A wallet could have multiple addresses and blockchain data alone sometimes not enough to determine whether set of address belong to same address/person. But if you meant an address rather than a wallet, you could set higher fee or use option to use multiple address as destination.
I tried to keep it vague; for instance some people inadvertently leak multiple addresses of a wallet online, give the xpub to a non-trustworthy party or - the easiest - address reuse. But sure, if you 'follow protocol', addresses in a wallet shouldn't be linked, so total wallet amount is unknown to the outside. I get the point, but people who bother use mixer/coinjoin (even with risk blacklisted from some service) is likely have better privacy practice and unlikely doing example you mentioned. They have the option of adding BTC to your account. They will convert it to a 'cash balance' at the time you send it and each time you deposit you get a new address.
The minimum is $1.00 at the time of sending.
So in theory you could create an account with just an email add a bunch of small amounts of BTC, withdraw to a gift card that you can use in person.
It seems neat idea, but i wonder if there's privacy implication if you keep doing it for long time? I know Bitrefill give new address for each purchase, but i don't remember whether they also give new address for each deposit. |
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OP, i strongly recommend you to use full stop to end a sentence and split to multiple paragraph. It'll make your post easier to read. Bitcoin is quite technical and the technical aspect is more difficult to understand and embrace by ordinary Bitcoin users
Bank is also quite technical. There are so many parts such as detecting fraud, preventing race condition and initiating secure connection. But most bank customer don't know that. so most Bitcoin users only focus on the theoretical aspect of Bitcoin because is easier to understand and do not involve computer programming knowledge to carry out basic Bitcoin functionalities such as sending and receiving Bitcoin, storing Bitcoin in a cold wallet and spending Bitcoin
And there's no problem if they have general idea of Bitcoin, have basic security awareness and know how to use their wallet. You can't expect everyone to have decent technical knowledge. |
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Alternatively, try pywallet: python pywallet.py --dumpwallet --wallet=wallet.dat > wallet.txt Did you include wrong link? That link leads to pywallet library which meant to create HD/BIP 32 wallet. Pywallet for wallet recovery is available at https://github.com/jackjack-jj/pywallet. |
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So, yeah. Apparently there's something going on with 4.2.1. Perhaps it's related with my Electrum server's version?  1. Which Electrum server implementation do you use? 2. Do you know whether version of server you use support Electrum protocol 1.4? Electrum 4.2.1 seek server which support protocol version 1.4[1]. 3. Have you checked log on your Electrum server when the problem occurred? [1] https://github.com/spesmilo/electrum/blob/4.2.1/electrum/version.py#L4 |
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That might work for new or small exchange, but on other hands they could accuse you for "conceal" origin of the coin (see Gemini response).
Pretty much this. Especially if the exchange is in cahoots with Chainalysis(as in the company that's the best with chain analysis as far as I know), then it's probably a very safe assumption that just doing 1 address hop before depositing to the exchange won't do the trick. Not sure if depositing to an exchange without KYC will do the trick (in the hopes of your withdrawal coming from another wallet address), but it poses an additional risk. Chainalysis is the most popular company, we don't know if it's best chain analysis when other company keep a low profile. But i agree 1 hop is unlikely to deceive them if they hire decent chain analysis service. That might work for new or small exchange, but on other hands they could accuse you for "conceal" origin of the coin (see Gemini response).
Not really, based on my friends experience and some users in this forum as regular gambler, they're fine using that method until now. Moreover some people usually directly send their coins to CEX and no faced any problem, they're using big and popular centralized exchanges e.g. Binance and Kucoin. I think these CEX didn't froze gambler funds because the legal law didn't really strict about gambling sources, perhaps in the future we will see a change from those CEX just like how Binance propose mandatory KYC. I'll keep that in mind, but the risk still exist. |
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I really appreciate your effort. But it's not surprising they have relative poor transparency and customer service who're not able to answer uncommon or specific question. Some people tricking centralized exchanges by don't directly send your coins from casino, but they send it to their own wallet first, so:
Casino --> Wallet --> Exchange
If the exchanges hired poor analysis companies, I think this can be solution since they're only look from the address come from, not search more deeply. However the another solution is you shouldn't use centralized exchange to prevent of this problem.
