Suggesting that China is aligned against us is to ignore their economic dependence on us. It's Russia which is becoming increasingly isolated and irrelevant. In fact, if they didn't have a veto in the security council the country would be about as important as India.

Unfortunately isn't one source. A couple that I use though to keep up to date on international affairs are as follows (you can pick and choose):

1.) Reuters: (a decent place to get general overviews of world news, go to their world section and click on the 'more world news' link on the center of the page).

2.) Relief Web: is a UN sponsored news aggregation site that deals with both conflict and natural disasters / disease. you can search by country, or what I do is simply read through their 'Updates' section every day).

3.) Institute for the Study of War: carries updates on Iraq and Syria (including updated maps)

4.) The Long War Journal: Is a bit more neoconservative in its opinions, but posts updates on the global war on terror (so mostly Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan). They also report SITE Intelligence findings which is a good way to stay up to date without having to pay hundreds of dollars for the SITE subscription.

5.) IRIN: is linked to the UN and is updated a couple of times per week with in depth humanitarian news.

6.) The Jamestown Foundation: has a couple of publications, a daily one about China, a daily one about Russia / Europe, a weekly one about the Caucuses, a bi monthly one involving terrorism analysis, and a publication on terrorist leader profiles.

7.) Combating Terrorism Center: produces a monthly PDF on reports concerning terrorist theory and activities and the occasional in depth longer report on a specific topic.

8.) Foreign Affairs: The name pretty much speaks for itself. if you register you can get a couple of articles free every month, otherwise you have to pay for it.

9.) Africa Confidential: A publication that the Bureau of African Affairs receives with updates on key issues in Sub-Saharan Africa.

10.) International Crisis Group: I mostly read their longer published reports which tend to be quite good.

11.) Human Rights Watch: Humanitarian news updates, I skim them and mostly read their in depth reports / PDFs.

12.) Amnesty International: Same as Human Rights Watch

13.) BBC News: Decent world news source, ok reputation, a little slow sometimes to update though.

14.) Al Jazeera English: Pretty similar to BBC description, only this is influenced by Qatar

15.) Al Arabiya: Saudi Arabia's version of Al Jazeera English

16.) IHS Janes: Security analysis, some stuff free, some requires a subscription.

17.) Economist Intelligence Unit: In depth analysis of different countries, you can usually find some of their material online for free after it's been published for a while, otherwise a subscription is required.

18.) Council on Foreign Relations: General foreign relations content.

19.) Brookings Institute: Same.

20.) Foreign Policy Magazine: Self explanatory, requires a subscription though, like Foreign Affairs you can register for free to read a couple of free articles every month.

21.) UN News: Self explanatory, you can also explore other UN pages.

22.) AllAfrica: African news

22.) Local news sites: Reading local news sites also helps since they tend to report on both the details of what is going on and on how the United states is interacting with them. Some I use include: Radio Dabanga (Sudan), Sudan Tribune, Radio Tamazuj (South Sudan), Radio Okapi (DRC), Daslan Radio (Somalia), Sabahi (Horn of Africa), Shabelle (Somalia), Yemen Times, Bangkok Post (Thailand), Irrawaddy (Burma), Democratic Voice of Burma, Karen News (Burma), Sahara Press Service (Western Sahara), Haaretz (Israel), B'Tselem (Israel), Times of India, etc.

We've had this conversation a bit before, and I've never really seen you put together an outline of these inconsistencies in much detail, outside of pointing to Egypt and maybe Syria (which isn't inconsistent with traditional US foreign policy dealings with regards to Egypt). Israel I think is both one of his largest failures and one of his greatest inconsistencies, but that was always expected since our policy has pretty much always been a "realist" approach to Israel since Israel is such a realist state.

But let's take a look at some of his major foreign policy decisions and see how they fit together under the ideological framework that I established in the first post:

1.) Iran: true to multilateral neoliberal form President Obama was both open to talking directly to Iran, and preferred to operate through international cooperation with Iran. As soon as he came into office he ended the Bush era practice of funding Sunni terrorist organizations in Iran such as Jundallah (a more classical realist approach to pressure mechanisms) and instead took a more multilateral approach through the utilization of both Russia, and Azerbaijan to put pressure on Iran (and to good effect) rather than following Israel's war drums and bombing the country. Likewise later on when Iran resurfaced as an issue his administration worked through international means to place very strict sanctions on Iran that lead to political change during the elections and remains a leverage tool. so engagement with Iran = pretty consistent.

