So that means addresses in a wallet is very easy to be associated. Then not-reusing address is not enough, and we have to generate a new wallet for each transaction?
Even if people all generate new address for each transaction, since the addresses in one wallet is easy to be found associated, their addresses are still can be classified into one big 'address family'. So there may be no 'well known address', but 'well know address family'. Did I make any mistake here? If this is true, why the trouble?
No, if you use each Address only once, it will be completely empty after you send BTC from that address the first time and will never be used for any transaction again. There would be no difference in creating a new Wallet. The client takes care that Change addresses are only used once, the only thing you have to do is to use addresses for reviving transactions only once. If you only revive at B one time, there never will be a B-2 Change. Unless what you send exactly equals to what you received before, otherwise there's a change and the change needs to be sent to a change address in the same transaction. So if you see a transaction S -> A and S -> S2, you know it's highly likely S and S2 belongs to the same wallet. As a result, your address S is associated with the change address S2, but not so closely because you can still claim (arguably weakly) that you are sending to two different people simultaneously and happens to used up all the unspent amount of S. Then let's say you have change address A, and change Address B, they all have 0.5 BTC and you want to send to user U 1 BTC, then this time you will see A -> U 0.5 and B -> U 0.5. This makes a strong association between A and B and every one knows A and B belongs to the same wallet. Therefore, it is easy to associate the addresses in the same wallet by analysing the block chain. |
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How can they know that transaction belongs to B? Whatever made {B} interesting to them in the first place. Perhaps he was involved in an unusually high value transaction. Perhaps {B} paid to a "Free tibet" honeypot or well known (reused) donation address and the attacker is the chinese government and now they want to identify B to send him to a reeducation camp. and never worry about their identity is disclosed People never worry about a lot of things, including some things they really should and some things they'll later greatly regret not worrying about. But B never reuses address, so whatever interests others is not the same address used to transact with A. B use address 1 to donate to 'Free Tibet' or whatever, and B use address 2 to send to 'well known' A. Why do you know address 1 and address 2 both belong to B? Address 1 may have separate fund sources in the same wallet as Address 2. If payments from B are to known reused addresses, the change is easily identifiable. When B-1-Change is combined with B-2-Change in a third transaction, those payments are associated. So that means addresses in a wallet is very easy to be associated. Then not-reusing address is not enough, and we have to generate a new wallet for each transaction? Even if people all generate new address for each transaction, since the addresses in one wallet is easy to be found associated, their addresses are still can be classified into one big 'address family'. So there may be no 'well known address', but 'well know address family'. Did I make any mistake here? If this is true, why the trouble? |
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I don't think Mastercoin is big enough to find blocks. If we don't find blocks the whole process is meaningless.
I possibly could get us a few THs/s, depends. I don't know how long that would find blocks though.  In average, 5 days for 5TH now. Just divide 25 by the daily BTC mined, assuming no difficulty change. |
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I don't think Mastercoin is big enough to find blocks. If we don't find blocks the whole process is meaningless.
I possibly could get us a few THs/s, depends. I don't know how long that would find blocks though. Oops, now I clearly feel the danger of BTC. Miners will only join the existing pools and new pool is almost impossible to survive now. Is it dangerous? Maybe seems off topic, but MSC is based on BTC, so it is related. Maybe create an 'Exodus Address' also on LTC block chain? |
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How can they know that transaction belongs to B? Whatever made {B} interesting to them in the first place. Perhaps he was involved in an unusually high value transaction. Perhaps {B} paid to a "Free tibet" honeypot or well known (reused) donation address and the attacker is the chinese government and now they want to identify B to send him to a reeducation camp. and never worry about their identity is disclosed People never worry about a lot of things, including some things they really should and some things they'll later greatly regret not worrying about. But B never reuses address, so whatever interests others is not the same address used to transact with A. B use address 1 to donate to 'Free Tibet' or whatever, and B use address 2 to send to 'well known' A. Why do you know address 1 and address 2 both belong to B? |
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Could you provide a concrete example to explain why reusing addresses by A will affect B if B always carefully choosing address. and how both A and B never reusing addresses prevent it? I'm still not so clear about it.
