[ANN][XST] Stealth-Coin.com | Tor | StealthText, World's first anonymous SMS Tx!

[Cloakko]

All righty. Since longandshort was posting the IRC chat including some of the stuff I was asking, I figure I'll post my perspective for anyone that might actually care.

The conversation in the bitcoin channel was somewhat misleading and really didn't answer me satisfactory.  Frankly, it's not their job and, as longandshort posted, they don't really know if it can be implemented or not given the limited information presented.  They're also looking at it from the perspective of bitcoin.

Since I was mentioning Monero in there, one of their devs invited me into one of their channels where I was able to ask a few more questions.

Regarding the paper I posted that outlines how Chandran signatures can be traceable etc. Apparently it has not even been peer reviewed. So I'm left with the assumption that while it could be implemented, it would be questionable as to whether or not it would be sound.

So I was thinking about the whitepaper and what it actually said.  Two things stood out to me, the first that it was talking about CN and then about burning Stealthcoins to Stealthsend coins.  One of the key issues is the blockchain.  For example, CN and bitcoin blockchains are completely incompatible. In addition, trying to implement something like Chandran sigs into a bitcoin core would be a massive undertaking.  I mention the bitcoin core since it appears the source for Stealthcoin is based on that given the copyright notice although there's probably been some mods to it as well.  Either way, I simply don't see how Stealthsend could be added into the blockchain after the fact especially given the time frame.

Given all that, the only way I can see potentially having Stealthsend in the time frame outlined is if it was based on CN with its own blockchain or perhaps some sort of dual blockchain scheme.  That would sort of fit with the whitepaper talking about burning one for the other.  In addition, changing CN to use Chandran sigs would be a much easier task but as I said, whether or not it would be cryptographically sound would still be up for debate.

And with that, I'm done with this Chandran sigs/Stealthsend topic as I spent far too much time looking into something that the devs should have been more clear about.  Good luck to everyone.

Stealthsend will be a new coin. It's stated clearly on some of the Stealthcoin papers...

Here it is: https://www.stealth-coin.com/wp-content/uploads/Stealthsend_Whitepaper_brief0914.pdf

[DLow]

All righty. Since longandshort was posting the IRC chat including some of the stuff I was asking, I figure I'll post my perspective for anyone that might actually care.

The conversation in the bitcoin channel was somewhat misleading and really didn't answer me satisfactory.  Frankly, it's not their job and, as longandshort posted, they don't really know if it can be implemented or not given the limited information presented.  They're also looking at it from the perspective of bitcoin.

Since I was mentioning Monero in there, one of their devs invited me into one of their channels where I was able to ask a few more questions.

Regarding the paper I posted that outlines how Chandran signatures can be traceable etc. Apparently it has not even been peer reviewed. So I'm left with the assumption that while it could be implemented, it would be questionable as to whether or not it would be sound.

So I was thinking about the whitepaper and what it actually said.  Two things stood out to me, the first that it was talking about CN and then about burning Stealthcoins to Stealthsend coins.  One of the key issues is the blockchain.  For example, CN and bitcoin blockchains are completely incompatible. In addition, trying to implement something like Chandran sigs into a bitcoin core would be a massive undertaking.  I mention the bitcoin core since it appears the source for Stealthcoin is based on that given the copyright notice although there's probably been some mods to it as well.  Either way, I simply don't see how Stealthsend could be added into the blockchain after the fact especially given the time frame.

Given all that, the only way I can see potentially having Stealthsend in the time frame outlined is if it was based on CN with its own blockchain or perhaps some sort of dual blockchain scheme.  That would sort of fit with the whitepaper talking about burning one for the other.  In addition, changing CN to use Chandran sigs would be a much easier task but as I said, whether or not it would be cryptographically sound would still be up for debate.

And with that, I'm done with this Chandran sigs/Stealthsend topic as I spent far too much time looking into something that the devs should have been more clear about.  Good luck to everyone.

Stealthsend will be a new coin. It's stated clearly on some of the Stealthcoin papers...

Wow, just wow.

When I came here 2 weeks ago while Bob was still involved I told you guys it's a pump and dump. You called me a Fudder. All I wanted was to warn any new people not to fall for the hype..

Dear XST community: I hope you're happy that you made a lot of innocent people bagholders. It's gonna take a very long time before this coin sees any new highs, if ever.

Wishing the best of luck to Hondo, hope you succeed! Thanks for all you are doing!

