Clarification: Security of a coin will be very tied to its transaction rate × average transaction size, i.e. velocity adoption and wealth of the velocity. The problem I have with the fixed size tail reward as compared to the design I am contemplating is that tail reward only captures those metrics indirectly through exchange price appreciation. I am not sure if the two models are equally powerful. I will need to think more deeply about it. My design also has an orthogonal tail reward.
Edit: some aspects of Monero's tail reward and block size adjustment algorithm are analogous to aspects of my design. There are some other things I didn't mention. I will need to really take the time to distil this into a carefully written white paper. So I would caution readers not to form any concrete conclusions (either for or against any design mentioned here) from these vague discussions.
BTW, I would suggest that Tragedy of the Commons is an ineffective analogy for explaining whatever it is you are trying to explain because obviously-intelligent people such as ArticMine don't understand it. It may be that you are entirely correct, but if you want to communicate effectively you need a differently-worded explanation.
Agreed at the appropriate time. I deem it necessary to be vague since I am months (or moar!) away from implementing my design. |
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The better retort would be to argue that the as the adoption increases, the price will rise so the fixed size (in coins) tail reward has an adaptive valuation.
But I will retort that the value of shorting also scales up accordingly.
Shorting can't erase the cost due to PoW (burning energy). It can only erase a cost from loss of value of a holdings (PoS and other methods that claim to turn holding coins into "virtual miners"). If attacking a coin causes its price to decline, shorting can return a profit. If that profit exceeds the cost due to PoW, then it erased it. Cover the short, stop the attack. Repeat if the price rises again. Yes but if the attack doesn't succeed, the energy burn cost is still there (i.e. risk of failure) Agreed, I also acknowledged that in the past, that the market might simply ignore the attack since it knows if the price doesn't drop there may be no way to sufficiently monetize the attack to offset the hashrate cost. However there are other more certain ways to profit on an attack of PoW, and that is to do the attack on behalf of the world government and charge the cost to the collective (i.e. to the people of the world). This is essentially my greatest fear for the future of Satoshi's design if it doesn't otherwise fail due to being a cartel: Regarding the future of Bitcoin and its Tragedy of the Commons economic design: At best one would see the type of cartel that TPTB_need_war has suggested; however my take is that this kind of cartel would only last for a short time before collapsing. Just witness what is currently happening in the crude oil market.
Cartels form in power vacuums. They must align with the greater power vacuums in order to sustain their market inefficiency (top-down control can't anneal maximum fitness). So the only way such a cartel would not fail, would be to become a fiat of the world government and be sustained by the Iron Law on Political Economics which is the perennial, inimitable power vacuum.
If, by contrast, you try to attack a coin almost costlessly via PoS exploits and if your attack doesn't succeed then your your coins nor your short loses value. Then you can just try again, until you succeed...
Agreed one of the major reasons PoS(hit) is insecure— there is no ongoing expenditure. I agree that "coins will go down in value" does not enhance the security of PoW; that would attempting to impute a some sort of stake-based incentive to mining, as some do, and that is flat out wrong, or at best, very weak security.
Agreed. Security of a coin will be very tied to its transaction rate × average transaction size, i.e. velocity adoption and wealth of the velocity. The problem I have with the fixed size tail reward as compared to the design I am contemplating is that tail reward only captures those metrics indirectly through exchange price appreciation. I am not sure if the two models are equally powerful. I will need to think more deeply about it. My design also has an orthogonal tail reward. Edit: some aspects of Monero's tail reward and block size adjustment algorithm are analogous to aspects of my design. There are some other things I didn't mention. I will need to really take the time to distil this into a carefully written white paper. So I would caution readers not to form any concrete conclusions (either for or against any design mentioned here) from these vague discussions. |
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The better retort would be to argue that the as the adoption increases, the price will rise so the fixed size (in coins) tail reward has an adaptive valuation.
But I will retort that the value of shorting also scales up accordingly.
