Il principale vantaggio, quasi unico di questa moneta, è proprio il fatto di avere le conferme instantanee, senza dover aspettare nessuna delle seguenti. Quindi, non usare questa potenzialità, è come renderla una normale crittovaluta clone di tante altre  |
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Mercoledi dovrei riuscire a sapere se riesco ad esserci o meno  |
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I confirm that I'll be one of the escrow for this ICO. Good luck to everyone |
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@jasgroup Ci sono tanti modi per essere truffa nel mondo delle cryptovalute, una di queste è fare una moneta che non offre assolutamente niente di nuovo e utile sul mercato, e con una grossa quantità di premining. Una cosa che ti avevo scritto, e che pare tu abbia saltato direttamete @jasgroup
Lo schema che può seguire questa moneta, come già altre hanno fatto, è questo:
1) Si crea una moneta che non abbia nulla di realmente interessante, un clone di cloni, ma questo non è particolarmente importante.
2) Si fa del premine, cioè, chi va a creare questa copia, si crea per se stesso una grossa quantità di coin, ancora prima che la moneta venga lanciata sul mercato.
3) Avvia un sistema a schema ponzi per promuoverla, visto che il mondo è sempre pieno di nuovi stupidi che ci cascano.
4) Con i soldi raccolti dal ponzi, anche fatto male, tanto appunto c'è sempre chi ci casca, va sui mercati a forzare degli acquisti con questi soldi praticamente rubati agli stupidi. Cioè, a creare domanda per far alzare il prezzo.
5) Visto che anche nel mondo delle crittovalute, è pieno di gonzi che vogliono diventare i nuovi ricchi, come altri hanno fatto prima di loro con Bitcoin, vedendo questa moneta alzarsi di prezzo (per via di queste richieste di acquisto, fatte appunto dai promotori del ponzi), si buttano a comprare.
6) Questo crea una scia a catena di gonzi su gonzi che pian piano vanno a comprare vedendo che sale il prezzo e facendolo alzare altrettando.
7) Si torna al punto due, i creatori di questa moneta, con tutti i coin preminati, ora che c'è il mercato lanciato dai gonzi, vanno a vendere i loro coin preminati in cambio di Bitcoin, che poi ricambieranno in euro o altre valute.
Quindi doppio guadagno per una moneta senza alcuna utilità e validità, grazie a tutti i gonzi ultimi arrivati, sia dallo schema ponzi, che dal premine.
Chi sta promuovendo questa moneta è giusto un esperto in ponzi e truffe, e avrà qualcuno esperto in truffe su crittovalute, nelle retrovie, un po' più esperto di lui, che gli starà dando una mano.
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1768454.msg17927194#msg17927194Però magari, come spesso capita, i "networker" ci fanno anche il callo a promuovere l'inutilità totale, facendola passare per oro colante  |
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Sia Copay che Electrum vanno bene.
Copay è più user-friendly, ma Electrum ha più funzionalità.
Una volta che hai esperienza con l'ambiente Bitcoin, è probabile che preferirai Electrum.
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Aspettano 50 conferme, che non ha senso su raiblocks ma vabbe |
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La postepay evolution è un conto corrente, quindi si, hai un conto corrente.
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Electrum è un ottimo wallet.
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@traincarswreck Many key people in the Core dev team are probably ignorant of what you are saying and/or in a position of conflict of interest (so their mind will deny everything that can go against their salary), but ... if you give a full proof about their ignorance, then Core will become a magic pure entity, full open source, completely transparent, where everyone is free to contribute ... Traincarswreck, do not waste your time on complaining. When things don't work as you think that they should do, help to build an alternative |
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@Nicolas Tesla You as many other are currently missing one important thing. What happen if the network lose a large number of nodes? The decentralisation feature of the network starts to missing. What happen to the market if the decentralisation feature of the network starts to missing? The confidence in the Bitcoin gets lower, and so the price.What happen to the miners if the price gets lower? They get less money.So, even with an unlimited block size, maybe there can be problems from a possible attack from malicious entity, and so some dynamic barriers are needed, but there is no way that miners will start to make huge blocks, because this goes directly against their interest on money. Again, not because they have a good heart, but even just because of their greed, as the Nakamoto's consensus works. ( 6. Incentive) And they have millions invested that need to cover on all the next months/years. Good past example of this economic behavior: http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-miners-ditch-ghash-io-pool-51-attack/No issue here. |
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however funds are deposited in their group IBAN - not my individual Maybe I'm not understanding it well, but are you saying here that you didn't deposit on your Paysera bank account with your name? What do you mean with "their group IBAN" ? It seems that you really sent to the wrong IBAN. |
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If the attacker is overpowering the network, as noted, they can produce any number of blocks ahead on their chain. Not just 12. In the real world, an attack isn't a simple logic it can be done / not. There are costs. Even now "it is possible" a 51% attack from an "attacker overpowering the network", and the only solution is a pow fork, as in the imaginary-but-not-economic-possible case in the BU world. If the attacker is overpowering the network, as noted, they can produce any number of blocks ahead on their chain. Not just 12. Again, it isn't free. Anyway, the settings of the BU node can be changed easily with few clicks. So they are the results of the perceived needed security of every user/service/business. Maybe many users will leave 12, but maybe businesses/exchanges will set it to 50, 100 or more. (and so then will do the same the users) Then the attacker will lose any incentive to it anyway. The BU node can be also set to work as a Core node (ex: EB 1 AD 999999999). The good thing is that the everyone will not need anymore any ""consensus"" from few devs to upgrade the network, it can move on it's own emergent consensus. No: more work wins, all that change does is potentially influence the behavior on ties of equal work (and potentially enable new selfish mining strategies, while slowing down validation and making it more memory hungry). Meaning an overpowering attacker can do whatever they want. This is the BU model and it is unlike the model described in the Bitcoin whitepaper or implemented in any version of the software ever released. More work on small and easy to validate blocks? Seems good to me. You are too vague here. |
