The collateral pool idea is not new: Hey guys, would it be possible to create a pool like this;
Each miner mines to a separate address. The pool (and the miner obviously) knows the private key.
The pool has insurance of lets say, 15 spr in a separate address for each miner. The insurance needs to be paid by the miner before he starts mining.
The miner submits shares and once he finds a block he publishes it to the network.
If the miner steals coins from his address then he gets banned from the pool and the pools uses his insurance to pay the other miners.
Could this work? Or is it not possible because it isn't how mining works for spreadcoin?
The problem here is that if you will find a block and will not try to steal its reward pool can still claim that you are trying to steal it and use both your funds and block reward. For external observer it is not possible to distinguish between situations when you are trying to steal money and when pool operators are just lying about this. Even if pool is operated by some legally registered entity with non anonymous owners they can steal your money and you wouldn't be able to prove anything. If you cannot find blocks consistently but are still mining that means that even one block's reward worth something for you. I don't see this problem as very different from the "pool got hacked, all coins are gone; sorry guys" problem. That is, I don't think it'll stop pools from being set up and having people mining at them. I think established pools reputation is meaningful enough that doing what's described above would result in the death of the pool. A few reports of the pool taking miners deposits and they'd be mining somewhere else. Edit: and this: I don't think his argument is valid, because
(1) The pool and other users know the pubkeyhashes that are mining.
(2) If the miner pubkeyhash finds a block and then refuses to give the funds back to the pool within say, 60 blocks, it's totally clear to everyone mining on the pool that this has happened aside from just the pool itself.
(3) Miners can mine to another pubkeyhash, but that's the exact same as solo mining.
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The payout for finding a block would look at the reported hashrate during the time the block was mined. If that hashrate exceeds the maximum the payout is refused.
Such a thing doesn't exist. Not yet. If there was a third party service which held all of the payouts until the hashrate is determined that would solve large pools. Wait, hold on. You're suggesting a centralized system to "solve" the problem of too much hashpower in too few hands? Essentially yes. However, i'm not suggesting an escrow service or a website handle this. What if something like the masternodes program handled it. The problem remains that it's still effectively unenforceable. |
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Darkcoin masternode is just a regular wallet that has special functionality enabled. It is not a separate program running in a separate network. There are currently over 2000 masternodes running 24/7, and the number is increasing constantly.
Worrying about all masternodes getting taken down is like worrying that all Monero pools and nodes are taken down.
Great insight! Whatever are you talking about? It might seem a bit out of the blue but I posted it for people who read other threads as well. It's not a like I had an epiphany all of a sudden.  Ah, alright. It really sounds like you're responding to someone, and that a lot of context is missing. |
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The payout for finding a block would look at the reported hashrate during the time the block was mined. If that hashrate exceeds the maximum the payout is refused.
Such a thing doesn't exist. Not yet. If there was a third party service which held all of the payouts until the hashrate is determined that would solve large pools. Wait, hold on. You're suggesting a centralized system to "solve" the problem of too much hashpower in too few hands? Edit: AND, wouldn't even work. |
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The payout for finding a block would look at the reported hashrate during the time the block was mined. If that hashrate exceeds the maximum the payout is refused.
Such a thing doesn't exist. |
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A reply of yours, quoted below, was deleted by the starter of a self-moderated topic. There are no rules of self-moderation, so this deletion cannot be appealed. Do not continue posting in this topic if the topic-starter has requested that you leave. You can create a new topic if you are unsatisfied with this one. If the topic-starter is scamming, post about it in Scam Accusations. ( Re: [ANN] SpreadCoin | True Decentralization ( No Pools) | Testing New Masternodes )  No comment. The new fake spr topic-starter has just deleted my post above. 2 relavent pictures without any comment are deleted. His irrelavent pic is still there. Why?  It's time for me to open a new topic. Here is the link : https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=946841Any comment on the screenshots ? Would you mind giving it a rest? Just because there's a moderated thread now doesn't mean you should attempt to destroy the unmoderated one (though it'll probably be locked anyway). We're discussing how to feasibly make a pool. Your posting is disingenuous and not relevant to the discussion. |
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This solves the problem fairly elegantly I believe. It's still not the ease of running a "standard" pool, and there are additional considerations, like: how popular would a BTC pool be if you had to deposit 25 BTC to mine there (even considering that their wouldn't be any other pools where you didn't have to do this)? Edit2: this plays on the "(which isn't much)" above; what if it was a "lot"?
