Bitcoin Forum
December 11, 2017, 07:22:51 PM *
News: Latest stable version of Bitcoin Core: 0.15.1  [Torrent].
 
   Home   Help Search Donate Login Register  
Pages: « 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 [12] 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 »
  Print  
Author Topic: The Ethereum Paradox  (Read 84027 times)
TPTB_need_war
Sr. Member
****
Offline Offline

Activity: 420


View Profile
February 17, 2016, 02:46:09 PM
 #221

I believe I have figured out what Fuserleer's design is doing based on re-reading the descriptions above.

I believe what he is attempting is to define a data structure wherein he can partition double-spends so that they can not cross-partition each other. In other words, once there is a double-spend, instead of discarding it (and unrelated transactions in the same chain), he isolates those transactions which depend on the double-spend and prevents them from cross-pollinating each other in derivative transactions.

The problem with this of course is it ruins the incentive to converge. It becomes a divergent block chain where the incentive is to double-spend and create forks (within the same system).

I cannot speak for Fuserleer, but I can say that this is how the design I am writing up works. Double spends do not create orphaned branches, they simply become invalid and subsequent, unrelated transactions process as normal. Therefore, you cannot create a divergent mess by double spending, because they can coexist within the DAG - this is only possible because of the eventual total order.

The system must have some means of converging on a consensus choice amongst competing double-spends.

Your thread is a discussion about that. We don't need to repeat that discussion here. I urge readers to click that link if they want to read what is being discussed about whether there could be an alternative to Iota/DAG, which is mathematical model which I assert the control of must be centralized in order to not diverge.

Advertised sites are not endorsed by the Bitcoin Forum. They may be unsafe, untrustworthy, or illegal in your jurisdiction. Advertise here.
1513020171
Hero Member
*
Offline Offline

Posts: 1513020171

View Profile Personal Message (Offline)

Ignore
1513020171
Reply with quote  #2

1513020171
Report to moderator
monsterer
Legendary
*
Offline Offline

Activity: 1008


View Profile
February 17, 2016, 02:48:35 PM
 #222

The system must have some means of converging on a consensus choice amongst competing double-spends.

Your thread is a discussion about that. We don't need to repeat that discussion here.

Eventual total ordering.
TPTB_need_war
Sr. Member
****
Offline Offline

Activity: 420


View Profile
February 17, 2016, 03:04:13 PM
 #223

The system must have some means of converging on a consensus choice amongst competing double-spends.

Your thread is a discussion about that. We don't need to repeat that discussion here.

Eventual total ordering.

In the meantime, payers need to know where to place their transactions in the DAG so the transactions don't become eventually invalid. And payees need to know NOW which transactions to honor. Please quote my reply and post your reply in your thread, not in this thread.

I copied this post to your thread. Please continue to there. Please.

TPTB_need_war
Sr. Member
****
Offline Offline

Activity: 420


View Profile
February 17, 2016, 03:04:52 PM
 #224

Apparently programmable block chains will be useful for decentralized financial and business logic, such as for example decentralized crowdfunding and Augur-like decentralized prediction markets.

The key is to understand that such scripts when enforced by the block chain are able to enforce invariants which an external scripting (CounterParty?) of an asset and data storage block chain (e.g. Bitcoin) could not enforce. An example of such an invariant is not releasing the crowdfunds until X percent of the funders have agreed that the necessary milestone has been achieved. It seems in most cases the utility of scripting will involve some crowdsourced decision as opposed to the authoritative judges society uses now.

There are two main points I want to make about the future of scriptable block chains.

1. The currency they use will end up being which every crypto currency is the most popular. Arguing that Bitcoin doesn't qualify because it lacks certains features (e.g. fast transactions) is arguing the Bitcoin won't be the most popular crypto currency. Thus I think it is unlikely ETH will be that currency, because another crypto currency will become more popular sooner.

2. The consensus network (block chain) design will be the most crucial feature for a scriptable block chain. The VM and all that is mostly just noise and experimentation will eventually settle on what is the most efficient. Whereas the consensus design will determine which system wins this technology space.



Ukraine plans to trial an Ethereum Blockchain-based election platform. I hate to gloat, but maybe Ethereum isn't the useless shitcoin that people here have been calling it?

The issue is not the concept of scriptable block chains, but rather Ethereum's piss poor, overly hyped plans for implementing a consensus algorithm.

You speculators need to learn the distinction.

Come-from-Beyond
Legendary
*
Online Online

Activity: 1792

Newbie


View Profile
February 17, 2016, 03:16:47 PM
 #225

which I assert the control of must be centralized in order to not diverge.