Since the drawbacks are very apparent, IMHO you need a very clear explanation about the benefit and why the benefit is far more important than the drawbacks.
http://blockexplorer.com/address/1Lukejrwhew7sj4TvWCKksaVo7aLpedHDtFollow the coins back ~12 hops to where they were generated, then follow forward where they were sent to "A". Easy to identify the recipient and owner. Backwards, not so much. Now if B's next payment with the change from that transaction is to "free Tibet", buy "recreational substances", or pay a hitman to whack a business partner, association with the transaction A may reveal identity. When A is shared and reused, as in "this is the donation address for Eligius", any separate-channel information about someone making a donation to Eligius can be used with this known address to reveal a path to their money. A question of mine is posted in https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=334399.msg3589360#msg3589360. |
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Could you provide a concrete example to explain why reusing addresses by A will affect B if B always carefully choosing address. and how both A and B never reusing addresses prevent it? I'm still not so clear about it.
Since the drawbacks are very apparent, IMHO you need a very clear explanation about the benefit and why the benefit is far more important than the drawbacks.
http://blockexplorer.com/address/1Lukejrwhew7sj4TvWCKksaVo7aLpedHDtFollow the coins back ~12 hops to where they were generated, then follow forward where they were sent to "A". Easy to identify the recipient and owner. Backwards, not so much. Now if B's next payment with the change from that transaction is to "free Tibet", buy "recreational substances", or pay a hitman to whack a business partner, association with the transaction A may reveal identity. When A is shared and reused, as in "this is the donation address for Eligius", any separate-channel information about someone making a donation to Eligius can be used with this known address to reveal a path to their money. How do you know it's a change rather than another transaction to others? Why sending BTC to a donation address will disclose my identity and address? People all around the world send to well known address of 'just-dice' and never worry about their identity is disclosed. |
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Could you provide a concrete example to explain why reusing addresses by A will affect B if B always carefully choosing address. and how both A and B never reusing addresses prevent it? I'm still not so clear about it.
A always reuses addresses. Blockchain.info uses this to display their name and IP address along with their transactions, everyone else they've ever transacted with knows who they are, anyone can identify who they are with a simple google search, etc. Because A reuses so often even if A sometimes doesn't reuse, the coins they receive inevitably get mixed up with the non-reused one. A is entirely public. Now B is super careful and paranoid... and we're not even in a world where blacklisting or whitelisting prevents B from comfortably using his paranoid practices. He never reuses. Someone is trying to figure out who B is because they want to defraud him. Initially they are thwarted by B's pratices but then they see that B initially received his coins from A. Everyone knows who A is. Moreover, they see when they did so. From that alone they've learned a ton of information about B, beyond that they can now go ask A to tell them— they could coerce A, or just trick him, as we've already established that A is pretty happy go lucky and not very cautious. Beyond that it isn't just A, B also transacts with other people who are not hygienic and those all potentially leak information too. This actually works in practice, too... A nice whitehat hacker on IRC was playing around with brainwallet cracking and hit a phrase with ~250 BTC in it. We were able to identify the owner from just the address alone, because they'd been paid by a Bitcoin service that reused addresses and he was able to talk them into giving up the users contact information. He actually got the user on the phone, they were shocked and confused— but grateful to not be out their coin. A happy ending there. (This isn't the only example of it, by far ... but its one of the more fun ones). Uh. We've gone pretty far offtopic here, perhaps these posts should be split from this thread? I've create a new topic and put my question there. |
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Could you provide a concrete example to explain why reusing addresses by A will affect B if B always carefully choosing address. and how both A and B never reusing addresses prevent it? I'm still not so clear about it.
