1DkyBEKt5S2GDtv7aQw6rQepAvnsRyHoYM

[dooglus]

Shoud I be suprised that the wold's largest bitcoin address is linked to silk road?

I'm not.  I remember somebody already having said that he traced his Silk Road deposit directly to the large address.  This just confirms it for me.

I've been looking at the huge list of transactions to and from the Silk Road wallet, trying to see how they can be making so much, comparing the amount they're able to stash in the large address with the throughput of the wallet, and found:

between Fri Jul  6 20:29:49 2012 and Tue Jul 10 16:26:45 2012 there was  63142.39 in and  58582.22 out;  8000 got stashed in big address

between Tue Jul 10 16:26:45 2012 and Wed Jul 11 18:40:54 2012 there was  26326.63 in and  18640.54 out;  7000 got stashed in big address

between Wed Jul 11 18:40:54 2012 and Thu Jul 12 05:21:21 2012 there was  11764.01 in and   4044.89 out;  7000 got stashed in big address

between Thu Jul 12 05:21:21 2012 and Wed Jul 25 19:32:10 2012 there was 212223.51 in and 203620.82 out; 10000 got stashed in big address

between Wed Jul 25 19:49:16 2012 and Fri Jul 27 18:31:12 2012 there was  36245.63 in and  30816.23 out;  6000 got stashed in big address

i.e. nothing very consistent.  I was hoping to see that a fixed percentage of the throughput was being stashed away, which would make sense if it was commission they were charging.  Probably they're just moving excess coins to cold storage on an ad hoc basis to keep them safe.  It doesn't necessarily represent "profits", just coins they're holding which aren't likely to be needed soon.  The majority of it could well belong to their customers, just sitting around in customer accounts waiting to be spent or withdrawn.

Does anyone remember when the big Silk Road scam happened?  One of their big traders had a "sale" and ended up running off with everyone's money, but when?

Side note: it might not be wise to trust me too much; what if I'd actually sent coins to Pirate?

Luckily, the methods used were fairly scientific, and anyone can replicate them.

But if you had sent them to pirate, the address would be in the "pirate cluster" of addresses.  There are 'only' 1138 addresses in his cluster at the moment.  He once posted that 1PSf86KnLuzM7Ris5kDhTEZwooR3p2iyfV is in the gpumax wallet.  From that znort's code finds 1138 addresses from his live wallet, from which the weekly interest payments are made.

[1714161251]

1714161251

[1714161251]

1714161251

[FreeMoney]

I'm surprised they let it be that obvious. Both for their sake (keeping people from knowing the full size) and for customers.

Who says it isn't on purpose?

Not me. I think they know what they are doing. I'm just surprised that's what they choose to do.

[Raoul Duke]

The Silk Road scam was on the 4/20 sale. So I would expect a timeframe between April 10 and April 25.
If I have a couple hours tomorrow I'll visit SR forums and digg that info.

[notme]

I'm surprised they let it be that obvious. Both for their sake (keeping people from knowing the full size) and for customers.

Who says it isn't on purpose?

Not me. I think they know what they are doing. I'm just surprised that's what they choose to do.

I never said that .  Also the .com seems to indicate it is on purpose.

[Raoul Duke]

http://whois.domaintools.com/1dkybekt5s2gdtv7aqw6rqepavnsryhoym.com

Creation date: 23 Jun 2012 17:44:00

That was 1 month after someone posted a thread about that address, so I would say it was someone unrelated with SR who registered the domain...
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=82952.0

[dooglus]

I'm surprised they let it be that obvious. Both for their sake (keeping people from knowing the full size) and for customers.

I tried to do something similar for SealsWithClubs just out of curiosity, but got nowhere. 

I've deposited and withdrawn there several times, but all my deposit and withdraw transactions are dead ends.  I don't know how you did it, but nice job!

[FreeMoney]

I'm surprised they let it be that obvious. Both for their sake (keeping people from knowing the full size) and for customers.

I tried to do something similar for SealsWithClubs just out of curiosity, but got nowhere. 

I've deposited and withdrawn there several times, but all my deposit and withdraw transactions are dead ends.  I don't know how you did it, but nice job!

