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Looks like the mempool site went down for a bit.
The blockchair chart appears to be fine though. I'm not too sure about the updating interval but it looks like it dips to zero today which could be due to them not displaying the transaction count on 23/2/2021.
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It has RBF enabled. If you want it to be confirmed faster, you can increase the fees by executing a RBF transaction to replace it with another transaction with a higher fee. Your transaction is roughly 10vMB below the tip of the mempool with 77satoshis/vbyte. It can be confirmed in a day or two if the transaction volume drops. I would recommend you to wait. |
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What is the longest I should wait?
What wallet are you using? Some wallets will rebroadcast the transactions till it confirms so it never gets dropped. Are you using 0.00010934BTC/KB or is that the total fee paid? If it's per KB, then it could be confirmed within a reasonable period of time. |
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Sorry for being a complete noob here, but when you say I need to load the .key file, how do you do this? I think you mean that I need to:
- Open a new wallet
- Import Private Keys
- Import File -> select that .key text file that I have
- Let it sync?
Export the wallet in the form of an unencrypted .key backup. You won't be able to synchronize the wallet, it's deprecated for a long time. |
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It's a MultiBit Classic file. You can download MultiBit Classic and load the .key file to restore the wallet, export it unencrypted and sweep into another wallet.
HCP made a post here about decrypting it without MultiBit Classic:https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5304446.msg55964982#msg55964982.
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It's probably password protected. You need to export the file unencrypted for the private keys to be in plaintext.
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You won't exactly know.
Typical CoinJoin transaction has many inputs and many outputs. The outputs usually have quite a few that are of the same amount. Chipmixer also does this, but they split it into many addresses with a common denomination. You'd want to explore Wasabi wallet, they have a convenient system for the coordinator for CoinJoin.
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Sure, they are hardened against side channel attacks, but they are also vulnerable to different attacks which airgapped, encrypted, cold storage is not vulnerable to. Seed phrases can be extracted from Trezor devices, and Ledger devices had a critical bug which would allow bitcoin to be stolen when the user was interacting with an altcoin, for example. Neither of these are possible against a well set up cold storage device.
Is there any research done on physical attacks to exploit the OS or the wallet software to glitch it to reveal the seeds or any sensitive info? I don't think Electrum (in this case) can be immune to such bugs, I mean JSON RPC was unencrypted for a long time. Is it possible for the attacker to clone the disk/sd card to have access to the encrypted storage to bruteforce? There is no perfect solution for bitcoin storage, and each has its own pros and cons. But writing off cold storage because of incredibly difficult and rare attacks such as an attacker listening to the speed of your computer fan is incorrect, when by far and away the most likely way to lose your coins is through user mistake, simple malware (such as clipboard malware), or physical coercion.
I don't think cold storage is insecure by any means. I've only switched to ColdCard because it is something like a cold storage while being way easier to use. It's slightly annoying to have to start my RPi up to make my transactions every time. Side channel defenses are just the icing on the cake. I would argue that the plausible deniability of cold storage can outperform that of a hardware wallet. With a cold storage device I can use hidden volumes to decrypt fake or misleading "sensitive" data much in the same way that a passphrase on a hardware wallet can lead to fake or misleading wallets, and in both cases I can keep my main sensitive data/wallet completely hidden. The difference is with a cold storage device I could be hiding anything, from bank details to business accounts to wikileaks data etc., whereas with a hardware wallet, it is immediately obvious that I am hiding cryptocurrency.
I agree. |
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You are right, I didn't phrase it good. I wanted to refer to those considering hardware wallets safer than cold storage.
Imho cold storage is safer because you can have much more control on what happens there and which in most cases you don't really need to update, versus hardware wallets which are not all open source, which can have bugs and hidden flaws (them or the wallets installed).
Both hardware wallets and cold storage are geared to defend against any traditional malware attacks and both can do so relatively well. It's a stretch to say that cold storage is safer. Most hardware wallets are audited regularly, even at times by competitors who obviously have an interest to exploit each other's devices. Vulnerabilities can happen with cold storage as well, they are not immune to it. There are hardware wallets which acts like an air gapped storage as well, like ColdCard but with the added benefit of it being easier to use as well as it being hardened against side channel. In terms of the theoretical exploitation surface, it could be argued that having a hardware wallet which is specifically designed for storing Bitcoins safely is better than a person with little to no knowledge having to set up one themselves and exposing it to unnecessary risks. Open source ≠ free of exploits. Companies like Ledger operates like a corporation with specific NDAs to follow. If you don't like to use devices that are not open source, avoid them. Plenty of HW wallets which are open source still. |
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IMO, academicians have to make money for something and they invent and investigate all possible kind of attacks on on air gapped computers which will never happen in practice if your device is behind the walls of your home. I think there is no need to worry about of all those attacks described in scientific articles.