A always reuses addresses. Blockchain.info uses this to display their name and IP address along with their transactions, everyone else they've ever transacted with knows who they are, anyone can identify who they are with a simple google search, etc. Because A reuses so often even if A sometimes doesn't reuse, the coins they receive inevitably get mixed up with the non-reused one. A is entirely public. Now B is super careful and paranoid... and we're not even in a world where blacklisting or whitelisting prevents B from comfortably using his paranoid practices. He never reuses. Someone is trying to figure out who B is because they want to defraud him. Initially they are thwarted by B's pratices but then they see that B initially received his coins from A. Everyone knows who A is. Moreover, they see when they did so. From that alone they've learned a ton of information about B, beyond that they can now go ask A to tell them— they could coerce A, or just trick him, as we've already established that A is pretty happy go lucky and not very cautious. Beyond that it isn't just A, B also transacts with other people who are not hygienic and those all potentially leak information too. This actually works in practice, too... A nice whitehat hacker on IRC was playing around with brainwallet cracking and hit a phrase with ~250 BTC in it. We were able to identify the owner from just the address alone, because they'd been paid by a Bitcoin service that reused addresses and he was able to talk them into giving up the users contact information. He actually got the user on the phone, they were shocked and confused— but grateful to not be out their coin. A happy ending there. (This isn't the only example of it, by far ... but its one of the more fun ones). Uh. We've gone pretty far offtopic here, perhaps these posts should be split from this thread? Actually I lost here: Initially they are thwarted by B's pratices but then they see that B initially received his coins from A. How can they know that transaction belongs to B? |
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I have a business like a gas station or a fast food, in order to actually serve all my customers and have the bitcoins in my account (transaction confirmed) Why do you need that? Do you accept credit cards? Do you wait for them to confirm as well (6 months)? with this limit of 1/block or 250/day I would have to use multiple addresses. You have to use multiple addresses anyway. "Addresses" are badly named: "invoice id" would be more accurate. What will happen if you have 1000 customers a day ? If you use the same address all the time, it'll be impossible to know which of the 10 or so paying-right-now customers failed to pay their bill. Thanks for the response. So the only inconvenience will be if you use the same address to pay for something you'll have to wait two block. This is not as bad as it seems for the average user. But , what will happen if the next pool decides to raise this for 1 to 100? I'm more concern about what this could lead to that what it actually does , to be sincere. I think client can help in this case. Whenever you are sending out BTC from an address, all unspent BTC are spent and send to a newly generated change address. In this case, no one will send out BTC with the same address more than once. I just don't agree on forbidding one address to accept BTC for multiple times. That makes many things complicated and brings no apparent advantage. It will be enough to restrict an address to be used again once its balance is spent. This could significantly reduce the frequency people have to change their donation address, tip address, and mining income address. But still it invalidates some useful applications, such as MasterCoin and maybe ColorCoin. |
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No one asks you to make your btc addresses public. You can keep it as secret as you will. You can always choose to generate one-time receiving address if you want. But is there any reason to stop others to use one address as their public address if they think they don't mind?
Because reusing addresses makes it open to everyone, not just the relevant parties you'd like (or have been ordered to) disclose them to. Worse, your lack of privacy make everyone you transact with and everyone they transact with less private. Your comments about "always choose" are empty promises in the face of proposals to have black and white lists which will limit your ability to transact, and empty in the face of privacy losses created by people who you've transacted with. I can turn everything you've said right around— there is nothing preventing you from privately identifying yourself and registering your addresses. You can always do this and the parties you transact with can to. Nothing about requiring privacy preserving behavior in the public network prevents you from separately having information disclosed about you, nothing can prevent investigations from happening. But the converse is not true, the lack of privacy in the public network very easily prevents people from choosing to be private at all, and it very easily can make Bitcoin worthless as a money like good. Could you provide a concrete example to explain why reusing addresses by A will affect B if B always carefully choosing address. and how both A and B never reusing addresses prevent it? I'm still not so clear about it. Since the drawbacks are very apparent, IMHO you need a very clear explanation about the benefit and why the benefit is far more important than the drawbacks. |
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So you mean BTC is mainly adopted by people wants 100% privacy? On the contrary, it's possible that the majority haven't adopt BTC just because of the anonymity. Most of people heard of BTC but haven't convinced to use them because they think the government will not allow such things to exist. The main objective of BTC foundation is not to increase its anonymity, but to explain to the authority that it's not as anonymous as they think. This isn't about anonymity. If the government wants to know who you are, they'll subpoena your landlord to tell them. Are you saying the majority of people want the unknown to-be-rapist down the street to know their every purchase, telling him where you've been and what you buy? They want the pedophile-to-be to know when and where they drop their children off at childcare? Why will they know my every purchase, and where I've been? I don't understand. Just because I put a fixed receiving address on the mining pool? Many people on this forum put their btc address in their signature for tips, what kind of privacy they lose? It only happens when they are using that address to buy something requiring name and shipping address, right? I believe no one will use public address to pay for something they don't want others know anyway. |
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For those who wants complete anonymity, they can go for some altcoins supporting it. In my opinion, BTC is supposed to be used by everyone and everywhere as mainstream currency. So please stop doing things like this to push the majority away just for the sake of niche market.