BTW, do you know that the money is impossible in a completely decentralized world? Because a monetary system can exist only within boundaries of an economic cluster which implies a non-zero level of centralization around the core.
TPTB_need_war
Sr. Member
****
Offline Offline

Activity: 420


View Profile
February 17, 2016, 03:42:16 PM
 #226

That's the dichotomy at hand

There is no dichotomy in the case of strict partitions for asset transfers. I will not repeat myself again.

Then, lets agree to disagree.

Afaics, my point was unarguable. I already explained why. Strict partitions can coexist in a block with other transactions without causing the block to be invalid. The block becomes orthogonal to whether any of the partitions in it are valid or not. The key point is that the partition for which the block producer is guaranteeing is valid (i.e. has validated) has to be truth, else that block producer will lose his block reward if another subsequent block offers a proof-of-cheating on that partition. You can think of these proofs as equivalent to not mining on that chain in Bitcoin where Bitcoin has only one partition. Subsequent blocks can correct any deficiencies with proof-of-cheating, thus any cascade of lies is contained within the partition and can be corrected at any time by any proof-of-cheating. Same as for Bitcoin, the users of the currency have to trust full nodes but they should only trust a confirmation which was betting its block reward on that partition the user is relying on.

So in effect what this does is interleave a merge mining of separate "chains" into one block chain, one "chain" for each partition.

You made the assumption that the only way for block producers to veto a lie, is to not mine on the chain that contains the lie. But as you see, there are more flexible possibilities for a design.

I don't know if it is also very useful, yet it does stand as an exception to your desire to pigeon-hole the analysis. I try to have a flexible mind and consider all possible angles.

TPTB_need_war
Sr. Member
****
Offline Offline

Activity: 420


View Profile
February 17, 2016, 03:49:03 PM
 #227

which I assert the control of must be centralized in order to not diverge.

BTW, do you know that the money is impossible in a completely decentralized world? Because a monetary system can exist only within boundaries of an economic cluster which implies a non-zero level of centralization around the core.

What I am driving at is that the economics of consensus MUST be centralized due to economies-of-scale which drive the power-law distribution of wealth.

Yet I am asserting (and designing) that it may be possible to decentralize control over the centralized aspects of consensus, by making the decentralized control UNeconomic for profit (yet economic for purpose, e.g. the Nash equilibrium of getting your transactions on the longest chain).

I am thinking Satoshi's PoW, the PoS systems I have seen, and Iota conflate the two issues above such that the control becomes centralized along with the other aspects which are forced to be centralized by the economics of profit.

In other words, I am stratifying economics into profitable activities and purposeful activities. Pure profit will always be won by those with the highest economies-of-scale (and the most corrupt connections).

monsterer
Legendary
*
Offline Offline

Activity: 1008


View Profile
February 17, 2016, 03:51:32 PM
 #228

The block becomes orthogonal to whether any of the partitions in it are valid or not. The key point is that the partition for which the block producer is guaranteeing is valid (i.e. has validated) has to be truth, else that block producer will lose his block reward if another subsequent block offers a proof-of-cheating on that partition.

Can you rephrase that statement? I'm having trouble parsing it; it sounds like you are saying opposite things one after the other.
TPTB_need_war
Sr. Member
****
Offline Offline

Activity: 420


View Profile
February 17, 2016, 03:58:24 PM
 #229

The block becomes orthogonal to whether any of the partitions in it are valid or not. The key point is that the partition for which the block producer is guaranteeing is valid (i.e. has validated) has to be truth, else that block producer will lose his block reward if another subsequent block offers a proof-of-cheating on that partition.

Can you rephrase that statement? I'm having trouble parsing it; it sounds like you are saying opposite things one after the other.

The block producer makes sure his partition (the one he is validating) is valid. Thus he will never lose his block rewards. He marks the block as only guaranteeing the partition(s) he has validated, so any other partitions included are informational but not Nash equilibrium confirmations. Re-read my prior post with that in mind. Again this is only valid for strict partitions (no cross-partition) transactions system.

The partitions can be thought of as separate block chains, that have been interleaved into one block chain with orthogonality between them. It is a more granular generalization of merge mining, because each block producer can choose which partition(s) he is validating and risking his block reward on in terms of the Nash equilibrium. Since all partitions eventually get confirmed by a block producer, then the overall Nash equilibrium is sustained on the coin's external market value.

monsterer
Legendary
*
Offline Offline

Activity: 1008


View Profile
February 17, 2016, 04:09:20 PM
 #230

The block producer makes sure his partition (the one he is validating) is valid. Thus he will never lose his block rewards. He marks the block as only guaranteeing the partition(s) he has validated, so any other partitions included are informational but not Nash equilibrium confirmations. Re-read my prior post with that in mind. Again this is only valid for strict partitions (no cross-partition) transactions system.

