Appears the bubble finally popped.
The central bank of Bitcoin (aka pirate) was steering the market, and you think that some bubble has popped? In the last few days, there have been several attempts to steer the market, and after each intervention, the market did stay bullish. Do you really think, that this is the way how a bubble should look like? Nice, I'm glad we're correcting.
lol, judging by your nick, I would have never guessed that you are a keynesian.
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I tried to figure out how the win calculation is done on BTCDice. Example: http://btcdice.com/details.html?q=8183Processed Time: 2012-07-20 09:54:27 Processed Time: 2012-07-20 09:52:03 Key Date: 7202012 Bet: lessthan 48000 Bet TX: c7bd37655431824053e4aab796feb0e1b72ea1786bd1604ad091c0a7c33ca985 Payment TX: 392592eeade96445887f4c7382bf5466fbc6ad8c97ef724f5fdcbb28f57bdca9 Paid to Address: 15pgcDLLJBzQLTjy2F6oo7iaymRnrFv5if Payment TX Status: CONFIRMED Bet Amount: 1.00000000 Outcome: WIN Payment: 1.31050550 Lucky Number: 25067 less than 48000 1BTCDiceLs79syendE1DM1XCaHcKkzBNnP 73.2422% 1.333x 1.650% 98.35% 0.0100 100.0000 133.0000 The calculation works this way: result = 1.0 BTC * 1.3333 * 0.9835 - 0.0005 BTC
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I see your points. How about this: First step is creating a transaction as it is now. After this the client creates a combined transaction with other unconfirmed and uncombined transaction. This combined one is almost like of a double spend on the first one, so legacy miners would ignore it. Now other clients upon seeing this combined transaction, check if they can sign it, and will do so if necessary. Once all inputs in the combined transaction are signed, a miner can replace all those single transaction by the combined one.
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One more point, while casascius method would extremely bloat the block chain, mine could actually reduce the size.
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Well, my proposal wasn't to mix 2 transactions, but maybe 10, or even 50. And then once you add the change addresses (at least 1 per wallet), it is no longer so easy to figure out what was used for what, and what belongs to what.
Couldn't you say the same thing about this mixing? It could be expanded pretty easily to have Alice's mix offer be "Hey, I'm running a 5 BTC mixing party. Let's get everyone in on this same transaction." If a lot of people are throwing in their 2's and 3's, it'll get difficult to find the original pairs. Not really, because once I do my 100btc transaction, I have to combine all those in my own wallet. So mine are again identifiable as mine. The "bad" operation is to actual combine. So my idea was, make the combine operation more anonymously.
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Bitcoin is really a hackers dream.
Last year, some hacker managed to steal huge funds from mybitcoin.com. How got blamed? The operator of mybitcoin.com. No one cared about the actual hacker. This year, a hacker stole 45k from Bitcoinica. Everyone blamed the operators. The owners replaced the funds. No one cared about the actual hacker. Now recently more funds where stolen from Bitcoinica. MtGox even knows who the hacker is, but "of course" cannot share this information. So same thing as every time, no one cares about the actual hacker. Everyone blames the operators and tries to lynch them.
Conclusion: In the Bitcoin world it is OK to steal, the blame will always be on the victim. A hacker can even use his real name and real address, and still no one cares. Blame and lawsuits are always on the victims...
And how is that different from cash, exactly ? Hack a USD bank, lose your life. Hack a BTC bank, lose your OTC reputation lol Now that would be a great development, because currently we have it this way: Hack a USD bank, lose your life. Hack a BTC bank, be completely ignored and happily spend the coins.
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One of the biggest issues is that once you make a transfer you combine coins from multiple addresses and as a result those can be identified as one wallet. I think casascius proposal addresses this only to some extent. If after mixing coins I again have to combine I have gained nothing. How about we do it different: Whenever I want to make a transaction, my client sends this out as a "transaction-indent", other clients that are also about to do a transaction combine their "indent" with mine (adding inputs and outputs) and after a few seconds, we all sign this combined indent to form a transaction. This would make it impossible to identify a single wallet, because inputs from multiple wallets would end up in a single transaction. And secondary, on one would know which input was the initiator for which output. Your comments?
