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I agree that it is a little on the paranoid side.
However, think back on the recent Android RNG debacle. Had those wallets not reused addresses, the private key could not have been computed.
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Are those no-fee transactions that get ignored?
Because the minimum fee is what now? 0.0001 btc? I would call that little.
Where can you see the transaction queue and the unconfirmed transactions?
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Ich denke, dass gerade öffentliche große Pools solch einen Angriff verhindern. Denn diese Pools sind groß genug um auf einen Egoisten zu reagieren. Sie werden schnell merken, wenn ihre Blöcke auf einmal nicht mehr in die Blockkette aufgenommen werden und könnten daraufhin mit anderen größeren öffentlichen Pools kooperieren und so den Egoisten ausschließen. Andersherum müssen sich die großen öffentlichen Pools gegenüber ihren Minern rechtfertigen. Würde also ein großer öffentlicher Pool einen sochen egoistischen Angriff versuchen und würde dies bekannt, so ist davon auszugehen, dass ein Großteil der Miner den Pool wechselt. Oh, und ausserdem ... “I’m not convinced it’s correct and I don’t think it’s been peer-reviewed,” said Andresen by phone from Australia. The researchers are only submitting the paper for peer review now, says a spokesperson for Cornell University, so it has not yet been looked at by academic colleagues for obvious holes.
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Address reuse issue. It is much more secure (not just more anonymous) to never re-use an address (and yes - am aware of my sig and you'll notice there a no unspent outputs on that address).
The reason being that once you have signed a tx for any unspent output that was sent to that address (i.e. once you "spend from it" and with the standard client you can't easily control how it chooses which unspent outputs to "spend from") then you have "released" your "public key" (prior to that only the Base58 encoded RIPEMD hash of it was publicly known - also known as the "address").
Now if the ECDSA that Bitcoin uses ever becomes found to be "crackable" then the "private key" to your "address" could be feasibly be cracked and any "remaining" unspent outputs to that address could now be spent by the cracker.
And another pointer to Amory's deterministic wallet. One paper backup is enough to restore all future private keys. |
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Reusing addresses is not ideal. It is much more secure (not just more anonymous) to never re-use an address (and yes - am aware of my sig and you'll notice there a no unspent outputs on that address).
The reason being that once you have signed a tx for any unspent output that was sent to that address (i.e. once you "spend from it" and with the standard client you can't easily control how it chooses which unspent outputs to "spend from") then you have "released" your "public key" (prior to that only the Base58 encoded RIPEMD hash of it was publicly known - also known as the "address").
Now if the ECDSA that Bitcoin uses ever becomes found to be "crackable" then the "private key" to your "address" could be feasibly be cracked and any "remaining" unspent outputs to that address could now be spent by the cracker.
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Right, because there is a wallet out there that guarantees lost coins due to software failure.
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China geht schlafen, Preis fällt.  |
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Miners do not determine the value. It is the other way around. The value determines how many miners there are.
Mining costs money and everyone can do it. Competition will cause it to reach an equilibrium where mining is barely profitable.
The Cornell paper was about how a group of selfish cooperating miners can push away other miners. If that were to happen, the non-selfish miners would notice how their blocks would not make the chain and would react. Possibly by ignoring the selfish group, or by adding rules to the fork resolution. All the regular "consumer" would notice is slower confirmation time, because of wasted hashing effort.
The bold part makes no sense.
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What's interesting about the foundation's forthcoming response — or lack thereof — is how it will advance the debate over whether Bitcoin is a reliable non-sovereign internet currency, or merely the ultimate example of a fiat currency (that only exists because people believe in it) caught in a speculative bubble. Because if the Cornell researchers are right, and the people minting new Bitcoins can control the market for them, then Bitcoin is essentially worthless, because who would want to make transactions in a currency whose value was decided by a single entity?
Is Bitcoin really that hard to understand, or do people write this nonsense on purpose? |
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I am not dismissing them but i can promise you that you will curse them enough in the future. The big dump has already started Well, it's time to say good night in China soon, so my guess is trading is going to slow down. But hey, what do I know? |
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How do you explain a 300% uprise in a few weeks just by a chinese exchanger and SR2.0?
Head over to http://btckan.com/priceand add up the trade volume of China and compare it to the rest of the world. Careful with dismissing China. |
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So probably stolen card.
Oh, yeah, Bitcoin takes care of that, too. No longer need to ender credit card details and other personal information where they are not necessary. As to the original question. My guess is that you only see those types of comments, because that is the only level you can quickly argue against Bitcoin. It also only takes a handful of those type comments for other more serious posters to move on in disgust. |
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You have to trust the makers that it does what they say it does.
It is very similar to what an offline Armory transaction does. Except that Armory is open source and that you can review the transaction details again before you sign the transaction. On the other hand, Trezor is more user friendly (you don't need an offline computer).
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At some point there is no way around taking security seriously. That includes disconnecting the private key from the internet and making sure the backup works. armory is good if you can get your head around it *AND* you are capable of (or willing to) synching the blockchain
Yes, it takes a moment to get used to, but makes you sleep so much better. http://bitcoinarmory.com/about/using-our-wallet/ |
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People change, situations change.
If it is something that is bothering you, talk it over with your future wife. If necessary, contractually sort out an agreement that makes everyone happy.
You already identified a potentially issue, may as well deal with it.
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Use Armory.
You do one paper backup, which allows you to restore all future private keys.
It is much easier to verify the integrity of a piece of paper than it is a digital wallet.
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Well, the coins are signed over from one address to another. They can't just vanish. Fingers crossed things fix themselves/catch up. |
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First thing that comes to mind is a missing fee?
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