Shorting can't erase the cost due to PoW (burning energy). It can only erase a cost from loss of value of a holdings (PoS and other methods that claim to turn holding coins into "virtual miners"). If attacking a coin causes its price to decline, shorting can return a profit. If that profit exceeds the cost due to PoW, then it erased it. Cover the short, stop the attack. Repeat if the price rises again. Yes but if the attack doesn't succeed, the energy burn cost is still there (i.e. risk of failure) Agreed, I also acknowledged that in the past, that the market might simply ignore the attack since it knows if the price doesn't drop there may be no way to sufficiently monetize the attack to offset the hashrate cost. However there are other more certain ways to profit on an attack of PoW, and that is to do the attack on behalf of the world government and charge the cost to the collective (i.e. to the people of the world). This is essentially my greatest fear for the future of Satoshi's design if it doesn't otherwise fail due to being a cartel: Regarding the future of Bitcoin and its Tragedy of the Commons economic design: At best one would see the type of cartel that TPTB_need_war has suggested; however my take is that this kind of cartel would only last for a short time before collapsing. Just witness what is currently happening in the crude oil market.
Cartels form in power vacuums. They must align with the greater power vacuums in order to sustain their market inefficiency (top-down control can't anneal maximum fitness). So the only way such a cartel would not fail, would be to become a fiat of the world government and be sustained by the Iron Law on Political Economics which is the perennial, inimitable power vacuum.
If, by contrast, you try to attack a coin almost costlessly via PoS exploits and if your attack doesn't succeed then your your coins nor your short loses value. Then you can just try again, until you succeed...
Agreed one of the major reasons PoS(hit) is insecure— there is no ongoing expenditure. I agree that "coins will go down in value" does not enhance the security of PoW; that would attempting to impute a some sort of stake-based incentive to mining, as some do, and that is flat out wrong, or at best, very weak security.
Agreed. Security of a coin will be very tied to its transaction rate × average transaction size, i.e. velocity adoption and wealth of the velocity. The problem I have with the fixed size tail reward as compared to the design I am contemplating is that tail reward only captures those metrics indirectly through exchange price appreciation. I am not sure if the two models are equally powerful. I will need to think more deeply about it. My design also has an orthogonal tail reward. Edit: some aspects of Monero's tail reward and block size adjustment algorithm are analogous to aspects of my design. There are some other things I didn't mention. I will need to really take the time to distil this into a carefully written white paper. So I would caution readers not to form any concrete conclusions (either for or against any design mentioned here) from these vague discussions. |
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And reading between the lines, can we expect a project with smooth and TPTB_need_war pair programming and altcoinUK as a project manager?
On altcoinUK as the manager, absolutely 0% chance. No disrespect, but one thing I don't want are managers (as opposed to organizers). I prefer a lean approach where every worker is their own manager. altcoinUK as an investor or as a coder perhaps (but also not pursing this as he has retired from coding and I am shooting for crowdfunding donations instead of investors at this stage if possible). On the potential of smooth and I working on the same project, this potential always exists in open source projects as we are all free to choose what we want to contribute to. As to the likelihood of smooth and I partnering to create a project (CC or otherwise), smooth and I talked before in mid-2015 about that (and not since) and it is not outside the realm of possibility but it isn't likely. I think probably the main reason is because smooth's focus afaics is for any project to be strictly modelled in the open source model, and I am instead wanting to combine aspects of closed source and open source and using some commercial marketing concepts. I get the impression this is foreign to smooth's desires, as ostensibly evident by his recent statement about the advantages of Monero: in the long run, moneros inflation is irrelevant tho... what matter is when all top 10 coin has anonymity implemented, how would xmr will stay relevant  ASIC-resistant pure-PoW coin with many independent miners, fair launched, healthy distribution (objectively shown by high available liquidity), vibrant and inclusive open source project that demonstrably attracts developers, integrated into a privacy-centric development effort including the privacy-enhanced cryptocurrency and I2P router development, deployed and proven dynamic block size scalability, 2-year project and code maturity, well-defined governance, strong experienced core team with diverse skills, proven forum funding system (crowdfunding). I just looked at the top 10 coins. None have a very strong subset of these qualities. There is no risk to Monero's differentiation in the foreseeable future. honestly i want to hear more good news from xmr community regarding their wallet, as i too once xmr holder and convert all of them when i realize xmr dev seem ignoring investors call for improvement. I guess you are not aware of the active project underway, funded by the community, to complete development of a brand new GUI wallet. If you were I doubt you would characterize that as 'call for improvement' being ignored. However, since the plans for my project include many sub-projects, it is possible to imagine that those aspects which are pure open source, could possibly be fit to smooth's ostensibly preferred model. There are other issues as well, such as the very high level of remuneration smooth normally receives, but this is also flexible I think depending on whether the project is purely open source, donation model or not. I think though that smooth is probably quite busy already with his community role for Monero and lead developer for Aeon. Also there are many talented people and interesting projects for smooth to work with on. There is no super strong reason he should choose to work with me on my projects. I haven't shown much coding yet. " Talk is cheap, show me the code" said Linus Torvalds. And I had been chronically ill for 4 years (and slightly ill for 7 - 10 years), so that is another risk (although I indicated I am hopefully making strides with the Oregano oil). So actually I find the presumption or implication of the question to be a bit embarrassing for myself. Edit: the anonymity of smooth is a hindrance to doing crowdfunding and Seedr IPO. Investors can't evaluate an anonymous lead developer. |
