Analysis and list of top big blocks shills (XT #REKT ignorers)

[Quantus]

... I already explained that we do not lose fifty percent of our security at the halving, since the exchange rate also effects this dynamic ...

Not really. This year, we are paying  roughly 10% of Bitcoin's total value, or what people here call "market cap," to secure it. In other words, we are currently spending roughly a dime to store (secure) a dollar for a year.
After the halvening, we will be paying only a nickel.
It doesn't matter how much a dollar is worth, the ratio remains the same.
Same for efficiency/cost of mining gear.

What matter is how much a Bitcoin is worth compared to fiat, since if the market capitalization of Bitcoin increases, the block reward will be worth more in terms of fiat value and real world purchasing power. This would stimulate increased mining since there will be profit to be made, since miners costs are still predominately in Fiat and it is the purchasing power of those Bitcoins that really matters not the amount of Bitcoins that are made. This is why the ratio does not stay the same, if the market cap of Bitcoins doubles so does the amount payed for security, these two things are explicitly linked.

But it doesn't matter. A safe that's "just good enough" to secure 10 dollars is probably not good enough to secure a billion, agree?
The attacker doesn't want to break Bitcoin to prove a point, the amount he's willing to spend on the attack is directly proportional to the potential reward. So if it costs him a buck ten to steal a dollar now, after the halving it will cost him 55 cents.
Bitcoin price in fiat doesn't play into this, because it affects both the cost of the attack and the reward equally.
Tell me if I'm being unclear.

The cost of the attack is measured in fiat. Since to buy and setup more then fifty one percent of the hashpower would cost more then two hundred and sixty million dollars (just ran a rudimentary calculation). If the price of Bitcoin however went up, it would in effect mean that the Bitcoin protocol is paying more for its security in terms of fiat or real world purchasing power. This would incentivize more miners to come into the ecosystem thereby increasing its security. Therefore it can be argued if the price of Bitcoin doubles that the security of Bitcoin would also double meaning that it would cost twice as much to attack the network, in this case for example it would cost more then five hundred and twenty million dollars, and this is just for the setup costs, not including maintenance or even electricity costs which would over the long term might even cost more then the machines themselves.

Pardon me if I don't trust your back of the hand calculations, your assumptions and narrow minded view that ignores the possibility that a miner or hacked mining pool/pools might desire to attack the network just to short the price and turn a quick buck, is absurd. An attacker my already have a large stockpile of bitcoins, perhaps confiscated in a drug bust but who are you to set the limits on a theoretical attacker and their potential resources?

[VeritasSapere]

... I already explained that we do not lose fifty percent of our security at the halving, since the exchange rate also effects this dynamic ...

Not really. This year, we are paying  roughly 10% of Bitcoin's total value, or what people here call "market cap," to secure it. In other words, we are currently spending roughly a dime to store (secure) a dollar for a year.
After the halvening, we will be paying only a nickel.
It doesn't matter how much a dollar is worth, the ratio remains the same.
Same for efficiency/cost of mining gear.

What matter is how much a Bitcoin is worth compared to fiat, since if the market capitalization of Bitcoin increases, the block reward will be worth more in terms of fiat value and real world purchasing power. This would stimulate increased mining since there will be profit to be made, since miners costs are still predominately in Fiat and it is the purchasing power of those Bitcoins that really matters not the amount of Bitcoins that are made. This is why the ratio does not stay the same, if the market cap of Bitcoins doubles so does the amount payed for security, these two things are explicitly linked.

But it doesn't matter. A safe that's "just good enough" to secure 10 dollars is probably not good enough to secure a billion, agree?
The attacker doesn't want to break Bitcoin to prove a point, the amount he's willing to spend on the attack is directly proportional to the potential reward. So if it costs him a buck ten to steal a dollar now, after the halving it will cost him 55 cents.
Bitcoin price in fiat doesn't play into this, because it affects both the cost of the attack and the reward equally.
Tell me if I'm being unclear.

The cost of the attack is measured in fiat. Since to buy and setup more then fifty one percent of the hashpower would cost more then two hundred and sixty million dollars (just ran a rudimentary calculation). If the price of Bitcoin however went up, it would in effect mean that the Bitcoin protocol is paying more for its security in terms of fiat or real world purchasing power. This would incentivize more miners to come into the ecosystem thereby increasing its security. Therefore it can be argued if the price of Bitcoin doubles that the security of Bitcoin would also double meaning that it would cost twice as much to attack the network, in this case for example it would cost more then five hundred and twenty million dollars, and this is just for the setup costs, not including maintenance or even electricity costs which would over the long term might even cost more then the machines themselves.