The reason this coin mixing strategy reveals that addresses belong to the same wallet is because of addition. Let's say you see a tx with inputs of value 2, 3, 1, and 5. The outputs are of value 5, 5, and 1. It's pretty easy to tell, knowing that this is a mixing tx, that the 2 and 3 came from the same source and that the 1 and 5 came from the same source. We also know that the output of 1 belongs to the owner of the previous 1 and 5 tx's. What we've gained is not knowing who owns each 5 output. With your proposed solution of just having two transactions per transaction, we still have the same problem. Let's say Alice is paying 3 BTC using inputs of size 2 and 2. Bob has another transaction where he pays 10 BTC with a 3 and a 7. Inputs: 2 2 3 7 Outputs: 3 1 10 It's still pretty easy to distinguish between the transactions. Clearly, one person owns the 2 and 2 input addresses, and someone else owns the 3 and 7 addresses. We can still tell that addresses are related. With both ideas, the only way to avoid this is to have equally sized inputs (which is difficult when bitcoins are divisible down to 8 decimal places). Inputs: 1 4 4 2 Outputs: 5 6 Now there's two possible solutions. 1 4 4 2 or 1 4 4 2. Casascius' idea of limiting mixing sizes to 5^n would help ensure that after the first mixing, each output should be of a fixed size. That should help reduce these concerns. Getting back to the original issue: yes, using this mixing to combine coins would still often show that some of the source addresses are held by the same person. The strength is that that knowledge cannot be used to track future transactions. You become detached from your past, breaking any string of transactions people might be using to track you. Now, if you have 0.3 and 0.7 unspent tx's, and you happen to come across someone else with exactly 0.3 and 0.7, you can make it uncertain that you own both addresses. Well, my proposal wasn't to mix 2 transactions, but maybe 10, or even 50. And then once you add the change addresses (at least 1 per wallet), it is no longer so easy to figure out what was used for what, and what belongs to what.
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One of the biggest issues is that once you make a transfer you combine coins from multiple addresses and as a result those can be identified as one wallet. I think casascius proposal addresses this only to some extent. If after mixing coins I again have to combine I have gained nothing. How about we do it different: Whenever I want to make a transaction, my client sends this out as a "transaction-indent", other clients that are also about to do a transaction combine their "indent" with mine (adding inputs and outputs) and after a few seconds, we all sign this combined indent to form a transaction. This would make it impossible to identify a single wallet, because inputs from multiple wallets would end up in a single transaction. And secondary, on one would know which input was the initiator for which output. Your comments?
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Or it was transferred to Accrum Exchange and used to buy Liberty Reserve.
I think Aurum Exchange is not that anonymously. If this was the case, they could probably identify the hacker, once given some information. But because all information that could lead to the hacker is classified by MtGox we will never know. The idea that the thief did a wire transfer to their personal bank account is just stupid.
I agree, but even then, have you ever seen single police investigation in Bitcoin land? There have been a number of heists and not a single one. So why now? Why do you believe, that it will be different this time? BTW, it is still be possible that one of the involved parties (Consultancy,Zhou,Tihan,...) was withdrawing. The community could recognize some account number or anything. I doubt that some complete Bitcoin-virgin that did steal this. I give you an example: someone recognized Zhou exchanging some 40k$ LR to RMB for some bad rate in a hurry a day after the theft. Zhou said it was unrelated, but this shows that a community can recognize way more than some astonished local Japanese police officer.
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I think you missed this: As I said we know how and where the USD moved, so yes.
They know to whom the funds have been transferred. Where does not equal whom. We have no idea what method of withdrawal was used for the USD, but it';s unlikely that the hacker tried to get it payed into their bank account. While unlikely, we don't know it. Keep in mind, that all those more or less anonymous withdraws take weeks, so either MtGox helped to speed this up, in which case they very much know with whom they dealt, or yes it was redrawn to some bank account.
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Can't it just be itself and worth what people would make it worth? I know I'm not explaining myself correctly probably. Like what is the real benefit of bitcoin over the dollar? It is not backed or insured....is it just the "idea" of having an underground money? It is not like I can go out food shopping and pay with bitcoin. I'm just curious...what people have to say.