They do not invent attacks. Theoractical attacks are discovered with substantiated evidence that it is possible. I don't think it's bad to be researching on these to highlight the possible loopholes? Indeed. I keep reading about people claiming that cold storage is not safe and show big list of possible attacks.
A 5$ wrench attack is much more likely than all those together.
I don't think anyone goes as far to say that cold storage isn't safe. I've mostly seen people highlighting the focus of hardware wallets and the hardened nature of them against more novel attacks. If you are that conscious about security, then you could possibly get a hardware wallet shipped through a reshipper and do some simple auditing by yourself and could probably give you a peace of mind. $5 wrench attack is much more likely and that is why most HW wallets have plausible deniability built into it as well. Don't think it's fair to shoot down hardware wallets like that; they do still provide much more protection against sidechannel attacks which is what you would be concerned about if you're absolutely paranoid. Using a drop address or a PO box for the shipping would be necessary as well. |
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If you do not have sole control of the private keys, then it is reasonable to assume that you were never in control of any Bitcoins at any point in time.
I don't see the point of the "miner" selling you the wallet without giving you any directions to retrieve it. What did you mean by Blockchain says otherwise? Did he give you an address or something?
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I think "blindly trusting" is not a good choice of words. I do believe that they're capable of making a good HW, but I won't blindly trust them. I will still critize them if they make lots of mistakes and stop using them if they go south.
Just like what happened to Ledger, I do think their HW is a good device, but their recent data leaks shows that Ledger needs to fix a lot of things to gain "trust" from its users again.
As I've mentioned over and over again, if you are not capable of reading the codes, then you have no choice. Firmware codes are usually fairly long and it would take forever for normal users to attempt to audit them and probably won't even find anything wrong if there even is. I wouldn't go to the extent of blindly trusting them but I would rather find hardware wallets that are more used than those which are less known. Ledger is not a great example; the problem is with their purchasing system but nothing is wrong with their devices that caused the leak. Auditing the firmware would definitely not prevent that, taking proactive steps to protect your privacy will. |
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The server returned an error when broadcasting the transaction.
Consider trying to connect to a different server, or updating Electrum.
mempool min fee not met
I assume that you're paying the fees in the single digit per byte? When looking at the transaction information on Blockchair, do you see Replace by Fee: Yes or No? |
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Are you using TrustedCoin 2FA? Electrum 4.0.9 is working perfectly fine for me. Did you freeze any of the inputs as well? You can try installing the previous versions here: https://download.electrum.org/. |
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Whitelisting Electrum addresses isn't effective as the restriction only applies in the client and anyone with your 12 word seeds can still send the funds anywhere.
However, you can save addresses that you are planning to send to frequently. Go to View>Show Contacts. Go to the tab and right click in the space, you can add addresses with a name. Right click on them and you can select Pay to to send the funds to that address.
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I transfer to CoinPayments. Using your advices I wrote them, and they informed me of their cancelation. They say nothing was transfer even though my wallet say othrwise. One of their suggestion was my wallet is not sync. could it be? What should I do to sync it?
Can you check the bubble at the bottom right corner? Is it red or green? Do you see the transaction in the History tab? Can you right click it, go to Copy>Transaction ID and paste it into blockchair.com. Does the transaction show up as unconfirmed or confirmed? |
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Do you remember that you use a 2FA feature before?
The 12 words seed you have might be generated with 2FA enabled?
The seed version should indicate that it is a 2FA seed isn't it? Electrum automatically detects that. |
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Assuming that you're using a BIP39 word list, the number of possible permutation is 2048^12. Which is about 5.444x10^39. The actual security of the keys comes down to about 128bits, after excluding the checksum at the end. If you can bruteforce a million keys a second, it will take you approximately 1.7262811 x 10^26 years to finish the key space or 8.6314055 x 10^25 years for half of the key space.
Using a longer seed phrase is possible and will definitely lower the risk even more. It will just be a hassle to store such a long seed phrase while providing a little extra security.
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Is your paper wallet damaged by any chance? Did you try scanning using the QR code?
On Bitaddress.org, there's a wallet details tab. If you were to enter your private key there, does it show your address? Do it offline of course.
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Pruned nodes only keeps the information that is relevant to the wallet and discards everything else. You cannot switch wallets when running a pruned node.
I assuming with the reindex that you're currently doing, you have turned the pruning off? If so, you can switch the wallets whenever you like, with a quick rescan of course. You can just replace the wallet.dat in the data directory, or if you have several you can just put all of them in the data directory and naming each of them differently (wallet1.dat, wallet2.dat, etc). You can open them by clicking on the file at the top left and go to Open Wallet in Bitcoin Core. You should be able to switch the wallet.dat as and when you like.
Bitcoin Core should automatically do a rescan and that can take several minutes to an hour. It should show rescanning... with the start up screen.
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