delete

[TheFascistMind]

Thus without the technical details we cannot verify his claims. We also cannot scramble to look through the codebase any more than we have been doing, it is a relatively large codebase and working through it has taken time and will continue to take time.

That is why fixing the anonymity amplification is an other vector we can pursue. At least we can see and measure that now.

And that is why my contribution may have been so valuable (still to be determined).

[fluffypony]

Gmaxell hasn't posted. Have you all heard from him on this?

Yes he has -

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=786201.msg8892342#msg8892342

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=786201.msg8895838#msg8895838

He has stated he has a GPU farm ready and only needs < 20% of the hashrate to accomplish an attack. He is only one of two guys (the other being ArtFortz who apparently taught him how to TW attack) that ever successfully performed a TW attack on any coin in the past.

I'm not discounting that he has access to a lot of hashing power, but that in and of itself isn't evidence of an exploit.

The TW attack issue can probably be fixed in any case. But there is a possibility that the anonymity issue can't be fixed. This is what BCX said in the prior closed thread and I am seeing some possibility he might be correct. I need to spend some time trying to characterize the amplification.

Well, let's see. We're open to the possibility it exists as well.

Are you telling XMR investors you don't care if BCX steals their money and you will just fix it after the fact?

Sorry I know BCX hasn't given us any proof so normally we should ignore him, but this is BCX a guy who has done it before.

We'll handle it the same way Bitcoin handled the block 74638 attack (which created 184 billion BTC). See: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/CVE-2010-5139

[TheFascistMind]

Gmaxell hasn't posted. Have you all heard from him on this?

Yes he has -

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=786201.msg8892342#msg8892342

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=786201.msg8895838#msg8895838

I mean specifically on my revelation that the two equations can be correlated. Those posts above do not.

Are you telling XMR investors you don't care if BCX steals their money and you will just fix it after the fact?

Sorry I know BCX hasn't given us any proof so normally we should ignore him, but this is BCX a guy who has done it before.

We'll handle it the same way Bitcoin handled the block 74638 attack (which created 184 billion BTC). See: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/CVE-2010-5139

That won't stop him from trading the XMR to BTC or otherwise dumping them before you can rewind what he did.

One thing he can do is mix them with other legitimate coins on the XMR block chain before you can fix, thus you have no idea which txs to unwind and which not to.

Geez man you boast that y'all are knowledgeable about the crypto but you fail a basic test on knowledge about your own coin. Lol.

Careful not to push me more and more to want to work with BBR. I am observing carefully how we interact on this issue. And believe me, I am one developer to reckon with. My skills far exceed zoid.

[fluffypony]

I mean specifically on my revelation that the two equations can be correlated. Those posts above do not.

Oh, no he hasn't.

That won't stop him from trading the XMR to BTC or otherwise dumping them before you can rewind what he did.

One thing he can do is mix them with other legitimate coins on the XMR block chain before you can fix, thus you have no idea which txs to unwind and which not to.

Geez man you boast that y'all are knowledgeable about the crypto but you fail a basic test on knowledge about your own coin. Lol.

Ad hominem attacks do not suit you.

Just as with the block 202612 attack, we had all exchanges suspend deposits the second it happened. Some suspended deposits leading up to it. The fork that was triggered lasted 35 minutes.

If there is an attack we'd checkpoint a fork from the bad block onwards, as we've done with 202612.

[TheFascistMind]

That won't stop him from trading the XMR to BTC or otherwise dumping them before you can rewind what he did.

One thing he can do is mix them with other legitimate coins on the XMR block chain before you can fix, thus you have no idea which txs to unwind and which not to.

Geez man you boast that y'all are knowledgeable about the crypto but you fail a basic test on knowledge about your own coin. Lol.

Ad hominem attacks do not suit you.

Facts are not ad hominem.

Just as with the block 202612 attack, we had all exchanges suspend deposits the second it happened. Some suspended deposits leading up to it. The fork that was triggered lasted 35 minutes.

Decentralized exchanges can't be suspended. Also you prevent your own investors from bailing out. By saying that now, you are telling them to stampede out of the coin now.

You had better retract that pronto.

If there is an attack we'd checkpoint a fork from the bad block onwards, as we've done with 202612.

And you then unwind all the legitimate trades done after that hurting those who sold early in the attack.

You just can't seem to grasp it is a major event and not something to be so smug about.

[fluffypony]

Facts are not ad hominem.

Except where they're wrong. You are incorrect in your statement, thus it is purely an ad hominem attack meant to strengthen your position as mentally superior. I certainly do not care enough to debate whether or not you are, and will gladly let you believe whatever you choose.

Decentralized exchanges can't be suspended. Also you prevent your own investors from bailing out. By saying that now, you are telling them to stampede out of the coin now.

Which decentralised exchanges exactly? Please let's stick to what exists and not what is hypothetical.

You had better retract that pronto.

This sort of alarmist, reactionary thinking has never fixed anything. As it stands, we have no evidence of this attack existing or being possible, other than a potentially spurious claim. We are not going to do anything until that status quo changes.

And you then unwind all the legitimate trades done after that hurting those who sold early in the attack.

You just can't seem to grasp it is a major event and not something to be so smug about.

Transactions !== trades. During the block 202612 attack most exchanges suspended trading and deposits, which I expect they would do in this situation as well if an attack even exists.