Ha, I don't try very hard, but I did use blockchain.info mixer a few times.

[Shadow383]

Has anyone on here tried tracking large payments made to/from BTCST? Ponzi or not I'd be interested to see where they go...

[Spekulatius]

Has anyone on here tried tracking large payments made to/from BTCST? Ponzi or not I'd be interested to see where they go...

+1

[Shadow383]

Has anyone on here tried tracking large payments made to/from BTCST? Ponzi or not I'd be interested to see where they go...

+1

Okay, a touch of digging:

Last week, BS&T paid out 26,000 BTC in interest.

i really wonder how anyone can know this.

the reason is, because when i ask for a withdrawal, it comes in exactly the same transaction as the interest payment.

so if someone is due to be paid 100 in interest, but they request a 400 btc withdrawal at the same time, everyone seems to assume they have (500 / 0.07) invested when in reality their balance is much lower.

I was just hinted at this post. This is not at all what is seen on the block chain and what users say.

Bitcoinmax withdrawal from BS&T matches very well with http://blockchain.info/address/19kEo3qmuUdAQb1Q7VZhRwahw5v3NSZCeW?filter=0

The 800 payment last Wednesday can be timed with withdrawal requests shown on the forum. I also was told by BS&T users that they could withdraw at any time, and Bitcoinmax offers withdrawals within 24h, explicitly allowing "withdrawals at any time"! How could the withdrawals be delayed until the next Monday with such promises?

Furthermore, look at the immediate large re-investment on Monday last week. Withdrawal?

One of the inputs to that address (presumably controlled by BTCST) is: http://blockchain.info/address/1PSf86KnLuzM7Ris5kDhTEZwooR3p2iyfV

Which is an output of some mining done by GPUMAX on their private pool:

The following address is managed by GPUMAX.

• 1PSf86KnLuzM7Ris5kDhTEZwooR3p2iyfV
  

Sorry it wasn't more interesting.

-pirate

If we trace some of those other inputs they end up here, which seems to be a mixer:
http://blockchain.info/address/1JEbx1x7k2ZukVFYBVidSA3fu2eCTLJ3b2
Which was since empties to here:
http://blockchain.info/address/1ELwS9w4B3vBPt7Mw5Her9GcBbzNMYqhy3
And a lot of those funds ended up here:
http://blockchain.info/address/16cou7Ht6WjTzuFyDBnht9hmvXytg6XdVT

There's also a 2500BTC payout from the "fee" address on the GPUMAX blocks which goes here:
http://blockchain.info/address/1PgxmSTp597CttDGkTAZRinPLDNFam2TTe

Which sent 10000BTC here:
http://blockchain.info/address/12PwokEjewCyxb3Jt19eAsaFXiQZf9T6rq
and 5000BTC here:
http://blockchain.info/address/13imTtV8ULYUwi9okX5bwtFFM2XQnzH7Yb
Which according to this transaction:
http://blockchain.info/tx-index/13212954/ca1c06bddca9723729b840d9a327b03a3920094bf3b01b79583312ee3a3adaf8

Links it to this vanity address here:
http://blockchain.info/address/1Pirate2EW1a89CgrF1KHR9Z5vcWurDxtK

So, noteable linked places with funds stored recently:
http://blockchain.info/address/1h3wA6JHSUrGzUpnVVS1f5iwDy7iHQxk9 (5000BTC)
http://blockchain.info/address/1Epc6YPR3gkNXpAxRRNGPPUyHJ4pdj7nUR (3000BTC)
http://blockchain.info/address/1FUaTPahUCvpCeoLvxBrmtxnq53squNFHF (3500BTC)
http://blockchain.info/address/16cou7Ht6WjTzuFyDBnht9hmvXytg6XdVT (54000BTC)

So whatever he's doing the mixing system is complex, but it's interesting that GPUMax blocks are easily traced into BTCST payouts.
What this needs is someone infinitely more knowledgeable than myself to see how interconnected these addresses really are...

[notme]

Used my block parser utility to do some more digging ...

