delete

[smooth]

do you know WHY i brought up feather coin ?

No I don't. Why don't you explain the connection?

the KING Shill jamming Monero down everyone's throat said Monero was his first altcoin.
i rest my case.

edit:
oh and by the way he has since gone and deleted the part of his comment where he said that.

The statement is still there. Is it untrue?

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[TheFascistMind]

iCEBREAKER, you are wasting my time. If you can get anyone credible here to explain to your side, I might respond further.

That you think the impacts of mining is modeled by Nash equilibrium is hilarious to me. I guess you haven't even figured out yet that your chart isn't addressing the question that was posed about impacts of centralization. You have a category error. You are merely modeling the percentage of the hashrate by some ill-defined metric called IP address or DNS name. That doesn't tell us if the impacts of mining are centralized. It is inconclusive. That we consistently have 2 - 3 pools as organized by that ill-defined metric with > 50% of the hashrate (51% attack threat), and 1 - 2 pools with > 25% of the hashrate (selfish mining threat), hints at the potential for centralization of impacts if the opportunity cost of not doing so is greater than every opportunity cost of doing so.

[iCEBREAKER]

iCEBREAKER, you are wasting my time. If you can get anyone credible here to explain to your side, I might be prompted to respond further.

What explanation is necessary?  Just look at the pie chart.  It shows a beautiful example of Nash Equilibrium.

And look who I've been quoting.  Cypherdoc is extremely credible (not that your appeal to authority is valid, but I'll patronize you).

Which government has "made it very costly" to run a pool?  Even if one did, that still wouldn't be an example of an externality.   

[TheFascistMind]

What explanation is necessary?  Just look at the pie chart.  It shows a beautiful example of Nash Equilibrium.

Oh my, are you that hard-headed or blind?

iCEBREAKER, you are wasting my time. If you can get anyone credible here to explain to your side, I might respond further.

That you think the impacts of mining is modeled by Nash equilibrium is hilarious to me. I guess you haven't even figured out yet that your chart isn't addressing the question that was posed about impacts of centralization. You have a category error. You are merely modeling the percentage of the hashrate by some ill-defined metric called IP address or DNS name. That doesn't tell us if the impacts of mining are centralized. It is inconclusive. That we consistently have 2 - 3 pools as organized by that ill-defined metric with > 50% of the hashrate (51% attack threat), and 1 - 2 pools with > 25% of the hashrate (selfish mining threat), hints at the potential for centralization of impacts if the opportunity cost of not doing so is greater than every opportunity cost of doing so.

[Este Nuno]

iCEBREAKER, you are wasting my time. If you can get anyone credible here to explain to your side, I might be prompted to respond further.

What explanation is necessary?  Just look at the pie chart.  It shows a beautiful example of Nash Equilibrium.

And look who I've been quoting.  Cypherdoc is extremely credible (not that your appeal to authority is valid, but I'll patronize you).

Which government has "made it very costly" to run a pool?  Even if one did, that still wouldn't be an example of an externality.   

I don't think that chart really gives us much information at all other than an estimate of how much hashing these pools have chosen to show publicly.

[iCEBREAKER]

Oh my, you can't even read.

I read the part where you claim "externalities" exist, but when pressed failed to mention more than one example.

And I read enough to find out that your purported singular example wasn't even an externality.

Stick with the math bro.  Econ isn't your strong suit, to put it mildly.  That's why you're so poor, and thus dependent on handouts from the businessman in the castle.

[TheFascistMind]

iCEBREAKER, you are wasting my time. If you can get anyone credible here to explain to your side, I might be prompted to respond further.

What explanation is necessary?  Just look at the pie chart.  It shows a beautiful example of Nash Equilibrium.

And look who I've been quoting.  Cypherdoc is extremely credible (not that your appeal to authority is valid, but I'll patronize you).

Which government has "made it very costly" to run a pool?  Even if one did, that still wouldn't be an example of an externality.  

I don't think that chart really gives us much information at all other than an estimate of how much hashing these pools have chosen to show publicly.

