And you need only a fraction of that, per day, to pull of an attack. Banks and payment companies, process tens of billions per day. They have manipulated multi-trillion dollar markets like the precious metals. Their sizes are ridiculously high - if they want to attack BTC. There is no cost that is too high. The only thing that there is is whether this attack is visible or not (they don't want "banks are scared" type of publicity), and the cost of preparedness for the next "iteration" of BTC. For every attack you do, you burn one card where your opponent is then more prepared. You only want to use your attacks wisely and in a timely manner. 2. the hypothetical bad miners aim to make some cash on the side by colluding with the attacker, but will only do as much of it consistent with not permanently undermining the blockchain, their total investment and their expected returns. furthermore, corrupt miners running pools must bloat the blockchain in non-evident way, or they would lose hashrate. hence their spamming must be to some extent limited.
+
[EDIT: in fact, all corrupt miners must be cautious with their spamming or risk having their blocks orphaned as jbreher below notes; that the attacker would pay for the orphaned blocks is irrelevant as orphaned blocks do not make it to the blockchain and therefore cannot bloat it.]
Addressed above to jbreher (plus the GPU enhancement scenario). |
|
|
|
In this case, if you allow miners the liberty to include as large blocks as they like, an external actor that hates bitcoin can just say to a miner "you know what? I'll pay you more fees than what the others are making, and if your block is orphaned, I'll pay that too - just make sure to put in there as many txs as you like".
At that point, the enemy of bitcoin who has employed "bad miners" for very little money (compared to the multi-billion dollar interests of banks/payment companies/governments), can bloat bitcoin to death for extremely small costs.
Just because the miners (in this hypothetical) are allowed to create blocks as large as they desire, does not mean that other miners are forced to accept those blocks as valid. If such a large block (presumably the result of your bribe above) is deemed detrimental to the system by the other miners (i.e., detrimental to these other miners' interests), these other miners are incentivized to orphan that block. Resulting in no problem to the network. The 'problem' solves itself. Not really. 1) The network is being spammed every day - even with stated spam attacks and stress tests. These blocks are now sitting in the blockchain as bloat. If the rejection scenario actually happened, they wouldn't be sitting in there. 2) Let's asssume I'm the exo-attacker and plan to do what I laid above. I also hire a programmer, modify bitcoin core to use GPU for validating big blocks, the ability to process blocks is raised significantly, and then release that software as open source so that miners will use it to "speed up new block verification and help scale bitcoin". By employing GPU power *and* the fact that network propagation between the large miners is good, there is no valid reason for others to reject very big blocks because I've also given them the tools to process them. I mean the (other) miner is not going to need minutes to process them, so why not? (this could happen too:) 3) The larger the miner, the biggest the incentive to accept even bigger blocks so that they can crush the opposition who can't handle them. It's like corporate cartel forming. You lower the price (to your detriment) until others fall out of the market. And then you raise the price. You can do the same with blocks. You accept the largest blocks possible, so that those who can't catch up fall behind. It's their problem, not yours. The less they mine, the more you earn. All these things are fucked up scenarios. Personally, I like to think as an attacker - not a wishful thinker. I want to think the worst that could happen so that I can prepare for it. Not make good assumptions and leave "holes" that trucks can drive through. So, if I were the banks, what would I do to bitcoin? One of the things I'd do, would be to bloat it to unusable levels, increasing centralization and decreasing the ability of people to adopt it directly - forcing them through centralized means. But the 1MB is an obstacle to this attack vector. So I would have to "raise awareness" (=divide the community) in order for parts of the community to ...demand the rope with which they'll get hanged (in our case "big blocks"). And these blocks are useless except for spamming. Every day, tens of thousands of txs are processed for 0 to 0.01$ per tx. If there was actual demand, this wouldn't be happening. Satoshi said to increase it when we are closer to needing it. Need is a very specific word. The blockchain covering every possible spamming tx with near zero fees is not a need. Increases should be in line with actual