I am in the dark. His irc bouncer disconnected yesterday for a bit but then came back.  AFAIK, he's been idle since Friday.

But developers are normal people too, so it might be possible that they are replaced with corrupt people. Does the community then still have a chance? I mean most of the people would download the new hashingtype automatically and wouldnt care about. I guess that would be more than 51%. So it could be possible to overtake bitcoin when the devs are corrupted? Or wouldnt that work?

This mean googledocs update is not that statement?

And what about "Immediately upon publication of each Statement of Profit and Loss SatoshiDice will pay to shareholders as dividends"

Where are the dividends?

I have not asked him but I welcome him to make a reply in this thread.

Scammer tags are for people who do not pay 1 btc loan back or ship a bad video card. Mods are like the us govt and pirate is like a large bank. I am waiting for the bailout next.

Mining majority cannot change the algorithm, only an economic majority can. I don't think anyone would be able to get most BFL miners to switch without a good reason, anyway - it's simply too risky since "greed" won't fly with the non-BFL miners.

There are no licenses or issued secrets. Each ASIC vendor is expected to come up with their own reasonable "secret alternative algorithm" and not tell anyone else (including developers) until such an emergency occurs.

That is not necessarily true. ASIC vendors are advised to implement an alternative algorithm they can switch to in case of emergency like this. If the community felt it necessary to block out ASICMINER (or some other hostile ASIC hoarder), the other ASIC vendors would then publish their secret alternative algorithms, and Bitcoin could be made to support those.

I'm not suggesting it be done, just concerned about the risk that it might be considered necessary by the community (no one man can do it).

I was asked here. The same "problem" applies to BFL ASICs and any other super-high speed mining device. I assume anyone making ASICs (and I know for sure including BFL) has given thought to the problem by now, and it's not like there isn't a solution developed already.

BFL says they are selling 100% (or close to it?) of their ASICs immediately, and a bunch at the same time to prevent any one person from having a chance to abuse it. ASICMINER has announced they plan to hoard their first batch and mine with it before anyone else has ASICs, thus centrally controlling a Bitcoin-threatening amount of hashrate. See the difference? As for "BFL lobbying"... while I do stand with BFL, I also stand with ASICMINER - I want them to succeed, and am even a shareholder; but that doesn't make these risks/concerns just disappear either.

All that being said, I'd like to note the following for anyone considering changing the algorithm:

• It sounds like ASICMINER's total will be under the 50% required to do anything evil, even accounting for some variance.
• With BFL (and other vendors) shipping ASICs to consumers within 2 months, any opportunity time for abuse is very limited.
• Most 51% attacks can be dealt with after the fact; that is, the algorithm change would be more or less just as effective if it is only IF abused. So there is no need to cut it off just for holding (near) 51% short-term.
• While the "time travel" attack remains a risk that cannot easily be dealt with after the fact, the practical reality is that it takes much longer or much more percent of hashrate to pull off, which ASICMINER probably won't have (less than 2 months and not much more than 50% if that)
• Changing the algorithm breaks all old clients and miners, requiring more work for developers and forcing every miner to update.

The new units will be even more aesthetically pleasing than the originals. 

Will there be a power adaptor splitter a bit like Enterpoint has done, so if someone has 5 or 10 SC Japalenos or Singles, then they don't have to use 5 or 10 power adaptors taking up just as many power sockets ?

That's precisely the self-destructiveness I'm talking about: the "perceived" threat? You are already aware of the destructiveness and bad reputational damage that a single source of 12TH of mining would be, otherwise you wouldn't feel the need to hide your hashrate amongst multiple pools.

Or, say you just misinterpreted what he's doing. Say he really does think splitting up mining hashrate will alleviate the dangers of centralization. In that case, two (or one) people sit down, think a moment, and could one day decide to attempt a double-spend, or a DoS via tx block flooding, or or or. And all you do is redirect your miners to a hacked bitcoind. So that's one person. This will hurt Bitcoin value a lot, which I think is acknowledged in the prediction of a possible future where Bitcoins drop in value as a result of ASICMINER's activities.

It may be feasible, but there are some more facts to consider:

1. When we begin to sell products to customers, limitlessly expansion will harm the buyers' motivation, hence the revenue via selling.
2. If may be better to keep the revenue for R&D of the next-generation of products than expand too much with the original technology, especially that we want to stay in the mining ASIC industry and help securing the network in the long run.

Problem: private hoarding of 12TH initially and keeping the technology to yourself creates an opportunity to screw with the bitcoin blockchain. How do you intend to deal with the consequences of hashrate concentration in terms of public trust, and why do you think this is a good idea except in terms of pure profit? Why do you say this is good for Bitcoin, when you are coming dangerously close to achieving 51% truly concentrated hashrate? (Or potentially far more than that?)

Everyone mining with GPU, or FPGA right now can change the way they mine: what happens if you suddenly started mining with 44% of the entire network, and the rest of the network decided to shut you out? Say you overwhelm the potential majority vote against you with an additional reserve of hashrate: well, either way, where's the public trust? And what happens if your ASIC suddenly become useless? You are taking an enormous gamble with a lot of peoples' money by essentially hoping you're going to slip under the radar: you took the greedy route. What happens when someone gets greedy? Everybody else claws them back if they can.

As Tycho began approaching the halfway mark, there was concern: however, that was mitigated by the fact that all his miners could simply shut off or go somewhere else if it became clear that he was being naughty. In your case, this is not so. Two or three colluding people, or maybe just one, are sitting on a claimed 12TH and can easily decide to do all kinds of interesting things. Sure, it'd be obvious you're doing it, but the entire point is that people value Bitcoin for the trust in its distributed nature. Many people envisioned an inevitable distant future of participatory datacentres. You are forcing this centralization early but only by becoming it. Why do you think the results won't be a clusterf*ck for your investors?

What you're doing is asking us to trust you as people: but the nature of bitcoin is that trust is disincentivized! And better, trust is not necessary.

NOTE: I ask this as a potential investor looking into GLBSE offerings that I haven't yet. I didn't really know you guys existed.