I think my point still applies. What is his incentive to include more than the single partition he is validating in his blocks?
TPTB_need_war
Sr. Member
****
Offline Offline

Activity: 420


View Profile
February 17, 2016, 04:20:17 PM
 #231

The block producer makes sure his partition (the one he is validating) is valid. Thus he will never lose his block rewards. He marks the block as only guaranteeing the partition(s) he has validated, so any other partitions included are informational but not Nash equilibrium confirmations. Re-read my prior post with that in mind. Again this is only valid for strict partitions (no cross-partition) transactions system.

I think my point still applies. What is his incentive to include more than the single partition he is validating in his blocks?

He has to implicitly (whether or not he includes the latest update to that other unvalidated partition) when he builds his block at the end of the chain that includes that other unvalidated partition. Longest chain wins so he won't want to ignore that last block. His block reward doesn't hinge on whether that latest (before the current or new) block contained a valid partition (assuming it is not the partition the current or new block is declaring to be valid).

Convoluted to write, but not convoluted in my mind. Seems quite simple. Some of the convoluted stuff on the 140+ IQ level of a Raven's matrices IQ test is more convoluted.

Edit: think of it as multiplexing while maintaining a holistic Nash equilibrium.

monsterer
Legendary
*
Offline Offline

Activity: 1008


View Profile
February 17, 2016, 04:32:39 PM
 #232

He has to implicitly (whether or not he includes the latest update to that other unvalidated partition) when he builds his block at the end of the chain that includes that other unvalidated partition. Longest chain wins so he won't want to ignore that last block.

By building on top of another partition's block, he increases the risk that his block will be orphaned because he cannot tell if it contains a double spend. For him it is better not to build on the best block at all, but to maintain his own partitioned chain of blocks.
TPTB_need_war
Sr. Member
****
Offline Offline

Activity: 420


View Profile
February 17, 2016, 04:34:29 PM
 #233

He has to implicitly (whether or not he includes the latest update to that other unvalidated partition) when he builds his block at the end of the chain that includes that other unvalidated partition. Longest chain wins so he won't want to ignore that last block.

By building on top of another partition's block, he increases the risk that his block will be orphaned because he has cannot tell if it contains a double spend. For him it is better not to build on the best block at all, but to maintain his own partitioned chain of blocks.

The partitions are strictly independent. Remember that.

Okay monsterer really. I must end this now. I am 100% certain my point is unarguable.

monsterer
Legendary
*
Offline Offline

Activity: 1008


View Profile
February 17, 2016, 04:40:22 PM
 #234

He has to implicitly (whether or not he includes the latest update to that other unvalidated partition) when he builds his block at the end of the chain that includes that other unvalidated partition. Longest chain wins so he won't want to ignore that last block.

By building on top of another partition's block, he increases the risk that his block will be orphaned because he has cannot tell if it contains a double spend. For him it is better not to build on the best block at all, but to maintain his own partitioned chain of blocks.

The partitions are strictly independent. Remember that.

Okay monsterer really. I must end this now. I am 100% certain my point is unarguable.

They are not independent when you combine them like that with the LCR rule. You must see that? Every block that partition A builds on top of partition B's block is essentially a merger of partitions A and B.
tromp
Hero Member
*****
Offline Offline

Activity: 505


View Profile
February 17, 2016, 04:49:56 PM
 #235

The partitions are strictly independent. Remember that.

Okay monsterer really. I must end this now. I am 100% certain my point is unarguable.

They are not independent when you combine them like that with the LCR rule. You must see that? Every block that partition A builds on top of partition B's block is essentially a merger of partitions A and B.

Make sure you are agreeing on the exact definition of a partition...
TPTB_need_war
Sr. Member
****
Offline Offline

Activity: 420


View Profile
February 17, 2016, 05:07:16 PM
 #236

He has to implicitly (whether or not he includes the latest update to that other unvalidated partition) when he builds his block at the end of the chain that includes that other unvalidated partition. Longest chain wins so he won't want to ignore that last block.

By building on top of another partition's block, he increases the risk that his block will be orphaned because he has cannot tell if it contains a double spend. For him it is better not to build on the best block at all, but to maintain his own partitioned chain of blocks.

The partitions are strictly independent. Remember that.

Okay monsterer really. I must end this now. I am 100% certain my point is unarguable.