2.) Somalia: one of President Obama's first policy moves overseas was to crack down on Somali piracy and Al Shabaab (al Shabaab of course being created during the employment of Bush era policies in the 2006 bombing and US backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia and the destruction of the ICU: another very realist approach). Instead, with President Obama in Somalia we see a more multilateral approach again. We've leaned less on Ethiopia, and have brought Kenya and the African Union into the mix and have employed US forces in a limited engagement capacity in the region too with drones and US soldiers being used in small numbers to assist both the fight against Al-Shabaab and the fight against piracy, and both the Somali government and the issue of Somali piracy have improved under our engagement in the area. So Somalia = mostly consistent

3.) Libya: here is a great example of President Obama's foreign policy style. Very multilateral, very inclusive of international organizations, and coupled with limited military engagement from the US. We supported a domestic movement against an old US enemy (one who Reagan tried to assassinate), and we did it through both the UN Security Council, NATO, and the utilization of the Arab League, all with some engagement by the US but not nearly as heavy as what was seen in Afghanistan and Iraq under his predecessor. since then we have worked with successive new governments to help disarm militias and engage in state building with locals taking the lead (instead of the US since it wasn't under occupation). So Libya = mostly consistent.

4.) Mali: Our initial response to the coup was standard US pressure mechanisms, halting of AGOA eligibility, suspension of our MCC Compact, and heavy diplomatic pressure, and vocal opposition through international mechanisms: particularly the UN (which had the desired effects). The subsequent Tuareg rebellion in the northern part of the country (something we've seen happen multiple times) was a bit of a situational game changer as was the eventual inclusion of Salafi Jihadi groups and their hijacking of the rebellion (which is actually the very thing that caused it to fail). We worked through international and multilateral actors (particularly the AU and France) to combat this incursion with again US involvement on a limited scale. And it worked, a peace deal is ongoing (with our encouragement), though it is likely to remain unstable for some time; one of the important things to note though was US cooperation with France which was largely absent under the Bush Administration and reflects a broader US counter terror strategy in the Sahel and Maghreb that has never been stronger. So Mali = consistent.

5.)The DR Congo: One of President Obama's first acts and major focuses in office in foreign affairs was this conflict. President Bush had actually already paved the way for President Obama through the use of more neo-liberal tactics (which President Bush became more fond of towards the very end of his administration). To that end. President Bush worked through partners on the ground and utilized limited direct US engagement support to help combat the Lord's Resistance Army through Operation Lightning Thunder. This was happening as he was transitioning out of office and as President Obama was coming into office. President Obama seized on this framework and enhanced / strengthened it working with the Central African Republic the DR Congo, Uganda and South Sudan (countries not necessarily inclined towards one another, particularly Uganda and the DRC) to launch another wave of crackdowns that was ultimately successful in severely reducing the LRA presence in all areas except South Sudan (and now due to the increased civil war in the CAR, the LRA has regained stronger operational grounds there as well).

Likewise we sent 100 US troops over to increase our military support initiated under Bush (and which Rush Limbaugh strongly criticized Obama for since we were sending soldiers over there to "kill Christians"). We also worked through the UN to strengthen and radically alter the UN mandate in eastern DRC. For the first time in Africa now the UN operation in the DRC was allowed to form an offensive unit to actively attack remaining rebel groups, which it did and the M23 rebel collapsed (the FDLR are next). This was coupled with strong US pressure against Rwanda and Uganda to reduce their material support for said rebels, and with a reform to conflict resource legislation here in the US to address economic factors of violence. The DRC still has a fair share of fighting ongoing, but it is far quieter now than it probably ever have been since independence. So DRC = Consistent

6.) Yemen: Largely a continuation and escalation of Bush era strategies with more attention placed on central government and institution building and federalization of Yemen. So Yemen = slightly less consistent. I think this rating though is the result of limited US options in Yemen in the face of our expenditure of political capital (both domestic and international) on other issues. AKA we've had to pick some of our battles and Yemen wasn't really one we chose.

7.) Central African Republic: we've responded with soft power pressures and support for AU and French operations while employing the use of sanctions on our end and pushing for a peace process (which is ongoing). CAR = consistent

8.) Nigeria: We've aided in Nigerian government capacity building, and helped (with France) to form a broader coalition of states against Boko Haram and related militias that has never existed before with unprecedented cooperation from both Chad and Cameroon, while maintaining a critical eye on Nigerian governmental abuses and while utilizing, once again, a limited US military engagement to support domestic efforts. Nigeria = consistent.