Pardon me if I don't trust your back of the hand calculations, your assumptions and narrow minded view that ignores the possibility that a miner or hacked mining pool/pools might desire to attack the network just to short the price and turn a quick buck, is absurd. An attacker my already have a large stockpile of bitcoins, perhaps confiscated in a drug bust but who are you to set the limits on a theoretical attacker and their potential resources?

This attack vector already exists today, and increasing the blocksize does not change this. I am not overly concerned with the possibility of fifty one percent attacks. The game theory of Bitcoin pretty much prevents this from becoming a serous threat in the first place. In the case of a government attacking Bitcoin, our best defense is to grow as quickly as possibly so that it makes this type of attack much more difficult both politically and financially.

[bargainbin]

... I already explained that we do not lose fifty percent of our security at the halving, since the exchange rate also effects this dynamic ...

Not really. This year, we are paying  roughly 10% of Bitcoin's total value, or what people here call "market cap," to secure it. In other words, we are currently spending roughly a dime to store (secure) a dollar for a year.
After the halvening, we will be paying only a nickel.
It doesn't matter how much a dollar is worth, the ratio remains the same.
Same for efficiency/cost of mining gear.

What matter is how much a Bitcoin is worth compared to fiat, since if the market capitalization of Bitcoin increases, the block reward will be worth more in terms of fiat value and real world purchasing power. This would stimulate increased mining since there will be profit to be made, since miners costs are still predominately in Fiat and it is the purchasing power of those Bitcoins that really matters not the amount of Bitcoins that are made. This is why the ratio does not stay the same, if the market cap of Bitcoins doubles so does the amount payed for security, these two things are explicitly linked.

But it doesn't matter. A safe that's "just good enough" to secure 10 dollars is probably not good enough to secure a billion, agree?
The attacker doesn't want to break Bitcoin to prove a point, the amount he's willing to spend on the attack is directly proportional to the potential reward. So if it costs him a buck ten to steal a dollar now, after the halving it will cost him 55 cents.
Bitcoin price in fiat doesn't play into this, because it affects both the cost of the attack and the reward equally.
Tell me if I'm being unclear.

The cost of the attack is measured in fiat. Since to buy and setup more then fifty one percent of the hashpower would cost more then two hundred and sixty million dollars (just ran a rudimentary calculation). If the price of Bitcoin however went up, it would in effect mean that the Bitcoin protocol is paying more for its security in terms of fiat or real world purchasing power. This would incentivize more miners to come into the ecosystem thereby increasing its security. Therefore it can be argued if the price of Bitcoin doubles that the security of Bitcoin would also double meaning that it would cost twice as much to attack the network, in this case for example it would cost more then five hundred and twenty million dollars, and this is just for the setup costs, not including maintenance or even electricity costs which would over the long term might even cost more then the machines themselves. Not to mention that the attacker would lose much more from such an attack then they could possibly ever gain.

I guess I am being unclear.
We can measure denominate the cost of attack in BTC, fiat or old hubcaps, it doesn't matter.

Think of yourself as a burglar Swiper from Dora the Explorer.
You denominate your swiping effort in dollars. It currently costs you $1.10 of 'effort' to rob $1 from Dora's pocket (due to the security measures she has in place).
You're a pragmatic Swiper, swiping for profit rather than sport. After doing some quick back-of-envelope (also swiped) calculations, you realize it ain't worth it. You choose not to swipe.

But then Dora goes and cuts her security spending (in dollars) in half, and now it only costs you $0.55 to swipe a buck.
Wat do, Swiper?
Doe it matter if we replace "dollar" with BTC in this example?

P.S. To avoid complicated maths, model this at the limit, i.e. "the cost of mining 1 BTC is slightly less than market price of 1 BTC, as per satoshi's prognostication.

P.P.S: Which would you do:
1. spend 10 dollars to make five dollars
2. spend "five hundred and twenty million dollars" to make a billion dollars
(chose one)

[Quantus]

... I already explained that we do not lose fifty percent of our security at the halving, since the exchange rate also effects this dynamic ...

Not really. This year, we are paying  roughly 10% of Bitcoin's total value, or what people here call "market cap," to secure it. In other words, we are currently spending roughly a dime to store (secure) a dollar for a year.
After the halvening, we will be paying only a nickel.
It doesn't matter how much a dollar is worth, the ratio remains the same.
Same for efficiency/cost of mining gear.

What matter is how much a Bitcoin is worth compared to fiat, since if the market capitalization of Bitcoin increases, the block reward will be worth more in terms of fiat value and real world purchasing power. This would stimulate increased mining since there will be profit to be made, since miners costs are still predominately in Fiat and it is the purchasing power of those Bitcoins that really matters not the amount of Bitcoins that are made. This is why the ratio does not stay the same, if the market cap of Bitcoins doubles so does the amount payed for security, these two things are explicitly linked.