demand. IMO the network should operate by balancing a) the covering of legit txs b) room for expansion or spikes c) covering of low-priority txs and even some spam, when there is no (b). Alternatively, you can just increase blocksize but demand a high tx fee as a minimum. Monero used adaptive block size and they quickly found out it doesn't work when spammed. So they raised the fees to pretty high per tx after their bloat attack, in order to stop it. It was a case of exo-attack, the external game theory. It was presumed to be an attack by an other altcoin (bytecoin) - so all the internal incentives / internal game theory of miners acting this and that, were useless, and the rule book had to be rewritten (high tx fees) to prevent external actors from attacking the coin. Why would I pretend that these things haven't happened or aren't happening in bitcoin? Why would I make best-case assumptions that everything will be fine? That's not how you make a robust cryptocurrency. |
|
|
|
No. It's very outdated and slow. I think this is the most recent multi-miner: (you want to mine x11 which is DASH's algorithm): https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1326803.0As for instructions, I think mining pools have a "getting started" version. |
|
|
|
The theory breaks down in a certain point. Given low fees, tx demand can tend to infinite. He argues that this is not the case due to miners not being incentivized to produce bigger blocks. Now there are two components in the game theory of bitcoin. One is internal, the other is external. The internal is the game theory that surrounds how the internal ecosystem works. For example 51% issues. Attacks of 51% do not make sense in the internal context (the 51% attacker devalues his coins because he attacked the system he is living in). They do however make sense in the external context (ie, external actors to the bitcoin ecosystem, employing means to disrupt it - like attacking pools, renting hashpower etc). The external context has to do with threats to bitcoin from banks, governments, payment companies etc, all those who want to see bitcoin harmed. In order to have a system that is resilient, you must be able to have a game theory that is both internally and externally robust. External robustness is an ideal... a dream (due to the resources external actors have at their disposal)... but at least you don't have to make it easy for them. In this case, if you allow miners the liberty to include as large blocks as they like, an external actor that hates bitcoin can just say to a miner "you know what? I'll pay you more fees than what the others are making, and if your block is orphaned, I'll pay that too - just make sure to put in there as many txs as you like". At that point, the enemy of bitcoin who has employed "bad miners" for very little money (compared to the multi-billion dollar interests of banks/payment companies/governments), can bloat bitcoin to death for extremely small costs. This is the element that is lacking in the above analysis, overlooking the fact that it's not only the internal game theory, but also the external. The external enemies are far more dangerous. By giving them the tools to bloat bitcoin, they can centralize it and then make it even easier to attack - or even shut down. |
|
|
|
Diff seems to be increasing in quite big steps.  Difficulty History Date Difficulty Change Hash Rate Sep 25 2016 241,227,200,230 6.82% 1,726,771,560 GH/s Sep 12 2016 225,832,872,179 2.30% 1,616,574,667 GH/s Aug 29 2016 220,755,908,330 1.56% 1,580,232,344 GH/s Aug 15 2016 217,375,482,757 7.67% 1,556,034,316 GH/s Aug 02 2016 201,893,210,853 -5.43% 1,445,207,896 GH/s Jul 18 2016 213,492,501,108 0.04% 1,528,238,850 GH/s Jul 04 2016 213,398,925,331 1.88% 1,527,569,009 GH/s Jun 21 2016 209,453,158,595 6.83% 1,499,324,110 GH/s Jun 08 2016 196,061,423,940 -1.63% 1,403,462,340 GH/s May 24 2016 199,312,067,531 2.60% 1,426,731,353 GH/s May 11 2016 194,254,820,283 8.73% 1,390,530,167 GH/s Apr 28 2016 178,659,257,773 -0.01% 1,278,892,782 GH/s Bitcoin Difficulty: 241,227,200,230 Estimated Next Difficulty: 259,869,959,857 (+7.73%) Adjust time: After 1599 Blocks, About 10.5 days Hashrate(?): 1,985,788,007 GH/s |
|
|
|
Μακαρι να τα καταφερει οπως το εχει σκεφτει... ολο το οικοσυστημα των crypto κερδιζει αυξανοντας τα ατομα που ασχολουνται με cryptocurrency, ειτε η αφορμη ειναι το decentralized blogging, ειτε το decentralized ebay, ειτε, ειτε ειτε. Παντως για να πετυχει θα χρειαστει περισσοτερο δουλεια στα επιμερους. Δλδ αν ο στοχος ειναι να κανεις bootstrap people στο cryptocurrency, τοτε πρεπει και οι εφαρμογες που εχεις χτισει ως "ατραξιον" να ειναι καλες. Εκει, σ'αυτο το τομεα, πρεπει να πεσει δουλεια. Η δουλεια στο user interface ειναι, για καποιο λογο, παρα πολυ αργη. Και να λεγες οτι δεν εχουν λεφτα για development, παει στο διαλο  |
|
|
|
Δηλαδη αν θες μεταπτυχιακο απο ΑΣΟΕ για να μην
αυτοκτονησεις ενταξει δεν παιζει να επενδυσει κανεις.