9.) South Sudan: Similar story, using regional and local actors to cobble together attempted peace processes while pressuring major actors through the use of sanctions and the international community. South Sudan = consistent, but also an area where we haven't expended the most political capital and attention.

10.) Israel: pretty straightforward power politics with a strong military twist, we've downplayed the nuances of the conflict while ramping up military spending and action. Very old school and very inconsistent with President Obama's normal foreign policy approaches, but fairly consistent with US traditional approaches to Israel. Israel= inconsistent.

11.) Egypt: We've been willing to engage for talks Egyptian political opposition groups like never before, which was a sharp break from President Bush's standing policy and is more neo-liberal, as was our adjustment of stances as local actors changed political entities within Egypt during the uprising. Which also happens to be pretty consistent with historical US policy in the region. where he takes a more classical approach is in the muted response to the coup against the Muslim Brotherhood and subsequent working relations with the Sisi government, a more realist and classical approach, but also one which is reflective of our priorities in the region which simply reflect working relations with Egypt at all costs (same as they are for Israel) due to their role in Israel / Palestine, international counter terrorism, Libya and Sudan, and the Suez Canal. All considered vital American strategic interests. that being said, we haven't been particularly warm with Egypt in the face of this forced tract. So Egypt = somewhat consistent / somewhat inconsistent but for good reason.

12.) Syria: Here president Obama tried to utilize his normal policy styles. He built a political coalition with France, Turkey and the UK (among others), but our action was talked down in congress, just as British action was talked down in their legislature. With the loss of our direct support and British support, French support dried up as well. Political capital via the Arab League had been expended in Libya and fatigue concerning such interventions had set in. So tactics had to change and that’s where the red line and the war drum beating came into play, a bit more of a realist style threat (a popular tactic in Israel for example) but it wasn’t taken too far, only to the point of encouraging Russian intervention and the loss of Syria’s chemical weapons, with some non-lethal aid and eventually some small arms munitions for chosen rebel groups. So once again, limited engagement, if not in exactly the way that President Obama wanted and while we did work through international and partner countries it once again, wasn’t in the way we wanted. Syria fell at a tough time for foreign policy execution and the complexities of it present a challenging point from which to engage in Syria now that it has lasted some time. Syria is also one of those conflicts where there are a lot of behind the scenes factors. So Syria = semi consistent (particularly at first), though limited.

13.) Iraq: A much more tricky country to analyze. President Obama inherited this mess (and it was / is a mess) from a previous administration that had relied upon not only a poorly constructed, but heavily damaging policy approach to occupation. As with some of Bush’s other policies though, he (and more specifically our generals such as General Petraeus) came to realize that the status quo wasn’t working and they skillfully developed the surge package which President Obama ended up utilizing. It was a much better piece of policy creation and while it increased troop numbers the major change was in our tactics. This surge represented a more neoliberal approach to Iraq and focused a lot on domestic actors and hearts and minds. Something which I think President Obama was more comfortable with but Iraq was also a war he had campaigned on to end despite the policy shift. The surge helped spark the Awakening which all but destroyed AQI, but the civil war in Syria coupled by the politically corrupt Maliki in office saved it. After our pullout, President Obama went back to the tactics that he was more comfortable with: international engagement and mechanism and pressures for reform within Iraq’s central government and institutions. Now we see a similar tactic being used in Iraq as we have seen in other conflict areas that President Obama has responded to, international engagement (particularly in pressuring regional countries like Saudi Arabia to target actors supporting the ISIS and Al Nusra) coupled with air strikes and limited ground support to supplement local actors while helping with containment through the utilization of Kurds and simultaneously pushing hard for Maliki to step down (which he eventually did). So Iraq: Somewhat consistent

14.) Russia: Pretty straight forward. President Obama has responded to this like many other conflict situations, high pressure through international institutions, the reliance on regional blocs like the EU through which we have expended a lot of political capital, and the enforcement of sanctions which has been the most up front we’ve been in opposing Russian interests since the Cold War (certainly a much stronger response than was seen in Russia’s war with Georgia). Before the Ukraine conflict we were happy to partner with Russia in nuclear arms reductions and successfully utilize Russian spheres of influence to pressure Iran. So our Russian policy = consistent.