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The amount of inflation you can slop onto a system before it compromises my above statement is far too arbitrary and unknown
So is the unknown of China's pools controlling 67% of Bitcoin's hashrate, and the potential of the Bitcoin money supply not only inflating like crazy the past years, but inflating more than the originally promised 21 million coin limit. Also the tail reward is usually designed to be much smaller than initial distribution, so if you are worried about inflation, you should be really worried now. If the tail reward is less than the population and economic growth rates, then it is still deflationary. Additionally if Bitcoin has no tail reward and due to the Tragedy of the Commons (if it remains decentralized) then transaction fees decline to costs, then it becomes a permissioned block chain as you alleged with no circulating coins passing back through mining. I'll make these points much more well explained and convincing in a future white paper. |
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The better retort would be to argue that the as the adoption increases, the price will rise so the fixed size (in coins) tail reward has an adaptive valuation.
But I will retort that the value of shorting also scales up accordingly.
Shorting can't erase the cost due to PoW (burning energy). It can only erase a cost from loss of value of a holdings (PoS and other methods that claim to turn holding coins into "virtual miners"). If attacking a coin causes its price to decline, shorting can return a profit. If that profit exceeds the cost due to PoW, then that cost was erased. Cover the short, stop the attack. Repeat if the price rises again. BTW, I would suggest that Tragedy of the Commons is an ineffective analogy for explaining whatever it is you are trying to explain because obviously-intelligent people such as ArticMine don't understand it. It may be that you are entirely correct, but if you want to communicate effectively you need a differently-worded explanation.
Agreed at the appropriate time. I deem it necessary to be vague since I am months (or moar!) away from implementing my design. |
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Next time my detractors make a thread to try to troll me, perhaps they should remember that when they do that, I turn such threads into a humiliating "tail between their legs" defeat for them every time: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1438301.msg14590792#msg14590792https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1438301.msg14597791#msg14597791Meritocracies can't lie. Those who work hard and are sincere, are not vulnerable to disingenuous trolls. Hey I tried to basically ignore that troll thread. But some of them got nasty with the verbal abuse and false allegations. So I got "nastier" with the calm, unemotional, ice cold facts. “Sit in the place of honor at my right hand until I humble YOUR ENEMIES, MAKING THEM A FOOTSTOOL UNDER YOUR FEET” |
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There is a permanent tail reward turnover in my design. And it is still unprofitable.
I'm honestly not ready to throw in the towel on inflation due to being a completely arbitrary number that opens an enormous slippery slope for alteration by succesors. Inflation also just being a form of social engineering that people will always attempt to bypass by utilizing other systems. Also due to the fact stated below: Transaction fee as block reward with zero inflation being the far lesser of evils to the point where it can only be considered a work of art.
There is no inflation with a tail reward. Any smallish level of inflation will result in a constant spendable money supply (click the quoted link for the math): |
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I have a solution, but it is a very radical change to the proof-of-work design that relies on unprofitable mining by payers.
Which I do not see as a solution due to my criticism of IOTA where abstracting block reward from the external entropy process defeats the purpose of the external entropy process from existing in the first place, giving you something that's functionally equivalent to a closed loop proof of stake system. Or to put it more simply for people who didn't read the IOTA thread, without permanent coin turnover via either transaction fee as block reward or permanent inflation, you technically have a permissioned ledger and not a decentralized system. Transaction fee as block reward being the far lesser of evils to the point where it can only be considered a work of art. I believe unprofitable mining is therefore pointless mining. My, to borrow a slightly overused Anonymint term, "holistic" grasp of all cryptocurrency elements was not where it is now when I originally made this thread, and Satoshi indeed did not implement any Sybil prevention due to pools acting as an unforeseen abstraction layer, but Bitcoin is otherwise a work of art that no alternative systems have been able to improve upon yet. There is a permanent tail reward turnover in my design. And it is still unprofitable. |
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[1] Note this means the tail reward security of Monero will be very weak and insufficient.