[adhitthana]

results of what its its not really their problem i mean they looked at the paper they gave an opinion and they are already not thinking about it.

I presume you are talking about GMaxwell etc...? I'm just not sure that aquick look even from experts necessarily means much. Some of the comments showed them admitting they didn't look too hard. And who's expect them to?

to sum it up its just not really somethign that is viable but it is doable but comes with conditions..loads of them

Doable but not viable. That doesn't appear to make a lot of sense. Can you elaborate?

its better to go back to the drawing board and start again they are looking at the wrong paper end of story

Can you explain this, it's too obscure for me to understand your point. Thanks

how many people do you want to look it over before you realise its not gonna happen!

Well the appropriate course of action would be to have it seriously reviewed by someone competent.

you are talking about a dev team that have ported most of their coin and even removed copyright and put their own

Can you elaborate please?

gmaxwell: it's not clear to me that its 'doable',

Hardly a condemnation.

there may be related schemes in that family which are applicable (I haven't researched further)

Ok,,,?

, but the particular paper cited is of a technique which is not usable as is.

Interesting but...what exactly GMaxwell means we'd have to guess.

And looks like it would not be advantagious if it were possible to modify it to make it usable.

Pretty unclear.

its not doable the way they are implying its unlinkable/tracable

But why?

[ElTomeko27]

3 StealthSend Specifications

"Although stealthcoin is a proof-of-stake (PoS) coin, stealthsend can not be PoS because PoS requires proof of
ownership for the stake, which compromises anonymity unless memory expensive proofs are included with
every staking transaction.

Although such proofs are theoretically possible, they are unnecessarily impractical for a crypto-currency.
Therefore, stealthsend will be a proof-of-work coin, which will most likely use the low energy scrypt hashing
algorithm.

Holders of stealthcoin will be able to convert to stealthsend at a ratio of 1:1 using a proof-of-burn conversion.
This conversion will account for 85% of the StealthSend money supply. The other 15% of the stealthsend
money supply will be emitted using a smooth emission algorithm, such that 1/2 of the remaining money
supply is emitted every 2 years. The total money supply will depend on how much StealthCoin is converted to
stealthsend.

Finally, stealthsend will have a six minute block time."

[StealthCoin1]

Before addressing the criticisms raised in this thread, I would like to express my sincere appreciation for these criticisms. Although some believe the manner in which they have been introduced may not be optimal to promote civil discourse, they are valuable criticisms nevertheless, and help to strengthen crypto-currencies in general. It is far better to address weaknesses in crypto systems during implementation than it is to address attacks after deployment.

Chandran signatures [1] make use of a common reference string. The common reference string generator (CRSGen) is a necessity for a model that does not require a random oracle, as described in [1]. CRSGen produces a string that is used as an input to a key generation function. The key generation function produces the user's public-private key pair. This key pair has specific properties in that it is a member of a particular mathematical group. In principle, key generation can be replaced by a cryptographic one-way function if the random oracle assumption is introduced.

Admittedly a more difficult issue to address is one of "unlinkability/untraceability", which boils down to the potential for a double spend. In short, Chandran signatures require the generation of a secret random parameter, g, that serves as an input to a "commitment" to a specific key in the key ring. This commitment basically identifies the public key from which the money is spent. The problem is that any number of g can be produced, creating the potential for any number of commitments to the specific public key.

In reality, this same issue exists with CryptoNote ring signatures except that the CryptoNote system incorporates a key image, I, into signing and verification, such that I can only ever be used once. A similar approach can be taken with Chandran signatures. As presented in [1], a key image I can be incorporated into Step 3 of signing and appended to the final signature. In addition to other parameters, Step 3 commits to the public keys of a subset of the ring. Just as with CryptoNote ring signatures, such a modification would commit to the key image and prevent its use for double-spends.

[1] Chandran N., et al. Ring Signatures of Sub-linear Size Without Random Oracles. ICALP 2007, LNCS 4596, pp. 423–434, 2007.