16.) Burma: Burma’s opening up to the west I think has more to do with timing than anything else, never-the-less we have played it fairly well even if it has currently taken a back seat in our foreign policy focus. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is part of a more open government now, the country is working on a widespread national ceasefire and peace treaty with multiple armed groups, is looking to federation which would represent additional governmental reforms, and has turned more away from China. The big disappointment is the loss in momentum concerning the domestic treatment of Rohingya, which after initial criticisms and pressure, we’ve quieted about considerably (though the violence has reduced as well). So Burma = Neutral in consistency

17.) China: I’m not extremely well versed in our China foreign policy and our overall ‘Pivot to Asia’ which has been a major foreign policy focus of President Obama’s non-conflict related foreign relations platform so I can’t comment too well on it outside of what I’ve seen in the south China Sea territory dispute where we have been very stern with China (by engaging in symbolism such as flying our unarmed bombers through disputed airspace that China insists is theirs, maintaining dialogue about these disputes, particularly as they relate to Japan and Philippines (I am less well versed in how we have been responding to China’s recent spat with Thailand). We saw this dedication in part during our hurricane relief efforts with the Philippines which made China look bad. China has always been one of those interesting and special cases in the foreign policy world. The language of the pivot seems pretty consistent with President Obama’s policy trends though, So China =

18.) North Korea: North Korea is a hard state to engage with. President Bush was slightly more open to working things out internationally with North Korea and then promptly ended those talks with his public “Axis of Evil” declaration (a huge international relations blunder that occurred in the midst of sensitive policy talks). That being said, President Obama has had to deal with a new North Korean regime and I’ve seen him deal quite well with it, if not in the way I think he would prefer to have engaged North Korea (but alas many of those options were taken off of the table before he stepped into office). That said, during the routine flare up in hostile language and action by North Korea, President Obama broke from US tradition of bribes and called Un’s bluff which forced him to back down after a period of making a show about it (the temporary closure of the joint North / South Korean manufacturing plant). So North Korea = neutral but well handled.

19.) Economic statecraft: The entire primary basis of President Obama’s first presidential term revolved around the new policy of economic statecraft which is straight out of the neo-liberal playbook and has been widely utilized in our engagement overseas, particularly in Africa and Asia. So very consistent.

The deal depends on good faith negotiations concerning the release of prisoners and coastal access which there is little precedence of Israel ever honestly engaging in (not without very heavy US pressure and even then only in limited terms). That may or may not be a deal breaker to the point of initiating rocket attacks (it usually isn't right away). Hamas will likely NOT be the first to fire rockets, that would likely be third party Palestinian militant factions (as per usual) which I suppose is the same thing since it all gets blamed on Hamas anyway. In fact, Israel rarely keeps ceasefire agreements very long outside of military action clauses. It knows that in terms of PR people only care about physical attack conditionals as they relate to ceasefires, not to the actual letter of the actual ceasefires as they relate to say, the fishing restrictions, or the opening of crossings.

The deal depends on good faith negotiations concerning the release of prisoners and coastal access which there is little precedence of Israel ever honestly engaging in (not without very heavy US pressure and even then only in limited terms). That may or may not be a deal breaker to the point of initiating rocket attacks (it usually isn't right away). Hamas will likely NOT be the first to fire rockets, that would likely be third party Palestinian militant factions (as per usual) which I suppose is the same thing since it all gets blamed on Hamas anyway. In fact, Israel rarely keeps ceasefire agreements very long outside of military action clauses. It knows that in terms of PR people only care about physical attack conditionals as they relate to ceasefires, not to the actual letter of the actual ceasefires as they relate to say, the fishing restrictions, or the opening of crossings.

A senior Hamas leader has said the group carried out the kidnapping and killing of three Israeli teens in the West Bank in June — the first time anyone from the Islamic militant group has said it was behind an attack that helped spark the current war in the Gaza Strip.

As far as the OP goes though; Hamas and other Palestinian Gaza factions have announced a ceasefire. We'll see what Israel has to say about it. In either case it depends on talks that will take place in a month on prisoner releases and a port construction and I doubt they will go well.

http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Co...-Israel-371952

And this is why I believe Hamas is going to continue to look like mindless killers to the US. Some of them are mindless killers; the question is why. Disliking Hamas shouldn't blind people to everything else. I know it can, but only because people want to be small.

http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Co...-Israel-371952

And this is why I believe Hamas is going to continue to look like mindless killers to the US. Some of them are mindless killers; the question is why. Disliking Hamas shouldn't blind people to everything else. I know it can, but only because people want to be small.