Edit: tacotime, why wouldn't you send the SPR equivalent of one block reward? BTC would be subject (I believe unnecessarily) to exchange rate volatility.
but more users will probably join a pool than only requires a tiny amount of BTC to join and the amount of risk losing SpreadCoins versus equivalent Bitcoins is probably pretty similar. So to mine on this hypothetical pool, I would need to send the pool a little collateral first? Sounds like a scam, and would steer clear of such a pool. Also easy to sabotage. Join pool. Steal SPR. Lose collateral. Evens. Pool users annoyed. Repeat. The pool would need to take a much larger than 1 block collateral from each miner to dissuade saboteurs. I agree on sabotage being fairly easy, but take issue with "much". Only a small % more should be plenty to dissuade. Pool users shouldn't be that annoyed; they aren't really affected. If collateral is any % larger than block reward, they should be happy, as they get more than they would've if he hadn't stolen. |
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This solves the problem fairly elegantly I believe. It's still not the ease of running a "standard" pool, and there are additional considerations, like: how popular would a BTC pool be if you had to deposit 25 BTC to mine there (even considering that their wouldn't be any other pools where you didn't have to do this)? Edit2: this plays on the "(which isn't much)" above; what if it was a "lot"?
Edit: tacotime, why wouldn't you send the SPR equivalent of one block reward? BTC would be subject (I believe unnecessarily) to exchange rate volatility.
but more users will probably join a pool than only requires a tiny amount of BTC to join and the amount of risk losing SpreadCoins versus equivalent Bitcoins is probably pretty similar. So to mine on this hypothetical pool, I would need to send the pool a little collateral first? Sounds like a scam, and would steer clear of such a pool. They would have to become established and trusted, similar to current coins' pools, just a little more trusted. What if we considered a hashrate cap? Even if people organized themselves in pools they could only mine up to a certain point. Perhaps no more than 20 Mh/s per mining operation.
Please do tell how you would implement such a system? If a miner is reporting a hashrate set above the maximum then there will be a refusal of payout. They will effectively mine the block but will not receive the reward. Even if someone had several machines mining to separate wallets it still creates the most decentralized coin in all of existence. Such a system is trivially exploitable; it won't work. Why wouldn't it? The system would take the refused SPR and put it into a faucet giving it back to the people. Creating economical stimulation. Why would a miner report having a HR that high if he's going to be penalized for it? If they go via shares, he'll just use multiple workers/logins. It's also against free market principles, but that's rather unrelated. But that's the beauty. The WORST possible situation is that we see thousands and thousands of small pools popping up. This means extreme decentralization. Someone with 4 farming machines will have to point them in different directions. No it won't. All it will do is mask the problem. |
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What if we considered a hashrate cap? Even if people organized themselves in pools they could only mine up to a certain point. Perhaps no more than 20 Mh/s per mining operation.
Please do tell how you would implement such a system? If a miner is reporting a hashrate set above the maximum then there will be a refusal of payout. They will effectively mine the block but will not receive the reward. Even if someone had several machines mining to separate wallets it still creates the most decentralized coin in all of existence. Such a system is trivially exploitable; it won't work. Why wouldn't it? The system would take the refused SPR and put it into a faucet giving it back to the people. Creating economical stimulation. Why would a miner report having a HR that high if he's going to be penalized for it? If they go via shares, he'll just use multiple workers/logins. It's also against free market principles, but that's rather unrelated. |
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Darkcoin masternode is just a regular wallet that has special functionality enabled. It is not a separate program running in a separate network. There are currently over 2000 masternodes running 24/7, and the number is increasing constantly.