I can't seem to find the link to your bank account records, mind posting them for us? Luke is pretty much the last person you'd expect to give a crap about underground uses. But privacy is _not_ only a consideration for them, or even primarily for them: dope dealers—or whatever you want your bogeyman to be—can buy their way to privacy even in a system which is very non-private. Financial privacy is an essential element to fungibility in Bitcoin: if you can meaningfully distinguish one coin from another, then their fungibility is weak. If our fungibility is too weak in practice, then we cannot be decentralized: if someone important announces a list of stolen coins they won't accept coins derived from, you must carefully check coins you accept against that list and return the ones that fail. Everyone gets stuck checking blacklists issued by various authorities because in that world we'd all not like to get stuck with bad coins. This adds friction and transactional costs and makes Bitcoin less valuable as a money. Financial privacy is an essential criteria for the efficient operation of a free market: if you run a business, you cannot effectively set prices if your suppliers and customers can see all your transactions against your will. You cannot compete effectively if your competition is tracking your sales. Individually your informational leverage is lost in your private dealings if you don't have privacy over your accounts: if you pay your landlord in Bitcoin without enough privacy in place, your landlord will see when you've received a pay raise and can hit you up for more rent. Financial privacy is essential for personal safety: if thieves can see your spending, income, and holdings, they can use that information to target and exploit you. Without privacy malicious parties have more ability to steal your identity, snatch your large purchases off your doorstep, or impersonate businesses you transact with towards you... they can tell exactly how much to try to scam you for. Financial privacy is essential for human dignity: no one wants the snotty barista at the coffee shop or their nosy neighbors commenting on their income or spending habits. No one wants their baby-crazy in-laws asking why they're buying contraception (or sex toys). Your employer has no business what church you donate to. Only in a perfectly enlightened discrimination free world where no one has undue authority over anyone else could we retain our dignity and make our lawful transactions freely without self-censorship if we don't have privacy. Most importantly, financial privacy isn't incompatible with things like law enforcement or transparency. You can always keep records, be ordered (or volunteer) to provide them to whomever, have judges hold against your interest when you can't produce records (as is the case today). None of this requires _globally_ visible public records. Globally visible public records in finance are completely unheard-of. They are undesirable and arguably intolerable. The Bitcoin whitepaper made a promise of how we could get around the visibility of the ledger with pseudonymous addresses, but the ecosystem has broken that promise in a bunch of places and we ought to fix it. Bitcoin could have coded your name or IP address into every transaction. It didn't. The whitepaper even has a section on privacy. It's incorrect to say that Bitcoin isn't focused on privacy. Sufficient privacy is an essential prerequisite for a viable digital currency. So, again, I ask—let's see your bank records; I'm sure there is an export to CSV. Mtgox transaction dumps? Stock trading accounts. Let's see you—even just you—post all this before you presume to say that you think that's what the public wants forced on everyone. No one asks you to make your btc addresses public. You can keep it as secret as you will. You can always choose to generate one-time receiving address if you want. But is there any reason to stop others to use one address as their public address if they think they don't mind? Bank records are actually open to banks and authorities. So if there's some need, allowed by the law, they can do the investigation. But it does not mean I have to make it open to you. It is a controlled anonymity. My information is a secret to the public, but can be investigated by the authority based on the law. Complete anonymity, however, makes laundering money unable to be detected. Then the authority has no other choices but to suppress it. BTC will not dead, I believe, even under suppression, but it will stay where it is and never becomes mainstream in that situation. |
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It's better to begin setting a MSC mining pool now. MSC transactions will be given the highest priority and each miner believes in MSC can join this pool instead.
