Agree 100%. I never left much on cryptsy but when they added that fee I'm made sure I had literally zero on there.

Same with MtGox BTW. When the problems started and were blamed on all sorts of excuses, I got all my coins out. It cost me money in lost profits from trading, but i lost nothing from MtGox failing.

That assumes they are breaking even before, which is very likely false.

All of the coins are not even needed for many masternode attacks. That was the point of the "incorrect high school math" discussion. In many cases the number required is far lower than "all". It is analogous to hash rate attacks which can be done with <50% hash rate, except that in the hash rate case, there is a cost when the attack doesn't succeed. In the masternode case that cost doesn't exist, because a node that is a laying-in-wait attacker is being rewarded at the same rate as any other node.

Also, I would guess a large part of the reason you dismiss these sorts of attacks is a false inference from the word "attack" as something that needs to be done on demand (i.e. go buy up all the coins quickly on an exchange -- which will obviously fail). A better way to phrase it may be "failed incentives", which can also occur over an extended period. For example, in PoW, mining becoming extremely concentrated is not an active attack (where you go and buy up all the hash rate quickly), it is something that may very well happen (and arguably has happened, at least to some extent) over time that still very much undermines the security assumptions of the system.

Unlike masternode ownership that continues to pay rewards, that can't work without an ongoing cost post MRL-0004, given the math in MRL-0001 (not necessary to follow the math -- the chart showing the 'burnout' effect is good enough). Even Bytecoin could fix this eventually if they implemented a minimum mixing, although it would take quite a while for 82% premine to burn out.

There is no such cost, since nothing is consumed. You still have the masternodes when you are done. If done as a malicious attack that reduces the value of the token, an attacker would have already stripped his exposure from his stake and resold it via derivatives. If merely done for spying purposes then you can continue to both spy and collect masternode rewards. This will outcompete honest masternodes over time since spying has economic value.

This was debunked both by fluffypony writing a program to analyze it (and showing the deanonymizing "results" obviously wrong) and later a reply from chainrader stating that it was just a bug in their web site showing wrong data and not even an attempt at deanonymizing at all. FUD/panic, in other words.

He probably doesn't but you would be well served to assume that any exchange will either run off with your money or be hacked and lose it (and not infrequently the former while claiming the latter).

There was nothing wrong with your request at all, and in fact your pool was added already. I was replying to the comment about "missing" pools, that's all.

Maybe try compiling 0.9.4 itself rather than possibly-unstable changes after that

git checkout v0.9.4
make clean (this will wipe out the 'build' subdirectory; make sure you don't have any wallets in there)
make

That also looks like a good recommendation to me.


Why does this matter? I would consider the interests of the project and network to take precedence over those of "anyone with a pool". The list of "missing" pools to which I was replying included one suspected of being a botnet (and also suspected of fake stats), one very large pool, one with suspicious affiliations and one which does not donate anything to support the software (pool software or core software). Why should any of those be listed regardless of what their operators "would like"?

Agree with what jwinterm said.

You would need to use the inside address (usually starts with 192.168.x.x:port) of the system running the pool instance, and also make sure the mining ports aren't blocked by any sort of firewall:

Because the evidence shows a high probability of deceptive, misleading, and manipulative statements and actions by the insiders, and on top of that, those same insiders are still involved with running the coin now (including enormous holdings that give them effective control over both the market and the faux-decentralized masternode voting). So anyone getting involved with investing in this coin should know who they are trading against and how those very same people have acted in the past in order to gain an unfair advantage for themselves.

Expect to be left holding the bag someday IMO unless you are extremely good, extremely lucky, or you are an insider. The markets are open to anyone though, so make your own decisions.

Obvious he is at least semi-trolling you.

Yes, I am in charge of all account selling around here, and if I say it didn't happen, it didn't happen.

Various enormously depending on market conditions.

I'm not aware of any, but in any case, now there is one more.

For unmoderated discussion. Enjoy.

Almost exactly, but not callable by the lender. Repayable early by the borrower.

It goes up to 2% per day on occasion. Even higher on very, very rare occasion.