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Repeating a lie won't make it true. It doesn't make it true, by the pure meaning of the "true" word, but it can help to make everyone believe a lie for a longest time of being able to gain a profit. Currently, no one is paying me to talk about BU or other Bitcoin implementation, no one paid me in the past, and I still nearly fully invested in the "Bitcoin token", on private keys that I fully own. I haven't any full contract with any company and/or invested on them. So I feel myself in a better position than yours about denying this possibility of having an incentive of gaining profit by repeating lies. Even though you and BU insist on ignoring how _every version ever released_ works-- you don't even need to look to the operation of the system to disprove your belief that Bitcoin does whatever the majority of the hashpower wants-- The whitepaper itself specifically speaks to the potential for a dishonest hashrate majority: As such, the verification is reliable as long as honest nodes control the network, but is more vulnerable if the network is overpowered by an attacker. While network nodes can verify transactions for themselves, the simplified method can be fooled by an attacker's fabricated transactions for as long as the attacker can continue to overpower the network.One strategy to protect against this would be to accept alerts from network nodes when they detect an invalid block, [...] "simplified method" The quote refers to the SPV clients, while instead we are talking about full nodes verification. Full quote:8. Simplified Payment Verification
It is possible to verify payments without running a full network node. A user only needs to keep
a copy of the block headers of the longest proof-of-work chain, which he can get by querying
network nodes until he's convinced he has the longest chain, and obtain the Merkle branch
linking the transaction to the block it's timestamped in. He can't check the transaction for
himself, but by linking it to a place in the chain, he can see that a network node has accepted it,
and blocks added after it further confirm the network has accepted it.
IMAGE
As such, the verification is reliable as long as honest nodes control the network, but is more
vulnerable if the network is overpowered by an attacker. While network nodes can verify
transactions for themselves, the simplified method can be fooled by an attacker's fabricated
transactions for as long as the attacker can continue to overpower the network. One strategy to
protect against this would be to accept alerts from network nodes when they detect an invalid
block, prompting the user's software to download the full block and alerted transactions to
confirm the inconsistency. Businesses that receive frequent payments will probably still want to
run their own nodes for more independent security and quicker verification.
(emphasis is mine) The text you quote, "He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules"-- is speaking to a world where network nodes validate and so miners ability to profitably break the rules is very limited. This incentive assumption is far weaker in the BU world where all users strongly trust miners. I think that you are trying to mix the full node situation with the SPV situation. It is suggested by always to wait more confirmations on an SPV clients. This is now, and it will be the same on a possible BU world. Again, nothing will change. There is also a big difference on "trusting the miners" and "trusting the legit miners". BU nodes trust the legit miners. Where is the difference? Legit BU miners aren't going to blindly accept blocks bigger then their EB settings. Because this damaging the users and belief in the Bitcoin system will damage their income. So, the possible attacker (from the quote of the bitcoin.pdf you have reported) will just mine huge blocks that will go nowhere. BU nodes instead (with the current default setting, that the user can freely change) aren't going to accept bigger block without 12 consecutive blocks after it. (AD setting) So, at the end, to be more precise, in the "current BU world" (with default settings) there is the basic idea that there can't be an attacker that is going to be able to do and pay for an attack of 13 consecutive blocks (the first one bigger + 12 small blocks) If someone thinks that a 13 block attack is still possible ... there is also this coming: Parallel Validation: https://github.com/BitcoinUnlimited/BUIP/blob/master/033.mediawiki ( being developed here) The first block downloaded and validated wins. So, the smaller and easier to be fully validated the better. I think that if segwit hadn't the fake block size increase (but everything else), now it could be already activated by the larger majority of the miners. |
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I advise you to use BTC-e to deposit on Advcash.
Bitcoin -> BTC-e -> EUR or USD -> BTC-e code -> Advcash
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I did and it's sitting with "Your comment is awaiting moderation.". I cannot "archive it" because it won't even be displayed in the first place without his permission.
Good to know, I'll trust you on this I think this point is especially dishonest coming from a BU developer, given that their whole security model is based on a strong assumption that the aggregate behavior of miners is honest. Oh well, this the basic on how the Bitcoin system works. I know and remember that the first time you saw Bitcoin you didn't agree on this, but still it didn't break in the past years, claiming the opposite is unproven. This is again a good history case/proof of the opposite of what you are claiming: http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-miners-ditch-ghash-io-pool-51-attackBU model is the Bitcoin model, no changes on its root. Bitcoin.pdf The incentive may help encourage nodes to stay honest. If a greedy attacker is able to
assemble more CPU power than all the honest nodes, he would have to choose between using it
to defraud people by stealing back his payments, or using it to generate new coins. He ought to
find it more profitable to play by the rules, such rules that favour him with more new coins than
everyone else combined, than to undermine the system and the validity of his own wealth.
With nodes here Satoshi was meaning miners, because they can mine with CPU power. |
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Finally, the untrue claims in this blog post are being plastered all over rBTC but due to actions by that subreddit's moderators I am unable to post a counterargument-- not just on rbtc-- but anywhere on Reddit. Yet they happily scream about far less limiting actions a censorship.
Then why don't you post it directly on the blog? What a better place to show to everyone that he is wrong? You can archive it if you are afraid of a possible censorship from him, and show it then to everyone. |
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Guardare su blockchain.info va bene. Nel caso ad un certo punto sparisca anche da li, contatta il supporto bitpanda, la rinvieranno probabilmente con una fee maggiore. Questa discussione ti sarà utile: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1515457.0 |
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