You don't even know for sure who owns what for example. But that is only one of a myriad of possibilities that isn't shown by that chart.

[TheFascistMind]

Oh my, you can't even read.

I read the part where you claim "externalities" exist

Again you don't read. I guess you fail to make the connection I made to Taleb and long-tails.

Do you even know what a long-tail is? Can they be shown to exist a priori?

Btw Taleb became financially sovereign in 1987 during the big crash.

[Este Nuno]

iCEBREAKER, you are wasting my time. If you can get anyone credible here to explain to your side, I might be prompted to respond further.

What explanation is necessary?  Just look at the pie chart.  It shows a beautiful example of Nash Equilibrium.

And look who I've been quoting.  Cypherdoc is extremely credible (not that your appeal to authority is valid, but I'll patronize you).

Which government has "made it very costly" to run a pool?  Even if one did, that still wouldn't be an example of an externality.   

I don't think that chart really gives us much information at all other than an estimate of how much hashing these pools have chosen to show publicly.

You don't even know for sure who owns what for example. But that is only one of a myriad of possibilities that isn't shown by that chart.

I don't think there is any solution to this problem though. Other than some sort of dystopian currency based on some biometric implant that authorizes you to mine or something.

[TheFascistMind]

I don't think there is any solution to this problem though. Other than some sort of dystopian currency based on some biometric implant that authorizes you to mine or something.

You mean the economic reality I described as quoted below?

I have the solution in mind.

For example, no one has solved the mining centralization dilemma yet.

Very sorry for the off-topic question, but there have been talks in Darkcoin forums about making all mining go through masternodes, i.e. every masternode would be a p2pool node. Those would be the only blocks that would be accepted. In your opinion, would this decrease the mining centralization and the 51% risk? Currently there are ~1000 masternodes, and the goal as I understand it is to get that number to 2000-3000 eventually.

What is the economic incentive for running a masternode?

Currently 20% of the block reward goes to masternodes, and the percentage is going up 5% every month until equilibrium for target number of masternodes is found. Eventually probably 50% of the block reward goes to masternodes and 50% to the miners (just my guesstimate). And will there be other services that generate value for the masternode owners, is not clear yet what ideas people can come up with.

GHash.io charges no fees to miners because it is subsidized by an ASIC miner which mines on it, that is why it consistently gets near or over 50% of the network hashrate.

If you charge for something, the fiat overlords can always use transfer pricing and debt to take control of that resource.

As I told rpietila in his thread, I am in the unique position of having both technical and macro economics expertise. Smooth is also very astute, as you can see.

With the proposition there would be no 3rd party pools, or incentive for people to go through GHash.io or any other mining proxy, because they'd have to mine on masternodes anyway which enforce (or don't enforce) the fee. There would probably be no use for a fee anyway because the percentage of the block reward is issued to masternodes already by the protocol. Do you think this has any merit at all compared to 2-3 pools having > 50% combined?

Miners who can use a pool which doesn't take some of their block reward, will have an economic advantage, thus masternodes will become unfunded and be centralized (offered for free) by whomever can gain from stealing the anonymity (or what ever value they can extract from centralizing masternodes).

Blocks that don't issue masternode reward are rejected, so why would people start mining on a pool whose all blocks become orphaned?

Masternodes can refund this to miners. There is an extra incentive because masternodes have all the anonymity information.

You can't stop the rich and the government from aggregating resources. They always find a way.

The only way to stop them long-term is to make the resources incompatible with aggregation, e.g. the government would have a very difficult time owning all the human actions we do as they are inherently diverse.

[iCEBREAKER]

Do you even know what a long-tail is? Can they be shown to exist a priori?

Of course I do, buddy.  I remember the dot-com hype and the crowdsourcing fad that followed its implosion.  Long tails were all the rage, back in your day. 

"A priori?"  Just how epistemological or ontological do you want me to get?   

It's cute that you gaze in wide-eyed childish terror at the "centralization theat" that the rest of us non-noobs debunked years ago.   

