Where do I download the wallet? There is wallet software, right?
No, put NODE server IP to your browser: NODE SERVER - http://5.45.124.65:19775/then use your password and that's it enjoy Ummm.. this is a p2p system, right? you know... decentralisation. You've just given me the link to a server. That is not my own wallet. Where is the software, so I can download and manage my own _secure_ wallet. |
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Nice to see this coin still going. Have we got any cool voting results yet?
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Boring clone. Anything new?
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Where do I download the wallet? There is wallet software, right?
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Where to download wallet?
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What is max NODE supply? is it on exchange? where can I buy?
Where to download wallet?
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Strong signals pointing upward.  |
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Thanks. Based on my research DRK seems to be winner of the anon alts. |
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Where can I find info on setting up masternode?
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Just want to learn more. What are the technical differences between Keycoin and Darkcoin?
Nice to see an inquisitive post for a change +1 Thanks. Have to be open minded in this space. |
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Just want to learn more. What are the technical differences between Keycoin and Darkcoin?
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Can I get some donation from infrastructure or marketing committee for this? I can add FIMK tomorrow morning (UTC+4).
Sure. The amount needs to be decided when we have seen the effect of your exchange, but I would estimate minimum of 100 000 FIM if your service is useful. 3) set up a FIM altcoin gateway and preconfigure FIMK with altcoin assets (example: BTC, DRK, LTC....). Users can then trade altcoins on the FIM platform. (benefits: gets users really using the system, increases mining fees, creates an exchange where all trades are in the open, so everyone knows their is no cheating by exchange) This has been in the works since early July. Unfortunately development is often slowed down by unforeseen circumstances, unless you do everything yourself, and there's just that much I can stretch to myself. Fantastic. Glad we are on the same page. Perhaps there's a way the community can help out. That is what we are here for. I am sure there are keen developers among us. You don't have to do everything yourself. 2) set up a FIM multipool that mines alt coins and buys FIM on exchanges (benefits: allows miners to obtain FIM and supports price). You know any competitive programmer / team capable and willing to do this, for a nice compensation? I might be able to dig a few up. Please PM me the details on the compensation. Also, someone from the community might volunteer. Nice to see things moving forward. |
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Thank you for the technical post. Hope this answers some.
Thanks for your productive response. I actually own both DRK and CLOAK, so want to understand the systems better. Obfuscation. You have to think about PoSA like tor.
1. We can black list malicious nodes and rely on the fact that there will be so many nodes on the network (unlike centralized masternodes) that the majority will not be spy nodes and to find any relevant data will be next to impossible. Nothing is 100% approaching limits is the best way to handle things.
You can only black list nodes if you can detect that they are doing something bad. There is no way to detect which nodes are the malicious nodes that are spying because other than recording transactions, they perform their duties perfectly and are upstanding citizens according to the protocol. However, they secretly record the links between transactions and publish them publicly elsewhere (example, their own de-anonomised block explorer). 2. Same question as 1
Indeed. 3. 2 levels out of a random selection. powers of two magnify probabilities of not being interfered with exponentially.
The problem is that 2^1 is only 2. To leverage the power of two, you need to add more layers of anonymity. For example, 8 or 10 steps, so you get 2^10 = 1024. However, the problem is that would slow down transactions too much. 4. Again the same questions
No. It's quite different. My 4th question is about someone stealing funds, not anonymity. Blacklisting is only a first defense and I have no idea if it is even going to be implemented, just a thought and it is a weak one. About layers of anon.. you forget that you have as many nodes as you have on the network to randomly be assigned to. It doesn't matter how many nodes there are. It only matters how many levels of mixing separate the outputs. We have already been thinking about ways of prevent nodes from knowing when a posa tx is incoming. Packet sniffing is an issue we are combating.
It sounds like it will be a problem. Is there are technical description of the protocol available yet? |
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I hope you do seriously think about these things because there are a few other large security risks I can see from this design.
So to all those in this thread who keep humming "we have working anonymity".....from my perspective, its not even close.
You will see us at blackhat. The internet isn't safe I'm afraid. Are you going to demonstrate an exploit or something at Blackhat? |
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Thank you for the technical post. Hope this answers some.
Thanks for your productive response. I actually own both DRK and CLOAK, so want to understand the systems better. Obfuscation. You have to think about PoSA like tor.
1. We can black list malicious nodes and rely on the fact that there will be so many nodes on the network (unlike centralized masternodes) that the majority will not be spy nodes and to find any relevant data will be next to impossible. Nothing is 100% approaching limits is the best way to handle things.
You can only black list nodes if you can detect that they are doing something bad. There is no way to detect which nodes are the malicious nodes that are spying because other than recording transactions, they perform their duties perfectly and are upstanding citizens according to the protocol. However, they secretly record the links between transactions and publish them publicly elsewhere (example, their own de-anonomised block explorer). 2. Same question as 1
Indeed. 3. 2 levels out of a random selection. powers of two magnify probabilities of not being interfered with exponentially.
The problem is that 2^1 is only 2. To leverage the power of two, you need to add more layers of anonymity. For example, 8 or 10 steps, so you get 2^10 = 1024. However, the problem is that would slow down transactions too much. 4. Again the same questions
No. It's quite different. My 4th question is about someone stealing funds, not anonymity. |
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Just reviewing the cloak coin anonymity claims. This is an interesting quote from the Whitepaper. "Again in the Phase 2 pass the originator and recipient are not recorded, instead the transaction occurs between the Phase 1 and Phase 2 nodes." My problem with this is: 1) the transaction are broadcast and, thus, propagated to all nodes. A malicious node could simply record all these transactions and easily publish the records linking the transactions. 2) the elected node could itself be a spy and publish records of these transactions for all transactions it pretends to anonymise. Further, there are a few other serious problems: 3) there are only two levels of mixing, which is hardly enough to provide any real guarantees 4) no mechanism is described that would prevent an anonymising node from stealing outputs 5) it is still easy to see between which nodes funds have transferred based on the amounts transferred. No mechanism is incorporated to split up the transfers into smaller units. Hopefully my concerns and questions can help put the discussion back on to a productive track. Thanks. |
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Not sure what to make of it. Will IPO investors become bag holders? The IPO goes until September, at which point there could be 100Mil ETH....
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How much can be mined per month with a single Masternode?
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Thanks!
NXT-ZL4V-6FUC-AAWZ-GT68H
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