But it doesn't matter. A safe that's "just good enough" to secure 10 dollars is probably not good enough to secure a billion, agree?
The attacker doesn't want to break Bitcoin to prove a point, the amount he's willing to spend on the attack is directly proportional to the potential reward. So if it costs him a buck ten to steal a dollar now, after the halving it will cost him 55 cents.
Bitcoin price in fiat doesn't play into this, because it affects both the cost of the attack and the reward equally.
Tell me if I'm being unclear.

The cost of the attack is measured in fiat. Since to buy and setup more then fifty one percent of the hashpower would cost more then two hundred and sixty million dollars (just ran a rudimentary calculation). If the price of Bitcoin however went up, it would in effect mean that the Bitcoin protocol is paying more for its security in terms of fiat or real world purchasing power. This would incentivize more miners to come into the ecosystem thereby increasing its security. Therefore it can be argued if the price of Bitcoin doubles that the security of Bitcoin would also double meaning that it would cost twice as much to attack the network, in this case for example it would cost more then five hundred and twenty million dollars, and this is just for the setup costs, not including maintenance or even electricity costs which would over the long term might even cost more then the machines themselves.

Pardon me if I don't trust your back of the hand calculations, your assumptions and narrow minded view that ignores the possibility that a miner or hacked mining pool/pools might desire to attack the network just to short the price and turn a quick buck, is absurd. An attacker my already have a large stockpile of bitcoins, perhaps confiscated in a drug bust but who are you to set the limits on a theoretical attacker and their potential resources?

This attack vector already exists today, and increasing the blocksize does not change this. I am not overly concerned with the possibility of fifty one percent attacks. The game theory of Bitcoin pretty much prevents this from becoming a serous threat in the first place. In the case of a government attacking Bitcoin, our best defense is to grow as quickly as possibly so that it makes this type of attack much more difficult both politically and financially.

politically yes but financially I absolutely disagree. Larger blocks at this time could lead to massive spam attacks leading to massive and prohibitively demanding bandwidth requirements on our weakest nodes leading to first torrents of orphaned blocks then whole orphaned chains then hard forks left and right leading to chaos.

[VeritasSapere]

... I already explained that we do not lose fifty percent of our security at the halving, since the exchange rate also effects this dynamic ...

Not really. This year, we are paying  roughly 10% of Bitcoin's total value, or what people here call "market cap," to secure it. In other words, we are currently spending roughly a dime to store (secure) a dollar for a year.
After the halvening, we will be paying only a nickel.
It doesn't matter how much a dollar is worth, the ratio remains the same.
Same for efficiency/cost of mining gear.

What matter is how much a Bitcoin is worth compared to fiat, since if the market capitalization of Bitcoin increases, the block reward will be worth more in terms of fiat value and real world purchasing power. This would stimulate increased mining since there will be profit to be made, since miners costs are still predominately in Fiat and it is the purchasing power of those Bitcoins that really matters not the amount of Bitcoins that are made. This is why the ratio does not stay the same, if the market cap of Bitcoins doubles so does the amount payed for security, these two things are explicitly linked.

But it doesn't matter. A safe that's "just good enough" to secure 10 dollars is probably not good enough to secure a billion, agree?
The attacker doesn't want to break Bitcoin to prove a point, the amount he's willing to spend on the attack is directly proportional to the potential reward. So if it costs him a buck ten to steal a dollar now, after the halving it will cost him 55 cents.
Bitcoin price in fiat doesn't play into this, because it affects both the cost of the attack and the reward equally.
Tell me if I'm being unclear.

The cost of the attack is measured in fiat. Since to buy and setup more then fifty one percent of the hashpower would cost more then two hundred and sixty million dollars (just ran a rudimentary calculation). If the price of Bitcoin however went up, it would in effect mean that the Bitcoin protocol is paying more for its security in terms of fiat or real world purchasing power. This would incentivize more miners to come into the ecosystem thereby increasing its security. Therefore it can be argued if the price of Bitcoin doubles that the security of Bitcoin would also double meaning that it would cost twice as much to attack the network, in this case for example it would cost more then five hundred and twenty million dollars, and this is just for the setup costs, not including maintenance or even electricity costs which would over the long term might even cost more then the machines themselves. Not to mention that the attacker would lose much more from such an attack then they could possibly ever gain.

I guess I am being unclear.
We can measure and denominate the cost of attack in BTC, fiat or old hubcaps, it doesn't matter.