Worrying about all masternodes getting taken down is like worrying that all Monero pools and nodes are taken down.
Great insight! Whatever are you talking about? |
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What if we considered a hashrate cap? Even if people organized themselves in pools they could only mine up to a certain point. Perhaps no more than 20 Mh/s per mining operation.
Please do tell how you would implement such a system? If a miner is reporting a hashrate set above the maximum then there will be a refusal of payout. They will effectively mine the block but will not receive the reward. Even if someone had several machines mining to separate wallets it still creates the most decentralized coin in all of existence. Such a system is trivially exploitable; it won't work. |
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That make's you a pool operator, using their logic.  LMFTFY That makes you a pool operator according to their deliberately disingenuous definition.
It's FUD. There's no logic involved, only wilful misinterpretation. You can make it up --- and they do ... the Daily Mail does it all the time. Cheers Graham From what I can tell, The Daily Mail exaggerate the truth. That's what's going on here. From what I can tell: Q. Can SPR be pool mined? A. Yes. Q. Would it be advisable to pool mine SPR? A. No. The pool can steal your money. Q. Would it be advisable to pool mine with a trusted pool operator? A. Possibly. So the OP should be qualified. Pool mining is possible [I don't actually know that for certain yet], but it is discouraged because the pool gets to see information you should not show them. We've had this before. All the multiplools hold on to your money and then they dump coins onto exchanges. Then they payout. You are never in control of your money until you get paid, and then you don't really know how much you are due. You can try and belittle the view, but there seems to be some element of truth in what is being discussed. You may not like they way people are going about it, but you can't simply call them out as liars. edit  +1 Well said. Until somebody comes up with a multisig solution to public pool mining that is. Coins101, this isn't correct. It's not that the pool can see information it shouldn't (all pools see this information), it's that each miner sees information it "shouldn't". Therefore everyone "should" try to steal the block reward immediately, while still receiving payments for submitting shares for blocks they didn't find (though if everyone did that, there wouldn't be a reward left to distribute). Stonehedge, I don't see how multisig would have any affect whatsoever on this situation. However, I think a poster on spreadcointalk may have solved the dilemma: each miner mines to their own address (provided to them by the pool) while having a collateral in the pool's possession equal to block reward. Thanks, luigi1111 That was my bad. It happens when you argue with someone on the internet and you know they are wrong. Woops, I thought the graphic was funny, didn't realize 'til just now that I was falling for the exact same thing. |
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What if we considered a hashrate cap? Even if people organized themselves in pools they could only mine up to a certain point. Perhaps no more than 20 Mh/s per mining operation.
Please do tell how you would implement such a system? Edit: wow, someone(s) filled MyFarm's wall. |
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you are talking about something like an "Automated Escrow", right?
Make everyone pay into a pot first, so should they dare to steal, you just keep what they previously payed.
Yeah, that's the idea. There's a 3500 SPR bounty if anyone is able to make this idea work. That is quite low... IMHO.. So what you're saying is a potential workaround is really hard and costly to implement? No not at all and that workaround is also not absolutely needed - but a good idea as some kind of extra insurance, I'm just saying that 3500 coins is quite low as a bounty. I'd love to hear your reasoning as to why it's not needed. Thanks |
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So, for a pool, I think what you would do is just have people send the BTC equivalent of one block's reward to the pool (which isn't much), then if the miner's steal the reward, the pool still retains their deposit so net miner gain is 0. You would have the miners themselves mine to their own pubkeyhashes, and you'd submit partial solutions to these blocks to the pool itself. When the miner gets a block, they would be given n many blocks to get the coinbase from their block to the pool to redistribute to the other miners. If they didn't return the reward to the pool, the pool would then just take their deposit and ban them.