Ok. Say I don't have any bitcoins. I also don't want to mine for them. How can I get them? I suggest that there is no way to answer this question that doesn't imply a BTC to USD (or EUR, etc.) exchange rate. I perform coding services for BTC. Cool, I pay you 1BTC per 1000hr coding work. OK? No? Why? Oh, exchange rate again.
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Wow, I wasn't aware that you can withdraw 40kBTC and 40kUSD while having an anonymous account at MtGox. The same MtGox that is known for their extensively KYC and AML... Maybe you know something that we dont?
It wasn't an anonymous account which withdrew the money. It was the Bitcoinica account which had trusted status - at one point the limits for trusted status were $100,000 and BTC 40,000 daily. They've been revised since then and yet again after the hack. you need to remember that as far as MtGox's computer was concerned it was Bitoinica making the withdrawals and Bitcoinica had a history of moving large amounts on and off MtGox. It's possible that there even more funds in the Bitcoinica account but the hacker was unable to access them because of the daily limits. I think you missed this: As I said we know how and where the USD moved, so yes.
They know to whom the funds have been transferred.
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...
As I said we know how and where the USD moved, so yes.
And about the Bitcoins, it would have been easy for MtGox to tell us the transaction ID, but they choose to astonish some Japanese police officer with such information, IF they even filed that report.
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And so eventually somewhere in this MtGox account thread they stated that they do, but don't share this information publicly.
They said they were filing a report with the police and could not publicly discuss the information they had while the matter was being investigated. They did not say that they knew who the hacker was. They said they knew where the transactions went. That information may allow the hacker to be traced but it doesn't mean that MtGox is aware of their identity. Wow, I wasn't aware that you can withdraw 40kBTC and 40kUSD while having an anonymous account at MtGox. The same MtGox that is known for their extensively KYC and AML... Maybe you know something that we dont?
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only a year later
Matthew, one year? Most of us are already used to Matthew Time(tm) so let me recap this for you: 1 week of 4 letter acronyms UABB, bitmoling, changing whole Korea and whatnot 1 week of bittalk.tv (see Christmas is not really a mathematical exact date) 1 week of BitcoinMagazin (sometimes a week can feel like half a year...) Currently we are in your 4th week, waiting for the Ellet (I think this week will also feel like half a year) So you managed 5000 posts in 3 and a half week. Congratulation!
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This has happened with Mt. Gox last year (Gox was blamed) as well. The issue is not so much blaming the victim, as blaming the only identificable source of error (try tracking down these hackers...).
This time MtGox even knows who has stolen the funds. Does that change anything? Apparently not! Where have they said that? Regular customers have to wait weeks to get their funds out, but the hacker managed do withdraw this in an instant. So of course, MtGox knows them. And so eventually somewhere in this MtGox account thread they stated that they do, but don't share this information publicly.
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Psychologically, they already know they lost their money to the hacker and know they aren't getting it back. They feel better about blaming someone else (the operator) so they don't feel as stupid about it. The more they whine about the operator not doing a good enough job, the better they will feel, and start to forget about their own stupidity. Even though it's the hackers fault for all of this, everyone knows catching them and getting their BTC back is never going to realistically happen.
Tell yourself a lie long enough, and even you will start to believe it.
First I thought like you. But this time the hacker is known, according to MtGox. But still they blame and try to sue the operator, and don't care about the actual thief. So I think it is more symptomatic than it is self-deception.
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And your point is?
If you are stupid and leave a briefcase full of cash out in the public square, you SHOULD be blamed when it gets stolen.
It was more like this: a burglar breaks into your hours, and you call the police, they will not investigate but tell you: "you should have had 10 foot concrete walls around your house, but your where only 3 foot, so it your fault. now go to jail".
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This has happened with Mt. Gox last year (Gox was blamed) as well. The issue is not so much blaming the victim, as blaming the only identificable source of error (try tracking down these hackers...).
This time MtGox even knows who has stolen the funds. Does that change anything? Apparently not!
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