-- Hondo

++1

thank you sir

[sibcurrency]

10/10/2014 04:37:21 PM    
BUY
   0.00006330    1000.00000000    0.06330000
10/10/2014 04:37:21 PM    
BUY
   0.00006320    1000.00000000    0.06320000
10/10/2014 04:37:21 PM    
BUY
   0.00006310    1000.00000000    0.06310000
10/10/2014 04:37:21 PM    
BUY
   0.00006300    1000.00000000    0.06300000
10/10/2014 04:37:21 PM    
BUY
   0.00006290    1000.00000000    0.06290000
10/10/2014 04:37:21 PM    
BUY
   0.00006285    743.40000000    0.04672269
10/10/2014 04:37:21 PM    
BUY
   0.00006280    1000.00000000    0.06280000
10/10/2014 04:37:21 PM    
BUY
   0.00006270    1000.00000000    0.06270000
10/10/2014 04:37:21 PM    
BUY
   0.00006260    1000.00000000    0.06260000
10/10/2014 04:37:21 PM    
BUY
   0.00006250    1000.00000000    0.06250000
...................................................
LOL
Sell more 'weakhanders'

[racer2012]

Price drop to 5800k 

[Cloakko]

Price drop to 5800k  

[sibcurrency]

Stealthcoin is on top with 110BTC volume!

[Cloakko]

Stealthcoin is on top with 110BTC volume!

[Artoodeetoo]

Flight to DRK and XC...

[gustopaz]

Price drop to 5800k 

Maybe last chance to buy cheap,i mean less then 10k.Soon will be released need wallet and then 2 weeks later price 5k it become only in our dreams. Dont listen to fuders just keep on mind that Hondo is real look POD5+

[youngmike]

No Bob's fake walls, no pump  R.I.P. XST

[sibcurrency]

10/10/2014 04:52:48 PM    
BUY
   0.00006220    264.76452473    0.01646835
10/10/2014 04:52:48 PM    
BUY
   0.00006214    205.64199622    0.01277859
10/10/2014 04:52:48 PM    
BUY
   0.00006200    339.22338827    0.02103185
10/10/2014 04:52:48 PM    
BUY
   0.00006190    4000.00000000    0.24760000
10/10/2014 04:52:48 PM    
BUY
   0.00006185    235.69543245    0.01457776
10/10/2014 04:52:48 PM    
BUY
   0.00006180    322.58967615    0.01993604
10/10/2014 04:52:48 PM    
BUY
   0.00006170    201.34779815    0.01242315

Keep going!  

[kaloryczny]

i think is problem with XST

[sibcurrency]

No Bob's fake walls, no pump  R.I.P. XST

LOL
Do you see market history?  

[moonchaser]

No Bob's fake walls, no pump  R.I.P. XST

LOL
Do you see market history?  

leave him alone..he's a shitty trader

[moonchaser]

i think is problem with XST

Yep...

http://www.engrish.com/

lol..yep what ?  are you advertising noodles ? what the hell is that engrish ?

[LongAndShort]

you fools are betting on a lemon end of story its aweful

[sibcurrency]

Before addressing the criticisms raised in this thread, I would like to express my sincere appreciation for these criticisms. Although some believe the manner in which they have been introduced may not be optimal to promote civil discourse, they are valuable criticisms nevertheless, and help to strengthen crypto-currencies in general. It is far better to address weaknesses in crypto systems during implementation than it is to address attacks after deployment.

Chandran signatures [1] make use of a common reference string. The common reference string generator (CRSGen) is a necessity for a model that does not require a random oracle, as described in [1]. CRSGen produces a string that is used as an input to a key generation function. The key generation function produces the user's public-private key pair. This key pair has specific properties in that it is a member of a particular mathematical group. In principle, key generation can be replaced by a cryptographic one-way function if the random oracle assumption is introduced.

Admittedly a more difficult issue to address is one of "unlinkability/untraceability", which boils down to the potential for a double spend. In short, Chandran signatures require the generation of a secret random parameter, g, that serves as an input to a "commitment" to a specific key in the key ring. This commitment basically identifies the public key from which the money is spent. The problem is that any number of g can be produced, creating the potential for any number of commitments to the specific public key.

In reality, this same issue exists with CryptoNote ring signatures except that the CryptoNote system incorporates a key image, I, into signing and verification, such that I can only ever be used once. A similar approach can be taken with Chandran signatures. As presented in [1], a key image I can be incorporated into Step 3 of signing and appended to the final signature. In addition to other parameters, Step 3 commits to the public keys of a subset of the ring. Just as with CryptoNote ring signatures, such a modification would commit to the key image and prevent its use for double-spends.

[1] Chandran N., et al. Ring Signatures of Sub-linear Size Without Random Oracles. ICALP 2007, LNCS 4596, pp. 423–434, 2007.


-- Hondo

+