Why not go find the relevant threads where your fears were laid to rest, maybe even necro a bit, instead of dragging dusty old BTC FUD into this nice Monero thread?

[TheFascistMind]

It's cute that you gaze in wide-eyed childish terror at the "centralization theat" that the rest of us non-noobs debunked years ago.

I've seen the various positions such as the world is a big place and miners can locate in favorable jurisdictions and users will choose to send their txs to those miners. I've seen the argument that attacking the value of the coin, destroys yourself. Sorry fail.

You carry on please. You are wasting my time. You remain confident. I will remain focused on fixing a long-tail problem I think lurks.

[illodin]

For example, no one has solved the mining centralization dilemma yet.

Very sorry for the off-topic question, but there have been talks in Darkcoin forums about making all mining go through masternodes, i.e. every masternode would be a p2pool node. Those would be the only blocks that would be accepted. In your opinion, would this decrease the mining centralization and the 51% risk? Currently there are ~1000 masternodes, and the goal as I understand it is to get that number to 2000-3000 eventually.

What is the economic incentive for running a masternode?

Currently 20% of the block reward goes to masternodes, and the percentage is going up 5% every month until equilibrium for target number of masternodes is found. Eventually probably 50% of the block reward goes to masternodes and 50% to the miners (just my guesstimate). And will there be other services that generate value for the masternode owners, is not clear yet what ideas people can come up with.

GHash.io charges no fees to miners because it is subsidized by an ASIC miner which mines on it, that is why it consistently gets near or over 50% of the network hashrate.

If you charge for something, the fiat overlords can always use transfer pricing and debt to take control of that resource.

As I told rpietila in his thread, I am in the unique position of having both technical and macro economics expertise. Smooth is also very astute, as you can see.

With the proposition there would be no 3rd party pools, or incentive for people to go through GHash.io or any other mining proxy, because they'd have to mine on masternodes anyway which enforce (or don't enforce) the fee. There would probably be no use for a fee anyway because the percentage of the block reward is issued to masternodes already by the protocol. Do you think this has any merit at all compared to 2-3 pools having > 50% combined?

Miners who can use a pool which doesn't take some of their block reward, will have an economic advantage, thus masternodes will become unfunded and be centralized (offered for free) by whomever can gain from stealing the anonymity (or what ever value they can extract from centralizing masternodes).

Blocks that don't issue masternode reward are rejected, so why would people start mining on a pool whose all blocks become orphaned?

Masternodes can refund this to miners. There is an extra incentive because masternodes have all the anonymity information.

You can't stop the rich and the government from aggregating resources. They always find a way.

The only way to stop them long-term is to make the resources incompatible with aggregation, e.g. the government would have a very difficult time owning all the human actions we do as they are inherently diverse.

There's still the problem for the attacker to get people mining to his (master)node, because until he actually has 51% of the hash, all his blocks will be rejected. And the masternodes ban "misbehaving" masternodes already, if they detect that one masternode is generating invalid blocks they would ban it from the network. The banning is not voted by hashrate, but by the 1000 DRK stake each masternode holds. Seems like an attacker would need 51% of the masternodes as well.

It's not perfect, and it's unclear whether a perfect system is even possible (maybe you already have thought of one, and I hope you have, but it might be far into the future). In the meanwhile, the question was, "would this decrease the mining centralization and the 51% risk?".

[TheFascistMind]

There's still the problem for the attacker to get people mining to his (master)node, because until he actually has 51% of the hash, all his blocks will be rejected. And the masternodes ban "misbehaving" masternodes already, if they detect that one masternode is generating invalid blocks they would ban it from the network. The banning is not voted by hashrate, but by the 1000 DRK stake each masternode holds. Seems like an attacker would need 51% of the masternodes as well.

It's not perfect, and it's unclear whether a perfect system is even possible (maybe you already have thought of one, and I hope you have, but it might be far into the future). In the meanwhile, the question was, "would this decrease the mining centralization and the 51% risk?".