Κοιτα, οι whale investors ουτως ή αλλως ξερουν τι κανουν. Δε τους ειναι ιδιαιτερα πολυπλοκα. Η μαριδα ειναι αδιαφορη. Απο κει και περα ο μεσος χρηστης του steem θα γινει, θελοντας και μη, επενδυτης του, γιατι τα μισα εσοδα πανε σε steem power. Δλδ αμα bloggarεις και βγαλεις 1000$, τα 500$ πανε σε επενδυση ως SP. Παντως το οικονομικο μοντελο ειναι σιγουρα πολυπλοκο για το μεσο χρηστη. Και το κανανε λιγο ακομα πιο πολυπλοκο καθως τωρα τα payouts δινονται σε 3 currencies (steem power 50%, ενα ποσοστο σε steem dollars και αλλο ενα σε steem σκετο). Το ελεος. Δλδ ο χρηστης εχει να κανει με 3 currencies του steem, μετα bitcoin (παμε 4), μετα usd (5), μετα local currency (6). Για αμερικανους (πχ coinbase) και ευρωπαιους (kraken), πες 5. Δυστυχως το cryptonerdiness εχει αντικτυπο στο usability αλλα δε φαινεται να το καταλαβαινουν με τιποτα. Παντως, μ'αυτα και μ'αυτα, η ανοδος του steemit ως site συνεχιζεται: https://steemit.com/steemit/@alexgr/i-just-noticed-steemit-com-is-now-9955-in-global-ranking-breaking-top-10-000Μπηκε στα top 10.000 της alexa... τον ιουνιο ηταν στα τοπ ...150.000  Τι δειχνει αυτο? Οτι η χρηση ανεβαινει, ασχετως τι κανει η τιμη. |
|
|
|
"Ok, I’m in. How do I get the Bitwala Bitcoin debit card?
Getting your hands on the Bitcoin debit card is super easy. First things first, you need to have a verified account on Bitwala. Let us show you how:
Sign up at Bitwala. If you already have an account, simply Log in Bitwala.
Verify for Level 2 by uploading your identification document and utility bill.
Order the card, decide whether you want to get a virtual or physical card. The virtual card would be delivered within one business day and the physical card takes around 10 business days.
Once it arrives, activate your card by clicking our e-mail link. Don’t have time to check your e-mail? No problem, find the steps here."
I'm sure the guy above verified he is Satoshi Nakamoto On a more serious note, is there anything more anonymous than that?
|
|
|
|
There's another point that got my attention. 1blockologist was asked about his personal github account, in order to assess his coding capabilities, but he never answered that question. Is there anything new on this? I would be happy to see some previous cryptocoin related projects - be it technical or non-technical ones.
The paper that 1blockologist published is mostly financial/pump material with a few simple technical stuff. I doubt he's an expert coder, but that doesn't mean anything: One can hire a coder. I mean if you are going to go for a multi-million valuation, what's gonna stop you from tapping the resources that you need? 5-10-20k usd? You don't want any coder for this kind of job. You want someone way above average. $250k/yr is what a smart coder makes full time in Silicon Valley. Ok, it can be part time and no taxes since it's crypto, but you're looking at a $50k budget most likely. If the stated target for the marketcap is 50mn USD, it should not be an issue for 1blockologist. |
|
|
|
There's another point that got my attention. 1blockologist was asked about his personal github account, in order to assess his coding capabilities, but he never answered that question. Is there anything new on this? I would be happy to see some previous cryptocoin related projects - be it technical or non-technical ones.
