Anyhow, From the more stats, we can see the 3 Best streaks and 3 Worst streaks
Is there way we can see more?
Like over 100,000 Games
What are the 10 best streak and the 10 worst streak?
Not from within the bot itself... but you could always get yourself a SQLite DB Browser, open the Dicebot database and run some SQL queries on it to find what you're looking for  |
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Haven't had too many issues with Bluewallet... even got a few sats in the lightning wallet to play around with... if anyone wants to "test" Lightning... feel free to hit me up for some "pico cents" I'm on Android 9 (Nokia 7 Plus), and never noticed any real issues with the app itself, so I assume it was due to the older Android version causing the issue? |
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As an update, both clearnet and TOR seem to be operating fine at the moment... as at 2019-10-31 17:30 UTC
I haven't really had much issue with either site the last day or so.
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Oh... I am totally in! #reserved or whatever the cool kids are doing these days to queue up for a slot  Honestly, I don't think the market dominance really makes too much of a difference. I suspect it is more that the market is a bit more mature these days now that the ICO/IEO goldrush is well and truly dead and you're not getting new coins every other day. |
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P.S. i'm not talking about extended mnemonic phrase.
But this is exactly what you are looking for... read the BIP39: A user may decide to protect their mnemonic with a passphrase. If a passphrase is not present, an empty string "" is used instead.
To create a binary seed from the mnemonic, we use the PBKDF2 function with a mnemonic sentence (in UTF-8 NFKD) used as the password and the string "mnemonic" + passphrase (again in UTF-8 NFKD) used as the salt. The iteration count is set to 2048 and HMAC-SHA512 is used as the pseudo-random function. The length of the derived key is 512 bits (= 64 bytes).
The "25th word" or "passphrase" is being used as a salt... without that salt, you'll never recover the same binary seed, even if you have all 12/24 words of the original mnemonic. So, by simply adding this in, you are effectively "encrypting" your seed. Why is this not enough? Why do you need/want another layer?  |
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Lucius is correct... you'd need to update to the latest BCH app and use ElectrumSV... but for that, you'd need to update the firmware... which puts you all the way back to the original issues that you have with the potential to wipe the device with no seed  Given the current price of SV (~US$100), unless they have 10's or 100's of BTC, it isn't a significant loss... So, your friend might be best off just accepting the loss, moving what they can and then resetting the device and starting from scratch. |
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As at 2019-10-15 05:37 UTC, both the clearnet site ( https://chipmixer.com/) and TOR site ( http://chipmixerwzxtzbw.onion/) seems to be "up"... however the captcha doesn't seem to be working:  EDIT: Actually it would appear I was wrong... occasionally I am able to get the Captcha to display on the TOR site, other times just timeouts and errors... I'm guessing the DDoS is still ongoing and both sites are still quite unstable. |
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Sorry for your loss, but unless you can tie this paxful account to a Bitcointalk account, there really isn't a lot anyone here can actually do to help.
I hope that the the opportunity to vent your frustrations has made you feel slightly better tho... best of luck with the paxful dispute.
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Does the latest release of Armory need the Bitcoin Core Client to be configured with a "bitcoin.conf" file containing this line of code "txindex=1" inside the file?
Just to further illustrate the points made above... this is a copy/paste of my current "bitcoin.conf": walletrbf=1
dbcache=750
#maxconnections=9
server=1
Armory 0.96.5 + Bitcoin Core v0.18.1 (GUI) on Windows 10 and everything working as it should... I even have my bitcoin "blocks" folder in a non-standard location (E:\Bitcoin). I simply specified that location in the Armory "Settings":  |
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How can I have a signed message with blockchain.com ? there is no option to get the signed message there
You can't create a signed message with blockchain.com using the "default" wallet addresses (ie. ones that are generated by the blockchain.com HD wallet)... but if you have an imported private key/address you can: If you click the "Settings" icon in the top right corner and select "Wallet and Addresses:  Then "Imported Bitcoin Addresses" and import one:  Once it has been imported, you can select "More Options" -> "Sign Message":  You can simply enter your message and click "Sign" (you'll be prompted for your 2nd password if you have one):  And then you'll get the digital signature: 
As the others have stated, unless you know what you're doing... importing private keys can be a security risk, as you can potentially expose your private key. You are better off using a different desktop wallet like Electrum or Bitcoin [1] or a hardware wallet etc. [1] NOTE: you don't have to download the full blockchain to be able to sign/verify messages with Bitcoin Core. So depending on your requirements, you might be able to use this if you're just wanting to stake an address that you don't intend to use for anything other than potential account recovery or proof of identity. However, if you want to also use the staked address for transactions, then you will need to download the 260+gigs of blockchain!! |
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I try to figure out a scenario which leaves no security gap in a corporate environment (and keep in mind that I try to go to the max of paranoia level...)
...