"Insufficient" is unclear because there is no unambiguous definition of how much is sufficient. In large part it depends on the decentralization of mining. If mining is decentralized then you only need a small (but still nonzero) incentive because any miner can't really do anything other than follow the longest chain rule. While raw hash rate attacks are possible (i.e. temporarily centralizing mining by incurring a cost), in a larger system they will have significant cost and will only succeed as long as the ongoing cost is paid. If mining is highly concentrated by nature then you are really only relying on the weak linear security of the block reward itself, and maybe not even that, because miners (e.g., hypothesized Chinese cartels) have all sorts of perverse incentives. Your statement would be correct if you added ", assuming mining becomes centralized as I have claimed it will." I will argue my statement was correct as stated, because there are other parties with significant resources and incentives who may not be mining normally but once the hashrate declines to the tail reward cost, they can then decide it is easier to attack the coin. The better retort would be to argue that the as the adoption increases, the price will rise so the fixed size (in coins) tail reward has an adaptive valuation. But I will retort that the value of shorting also scales up accordingly. Rather what I do in my improved design, is to set the cost of mining to the reasonable fraction of the transaction value. That is why I say the only way to solve the block chain Tragedy of the Commons is to require what is effectively a minimum transaction fee in the protocol. But then there is the problem of miners competing with each other to rebate the fee to the payer/payee so how to enforce a minimum transaction fee? There is only one way to do that, which is to burn the fees. But if you burn them then the money supply declines to 0. So the only way is to burn hashrate. And that is why only my design which makes mining unprofitable will solve the problem. |
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[1] Note this means the tail reward security of Monero will be very weak and insufficient.
"Insufficient" is unclear because there is no unambiguous definition of how much is sufficient. In large part it depends on the decentralization of mining. If mining is decentralized then you only need a small (but still nonzero) incentive because any miner can't really do anything other than follow the longest chain rule. While raw hash rate attacks are possible (i.e. temporarily centralizing mining by incurring a cost), in a larger system they will have significant cost and will only succeed as long as the ongoing cost is paid. If mining is highly concentrated by nature then you are really only relying on the weak linear security of the block reward itself, and maybe not even that, because miners (e.g., hypothesized Chinese cartels) have all sorts of perverse incentives. Your statement would be correct if you added ", assuming mining becomes centralized as I have claimed it will." I will argue my statement was correct as stated, because there are other parties with significant resources and incentives who may not be mining normally but once the hashrate declines to the tail reward cost, they can then decide it is easier to attack the coin. The better retort would be to argue that the as the adoption increases, the price will rise so the fixed size (in coins) tail reward has an adaptive valuation. But I will retort that the value of shorting also scales up accordingly. Rather what I do in my improved design, is to set the cost of mining to the reasonable fraction of the transaction value. That is why I say the only way to solve the block chain Tragedy of the Commons is to require what is effectively a minimum transaction fee in the protocol. But then there is the problem of miners competing with each other to rebate the fee to the payer/payee so how to enforce a minimum transaction fee? There is only one way to do that, which is to burn the fees. But if you burn them then the money supply declines to 0. So the only way is to burn hashrate. And that is why only my design which makes mining unprofitable will solve the problem. |
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And I am just a spectator  I believe it's not only CPU miners that are at stake here. Even signatures could be validated 2-4 at a time, on the same subroutine, to get SIMD benefits. So scaling is affected as well. It would need the main routine to be adjusted accordingly instead of sending 1 for processing (per thread) to 2-4 (per thread) and expect back 2-4. Heck, even cracking speed could be improved.
Signatures should eventually be verified on GPUs (or similar SIMD units that get integrated into CPUs in time). That will happen when it is needed. CPU SIMD instructions are kind of interesting but also kind of narrowly-targeted. Processing large amounts of data in a fixed pipeline will still be more efficient on GPU-type architectures. This is why only main memory random access latency bound proof-of-work algorithms can potentially remain GPU and ASIC resistant. And they must be carefully designed so that increased computation can not be realistically traded for latency. One of the challenges in such a design for a memory hard hash, is that very slow speed if you want the memory consumed to be larger than the SRAM caches of GPUs and ASICs. Ideally you want the computation to be very small, so that the electrical efficiency optimization of the ASIC won't be significant.