Think of yourself as a burglar Swiper from Dora the Explorer.
You denominate your swiping effort in dollars. It currently costs you $1.10 of 'effort' to rob $1 from Dora's pocket (due to the security measures she has in place).
You're a pragmatic Swiper, swiping for profit rather than sport. After doing some quick back-of-envelope (also swiped) calculations, you realize it ain't worth it. You choose not to swipe.

But then Dora goes and cuts her spending (in dollars) in half, and now it only costs you $0.55 to swipe a buck.
Wat do, Swiper?
Doe it matter if we replace "dollar" with BTC in this example?

It does matter if the "dollar" value of BTC has doubled since then. Since if hypothetically the value of Bitcoin doubles after the halving, then there is still the same amount being paid for security in terms of the "dollar" value compared to before the halving, the amount of Bitcoins being rewarded might have been reduced but the purchasing power for those Bitcoins would be the same. Which therefore means that the same amount is being paid for security by the Bitcoin protocol in terms of real value.

[Quantus]

bargainbin your logic is sound this guy just can't grasp the idea.

I'm go cook here vote in my poll https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1323660.msg13518719#msg13518719

[bargainbin]

[...] It does matter if the "dollar" value of BTC has doubled since then. Since if hypothetically the value of Bitcoin doubles after the halving, then there is still the same amount being paid for security <snip>

But since the value of BTC has doubled, the thing that you're securing has doubled in value, so you need twice the security. If a $5 lock is just-good-enough to protect a $100 bike, is it also good enough to protect a $200 bike?

[hdbuck]

My fear is that people who want the settlement layer to be more like a payment layer are like people who want to build computer games out of an assembly language. We need payment layers, not to turn the settlement layer into something that it is not.

I suppose it is good PR to say that this is all a debate over whether we should make Bitcoin usable or not, but let's be honest, this debate is about how we think we should make bitcoin usable. Do we try to make bitcoin itself super-usable at the potential expense of its reliability and trustworthiness? Or do we try to create layers on top of bitcoin that preserve bitcoin's trustworthiness and yet also provide usability via those layers? (A common analogy, do we try to improve the internet to the point where everyone suddenly gets that it is useful, or do we develop layers on top of the internet, like the Web, that make its usefulness obvious?)

My argument is this: Money systems depend on trust and usability, one cannot exist without the other, just as the OP said. However, if we try to merge trust and usability into one system, we risk a situation where the system lacks both. It will still be difficult to use, and yet people won't feel it is a safe place to put their money either. In other words, it will remain exactly as it is today. Modern money systems don't work that way and neither should bitcoin.

Layered tiers of a monetary system is foundational to how modern money works. The "M"s designation of different types of money --m0, m1, m2, etc -- is meant to represent these layers. The further up you go in layers, the faster the money becomes, but also the less dependable and trustworthy the money becomes. Likewise, base money, like cash, is slow and cumbersome, yet it is the most trustworthy form of money in an economy. In the modern economy, cash is considered real money and more real and dependable than bank credit. If the banking system experiences a crisis, bank credit could become worthless overnight, whereas cash will only rise in value. So there is an intrinsic tradeoff to having fast money and that is that it becomes less reliable money. Same was true back in the days when banknotes were backed by gold. The physical note was a faster, more liquid form of money. Gold was cumbersome and slow but more trusted and dependable.

"Settlement layer" is just another way of saying "base money." They are really the same thing. The reason a layer is the settlement layer is precisely because it is made out of base money, i.e., real money. If I went to you and said, "look, I promise I'll swing buy and pay you $100 in cash tomorrow" that would be the payment layer. It is fast, but it lacks trust because ultimately real money hasn't been transferred until I actually pay you in hard cash. When I do pay you in hard cash, that is called settlement. Settlement layer simply refers to people or institutions concluding all promises to pay with actual payment. So the settlement layer is actually just base money. In the modern financial system, when you pay someone with cash, you are using the settlement layer.

A settlement layer is the fundamental monetary force behind the economy. In the modern system, the settlement layer is institutionally controlled by the central bank. They are the ones who have the sole right to create cash, and as such money held in the central bank is considered as good as having cash. Only commercial banks are allowed to hold accounts with the central banks and all settlements between commercial banks are mostly concluded by transferring money held in accounts at the central bank. That is to say, for all intents and purposes, the central bank is the settlement layer in the modern system.