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Not restricted, but MSC transactions could become a low priority transaction potentially taking longer to complete. Every transaction will send something to the "The Exodus Address" (correct me please if I am wrong). Therefore, all transactions will be given lower priority by those miners. The current patch they are proposing includes only one transaction in one block, that already will make MSC transactions become super slow. If they take more aggressive method, things will be worse. |
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One very common scenario is to use a bitcoin address as the identification. This may be used in faucets, mining pool, gambling sites, and maybe future block-chain based exchanges. If address reusing is discouraged, any alternative is suggested? To introduce another identity-> bitcoin address translation layer? Address-as-identity does not use the blockchain at all. If people want to hide their trace, they can choose not to reuse addresses. If people don't care, why have to increase the difficulty for them? Why not just let the users to make the decision? Reusing addresses doesn't merely hurt your own privacy. It hurts everyone's. There are also security ramifications. And now adoption issues too. So you mean BTC is mainly adopted by people wants 100% privacy? On the contrary, it's possible that the majority haven't adopt BTC just because of the anonymity. Most of people heard of BTC but haven't convinced to use them because they think the government will not allow such things to exist. The main objective of BTC foundation is not to increase its anonymity, but to explain to the authority that it's not as anonymous as they think. What you are doing, IMHO, is not helping the BTC but killing it. For those who wants complete anonymity, they can go for some altcoins supporting it. In my opinion, BTC is supposed to be used by everyone and everywhere as mainstream currency. So please stop doing things like this to push the majority away just for the sake of niche market. |
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One very common scenario is to use a bitcoin address as the identification. This may be used in faucets, mining pool, gambling sites, and maybe future block-chain based exchanges. If address reusing is discouraged, any alternative is suggested? To introduce another identity-> bitcoin address translation layer?
Maybe you mean outgoing only? An bitcoin can accept many incoming transactions, but it can send out coins only once? That's a little bit better, but still in many scenarios people are expecting coins are sent from the same address. Mastercoin is an example.
If people want to hide their trace, they can choose not to reuse addresses. If people don't care, why have to increase the difficulty for them? Why not just let the users to make the decision?
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Some comments about the leaked document.
I think it is a very preliminary design and nothing impressive inside.
First, all the issuers addresses are kept in the OSE servers, so it is not a real decentralized socket exchange. There's nothing in the blockchain for others to verify the issuer's addresses and map addresses to the stocks.
Second, The seller has to send 100 BTC (although will be returned immediately) to sell his shares for 100BTC seems quite ridiculous to me.
Third, it takes one hour to execute an order seems really too long.
In short, if this one is genuine then it's a bad news.
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Some useful information: 除上市费用外，OSE服务器不收取任何费用。并且交易和支付都是免费的
OSE server charges nothing except for listing. Trading and depositing are both free. 使用OSE，您不需要登录。但是，您将需要一个比特币钱包客户端或者在线钱包。比特币地址将会作为你的识别ID。发行，交易，或管理虚拟证券的所有操作，都是通过发送一定量的比特币到一组分配给每个虚拟证券的特定地址中实现。 No registration and login are needed to use OSE, but a bitcoin wallet client or online wallet is required. The bitcoin address is used as your identity ID. Issuing, trading, or managing virtual stocks are all through sending a certain amount of bitcoins to a group of bitcoin addresses assigned to each virtual stock. 买入