That might work for new or small exchange, but on other hands they could accuse you for "conceal" origin of the coin (see Gemini response). |
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This is mobile bitcoin wallet, transferring bitcoin to a new wallet.
What is it called? It's screenshot of very old version of blockchain.info (today it's called blockchain.com) wallet.  Source: https://www.pinterest.com/pin/570127634048048045/It doesn't make sense to charge you 0.0005 BTC or even make the fees optional unless it's a custodial wallet/exchange in which case, I wouldn't recommend using it to store your funds.
0.0005 BTC isn't that high for 10 years ago. |
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If every transaction in the blockchain is broadly known to be the result of a swap, it will be harder for a potential observer to find out who owns what, and who makes transactions with whom. If a robber is not sure you really have those coins, he is unlikely to make you a target. That would require a serious attitude change of the entire Bitcoin userbase and I am sure that is never going to happen. The protocol (PayJoin[1]) already exist though. If more merchant use it as default option and more wallet support it[2], i expect some users will use it and some of them might not even realize their transaction use PayJoin. But even if it does at one point in the future, I don't see robbers going that deep into research to consider if their potential victim has or doesn't have the coins that their history shows they should possess.
I agree, it's more likely the robber use another means to obtain reliable information or simply seek more vulnerable target. [1] https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0078.mediawiki[2] https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/PayJoin_adoption#Software_Wallets |
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I wanted to know the risks of nefarious actors posing as merchants or other suitable channel partners who create seemingly legit channels, but also infect their partners through other means with malware, trojans, RATs, etc. that then causes the victim to unknowingly force publish an old commitment transaction thereby unknowingly punishing themselves and forfeiting their funds to the attacker.
First of all, how would they infect victim's device? If you're referring to social engineering attack where they persuade the victim to download or run something, the main problem is victim's security awareness. Other means such as finding vulnerability on LN client which run arbitrary script from LN message[1] is very unlikely to happen. Is this a plausible threat to the lightning network, and if so, how best to mitigate such a threat?
No. [1] https://docs.lightning.engineering/lightning-network-tools/lnd/send-messages-with-keysend |
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I was wondering if it's possible to find the wallet with keys if that wallet was an encrpted?
I have the old drive and forensics shows data but i can't find the wallet with hex and the mentioned sequence. is there a differenet sig for an encrpted wallet? or is it truely lost?
It's possible, tools such as pywallet can do it even if the file is marked as deleted. Most magic bytes applicable for both unencrypted and encrypted wallet. You might want to check few magic bytes/signature at https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/a/41450. I may have been decieved or scammed? but this was a first year wallet with the first qt client and had what i think I rememeber was 1000 coins?
By any chance, did you buy wallet.dat file online? |
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I wouldn't bother doing it, Electrum isn't private by design. Electrum client simply send list of address to Electrum Server and Electrum client use clearnet by default. Additionally, answer to your question heavily depends on what kind of CoinJoin you're talking about. You might want to read about WabiSabi protocol at https://github.com/zkSNACKs/WabiSabi/blob/master/protocol.md. |
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A USB disk can not function like a hardware wallet that you connect it to your PC and sign transactions I believe if homomorphic encryption will be used, then it even could do something like that. Because if the currently running operating system is evil, then no hardware wallet can protect you. So, that means you could store a VirtualBox image or something like that, and run it from your USB disk. You can use VirtualBox, unlock your image with some key, and then run it. There is no need to decrypt everything to run it, that's how homomorphic encryption works. I did quick research and looks like there's almost no application of virtual machine which use Homomorphic encryption. Implementation for VirtualBox (which is most user-friendly virtualization software) only exist on academic research[1]. IBM also release FHE implementation for 3 different linux distro, but it's rarely updated only available on Docker[2]. It means you're limited to CLI-based Bitcoin wallet, unless you're able to setup X11/Wayland server. [1] https://research.ijcaonline.org/volume100/number1/pxc3897999.pdf[2] https://github.com/ibm/fhe-toolkit-linux |
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So I want to use the console to write these configurations to the bitcoin.conf file: (a) peerbloomfilters=1 and (b) prune=0 I have searched and I cannot find the syntax
You just write the two things into the file, one per line. You can see my Bitcoin Core config here in step 6 when it comes to the syntax / format of this file. Though I obviously don't have the bloomfilters setting that seems to be required for Bisq. I just tried Jameson Lopp's config generator[1] and found out where it should be located[2]. Prune is disabled by default, so there's no need to add prune=0 manually. # Generated by https://jlopp.github.io/bitcoin-core-config-generator/