Bitcoin functions as a central bank. It could, in theory, replace central banks. It prints base money, called 'bitcoins,' which is then hands out to the miners who are the equivalents of the commercial banks. In the Bitcoin system, miners are bankers. The central bank, Bitcoin, then is ultimately controlled by the collection of those miners who can decide to set Bitcoin policy. This is exactly how the modern banking system works, the bankers collectively decide on how the central bank should set policy.
Many people think of banks as a place people store their money for safe keeping, and then the bank uses that money to make more money and spark growth in the economy through lending. However, what people forget is that the power of banks comes not from the fact that people give them money, but from the fact that they hold base currency. Today, most base currency held by banks comes from the central bank printing it and handing it to them, not from people depositing it. In fact, most people don't deposit cash into banks anymore, they just move bank credit around. By having large sums of base currency, banks can settle with other banks and neither bank needs to be concerned with the internal affairs of the other.

In other words, banks allow consumers and the larger economic system to use money off-chain, so to speak, that is their function, always has been. Then they settle accounts at the end of the day on-chain, that is to say at the settlement layer. It is precisely this power that allows them to lend (i.e., create broad money) and creates the varied payment networks. If all transactions had to be done through the central bank then that one bank would control everyone's money and decide who deserved loans and who didn't. It would be a centralized economy on steroids, the financial system wouldn't exist. By not trying to let the central banks do everything, the monetary system was allowed to become robust. (Obviously, it is corrosive and needs to be replaced by something better, but one can't deny that the modern financial system has been a huge success even if it is nearing the end of its days.)

Furthermore, a global central bank, Bitcoin, is simply not going to work unless it is trusted by everyone. And it won't be trusted by everyone unless it is considered fair. Trust in a global central bank is not going to be there if it is perceived as being controlled by someone untrustworthy. If someday the majority of miners work for the Chinese government, how much trust can there really be in bitcoin by people living in other countries? Decentralized control is the only way to achieve a global central bank. But my understanding is that increasing the block size can potentially lead to increased incentives for mining centralization, precisely the opposite of what we want. And once a high degree of centralization occurs, since the miners must approve future changes, what can get us to reverse course? This would weaken the inherent trust in the base currency that comes from the decentralization of control. Put simply, raising the block size limit threatens to undermine the foundation of the bitcoin system which is decentralization, resulting in a less trusted base currency. Since trust is the most important feature of base currency, this isn't something people should take lightly.

Off-chain transactions, payment layers, allow for the growth of a more decentralized ecosystem around the base layer as well as the emergence of cryptocurrency banking and lending, and more widespread use of 2.0 tokens and currencies built on top of bitcoin. By creating payment layers you will far outstrip what base bitcoin can ever achieve in terms of usability left to its own devices. This is because the whole role and purpose of payment layers is to increase usability, and if that is how they are financially incentivized, they will come up with the best solutions and thus open the doors for mass adoption. You get both a profoundly trusted base layer, and a decentralized, competitive market for payment layers and usability, all rooted in a non-state, non-institutionally controlled currency. By not constricting the system to ONLY base money, broad money creation can allow for an explosion in the bitcoin ecosystem and innovation around the use and control of that broad money.

On the other hand, raising the block size limit increases mining centralization, reducing trust in the base currency, but doesn't increase incentives for profiting from innovation around increased usability solutions, thus limiting banking and lending innovation. Essentially, it keeps bitcoin where it is today, stagnating under the weight of the fact that people don't really need it and it is not really a safe place to keep your money. The killer app for bitcoin hasn't been invented yet, raising the block limit helps to assure that it never will be. This is precisely because the future killer apps are the payment layers and all that comes with them. When Bitcoin achieves a profound level of usability from the payment layers, and a high degree of trust from its decentralized base settlement layer, it will be completely unstoppable. But if you water down the decentralization and think the current system, just with a larger block size limit, is good enough as a payment system ... we will never get past where we are today.

That is one damn fine essay!  Spectacularly informative and well-written, it should be required reading at Draper University.

Who is this Ilogy guy, and how do I subscribe to his newletter/put in a resume?

More timely, trenchant analysis:

"The reason is because there is such a heavy push for scalability, even at the expense of decentralization, that decentralization advocates are playing defense. Right now the best way to improve decentralization is to prevent a scaling solution that does further harm to it. Your question is "why don't we see an equally strong response to fix this situation," yet that is precisely what the small block side of the block size debate is.

When the enemy is attacking your fort with superior numbers, you don't sally forth and meet them in the field. You turtle and wait until they are weakened to the point where you can move to the offensive. In the block size debate that means that even though there is a massive angry army of people who are demanding a block size increasing now -- people who are convinced that the only reason it's not happening is because of a small minority of people seeking to undermine bitcoin for their own gain --you slowly and steadily make rational arguments for why a rash increase threatens the core of what Bitcoin is until they stop being so angry and consider that your concerns need to be met as well.