(for those interested, the block parser code is here: https://github.com/znort987/blockparser,
and the original thread is here: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=88584.0;all)

There is clearly a very strong link between pirate and the fat address.

<disclaimer>
    this was slapped together very quickly, it might not be 100% correct
</disclaimer>

Method used:

    1. Compute closure of an address known to be owned by pirate, where
        closure is defined to be the list of addresses that provably belong to
        the same person.

    2. Compute all "SPEND" transactions from all addresses in that closure

    3. Compute the taint from these "SPEND" transactions into all known transactions

    4. Compute the list of all transactions spending *into* the fat address

    5. Get the taint for these transactions

Result: most of transactions spending to the FAT address exhibit a very strong
taint from the closure (from 1% to 28%).

For the curious, here are the results and, below, the script used to compute the result:

The full taint of the closure into the fat address:

Code:

Compute closure of an address known to belong to pirate (closure = all addresses provably controlled by same person)

real	0m27.465s
user	0m26.280s
sys	0m1.070s

Clean up list

See how many addresses we got
1138 PIRATE-CLOSURE-CLEAN

Now compute all transactions in and out of that closure

real	0m23.338s
user	0m22.810s
sys	0m0.440s

Clean up list

See how many we got
11106 PIRATE-TRANSACTIONS-CLEAN

Extract spend transactions

See how many we got
1110 PIRATE-SPENDS

Now compute taint of these spend transactions to every TX in the blockchain

real	0m25.584s
user	0m24.360s
sys	0m1.140s

Grab list of all TX in fat address

real	0m22.708s
user	0m22.140s
sys	0m0.490s

Find the taint of these TX

Show how tainted the fat address is by coins known to have been pirate's

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0.10582684078133196724691347107017 9eb1edbd6c9694b360808731f3349b5c1e8a6da021f54cc1613fa2772f015650
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0.11880037027129783312235809453195 e71d4e288f56082f58275fc9222d17556eee423031153fb0427ec0920bc13db5
0.12253640832957096238865985285416 6a14bb127e2bf3e8ceed65db7592fceb396689d3aa58e68d0595edcb4b2a9447
0.12413700013490094392002837525579 a6685f18ecba88175572b12292876918f2ecb067e83a81212fdddd5be1e437a8
0.12772725006792955497177208951110 d322d96dec0f7564adaeb2eab276b98ffa4c7f3faba4bc8f2b2ce8e7ac4a7c4f
0.12808351201890435387589339127912 db9236f7e47a92d520f20208371ee671914e280fa01abe2bb41d8c1b94ac9ed6
0.13223097544522830650687815479127 62b5e80343a07d956c3c4b9d4ae1f7c010d6c66a97d20df19bb0dc76660b7c26
0.13223322896850686557451530489526 be5d9e4fc0f2497a97ccf4220ad71544e93c5ac52325c132e10b440faee07729
0.13673194202726127755042652422990 e153d4d00e6ee449dd16006ea43285e1075a5ae7b7c2581c5f62048143aa5123
0.13962676271458948146697229275581 6aadb5d9a725b3e7e83d7e477a0e1e818369cd2a66aec91b98d2453371bc0430
0.14066572636022004961955499807713 91c7884d897d87c7e4fc4a5d3a5b7a0dc78d2b504fdc865c61d31932a07ce07c
0.14264201445231126996542828783143 fdd9d039370c520432104dc91ffdbb4ec25524686d09eee60bd3d8deb82efc3c
0.14822764905869153644621741272580 d546dc0861cec9c40db5699914da192743a724cdc9c43dc997602135ba259c7c
0.14992664462329265148503830429316 d9ad5b3662c6a28bd8426a66b6d0e52fee2bb8c616215d2bae1fef8b53ac6a32