每个虚拟证券将被绑定一个买入证券的比特币地址（买入地址）。想要用Y个比特币买入X份股票，则请发送X * Y + X * 0.00000001个比特币到买入地址进行挂单。
其中，X最大不能超过9999。并且Y必须是0.0001的倍数。例如，10.00000100代表以以0.1BTC的价格，购买100股。发送比特币的来源地址被称为买家地址。
买盘将会一直予以保留，直至被人全部吃掉，或者被买方取消。当交易部分或全部完成的时候，对应虚拟证券的股份数量将根据交易的数额而增加。这部分股份数将绑定到买方地址上。
当发送了X * Y + X * 0.00000001个比特币之后，X * 0.00000001的这部分比特币将会被立即返还。当订单被保留的时候，X * Y的这部分比特币将会被OSE服务器持有。当订单被执行，根据交易股票数的比特币将被发送给卖方。。如果订单取消，比特币将返还给买方。 Buying: Each virtual stock will be bound with a bitcoin address for buying. To buy X shares with Y BTC each, please send X * Y + X * 0.00000001 BTC to the buying address. X cannot exceed 9999 and Y has to be dividable by 0.0001. For example, 10.00000100 represents to by 100 shares with 0.1 BTC each. The sending address is called 'buyer's address'. The bid order will be kept until it's filled or cancelled. If the bid is filled partly or completely, the corresponding stock shares bound to buyers address will increase by the traded amount. After sending X * Y + X * 0.00000001 BTC, the part of X * 0.00000001BTC will be returned immediately. When the order is in escrow, the part of X * Y will be held by the OSE server. When the order is executed, this part will be sent to the seller. It will be returned to buyer if the order is cancelled. 卖出
每个虚拟证券将被绑定一个卖出证券的比特币地址（卖出地址）。想要用Y个比特币卖出X份股票，则请发送X * Y + X * 0.00000001个比特币到卖出地址进行挂单。
其中，X最大不能超过9999。并且Y必须是0.0001的倍数。例如，10.00000100代表以以0.1BTC的价格，卖出100股。发送比特币的来源地址被称为卖家地址。
卖盘将会一直予以保留，直至被人全部吃掉，或者被卖方取消。当交易部分或全部完成的时候，对应虚拟证券的股份数量将根据交易的数额而减少。这部分股份数绑定卖方的地址。
当发送了X * Y + X * 0.00000001个比特币之后，全部的比特币都将会被立即返还。当X股的卖单被保留，流通股中可用来被卖出或者转移的总数将会减少X股。当订单交易发生时，对应股份将会被转移至买方。如果取消挂单，可用于卖出的股份数将会重新更新。
Selling Each virtual stock will be bound with a bitcoin address for selling. To sell X shares for Y BTC each, please send X * Y + X * 0.00000001 BTC to the selling address. X cannot exceed 9999 and Y has to be dividable by 0.0001. For example, 10.00000100 represents to sell 100 shares with 0.1 BTC each. The sending address is called 'seller's address'. The ask order will be kept until it's filled or cancelled. If the ask is filled partly or completely, the corresponding stock shares bound to seller's address will decrease by the traded amount. After sending X * Y + X * 0.00000001 BTC, all BTC will be returned immediately. When the order is in escrow, X shares of the stock will be removed from the market. When the order is executed, these shares will be transferred to the buyer. They will be returned to the market if the order is cancelled. [ By translator: It's kind of weird to require the seller to have 100 BTC first before they can sell their shares for 100BTC] 转移
每个虚拟证券都将绑定一个可以用来转移的地址（转移地址）。要转移X股，请发送任意数量（Y）的比特币到转移地址，并且发送X * 0.00000001个比特币到你想要的转移的地址（接收地址）。X最大不能超过9999。发送比特币的源地址被称为“发送人地址”。
当发送了Y个比特币之后，所有的比特币将有被立即送回。发送人地址中对应的股份数将会减少X股，而接收人的地址对应的股份数将增加X股。 Each virtual stock will be bound with a transfer address. To transfer X shares, please send any number (Y) of BTC to the transfer address and X * 0.00000001 BTC to the address you want to transfer (the receiving addess). X cannot exceeds 9999. The sending address is called 'Sender's address' After sending Y BTC, all BTC will be returned and the sender's shares will decrease X and the receiver's will increase X. 提示
错误的格式
当发送给OSE地址的比特币指令在系统中没有相匹配的指令，也即格式错误，所发送的比特币将会立刻原路发回。
延迟
如果对应的交易没有达到6个或以上确认，则其对应的所有命令都将会被视为无效。考虑到平均每次确认有10分钟，这意味着识别和执行每个命令将需要大约一个小时。 Wrong format: If OSE addresses received transactions are not recognized, all BTC will be sent back. Delay: All commands are not valid until there're 6 or more confirmations. Considering each confirmation takes 10 minutes in average, it means recognizing and executing each command will take about 1 hour. |
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