Only then do you sally forth with serious suggestions of how to increase decentralization."

https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/3yvkep/devs_are_strongly_against_increasing_the/cyhf4tz

Quite so, the turtle metaphor speaks the truth but there is also a surreptitious judean's people front "splitter" strategy in effect: bitcoin xt, bitcoin unlimited, bip101010101010, segwit, soft/hard/easy ph0rkers.. dat nuthouse.

[VeritasSapere]

... I already explained that we do not lose fifty percent of our security at the halving, since the exchange rate also effects this dynamic ...

Not really. This year, we are paying  roughly 10% of Bitcoin's total value, or what people here call "market cap," to secure it. In other words, we are currently spending roughly a dime to store (secure) a dollar for a year.
After the halvening, we will be paying only a nickel.
It doesn't matter how much a dollar is worth, the ratio remains the same.
Same for efficiency/cost of mining gear.

What matter is how much a Bitcoin is worth compared to fiat, since if the market capitalization of Bitcoin increases, the block reward will be worth more in terms of fiat value and real world purchasing power. This would stimulate increased mining since there will be profit to be made, since miners costs are still predominately in Fiat and it is the purchasing power of those Bitcoins that really matters not the amount of Bitcoins that are made. This is why the ratio does not stay the same, if the market cap of Bitcoins doubles so does the amount payed for security, these two things are explicitly linked.

But it doesn't matter. A safe that's "just good enough" to secure 10 dollars is probably not good enough to secure a billion, agree?
The attacker doesn't want to break Bitcoin to prove a point, the amount he's willing to spend on the attack is directly proportional to the potential reward. So if it costs him a buck ten to steal a dollar now, after the halving it will cost him 55 cents.
Bitcoin price in fiat doesn't play into this, because it affects both the cost of the attack and the reward equally.
Tell me if I'm being unclear.

The cost of the attack is measured in fiat. Since to buy and setup more then fifty one percent of the hashpower would cost more then two hundred and sixty million dollars (just ran a rudimentary calculation). If the price of Bitcoin however went up, it would in effect mean that the Bitcoin protocol is paying more for its security in terms of fiat or real world purchasing power. This would incentivize more miners to come into the ecosystem thereby increasing its security. Therefore it can be argued if the price of Bitcoin doubles that the security of Bitcoin would also double meaning that it would cost twice as much to attack the network, in this case for example it would cost more then five hundred and twenty million dollars, and this is just for the setup costs, not including maintenance or even electricity costs which would over the long term might even cost more then the machines themselves.

Pardon me if I don't trust your back of the hand calculations, your assumptions and narrow minded view that ignores the possibility that a miner or hacked mining pool/pools might desire to attack the network just to short the price and turn a quick buck, is absurd. An attacker my already have a large stockpile of bitcoins, perhaps confiscated in a drug bust but who are you to set the limits on a theoretical attacker and their potential resources?

This attack vector already exists today, and increasing the blocksize does not change this. I am not overly concerned with the possibility of fifty one percent attacks. The game theory of Bitcoin pretty much prevents this from becoming a serous threat in the first place. In the case of a government attacking Bitcoin, our best defense is to grow as quickly as possibly so that it makes this type of attack much more difficult both politically and financially.

politically yes but financially I absolutely disagree. Larger blocks at this time could lead to massive spam attacks leading to massive and prohibitively demanding bandwidth requirements on our weakest nodes leading to first torrents of orphaned blocks then whole orphaned chains then hard forks left and right leading to chaos.

You are saying that if we increase the blocksize at all it would lead to the very destruction of Bitcoin? This is such fear mongering it really is, an increase to two megabyte or even eight megabyte would not lead to the catastrophic scenario that you are describing.

First of all larger blocks would allow the Bitcoin network to become much more resistant to spam attacks, since it would make effectively overloading the network much more expensive. After all for the vast majority of Bitcoins history this blocksize limit has existed far below the actual transaction volume, these spam attacks have only become an issue recently since we are approaching this blocksize limit. Making it rather easy and cheap to overload the network, this would not be as easy or as cheap with an increased blocksize.

There are many prominent engineers and coders that think it will be fine to increase the blocksize, and that this was always the plan for Bitcoin. If it really is this obvious that any increase in the blocksize would destroy Bitcoin, why are all these good people like Gavin Andresen saying that this would not be a problem? Furthermore what is so special about one megabyte, it seems rather arbitrary to me, earlier in Bitcoins history it had a thirty two megabyte limit, this also did not lead to its destruction, or chaos and hard forks left and right as you describe. Bitcoin will do just fine, I think we should continue with the experiment and let it runs its course, not stop it in its tracks before it has even had a chance to prove itself.