# This config should be placed in following path:
# ~/.bitcoin/bitcoin.conf
# [network]
# Support filtering of blocks and transactions with bloom filters.
peerbloomfilters=1
# [Sections]
# Most options automatically apply to mainnet, testnet, and regtest networks.
# If you want to confine an option to just one network, you should add it in the relevant section.
# EXCEPTIONS: The options addnode, connect, port, bind, rpcport, rpcbind and wallet
# only apply to mainnet unless they appear in the appropriate section below.
# Options only for mainnet
[main]
# Options only for testnet
[test]
# Options only for regtest
[regtest]
[1] https://jlopp.github.io/bitcoin-core-config-generator[2] https://jlopp.github.io/bitcoin-core-config-generator/#config=eyJuZXR3b3JrIjp7InBlZXJibG9vbWZpbHRlcnMiOjF9fQ== |
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~ Why is BIP38 involved here? From what I remember a password protected wallet.dat basically encrypts more or less only the private key stuff with AES. I may lack knowledge here though as cracking wallet.dats is not my business. I'm more just curious and have fun to broaden my crypto knowledge. It's true Bitcoin Core use AES, although it's more than encrypt private key with AES[1-2]. Has anyone tried to load this wallet.dat into Bitcoin Core to check which addresses claim to hold the funds and if a blockexplorer actually shows these funds? I admit, I haven't tried yet because I don't believe this is a legit and valid wallet.dat (well, likely 99.999% of publicly available wallet.dats are manipulated scams).
Since you asked, i just did it on VM. Looking at it's transaction history, 1NUW3z5z6cNs8Ltd2cN2BnxP92dySdcuG8 is the only receiving address. According to mempool.space[3], it has ~3.5 BTC. But there's no way to know whether the non-encrypted part of the wallet is manipulated or not[4]. [1] https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Wallet_encryption[2] https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/a/1714[3] https://mempool.space/address/1NUW3z5z6cNs8Ltd2cN2BnxP92dySdcuG8[4] https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5130929.msg50566174#msg50566174 |
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Has anybody done any research about how much time it takes to verify bitcoin blocks on different hardware?
I doubt there's any research or benchmark list about it. Some time ago i asked similar thing for block size, but there's very little data about it[1]. Interesting project idea; but it only really seems viable to use common hardware such as 'Raspberry Pi 3B' or 'Base MacBook Pro 2016'.
--snip--
The result also heavily depends on which software do you use to verify block, i expect Bitcoin Core have better performance than other implementation[2]. OS and drive filesystem also have small impact. [1] https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5332414.0[2] https://blog.lopp.net/bitcoin-core-performance-evolution/ |
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Thanks for sharing, i didn't know there are so many alternate front-end for those services. I'd like to mention some of those service accept Bitcoin as donation option (such as nitter), in case someone think this thread is off-topic on this board. If there is an alternative to quora it will be good.
I read somewhere that is enough to block Quora cookies in browser settings. Then quora can't follow your read history therefore, they will not even ask for sign-in after a reading certain number of posts. I did not try this method so I can't confirm, somehow that the service doesn't suit me. Actually you just need to add ?share=1 to the URL, so you can read the page without login or register. |
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