Another reason that direct blockchain transaction will never be used at the point of sale is that they are far too inflexible. Doing the sale from an account through a clearing house allows for all kinds of problems to be resolved befor the transaction hits the blockchain - e.g. reversals, refunds, revisions. They also provide value added services like insuring the transaction, use of store cards etc etc. Do you think there's only one kind of blockchain transaction?
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Spending a paper wallet means bringing the entire balance online. The right way to do cold storage is with offline signing.
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As you may notice the pumping bulls are starting to get scared, we aren't going to see all time highs ever again. Bitcoin will level off and media attention will die off since we're the only reason it was there to begin with was because we were in a period of expontential growth.
People will look back in 3 years time and laugh about how a virtual currency with so many intrinsic flaws managed achieve a market cap of over 12 billion.
Cryptocurrencies may be the future, but it will not be bitcoin. You need to work on your trolling. C-
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Since they never had the private key no one will ever have the private key so any coins sent to that address are lost forever.
inb4 somebody quibbles about the odds not being exactly zero.
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We shouldn't be celebrating crony capitalism. Regulations and taxes that are selectively enforced against smaller competitors to the mega-corps are not better than regulations and taxes that apply to everyone.
Right, and the answer is to end the regulations and taxes. The problem with uneven oppression is not that certain people aren't oppressed enough.
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What's wrong with QT? It has been audited to an extreme. Armory is great with the paper wallets but putting a wallet.dat into cold storage should be ok.
Can you sign transactions offline with Bitcoin-Qt?
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I think a more important question here is why are you buying coffee at Starfucks? Good for them.
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do you think this was all played ? create some panic people start selling and some big hands eats the weak hands ?
Welcome to Bitcoin.
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Use Armory - it has offline transaction signing.
Paper wallets are only secure until it's time to spend them.
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The only reason I've never created paper wallets is that I'm scared of sending them through my printer. I've heard that newer printers keep data or could have bugs... What is the best way to print securely?
Forget about the printer - you should be worried about the security implications of exactly what is needed to spend your paper wallet.
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Word of caution: after you enter a wallet's private key into any online service that wallet is no longer secure. You should considering transferring all the coins it holds out then not using that wallet again. Word of caution: a wallet is not an address.
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Miners would be the ones breaking old insecure keys.
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Good news coming from these sources makes me suspect a large dump coming soon.
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It's as amusing to myself to dissect your jokes as it is for you to ridicule my belief system.
Ridicule is the price one pays for irrational approaches to truth. Nobody has ever complained about someone else ridiculing their belief in the height of Mt Everest. Since Mt Everest is a real thing that actually exists, we can just go measure it. No faith required there - that's only required when you're talking about imaginary things.
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I am thinking of not putting a filesystem at all on the medium and moving everything with dd, raw blocks in, raw blocks out, then piping all data to sha256sum check first on the online machine(yes there will probably be buffer overflows), for transaction data, I will be even careful by read and check 64 -128 bytes a time to prevent buffer overflows.
That would probably be fine, as long as your medium isn't a USB drive. Basically any data transfer medium that has circuitry embedded in it certainly isn't safe. Purely passive mediums like CDRs might be safe.
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And how do you move the Armory installation itself to the offline machine? Burn it to a CD. There's probably a lower chance of malicious data on a burned CD having the ability to execute a hardware-level compromise. Probably.
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it's a big IF since usb always has firmware.
trezor is a great attempt at minimizing the attack surface by designing duty-built hardware. it's a shame that they chose usb instead of serial, imo.
USB doesn't inherently need firmware, any more than a serial port does. It's just easier to build programmable devices because you can fix bugs in software instead of hardware. The cost is that a general purpose computer is capable of any computation, and that's a giant attack surface. I'd feel better about the hardware wallet projects if I saw the teams involved take this issue very seriously and go back to the roots of computing - custom-built electronic circuits that preform exactly one task, not general purpose programmable computers which can be repurposed by an attacker.
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Make sure you have a well-connected node.
After you first see a transaction, wait X seconds and look for double spend attacks.
If no double spend attacks have occurred yet, then you can assume the odds the transaction you want will be included in a block instead of a conflicting transaction is at least Y%.
Don't ask me how to calculate X and Y, but if you can accurately estimate Y then you can just increase your price by n*(1-Y) to cover expected losses from double spends. Where n is the fraction of customers who try to scam you.
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I have faith that Jesus walked on water. I just kind of figured it was winter.
There is no evidence it was winter. WTF does evidence have to do with fairy tales?
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