0.15250693232056908281858275538978 de0b92a219af3ec81817327aa67eefbba51eb9a843e07479de64d1fa459a5b42
0.15311717756951252080821306023051 c6d753ebee5b5d0a63e89c0af19dc8d7320beb91b779f0670558d93013180ff6
0.15328475732772954907682811526159 efc54a7067538500282c939949d47c74589b8dfac8ed540b210a27304298c030
0.15659941803225319296272947250381 d7adda2556ab93217804d62050aaa559cbcc1f578ff87319627217a5cc1d00f0
0.15690096403466376596795572861964 1c998934319b3b4792571a7c43ee5658b904073fa7e906e3d9f974230593fb40
0.15781031137548023604501735289718 c83a0169feefdd6dd830a0e825f1ccc059583d863bf48cbf75f67729f959d006
0.15915661959819982806713274670063 519d553eafcf2a98eabc53b32b9cda90157cc76f6a640cf30df721eea06cd50b
0.16072954413676313552869316658711 587fc053387e24e49d47913b16d15e5499ecce8af40d30d28e9a4e2d29f65482
0.16792384857294452865531051571901 7c43eba80f90c770b8a5e3d196df7138fadbc62b2c81fc234fa48023bc23a8b2
0.17451377901669093344418949576013 62699afd4b0b49a2587a012cb0b71f59756853d09722f0bb0753358861cd73f1
0.18328498879410596171025439604652 ba8a2a11d316db8e0592bb0b523dc556cb0014c040c91ee5bc30e6fc55951917
0.18693076749818121126006393445396 e930739cb800715b5356220fcf2765577feb489976b3dc80c12c03072b42a244
0.19510679439307329236809838979294 f63565bea7500a38a3fdf2516feb5fa31cf7043a6df8a741beb6ba3854c40218
0.19895167185493428417878119390805 6ece83afb4f35b492ad3140556a0f3b39121a70a7d3020c68b83266298bffe50
0.21751952075406150285876577532562 624ee89e71c4eeb2ba816e8c2e05f55ee83e215092108820285961d0b61c7e3c
0.23058719920464774378265036813840 8727fed741df1ab683df628173bbe9994c89b26a29cb3b4e2344a0ea589cb8a6
0.23469585863412621414090392102381 3f163f6acf852e124feaa07ac3dc0b0b9938f7bf24d0a6298101cfc0f60cc3db
0.23541796856437542629584408482302 80b784c26ddfaf4fb868e617f60df89c5737b7f5cc0537c935cb3f47875c3892
0.23761356852795954101311391715168 26f4c0c1a41b472aedda989de88e0c18ef28b99321730e4e75638b02d570aa79
0.23872803016153046016536391077389 51b081407712889b59ff17a53c8648b538be8288d12eebfcbc4d3a0b2659c753
0.24100789271110171390396365032061 a6941130a0dd4944847a28c0a1b37aeabff2a272e47f83e13cc50086cd2cc8db
0.24478013634892244885967859530096 7944c69974e1304f49ff2daec97374d038844b09db209ca59af20f8882b89d44
0.24574117129239915472056245138166 964be3c8f07a7143cd3d4c8bb82680ead5a344e5e9812f5b47cb30fa42475b8a
0.24578296178500247883718689279053 ac0e4cefdd0508e8b365b2baec8293231d1167d6ff3d7b187f45e1c64a70c273
0.25093828674529229232634600088581 f6e36546d90a76cb02713ed45ebe41c03492174a727ab7b3bb7b37ccb7fcefbb
0.28332011516511113456587116210539 f9eb2ac1831b18414b7fccae49e604a387b170d73c45041264f7b336d0b91ddd

The script:

Code:

#!/bin/bash

echo Compute closure of an address known to belong to pirate '(closure = all addresses provably controlled by same person)'
time ./parser closure 1PSf86KnLuzM7Ris5kDhTEZwooR3p2iyfV  > PIRATE-CLOSURE
echo

echo Clean up list
cat PIRATE-CLOSURE | grep -v '^$' | grep -v '^Building' | grep -v '^Starting' | grep -v '^done' | grep -v '^Cluster' | grep -v '^Address' | grep -v 'addresse(s)' | grep -v '^all done' | cut -d' ' -f2 | sort | uniq > PIRATE-CLOSURE-CLEAN
echo

echo See how many addresses we got
wc -l PIRATE-CLOSURE-CLEAN
echo

echo Now compute all transactions in and out of that closure
time ./parser tx --csv file:PIRATE-CLOSURE-CLEAN > PIRATE-TRANSACTIONS
echo