So, I don't think there's a big issue with pooling, just a slightly more complicated implementation. There's a small associated cost with joining a pool, but it's not really much.
This solves the problem fairly elegantly I believe. It's still not the ease of running a "standard" pool, and there are additional considerations, like: how popular would a BTC pool be if you had to deposit 25 BTC to mine there (even considering that their wouldn't be any other pools where you didn't have to do this)? Edit2: this plays on the "(which isn't much)" above; what if it was a "lot"? Edit: tacotime, why wouldn't you send the SPR equivalent of one block reward? BTC would be subject (I believe unnecessarily) to exchange rate volatility. |
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So I guess they won't be taking the (No Pools) out of the ANN.
It appears that the concept of a true solo only coin is appealing to many people. Since spreadcoin obviously does not fall into that category, we are going to move forward towards that goal. I am putting a roadmap together outlining the path towards that goal. It won't be easy and it won't happen overnight but I am sure that with the help of those that have contacted me we will be able to achieve that goal.
Spreadcoin and those behind it can continue to make false claims and move towards their masternode implementation designed to enrich a few large holders that are now making the decisions for spreadcoin. It's unfortunate that they are so shortsighted that all they can see is short term profit. I am of the belief that you can create something without false promises and if the product is good and does what it claims the rest will fall in place.
I'll be getting back to those of you that have contacted me in the near future.
Thanks for your support
Not to rain on your parade, but I'd love to hear how you're going to accomplish this. I do not believe it is possible on a theoretical level. The way Spread is currently is essentially no pools. I private pool with closed registration doesn't count. However, as I posted above, I think it's only a matter of time before someone implements a feasible public pool. Interestingly, though, compare that to BTC. A collateral equal to block reward would be hard to swallow: 25 BTC to be allowed to mine at a pool.  Edit: tt nailed it. |
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That make's you a pool operator, using their logic. LMFTFY That makes you a pool operator according to their deliberately disingenuous definition.
It's FUD. There's no logic involved, only wilful misinterpretation. You can make it up --- and they do ... the Daily Mail does it all the time. Cheers Graham From what I can tell, The Daily Mail exaggerate the truth. That's what's going on here. From what I can tell: Q. Can SPR be pool mined? A. Yes. Q. Would it be advisable to pool mine SPR? A. No. The pool can steal your money. Q. Would it be advisable to pool mine with a trusted pool operator? A. Possibly. So the OP should be qualified. Pool mining is possible [I don't actually know that for certain yet], but it is discouraged because the pool gets to see information you should not show them. We've had this before. All the multiplools hold on to your money and then they dump coins onto exchanges. Then they payout. You are never in control of your money until you get paid, and then you don't really know how much you are due. You can try and belittle the view, but there seems to be some element of truth in what is being discussed. You may not like they way people are going about it, but you can't simply call them out as liars. edit +1 Well said. Until somebody comes up with a multisig solution to public pool mining that is. Coins101, this isn't correct. It's not that the pool can see information it shouldn't (all pools see this information), it's that each miner sees information it "shouldn't". Therefore everyone "should" try to steal the block reward immediately, while still receiving payments for submitting shares for blocks they didn't find (though if everyone did that, there wouldn't be a reward left to distribute). Stonehedge, I don't see how multisig would have any affect whatsoever on this situation. However, I think a poster on spreadcointalk may have solved the dilemma: each miner mines to their own address (provided to them by the pool) while having a collateral in the pool's possession equal to block reward. |
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Bounty: 400 SPR
For shits and giggles, if someone good at math would like to do an analysis to find the most efficient determination of how many Darkcoin would have to be sold and how many Spreadcoin would have to be bought (with the total BTC that would have to be spent for them) for SPR to pass Darkcoin in price, in a manner that at least makes sense as I understand there are many variables, I'll pay you 400 SPR.