[1] Note this means the tail reward security of Monero will be very weak and insufficient.
"Insufficient" is unclear because there is no unambiguous definition of how much is sufficient. In large part it depends on the decentralization of mining. If mining is decentralized then you only need a small (but still nonzero) incentive because any miner can't really do anything other than follow the longest chain rule. While raw hash rate attacks are possible (i.e. temporarily centralizing mining by incurring a cost), in a larger system they will have significant cost and will only succeed as long as the ongoing cost is paid. If mining is highly concentrated by nature then you are really only relying on the weak linear security of the block reward itself, and maybe not even that, because miners (e.g., hypothesized Chinese cartels) have all sorts of perverse incentives. Your statement would be correct if you added ", assuming mining becomes centralized as I have claimed it will." I will argue my statement was correct as stated, because there are other parties with significant resources and incentives who may not be mining normally but once the hashrate declines to the tail reward cost, they can then decide it is easier to attack the coin. The better retort would be to argue that the as the adoption increases, the price will rise so the fixed size (in coins) tail reward has an adaptive valuation. But I will retort that the value of shorting also scales up accordingly. Rather what I do in my improved design, is to set the cost of mining to the reasonable fraction of the transaction value. That is why I say the only way to solve the block chain Tragedy of the Commons is to require what is effectively a minimum transaction fee in the protocol. But then there is the problem of miners competing with each other to rebate the fee to the payer/payee so how to enforce a minimum transaction fee? There is only one way to do that, which is to burn the fees. But if you burn them then the money supply declines to 0. So the only way is to burn hashrate. And that is why only my design which makes mining unprofitable will solve the problem.
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What was your retort to my prior post? I only see a photo with some inconclusive claims. |
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I believe it's not only CPU miners that are at stake here. Even signatures could be validated 2-4 at a time, on the same subroutine, to get SIMD benefits. So scaling is affected as well. It would need the main routine to be adjusted accordingly instead of sending 1 for processing (per thread) to 2-4 (per thread) and expect back 2-4. Heck, even cracking speed could be improved.
Signatures should eventually be verified on GPUs (or similar SIMD units that get integrated into CPUs in time). That will happen when it is needed. CPU SIMD instructions are kind of interesting but also kind of narrowly-targeted. Processing large amounts of data in a fixed pipeline will still be more efficient on GPU-type architectures. This is why only main memory random access latency bound proof-of-work algorithms can potentially remain GPU and ASIC resistant. And they must be carefully designed so that increased computation can not be realistically traded for latency. One of the challenges in such a design for a memory hard hash, is that very slow speed if you want the memory consumed to be larger than the SRAM caches of GPUs and ASICs. Ideally you want the computation to be very small, so that the electrical efficiency optimization of the ASIC won't be significant. |
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This brings us back to the Cryptonote adaptive blocksize limit combined with a tail emission found in Monero where:
1) The cost of mining a block is set by the block subsidy
Correct, meaning the amount of hashrate miners spend will be equal to the block subsidy[1] (where block subsidy will ultimately be Monero's perpetual tail reward which is necessarily a fixed # of coins), because (as I pointed out in our prior discussion) transaction fees will trend to costs, due to that the median block size M N will trend upwards to match market demand and thus there is no pricing power on transaction fees. [1] Note this means the tail reward security of Monero will be very weak and insufficient. 2) The total amount in fees per block has to rise to a number comparable to, but most of the time smaller, than the block subsidy.
You wrote that before in our prior discussion: The reason the above two scenarios do not apply to a Cryptonote coin with a tail emission such a Monero becomes apparent when one considers the economics of the total block reward components of fees and base reward (new coin emission). If the total in fees per block significantly exceed the base reward then it becomes economically attractive for miners to burn coins to the penalty by mining larger blocks. The block size rises until the total fees per block fall below a level where it is uneconomic for the miners to pay the penalty by increasing the blocksize. This level is comparable to the base reward. It is at this point where the need for a tail emission becomes clear, since without the tail emission the total block reward (fee plus base reward) would go to zero.