The paper that 1blockologist published is mostly financial/pump material with a few simple technical stuff. I doubt he's an expert coder, but that doesn't mean anything: One can hire a coder. I mean if you are going to go for a multi-million valuation, what's gonna stop you from tapping the resources that you need? 5-10-20k usd? |
|
|
|
|
It wouldn't be a bad idea to enlist CZ to do some changes, if needed. After all he stills gets his fee, and it would benefit him if that fee is higher in price due to development.
|
|
|
|
Τι λεει το στιμ το παρακολουθει κανενας;
Βλεπω βαραει κατι ακυρα +30% που και που αλλα το
γραφημα ειναι πεθαμενου νομισματος.Σωζεται;
Το marketcap να κοιτας, στη περιπτωση του steem ειναι πιο σημαντικο απ'τη τιμη του coin. Το coin, ως coin, ειναι φτιαγμενο να πληθωριζεται με ενα ρυθμο τριψηφιο %. Οι χρηστες παιρνουν πισω το 90% αυτου (δλδ τα νεα coins που εκδιδονται πανε στους εχοντες steem power). Προφανως αμα η τιμη εμενε εστω ιδια, τοτε σε ενα χρονο θα εβαζες 1000$ και θα ειχες 1900$. Το design ειναι τετοιο που αναμενει τη πτωση της τιμης λογω dilution και αρα κανει compensate το χρηστη με αυξημενο αριθμο νομισματων. Δε παιρνει ο χρηστης 90% του πληθωρισμου για πλακα Ο σχεδιασμος βασικα ειναι αποπληθωριστικος, αλλα το γυρισαν αναποδα για πρακτικους λογους. Ουσιαστικα αμα πχ ειχες 100 coins, στο τελος του χρονου θα εχανες τα 10 τα οποια θα πηγαιναν για να πληρωνουν nodes, περιεχομενο, κτλ. Επειδη κατι τετοιο θα δημιουργουσε προβληματα στο accounting, ειδικα σε exchanges που θα εβλεπαν να τους μειωνονται coins, λενε οκ, αντι να το κανουμε ετσι, απλα θα εκδιδουμε για καθε 100 coins αλλα 100 και απ'αυτα τα 90 θα τα παιρνει ο ηδη εχων και τα 10 θα πανε για περιεχομενο, witness κτλ. Στη πραξη ειναι το ιδιο πραγμα. Στη πρωτη περιπτωση θα εβλεπες τη τιμη ανα token να ανεβαινει, και εδω τη βλεπεις να κατεβαινει. Το marketcap ομως θα ηταν ιδιο, οπως και η αξια που εχει ο καθε χρηστης. |
|
|
|
Is the little guy squeezed out? In the last 24 hours, 512 txs had zero fees. Another 36000 txs had fees ranging from 1 to 9 satoshi per byte. So ~36500 txs were in the range of 0$ to 0.01$ in fees.
|
|
|
|
Suppose I create a faucet. I claim that I will give 1 satoshi for every request that is made through some web form. Meaning, any user who inserts his btc address will get 1 satoshi from me. I place no limits on how many times users do that. A user may do it 100mn times and he'll get 1 BTC. I am willing to pay 1 satoshi for fees per transaction (250 bytes). So for every user who wants 1 satoshi, I pay 1 to him and 1 to fees. What do you think will happen in terms of network demand? Even if you have 10MB blocks, they'll be full. My cost for doing that, and assuming nobody else transacted in the network, would be: 10mb per block / 250 bytes per tx = 40k txs per block x 144 blocks per day = 5.760.000 txs per day, moving 1 satoshi each and paying 1 satoshi in fees each = 11.52mn satoshi = 0.1152 btc per day. So for 0.1152 btc per day, I can have 10mb blocks full by running a faucet that hands out money to everyone, no strings and no limits attached. The number is 1.1152 btc per day for 100MB blocks, of which 0.576 btc will be donated to the users and the other 0.576 will go the network as fees. For 11 btc per day, even 1 GB blocks can be full while users are scrambling to take the 5.76 BTCs that I'm donating (another 5.76 will go in fees). As long as there are nodes relaying and miners mining my txs, this is quite achievable. Do you understand why "blocks full" is irrelevant? The lower the cost of transacting, the bigger the demand for cheap txs, ensuring "blocks are full" for any capacity scenario (even 1gb blocks). I'm seeing this right now: https://bitcoinfees.21.co/In the last 24 hours, 512 txs had zero fees. Another 36000 txs had fees ranging from 1 to 9 satoshi per byte. So ~36500 txs were in the range of 0$ to 0.01$ in fees. If there was real congestion, you wouldn't see these kind of transactions getting processed. They'd need at least 5-10x in fees. |
|
|
|
|
Show Posts