In a corporate environment, it would make sense to have several levels of segregation where the persons signing the transactions would have no possibility to get even close to the seed, the master private keys or the private keys. The problem is that you need the private keys to be able to sign transactions... so you need a way to "hide" the seed/private keys... but still let people sign transactions! Hmmm.... The only way I can think of that would allow you to do this, would be to use a hardware wallet like a Trezor or Ledger. Generally, after initial setup, these devices do not allow you to view or export the seed or private keys. You can also create a MultiSig in Electrum that uses hardware wallets. You're still going to have issues with how to initialise the devices in the first place... at least one person will "see" the seeds used to initialise these devices... you also need someway to safely AND securely back those seeds up so that if one of the devices is lost/stolen/damaged (or the person holding the device leaves the company and refuses to return it etc), coins can still be recovered. Also, when a transaction needs to occur, the signers would need to have physical access to the hardware wallets to be able to sign the transaction... so while any "random" employee could then create a transaction (using a watching-only wallet)... only the 4 people in possession of the hardware wallets could sign it. There is still the (obvious) flaw that if the 4 hardware wallet holders collude, then the funds can be stolen... which is true of ANY multisig arrangement. You simply cannot prevent this unless you have at least one 100% trusted signer in your 4-of-4 setup (basically ((M-N)+1) 100% trusted people in an N-of-M setup) to be able to "veto" any attempts to create a transaction that steals the funds. |
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I pasted the .conf file into Application Support/bitcoin but I need to let the app somehow know that I want to apply the .conf file to it.
No you don't... if your bitcoin.conf file is in that directory, then Bitcoin Core should use it automagically. To confirm that it is, if using GUI, you should be able to goto "Settings -> Options -> Main" and click the "Open Configuration File" button:  It should open the file in your default text editor and you'll see the contents of the file... you should even be able to edit/save it and then when you restart Bitcoin Core the changes will be activated. |
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I'm still very confused as to why being able to see the seed is a problem? To see the seed from each wallet, one needs the wallet password (assuming one is set... because it should be!!?!)... if one has the wallet password, they can also sign transactions. So, if you have enough people willing to collude to collect all the passwords/seeds, you also have enough people willing to collude to be able to simply create a transaction and take all the coins. You can use the BIP39 seed generated by another BIP39-compatible software. BIP39 seed will not be shown.
And as above... if you have users who would be willing to share seeds, you have users who would be willing to share wallet files/passwords or simply sign transactions... in which case, the funds are as good as gone. Like I said earlier, if you cannot trust at least one of the 4 people in control of this multisg to behave, then you have the wrong 4 people in control of this multisig.  |
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Thanks. This is basically the case. However, on Electrum, you always can show the seed.
Each user will ONLY see their seed (and the 3 other xpubs) in the multsig... they won't be able to see anyone elses seed (unless they get access to the other persons copy of the wallet file AND their wallet password). So if four people would collude - they would be able to drain the wallet. Seems there's no way to prevent this on a technical level then. Well of course... if you have 4 people colluding on a 4-of-4 wallet then it doesn't matter if they can see the seed or not... they could simply just create a transaction, everyone could sign it and then they can broadcast it! Nothing will be able to prevent theft if the minimum number of co-signers in a multisig wallet are colluding... ie. if you have 6-of-10 and 6 people are willing to collude, then the funds can be stolen. So, either the 4 people who have been chosen to control this multisig are not the people who should be controlling this multisig, or you're just being overly paranoid. |
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That is correct... if you have created a 4-of-4 wallet and someone can get each of 4 seeds (or 4 xprvs) used to create this multisig, they'll be able to create a copy of the wallet that has all 4 private master keys and can effectively "self sign" a transaction to drain the wallet.
The 4 seeds should have been created independently on different machines, by different people... each seed should only be known to the person who created it. Each person should password protect and encrypt their wallet file using secret passwords known only to them. Then each person shares their XPUB with the other 3... and each user can create their own local copy of the 4-of-4 MultiSig wallet using their seed + 3 xpubs.
If a transaction needs to happen, then one person needs to create the transaction (and partially sign it), then it should be passed to each of the other 3 to sign, and the last person can broadcast it.
With this setup someone would need to get the passwords to ALL of the 4 wallets to be able to extract all 4 seeds to be able to steal everything.
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Hold the seed offline and only have a "watching only" wallet on the server created using the xpub. They'll be able to see ALL addresses/transactions/balance etc... but won't be able to send/sign anything nor see the seed or private keys. Or you can password protect the wallet but NOT fully encrypt it... so that anyone can open the wallet to view, but only someone with the password can view the seed/private keys and/or sign transactions/messages etc. You might also want to consider using a MultiSig wallet arrangement, which may or may not be useful depending on your "reasons" |
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It would appear that you can't remove it (I suspect as it is the default)... but you can select EUR from the dropdown... and whenever you start Mycelium up it will default to EUR. Is it really that problematic that it still exists as an option in the dropdown? If so, then you'll need to log an issue on Mycelium's Github: https://github.com/mycelium-com/wallet-android/issues |
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