Personal attacks ? Where ?

The whole thinking of dirty and clean coins simply does not work. There are no 'coins'. That's the point.

And i would defend any reputable business which is being attacked by people who don't know the technical details of bitcoin and therefore making wrong accusations.




No, i do not own that business.

So, in your eyes.. everyone who cares about his privacy is a criminal ? That's some weird logic.




I am able to argue properly.
All i see in this section of the forum is some heavy misunderstanding on how bitcoin works. And this leads to wrong conclusions.
Whether it is how BTC technically works or how everyone caring about his privacy is a criminal. That's just plain stupid.




That's definitely possible.
Bitcoin never had any anonymity. Bitcoin was (and is) pseudonymous.

But with future improvements, BTC can definitely be a more private coin. I am not talking about full anonymity, but about enough anonymity to not get spied on by your neighbor or the store next block.




My point is still valid.
It is simply not possible to distinguish between clean and dirty 'coins' (coins do not exist in BTC) after mixing.

Instead of simply stating 'silly argument', what about explaining how you would distinguish between them in the example i gave earlier ?

I wouldn't regard THIS as a 'only in the movie' attack.


The recent extraction of sensitive information via sidechannel attack on the power consumption on the screen seems like a very improbable ('move'-) attack.
But stealing a hardware wallet and simply extracting the seed with a tool isn't too 'movie-like'.

When in possession of the tool, that's even more easy to accomplish than a 5$ wrench attack. All you need is physical access to the hardware wallet.

Not necessarily. There are proposals to increase the anonymity of bitcoin.

While coinjoin is fine, there are better solutions available, such as payjoin.




Not really.

By combining 2 'dirty' and 'clean' outputs, creating 4 new outputs, it is not possible to call any one of them 'clean' or 'dirty' anymore.
The whole concept of 'dirty' coins simply does not work. Coins do not exist. Only UTXO do. And UTXOs are being 'destroyed' in each transaction.

You don't gain any advantage in anonymity/privacy when using non-deterministic wallets compared to deterministic ones.




You'd either need the device itself or the master public key to do that.
If you never enter your xpub into a software or post it online, the only way would be to have access to the device.

And if you have access to the device, it doesn't matter whether it is a deterministic or non-deterministic wallet. All private keys stored can be linked to one identity.




That should be possible with all hardware wallets (thanks to bip32 / bip44).




While trezor definitely is a good choice, i'd personally prefer a ledger device. Ledger's software is open-source.
The only part which is not open source is the firmware of the secure element due to NDA's.

It is called Bitcoin, not BitCoin.

And it works with any counterparty. Feel free to let a 3rd party control your coins - and therefore your money.
But this definitely won't be the future for the majority, and there is zero sense in that.

Counterparty - by the way - implies that you can transact with anyone, which is always the case. Even without giving full control away.
Letting someone else manage your funds, does not fall under 'work with any counterparty'.


Why would i need luck ?
I am using BTC as it is supposed to be. You'd be the one who needs luck if you are going to let a 3rd party control your funds. You are giving away all the benefits bitcoin offers.




I heavily doubt that.

The operator behind Bestmixer obviously didn't know how to run such a business.
The people behind ChipMixer are way more competent than those of any other mixer around (past and present).




Maybe because there are people around who care about their privacy ?

I mean.. sure.. there a lot of people like you who give their whole privacy away just for a few bucks (e.g. KYC for shitty tokens worth nothing).
Or by browsing with tracking cookies, or by installing the amazon browser plugin basically giving away your privacy for 10$.

Not everyone is like that.

That's actually not that hard.
ChipMixer splits those coins into chips having fixed sizes.

You can determine whether they went to ChipMixer by looking at the outputs created. If you see X BTC being split into 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, etc.. UTXO's you can be pretty sure that they sent their coins to ChipMixer.

However, whether the coins were sent to a mixing service is not a privacy implication at all.
It would be problematic if you could trace which coins were sent back in exchange. But fortunately that's not the case with ChipMixer.

 
I won't let anyone handle / control my coins. Ever.

If you believe that banks are going to control and manage your BTC in the future, you didn't understand the philosophy of bitcoin yet.
Be your own bank implies to not let a bank manage your coins.


Bitcoin is a mean of payment, and not a speculative object. While quite a lot people see it as such, the utility behind it is what will change the world we live in.
Decoupling from banks does not work if you let them manage your coins.




I think there are quite some things regarding the technical aspects of bitcoin you don't understand.

My argument is valid.

That's not how bitcoin works.
There are no 'clean' and 'dirty' coins.

There can be UTXO with an illegal source, but after the next transaction they are not traceable anymore.


Image, you have 1 'dirty' bitcoin (input A) and 1 'clean' bitcoin (input B).
Now you create a transaction consuming both inputs and creating 4 outputs (0.5 BTC each; output W, X, Y, Z).

Which 2 outputs are 'clean' and which are 'dirty' ?
That question can not be answered.

Same applies to cash:
1 'dirty' 10$ bill and 1 'clean' 10$ bill. Now you exchange them to 4 5$ bills. You can't say which of them are 'clean' and which are 'dirty'.

You don't need access to your account to sign a message using an addresses which has been used by this account earlier.