You are getting too detailed for what I am interested to explore about DRK. I will just say the game theory is very likely more complex than you've considered. For example take a look at the selfish mining state machine and equations. That was a non-intuitive result that iCEBREAKER would think is impossible until the reality was rammed up his a$$.

In your case, for example the masternodes can collude. Also what ever randomness you have for trying to spread mining shares to all pools can potentially be gamed.

My conceptualization of attempts to enforce decentralization by forcing randomization, is as a Coasian barrier that opportunity cost will find a way around. Random smaller pools are less efficient than larger pools, not only from the standpoint of variance but also from the value of the information and control that can be extracted.

My solution is about offering some value that is greater than the value of larger pools, thus removing the economics (opportunity cost) of the Coasian barrier.

[iCEBREAKER]

I've seen the various positions such as the world is a big place and miners can locate in favorable jurisdictions and users will choose to send their txs to those miners. I've seen the argument that attacking the value of the coin, destroys yourself. Sorry fail.

You carry on please. You are wasting my time. You remain confident. I will remain focused on fixing a long-tail problem I think lurks.

Miners don't need to locate in favorable jurisdictions, given Con's swanky new stratum proxy/pass-through and forthcoming 'sister pool' innovations.

People have been working for several years to avoid the pitfalls you are given to panic over, and have made great progress.  Did you miss p2pool?

Why don't you short BTC if you are so confident that the 'ButtCoin is d00000med' forecast is correct?  I'm sure Risto will spot you a couple of coins to play with.

And what ever happened to those "externalities" you mentioned?  Did you look up the definition of the term and discover you were misusing it?   

[TheFascistMind]

Did you miss p2pool?

Where were you a year ago when I explained why P2Pool can't be a solution.

I did short Bitcoin since $600 twice. Have you not seen the public posts?

I temporarily went long at $300.

I do this all without ever touching much Bitcoin myself. I have others do it for me.

Miners don't need to locate in favorable jurisdictions, given Con's swanky new stratum proxy/pass-through and forthcoming 'sister pool' innovations.

More nonsense.

[TheFascistMind]

And what ever happened to those "externalities" you mentioned?  Did you look up the definition of the term and discover you were misusing it?  

Correct use.

ex·ter·nal·i·ty
    the fact of existing outside the perceiving subject.

I told you please don't waste my time with your huge EGO. But I guess that is impossible for you.

[iCEBREAKER]

Where were you a year ago when I explained why P2Pool can't be a solution.

I did short Bitcoin since $600 twice.

Good job!  Now you're going to let the profit ride into new shorts, so high is your confidence in the "ButtCoin is d000med" forecast, right?

P2pool is a work in progress, but it's getting there (if sister pools don't may make it obsolete first).  Either way, Bitcoin's antifragility has been confounding doomsaying Cassandra types, especially those like you who are too used to being the smartest guy in the room, since before it was worth $1.00.

ex·ter·nal·i·ty
    the fact of existing outside the perceiving subject.

We are discussing economics and game theory (IE human action WRT pools and Nash, etc) not counting angels dancing on pinheads.  You were just telling us what an unequaled paragon of econometric prowess you are, so why the sudden shift from the normal [1]economic sense to the obscure [2]philosophic definition?

[TheFascistMind]

P2pool is a work in progress

You didn't grasp the technical point I made at the linked post which can't be fixed. It is fundamental. I actually wanted to use P2Pool as a solution before until I realized it can't work ever.

why the sudden shift from the normal [1]economic sense to the obscure [2]philosophic definition?

Because the claimed economics definition was too narrow for what I wanted to say and I didn't think of a better word to describe what I wanted to say to you. I actually did check the definition before using it, then I decided it was perfect because it would trap you. Your EGO would surely try to ensnare me if I intentionally misused it according to the narrow definition.


Are you going to let me work now or continue filibustering me to satisfy your jealously?

[TheFascistMind]

especially those like you who are too used to being the smartest guy in the room

There are many people much smarter than me. I never claimed to be as smart as for example Tom Hedges who I worked for.

I am just a guy trying to work on what I think is important. You are free to pursue what you think is important.

You are a very abrasive personality, and not only with me.