echo Clean up list
cat PIRATE-TRANSACTIONS | grep -v '^$' | grep -v '"Time"' | grep -v 'Starting method' | grep -v 'all done' >PIRATE-TRANSACTIONS-CLEAN
echo

echo See how many we got
wc -l PIRATE-TRANSACTIONS-CLEAN
echo

echo Extract spend transactions
cat PIRATE-TRANSACTIONS-CLEAN | grep '-' | awk '{print $3}' | sed -e 's/[",]//g' | sort | uniq > PIRATE-SPENDS
echo

echo See how many we got
wc -l PIRATE-SPENDS
echo

echo Now compute taint of these spend transactions to every TX in the blockchain
time ./parser taint file:PIRATE-SPENDS > PIRATE-TAINT
echo

echo Grab list of all TX in fat address
time ./parser tx --csv 1DkyBEKt5S2GDtv7aQw6rQepAvnsRyHoYM | grep -v '-' | awk '{print $3}' | sed -e 's/[",]//g' | sort | uniq > FAT-ADDRESS-INCOMING-TX
echo

echo Find the taint of these TX
rm PIRATE-FAT-TAINT
for tx in `cat FAT-ADDRESS-INCOMING-TX`
do
    grep $tx PIRATE-TAINT >>PIRATE-FAT-TAINT
done
echo

echo Show how tainted the fat address is by coins known to have been pirate\'s
cat PIRATE-FAT-TAINT | sort -n
echo

And what are the results if you try with a couple random addresses instead of the fat address?  Maybe pirate just has touched a lot of coins.

[sadpandatech]

One more data point:

The taint for a "SPEND" from the fat address is currently 6.4 %

For example:

0.06495062339675875923524677249543 cea22747487e8a2824566fa362981782871fea50fdfb690a3b63d85bd3189593

This means that the coins currently held at 1DkyBEKt5S2GDtv7aQw6rQepAvnsRyHoYM are
6% tainted by coins that came from coins known to have been owned by pirate at some point.

Another remark: if anyone can find addresses that are known to be owned by pirate
and aren't part of the closure computed in my previous post, please post them (or
send them to me), it would help make the calculation more accurate.

that low amount of taint would suggest to me that it could just be that either pirate or some of his payees shop at said S R destination. Would that also be your take on it?

[notme]

I meant the other way... how much is the pirate closure tainting say the receiving addresses of the last 10 transactions (or 10 random transactions since we are getting close to his weekly payout time)?

[sadpandatech]

that low amount of taint would suggest to me that it could just be that either pirate or some of his payees shop at said S R destination. Would that also be your take on it?

I never said I proved the address belonged to pirate.

All I've shown is:

    - how some coins going into that address have a very strong pirate flavor (>28%)
    - how the coins currently stored on that address have a non-negligible pirate flavor (around 6 %)

In other words, it's highly likely that pirate has a close business
relationship with the owner of the fat address.

That includes the possibility that he himself is the owner.

I simply mis-spoke on that but am still curious.
Let me ask the same question and replace pirate with 'that address'.  Still curious to hear your take on the assumption to s r activity..

[Spekulatius]

In order to draw conclusions, one needs to have standard values on taint contamination from ALL bitcoin addresses created past Jan '12 (the date this FAT address was first funded). If we know how much taint an average address in the blockchain contains, we can gauge the probability with which any other address is related to pirate.

More simply put: If every address in the blockchain contains roughly 5% of "pirate taint", than this 6% of taint you found is nothing special. Its like 2/3 of all dollar bills having cocain on them. It doesnt say, that you are a drug dealer if 2/3 all the bills in your personal purse have traces of cocain on them. If on the other hand if 99% of all the bills have cocain on them, you may be likely close to some cocain operation.

[notme]

I meant the other way... how much is the pirate closure tainting say the receiving addresses of the last 10 transactions (or 10 random transactions since we are getting close to his weekly payout time)?

Feel free to use the block parser to gather you own stats and reach your own conclusions

I see, so you publish research without providing a baseline.  Good scienceing.