[VeritasSapere]

[...] It does matter if the "dollar" value of BTC has doubled since then. Since if hypothetically the value of Bitcoin doubles after the halving, then there is still the same amount being paid for security <snip>

But since the value of BTC has doubled, the thing that you're securing has doubled in value, so you need twice the security. If a $5 lock is just-good-enough to protect a $100 bike, is it also good enough to protect a $200 bike?

Yes and because it has doubled in value, miners will be incentivized to increase their operations. So that $5 lock becomes a $10 lock in your analogy.

[Bergmann_Christoph]

Why don't people understand that;

• Increased Blocksize would lead to a bigger Blockchain that overwhelms the storage capacity of smaller nodes.
• More space for transactions will decrease the market for transaction fees.
• Bitcoin should be a currency for the Elite and not for your daily cup of coffee.
• Sidechains will solve the problem of smaller block size limit anyway.
• Consensus might not be achievable and there will suddenly be two types of Bitcoin.

You don't like Socrates, do you?

Short answer: I think you missed the part of this thread when people slightly accepted that there's no absolute truth in this issue.

Nearly everyone here knows a dozen of arguments to counter your claims (and most of them have been discussed / strived at some point earlier)

• Consensus might not be achievable and there will suddenly be two types of Bitcoin.

This is some worst-case scenario. Maybe it will be good, maybe it will be desastrous. I depends upon if the split stays or closes. I think most exchanges should agree on one version, may it be small or big, and since miners are here for the money, they would follow he exchanges, and the other change would die quickly.

If the exchanges serve both chains - which is the economically rationale decision - then we'll find the markets in chaos. Best decision will be to sell instantly both coins and look like they crash. Maybe there will terrible double spend opportunities.

If miners decide for a chain, the other will die quickly.

it would be exciting, but could be really terrible. I hope the important people will be wise enough to accept and respect different oppinions. Bitcoin is designed to find a consensus or to break. Holding it together is not a technical challenge, but a political.

[BlindMayorBitcorn]

..but there is also a surreptitious judean's people front "splitter" strategy in effect: bitcoin xt, bitcoin unlimited, bip101010101010, segwit, soft/hard/easy ph0rkers.. dat nuthouse.

Ya but WTF is this supposed to mean!? I mean, srsly ppl!

Just srsly

[VeritasSapere]

Why don't people understand that;

• Increased Blocksize would lead to a bigger Blockchain that overwhelms the storage capacity of smaller nodes.
• More space for transactions will decrease the market for transaction fees.
• Bitcoin should be a currency for the Elite and not for your daily cup of coffee.
• Sidechains will solve the problem of smaller block size limit anyway.
• Consensus might not be achievable and there will suddenly be two types of Bitcoin.

You don't like Socrates, do you?

Short answer: I think you missed the part of this thread when people slightly accepted that there's no absolute truth in this issue.

Nearly everyone here knows a dozen of arguments to counter your claims (and most of them have been discussed / strived at some point earlier)

• Consensus might not be achievable and there will suddenly be two types of Bitcoin.

This is some worst-case scenario. Maybe it will be good, maybe it will be desastrous. I depends upon if the split stays or closes. I think most exchanges should agree on one version, may it be small or big, and since miners are here for the money, they would follow he exchanges, and the other change would die quickly.

If the exchanges serve both chains - which is the economically rationale decision - then we'll find the markets in chaos. Best decision will be to sell instantly both coins and look like they crash. Maybe there will terrible double spend opportunities.

If miners decide for a chain, the other will die quickly.

it would be exciting, but could be really terrible. I hope the important people will be wise enough to accept and respect different oppinions. Bitcoin is designed to find a consensus or to break. Holding it together is not a technical challenge, but a political.

Bitcoin is designed to find consensus or split. Splitting solves the problem of tyranny of the majority, in some cases I would consider this to be a good and desired feature, it might be the perfect way to resolve disagreements, since both sides can still have the Bitcoin they want, it can be considered a win-win scenario in many ways.

[bargainbin]

[...] It does matter if the "dollar" value of BTC has doubled since then. Since if hypothetically the value of Bitcoin doubles after the halving, then there is still the same amount being paid for security <snip>

But since the value of BTC has doubled, the thing that you're securing has doubled in value, so you need twice the security. If a $5 lock is just-good-enough to protect a $100 bike, is it also good enough to protect a $200 bike?

Yes and because it has doubled in value, miners will be incentivized to increase their operations. So that $5 lock becomes a $10 lock in your analogy.

How would the miners be "incentivized" to increase their operations, after the block reward halves & price doubles?

Also, earlier postscript you might have missed:

P.S. To avoid complicated maths, model this at the limit, i.e. "the cost of mining 1 BTC is slightly less than market price of 1 BTC, as per satoshi's prognostication.