For example, if there is a 1000 DRK buy wall then selling into that isn't going to be efficient. So 0 DRK would need to be sold but XXX,XXX SPR would have to be bought.
Or the most efficient means to do it would be to sell 23,450 DRK and buy 114,500 SPR because of current and anticipated buy and sell walls.
Not easy math I understand. It's far beyond my capabilities.
That's the fighting spirit. The visible order book on Bittrex is 4.8BTC, which gets you 12,587 SPR. To match the DRK price you need the highest ask price (shown) to be 18x greater than it is 0.0192554 > 0.00869. If someone sells 226,566 coins at that price, you beat the DRK price /per coin. But that only gets you a market cap of ~$3.3m. Another x3 dump of coins, say 700k SPR might get you to a marketcap of $10m. You're looking at ~350BTC. Done gradually forcing up the price, you might need 5x that, say 2000 BTC. otoh has a put a price floor on DRK at 0.007. He has open orders around 400-500 BTC DRK on finex and 100 BTC on Cryptsy. Depending on whether he wants to keep topping up, your're looking at 600-1,000 BTC of selling. edit clarification  LOL, I was reading this like: "Does he actually think he's making any sense?" Then I refreshed. |
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Bounty: 400 SPR
For shits and giggles, if someone good at math would like to do an analysis to find the most efficient determination of how many Darkcoin would have to be sold and how many Spreadcoin would have to be bought (with the total BTC that would have to be spent for them) for SPR to pass Darkcoin in price, in a manner that at least makes sense as I understand there are many variables, I'll pay you 400 SPR.
For example, if there is a 1000 DRK buy wall then selling into that isn't going to be efficient. So 0 DRK would need to be sold but XXX,XXX SPR would have to be bought.
Or the most efficient means to do it would be to sell 23,450 DRK and buy 114,500 SPR because of current and anticipated buy and sell walls.
Not easy math I understand. It's far beyond my capabilities.
This isn't really possible to answer, as it depends on liquidity, which is largely unknown (at least the way I see it). You can't "anticipate" buy and sell walls with any sort of confidence. On the other hand, if you're just talking about absolute price in BTC, one could simply take a look at the current order books and come up with some numbers pretty quickly, noting of course that the result would be a temporary equilibrium in price. A few seconds/minutes later the market would have shrugged off your buys/sells to some extent. Want to ensure SPR's price attains and stays above DRK's? (~0.00785) Put in an order for every SPR in existence at 0.00786; ~1,760,000 * 0.00786 = 13,833.6 BTC. Note of course in reality it will take much, much less than that at least for the near future (until significantly more are mined). I'd estimate 1/10th to 1/5th of that amount, but that's not really grounded in anything. With the buy walls existing in DRK at the moment, selling is probably not going to be very productive to this hypothetical. Edit: Bittrex's current order book says it'd require 148.9120 BTC to achieve > 0.007 (order book gets really thin up there). Selling DRK is less efficient than clearing out the last few rows in the SPR order book. Note of course that buying this way wouldn't last more than a few seconds at most. |
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Coins101 is definitely Spreadnodes. I'm not sure on others, but am positive on that one.
I sincerely hope coins101 knows the difference between "your" and "you're". You mean with the current optimized miner being used by a couple large farms the chances of a normal person being able to acquire any spreadcoin by mining is next to none.
If you are mining spreadcoin with a couple of GPU's you might as well switch them to something else. You have a better chance of winning the lottery than mining spreadcoin. All your doing is using electricity. Mining spreadcoin is now controlled by a few large farms using optimized miners.
I thought the no pool solo mining only concept was great at first. Then I realized it was just a ploy to be able to hide what's actually going on. Private optimized miner, private pools.
Comparing solo mining Spreadcoin to winning the lottery is pretty funny...and off by several orders of magnitude. |
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