28% taint on one transaction could just be somebody cashing out from pirate and spending 28% of it on drugs, could it not?  The 6% total taint is slightly more interesting, but again, we have no baseline for comparison.

You already have everything setup, it would take me an hour to get started.  If the problem is picking the addresses, here's 10 I pulled pseudorandomly from various recentish transactions:
17qq5A3XKfrxpJRSC5LH6APjvTDb9hTmma
19NmcoeHo2qwEFjQdUrbGuk34SU2fgfDeg
14hYbtGjTButtsYhCwsJpGBD9TMdMY6DKt
1MW2LCfz7bvFZJG88QTeC3a1cUHLSbS2ty
16VsQigp45paX9cwt8Ees6hAPbMpNSUjj
1dice8EMZmqKvrGE4Qc9bUFf9PX3xaYDp
1QGyQGd9WprNZ4ud75jUVE4gcjEWxwUv1L
12oiay6fiaFhHU2sPeCad18Myr5nHJzgGa
1KJTGpNzYsFibLmq9WaTGAXQbhRFUgnG3z
1VayNert3x1KzbpzMGt2qdqrAThiRovi8

[dooglus]

Several of pirate's lenders receive weekly interest deposited directly into their MtGox accounts and pirate is also thought to have recently been involved in moving large volumes of coins on MtGox.  This would likely lead to any coins moved through MtGox recently having a strong scent of pirate on them.  This could explain why the Silk Road coins are so piratey smelling, even if pirate's lenders aren't Silk Road customers.

[notme]

In order to draw conclusions, one needs to have standard values on taint contamination from ALL bitcoin addresses created past Jan '12 (the date this FAT address was first funded). If we know how much taint an average address in the blockchain contains, we can gauge the probability with which any other address is related to pirate.

More simply put: If every address in the blockchain contains roughly 5% of "pirate taint", than this 6% of taint you found is nothing special. Its like 2/3 of all dollar bills having cocain on them. It doesnt say, that you are a drug dealer if 2/3 all the bills in your personal purse have traces of cocain on them. If on the other hand if 99% of all the bills have cocain on them, you may be likely close to some cocain operation.

Cocaine has an e.  But yeah, that's the point I'm trying to make.

[dooglus]

I see, so you publish research without providing a baseline.  Good scienceing.

He wrote and open sourced his block parser, then published a script to calculate the taint.  That's pretty good in my opinion.  I'll run those 10 addresses you list and find a baseline from those.

28% taint on one transaction could just be somebody cashing out from pirate and spending 28% of it on drugs, could it not?  The 6% total taint is slightly more interesting, but again, we have no baseline for comparison.

The 28% means that when Silk Road decided they had too much in their hot wallet and should move a few thousand offline, 28% of the coins they moved offline were from pirate's wallet.  Kind of.  It certainly doesn't mean that a pirate lender spent 28% of his interest payment on drugs.  If the coins all came from a single pirate lender then the 28% means that the drug payment was made up 28% of coins from pirate and 72% of other unrelated coins.  Kind of, again.

[notme]

I see, so you publish research without providing a baseline.  Good scienceing.

He wrote and open sourced his block parser, then published a script to calculate the taint.  That's pretty good in my opinion.  I'll run those 10 addresses you list and find a baseline from those.

28% taint on one transaction could just be somebody cashing out from pirate and spending 28% of it on drugs, could it not?  The 6% total taint is slightly more interesting, but again, we have no baseline for comparison.

The 28% means that when Silk Road decided they had too much in their hot wallet and should move a few thousand offline, 28% of the coins they moved offline were from pirate's wallet.  Kind of.  It certainly doesn't mean that a pirate lender spent 28% of his interest payment on drugs.  If the coins all came from a single pirate lender then the 28% means that the drug payment was made up 28% of coins from pirate and 72% of other unrelated coins.  Kind of, again.

Except you don't know for sure how coins move through SR, just good guesses.  However, thanks for providing a slightly clearer picture of what that means.  Kind of .  Thanks for running those addresses.  I want to play around with getting the block parser running sometime, but today's not that day.