P.P.S: Which would you do:
1. spend 10 dollars to make five dollars
2. spend "five hundred and twenty million dollars" to make a billion dollars
(chose one)

[Fatman3001]

@bargainbinlambie Any attack will be clear for all to see. The value of what's stolen will be destroyed.

[bargainbin]

^^

@bargainbinlambie Any attack will be clear for all to see. The value of what's stolen will be destroyed.

...The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together; and a little child shall lead them.

[Bergmann_Christoph]

[...]
Transaction space means MORE transactions and thus more fees
even though the fee per transaction might decrease, but not necessarily the total.
[...]

If it costs ~nothing for miners to process transactions (vs. mining empty blocks) & plenty of block space, why would I pay > satoshi tx fee?

Since it does cost something for the miners to process transactions, increased orphan rate is one factor. Therefore if you want your transaction to be confirmed faster or even confirmed at all, you should include a fee. It is up to the miners to decide whether it is worth including your transactions or not. If it is worth including your transaction they will include it, if it is not they will not, just increase the fee until miners accept your transaction. This is the essence of the free market behind fees. There already is a free fee market and we do not need to introduce an arbitrary limit in order to impose this.

Yes, miner's have many business opportunities beside the reward.

They don't need to include transactions. They do it cause they get something for it. It's not important how much space they have. If you have six farmers with unlimited fields, they would still get money for their fruits, cause they are the only ones with access to farmlands.

Miners can do so much. They have the power to include transactions. I just don't get how people claim that you'll help the miners by restricting their space.

Miner's don't need to include transactions. They can sell priority transactions, they can sell abonements (get through without min fee). They can develop new business modells. Look at btcchina, their pool supports the exchange by including every tx. And so on.

[VeritasSapere]

[...] It does matter if the "dollar" value of BTC has doubled since then. Since if hypothetically the value of Bitcoin doubles after the halving, then there is still the same amount being paid for security <snip>

But since the value of BTC has doubled, the thing that you're securing has doubled in value, so you need twice the security. If a $5 lock is just-good-enough to protect a $100 bike, is it also good enough to protect a $200 bike?

Yes and because it has doubled in value, miners will be incentivized to increase their operations. So that $5 lock becomes a $10 lock in your analogy.

How would the miners be "incentivized" to increase their operations, after the block reward halves & price doubles?

Also, earlier postscript you might have missed:

P.S. To avoid complicated maths, model this at the limit, i.e. "the cost of mining 1 BTC is slightly less than market price of 1 BTC, as per satoshi's prognostication.

P.P.S: Which would you do:
1. spend 10 dollars to make five dollars
2. spend "five hundred and twenty million dollars" to make a billion dollars
(chose one)

The cost of mining one BTC is not slightly less than the market price of one BTC. When Satoshi mentioned this he was pointing out something that I am alluding to as well however. Which is that miners will chase profit until it is not as profitable anymore. For example, if Bitcoin doubles in price my mining operation will all of a sudden make twice as much money, at such a point it does make sense for me to expand my operation so that more profit can be made. A good mining operation should expand and retract depending on the network conditions, an increased price is a very clear sign for most miners to expand, unless the difficulty is skyrocketing as well, which does however imply that other miners beat them to the expansion, which is pretty much what is happening now with the mining industry.

[BlindMayorBitcorn]

@bargainbinlambie Any attack will be clear for all to see. The value of what's stolen will be destroyed.

So what's the plan here exactly? Was the block reward intended to just bootstrap the network? Fees are supposed to suddently up and kick everybody in the face? That seems odd.  

[bargainbin]

...
P.S. To avoid complicated maths, model this at the limit, i.e. "the cost of mining 1 BTC is slightly less than market price of 1 BTC, as per satoshi's prognostication.

P.P.S: Which would you do:
1. spend 10 dollars to make five dollars
2. spend "five hundred and twenty million dollars" to make a billion dollars
(chose one)

The cost of mining one BTC is not slightly less than the market price of one BTC. When Satoshi mentioned this he was pointing out something that I am alluding to as well however. Which is that miners will chase profit until it is not as profitable anymore. For example, if Bitcoin doubles in price my mining operation will all of a sudden make twice as much money, at such a point it does make sense for me to expand my operation so that more profit can be made. A good mining operation should expand and retract depending on the network conditions, an increased price is a very clear sign for most miners to expand, unless the difficulty is skyrocketing as well, which does however imply that other miners beat them to the expansion, which is pretty much what is happening now with the mining industry.

Assume: you are a perfect miner, mining at the ragged edge of profitability today.
Wat do nao?

P.S. also, what do you mean by "expand and retract"? How does a mining operation go about retractng, exactly?

@BlindMayorBitcorn: we'll figure it out as we go along, don't worry