And it still doesn't make any sense to me. The block size will trend upwards to match transaction demand, because the penalty is driven to 0 as the median block size increases as miners can justify burning some of the transaction fees to the penalty. That drives the median block size upwards, which drives the penalty to 0 again. The median block size doesn't have any incentive to decrease again, thus transaction fees then fall to costs. Sorry as I told you before, Monero does not solve the Tragedy of the Commons in Satoshi's design. It does adaptively increase the block size while preventing spam surges. I doubt John Conner's design has achieved any better, because as I explained at our prior discussion, there is no decentralized solution to that Tragedy of the Commons in the current proof-of-work designs. I have a solution, but it is a very radical change to the proof-of-work design that relies on unprofitable mining by payers. |
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This brings us back to the Cryptonote adaptive blocksize limit combined with a tail emission found in Monero where:
1) The cost of mining a block is set by the block subsidy
Correct, meaning the amount of hashrate miners spend will be equal to the block subsidy[1] (where block subsidy will ultimately be Monero's perpetual tail reward which is necessarily a fixed # of coins), because (as I pointed out in our prior discussion) transaction fees will trend to costs, due to that the median block size M N will trend upwards to match market demand and thus there is no pricing power on transaction fees. [1] Note this means the tail reward security of Monero will be very weak and insufficient. 2) The total amount in fees per block has to rise to a number comparable to, but most of the time smaller, than the block subsidy.
You wrote that before in our prior discussion: The reason the above two scenarios do not apply to a Cryptonote coin with a tail emission such a Monero becomes apparent when one considers the economics of the total block reward components of fees and base reward (new coin emission). If the total in fees per block significantly exceed the base reward then it becomes economically attractive for miners to burn coins to the penalty by mining larger blocks. The block size rises until the total fees per block fall below a level where it is uneconomic for the miners to pay the penalty by increasing the blocksize. This level is comparable to the base reward. It is at this point where the need for a tail emission becomes clear, since without the tail emission the total block reward (fee plus base reward) would go to zero.
And it still doesn't make any sense to me. The block size will trend upwards to match transaction demand, because the penalty is driven to 0 as the median block size increases as miners can justify burning some of the transaction fees to the penalty. That drives the median block size upwards, which drives the penalty to 0 again. The median block size doesn't have any incentive to decrease again, thus transaction fees then fall to costs. Sorry as I told you before, Monero does not solve the Tragedy of the Commons in Satoshi's design. It does adaptively increase the block size while preventing spam surges. I doubt John Conner's design has achieved any better, because as I explained at our prior discussion, there is no decentralized solution to that Tragedy of the Commons in the current proof-of-work designs. I have a solution, but it is a very radical change to the proof-of-work design that relies on unprofitable mining by payers. |
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well fuck i wrote a long winded butle and hit back so now its all erased. i take back what i say about you being an idiot, but you are still a spectator, whether its your health to blame or something else.
what im trying to say is that, and writing 7500+ posts and spending all day long here is unhealthy. go outside and do something, learn to play music, or go to the park and interact with people in meatspace. you are priding yourself in what can only be considered unhealthy behavior, im am also guilty of ODing on shiny backlights 4am night after night, from time to time, so i recognize your behavior, you seriously need to get out of the house.
Your posts are almost rational, except your assumption that my posts don't include incredibly valuable technical work that applies to my coding, is where you lose the plot. I use the forum as a place to share my technical work ongoing. As well I do my economic theory development, which is also essential to my coding work. You don't seem comprehend the value of my forum posts. Thus to you, it appears to be a speculator. To me, I am designing the crypto currency future technology in my posts. Do you need an example? sure i could use an example, maybe it got lost in your other 7500 posts Hopefully you know that TierNolan is respected by the Bitcoin core devs and you can review the following thread where I explained to him and jl777 the only correct way to do decentralized exchange: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1364951.msg14078549#msg14078549I solved one of the most important technical design issue that exists in crypto currency. Just let me know how many examples you need, but I think that one is already blockbluster enough to demand your apology. Now can I stop posting here and get back to my work? Here is another one where I explained precisely why Satoshi did not solve the Byzantine Generals Problem as everyone had thought he did: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1183043.msg13823607#msg13823607Or how I explained that Monero had not solved Bitcoin's Tragedy of the Commons around block size and transaction fees: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1183043.msg13844014#msg13844014 |
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