What kind of 'security measurement' is this ?
This is the worst thing you could possibly do.

There is not a single reason to delete private keys - at all.

Without a signed message, you unfortunately can't get your account back and no one can verify that you really are the original owner of this account. You could just be anyone claiming it.

For example ?

The only thing i can imagine is a vulnerability in the software creating those paper wallets.
But a paper wallet itself can not be vulnerable because it is no electronic interface. How can it be vulnerable to anything other than loss or theft (which applies to everything; hard drive, hardware wallet, etc..) ?

Wrong usage can lead to loss of funds. But then not paper wallets are to blame, but the person using them.

Actually, if it is a RAT, you are in trouble anyway.

A RAT (Remote Administration Tool) gives the attacker full access (under installed permissions) to your system.
It doesn't really matter what it is searching for upon infection.

An attacker can always simply download additional payload onto your system to do additional stuff (e.g. looking for wallet files, passwords, mnemonic codes in text files, etc..).


The point is.. if you are infected with a RAT-like kind of malware, your system is owned by the attacker. And he can do whatever he wishes.

So, any RAT is extremely dangerous. The one you mentioned would not be different at all.

The xpub would be stored on the web server handling the payment requests.
It wouldn't be publicly available to customer / visitors of the site.

You'd be generating a new receiving address for each customer using this xpub. While the private keys are in cold storage.

This does not have any implications on the privacy compared to receiving coins to a hot wallet and afterwards sending it to the cold storage.


Or what exactly was your concern ? Maybe i misunderstood it ?




The xpub is not an address, but is used to derive public keys (and therefore addresses).
However, i doubt the admint of a shop which accepts crypto could even fall for such a phishing attempt. I mean.. who would be the sender ?
There is no 'official authority' who could request anything. If you are the admin, you are the admin. No one else should ask you for anything.

Open source does not mean that anyone can change the code. It means everyone can view the code.

Anyone can make requests to change the code, but it will still be audited by multiple people managing the repository.
And only if it passes the code audits, it will be merged into the repository.




It has been mentioned numerous times here around this forum that one should only download electrum from the official website.
And verifying the signature is mandatory.

Just because most people don't follow those pretty simple tips to stay safe, it by far doesn't mean that everyone would get fooled by such a cheap phishing attempt.

This only works if you are solo-mining.
If you are mining in a pool, the pool-operator is constructing the block.

However, if you are solo-mining simply include the transaction into your block when calculating it.

This link is not working for me.

Archived it here: https://archive.fo/ywFnx

Also du hast zwei möglichkeiten:

1)
Um einfach nur schnell an deine Coins zu kommen: Private keys exportieren und in ein anderes Wallet importieren (z.B. electrum).
Der root-key funktioniert nur in armory, aber die private keys können in jedes Wallet importiert werden.

Dazu einfach den zitierten Schritten von Lakai01 folgen


2)
Du fixt die armory settings.
Dazu müsstest du uns die Logs hochladen, damit wir sehen wie wo was nicht passt.

Aber generell, musst du einfach das "satoshi-dir" korrekt einstellen. Das kannst du in der Datei armoryqt.conf machen.
Dazu einfach folgendes eintragen:


Wenn du armory zum laufen kriegen möchtest, wäre das einfachste wenn du uns deine Logs posten könntest.
Die kannst du am einfachsten exportieren, wenn du auf "File" -> "Export Log File" klickst, dann einfach auf https://pastebin.com/ oder ähnlichem hosten und hier den Link posten.

Same applies to when you want to send coins.
If you don't want to send / access your coins, you don't need to install a different application.

When you want to send coins uninstalling and installing a different application literally takes less than 30 seconds.




It really isn't hard at all.

Open ledger live -> ledger manager -> Click on 'install' -> accept it on the nano -> Done.




Well, you should keep your firmware updated all the time. That is not related to uninstalling/installing apps at all.

And you don't get logged out after a minute of inactivity.




No, it is way easier.
3 Clicks and 30 seconds.

I really don't see any issue at all.

Just like any other wallet.

Each wallet had vulnerabilities in the past. There is not a single one which didn't.
And some do even still have vulnerabilities which will never be fixed (e.g. jaxx).




Even if you know the sender you shouldn't click on links without verifying it.
If the original sender is compromised, malware could send emails to all contacts. While you'd believe the sender is a well known friend, in reality it is just some attacker who compromised the system of your friend.

Do not trust, verify.

One does not have to use a service to know it is scam.

You can continue to claim that everyone here is braindead and mentally ill.
But if i were you, i'd reconsider this statement. Everyone is mentally ill and you are the only one who is legit and trustworthy here?  Are you sure? 

It has been proven that you are a scammer, and still you are denying that like a little child who doesn't want to admit he ate the lollipop.

Anyone who is not schizophrenic will realize that those 50 trustworthy people here on the forum are right and that you are the scammer here.
Not you are the only one right here, while the whole world is wrong. Not the whole forum is the problem. You are the problem.

It is because there are standards on how to derive private keys (i.e. which derivation path to use for which address type).
This data is stored in wallet files. The xpriv itself is only used to derive the private keys.

BIP32 and BIP44 define the standard to derive private keys for different 'accounts' or coins. Following the standardization you will be able to derive your needed keys using your xpriv.