They are not independent when you combine them like that with the LCR rule. You must see that? Every block that partition A builds on top of partition B's block is essentially a merger of partitions A and B.

Sigh.  Roll Eyes

Independent partitions are not merged. The holistic Nash equilibrium (of the LCR) was explained.  Cry

monsterer can rescue his ego (and fill the thread with endless noise about his inability to connect the dots 3 pages ago) because many (most or all) readers are just as incapable as he is, so many will doubt what I wrote. Nevertheless my point was unarguable, but it isn't worth arguing to those are incapable.

monsterer can reply with some more nonsense. I am done arguing with him. Not because I lost, but because his ego desires a filibuster.

Make sure you are agreeing on the exact definition of a partition...

They aren't merged for the transactions nor for the Nash equilibrium of the blocks. There is no possible definition of strict(ly independent) partition for asset transfer that can support his position.

TPTB_need_war
Sr. Member
****
Offline Offline

Activity: 420


View Profile
February 17, 2016, 05:36:21 PM
 #237

Even if someone argued against my upthread point that strict partitions can't exist for scriptable block chains wherein I claimed this is due to uncontrolled external chaos due to external I/O, there is another unarguable reason that strict partitions can't exist for a scriptable block chain. That is because the gas (currency) transfers must be atomic with the script block confirmation (i.e. if they are orphaned and chain reorganized then they must be done together) so they must be in the same partition. But if the currency for a partition is a static set of UXTO or account balances (i.e. no cross-partition spending), then the system can not function properly.

Yet we also explained above (and even monsterer agrees on this point fwiw) that cross-partition spending breaks the Nash equilibrium.

Thus I continue to maintain my point that Ethereum can not scale with decentralized validation.

monsterer
Legendary
*
Offline Offline

Activity: 1008


View Profile
February 17, 2016, 06:29:10 PM
 #238

That is because the gas (currency) transfers must be atomic with the script block confirmation

As I understand it, gas is paid within the script activating transaction.

Yet we also explained above (and even monsterer agrees on this point fwiw) that cross-partition spending breaks the Nash equilibrium.

You're putting words into my mouth there - I agree that there is a disincentive to merge partitions yet partition merger is essential for consensus; that is the basic problem facing all trustless p2p currencies and is particularly acute when there is no mining incentive.
TPTB_need_war
Sr. Member
****
Offline Offline

Activity: 420


View Profile
February 17, 2016, 07:40:28 PM
 #239

That is because the gas (currency) transfers must be atomic with the script block confirmation

As I understand it, gas is paid within the script activating transaction.

You didn't understand.

Yet we also explained above (and even monsterer agrees on this point fwiw) that cross-partition spending breaks the Nash equilibrium.

You're putting words into my mouth there - I agree that there is a disincentive to merge partitions yet partition merger is essential for consensus; that is the basic problem facing all trustless p2p currencies and is particularly acute when there is no mining incentive.

Obviously from the context of our discussion, I meant in the context of a block chain that allows multiple partitions to persist in the longest chain. In that case, you have agreed. Of course with Bitcoin's LCR, only one partition sustains within the LCR, so obviously I didn't mean that since the Nash equilibrium isn't broken for Bitcoin.

monsterer all I can say to you is sigh. You sure know how to fill up a thread with needless discourse.

TPTB_need_war
Sr. Member
****
Offline Offline

Activity: 420


View Profile
February 17, 2016, 07:45:01 PM
 #240

Btw, the way valiron handled the first few people who trolled him in this thread is probably indicative of the way I should handle monsterer, but what was more shocking is how gmaxwell and his gang railroaded valiron and even apparently deleted Come-from-Beyond's post wherein CfB had linked to this white paper just today:

http://rakeshk.crhc.illinois.edu/dac_16_cam.pdf

What is incredible is to see gmaxwel (and the other huge egos over there in Bitcoin Technical Discussion) have his arrogant, totalitarian ass (their arses) handed to him (them) by valiron (who is apparently a PhD level researcher) and so what does Gmaxwell do? Today when CfB posts, he locks the thread and does his usual Hitler tactics.

Fucking amazing.

I will do my damn best to make the Bitcoin killer and dethrone Blockstream. I hope you all have noticed that Blockstream's Segregated Witness proposal is a Trojan Horse takeover of Bitcoin.

Pages: « 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 [12] 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 »
  Print  
 
Jump to:  

Sponsored by , a Bitcoin-accepting VPN.
Powered by MySQL Powered by PHP Powered by SMF 1.1.19 | SMF © 2006-2009, Simple Machines Valid XHTML 1.0! Valid CSS!