I fail to see how you think I'm being smug. My statements are clear: right now we do not know if there is going to be an attack or if an attack is possible. We do not know the technical details of the proposed attack. Nevertheless, we do not discount the remote possibility, and are prepared accordingly. We will react and handle it as we have done so before, and as we will do so in the future if an attack occurs without an ominous 72 hour countdown. The countdown is largely irrelevant, our ability to rapidly react remains as if there were no countdown and an attack came suddenly and without warning.

I think it's clear that you and I are going to disagree here, given that you've already resorted to insulting me. As I do not want to get embroiled in mud-slinging I'm going to end this conversation permanently and step out and go walk on the beach with my wife. It's a Sunday afternoon, after all, and my life does not revolve around forum debates.

[Oscilson]

It think the problem is not about the imminent attack, which can be fixed if reacted promptly. If the rumor about compromise anonymity is true, then CN coins will have a fundamental problem.

[broekies]

Observers would be well suited to ignore all the FUD flying round and certain posters intentional misinformation campaign against Monero . Not a single scrap of evidence to back up their claims has been shown. People are using the terms "attack" as if this is an established fact.  IF an attack even exists all we'd have to do to patch the exploit is fix the implementation so it correctly reflects the cryptography in the whitepaper.

This really is the classic good-cop / bad-cop routine.

The crux of the situation is that two posters here, Anonymint and jl777 remained bitter after the Monero community didn't bow down and lick their boots in the fashion they were accustomed to.

That's because their intentions are transparent and don't require their contributions from them shape what is coming. We simply have no requirement nor room for large egos. Monero does not need faux economys plugging into the network as a selling feature.  We have heard the criticisms levied against Monero by Anonymint and addressed them. That may come across as smug however it's not intentionally so, it is just the reality of the situation.

Monero will succeed and these dirty tactics will be forgotten within a matter of days. The market reaction will speak for itself. My life does not revolve around forum debates and there is certainly things I would rather be doing right now than arguing pointlessly about hypothetical exploits.  We are wasting time here even conversing with the trolls when it is better spend on continually improving our ecosystem, but it is a necessity for those more easily mislead who are vulnerable to having their opinions swayed by idle threats. I do not wish to see any of us lose out money to these dirty tactics, hence the reason I am even taking time out to post.

Sorry Anonymint, whilst you may have been a capable coder you're out of line in this occasion and frankly well past your shelf-life.
I grew tired of your  martin armstrong links quite some time ago.  I don't wish to offend you but this has become increasingly tedious. Resorting to Ad hominem attacks reflects poorly on your already fragile reputation.

[jl777]

It think the problem is not about the imminent attack, which can be fixed if reacted promptly. If the rumor about compromise anonymity is true, then CN coins will have a fundamental problem.

all such compromises that are being talked about appear to have solutions, so even if the possibilities are proven to be true, there is high probability it is fixable

[Hotmetal]

While people are looking at the XMR code, this https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/CVE-2010-5139 made me think of something (quite probably unrelated).

There are a fair amount of signed vs unsigned integer comparisons throughput the XMR code base.
Could someone fix that as well so that future over/underflow occurrences do not take place.

[akujin]

[DooMAD]

Helpful tips to survive an anonymint encounter:

• Never address anonymint directly, it only serves to feed his massive ego.
• Understand that the sky is not falling regardless of how many times anonymint overreacts and says it is.
• While anonymint might appear intelligent, he has a ridiculously vivid imagination and is prone to wild theories that never actually turn out to be true.
• Any attempt to disagree with anonymint's "one true vision" on any subject will result in an unnecessarily verbose diatribe because he's a pompous windbag who doesn't know when to shut up.

[Hotmetal]

While people are looking at the XMR code, this https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/CVE-2010-5139 made me think of something (quite probably unrelated).

There are a fair amount of signed vs unsigned integer comparisons throughput the XMR code base.
Could someone fix that as well so that future over/underflow occurrences do not take place.

To save a bit of time:

Signed/Unsigned Comparison:

Code:

Line: 71 - /tmp/src/common/base58.cpp
          return idx < m_data.size() ? m_data[idx] : -1;

Line: 95 - /tmp/src/common/base58.cpp
          assert(encoded_block_size <= full_encoded_block_size);

Line: 133 - /tmp/src/common/base58.cpp
        memcpy(data, reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&num_be) + sizeof(uint64_t) - size, size);

Line: 140 - /tmp/src/common/base58.cpp
        uint64_t num = uint_8be_to_64(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(block), size);

Line: 245 - /tmp/src/common/base58.cpp
      const char* hash_data = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&hash);

Line: 262 - /tmp/src/common/base58.cpp
      std::string expected_checksum(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&hash), addr_checksum_size);

Line: 160 - /tmp/src/common/int-util.h
  for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {

Line: 166 - /tmp/src/common/int-util.h
  for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {

Line: 180 - /tmp/src/common/int-util.h
  for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {

Line: 186 - /tmp/src/common/int-util.h
  for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {

Line: 82 - /tmp/src/common/util.h
    s.append(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&pot.peer_id), sizeof(pot.peer_id));

Line: 83 - /tmp/src/common/util.h
    s.append(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&pot.time), sizeof(pot.time));

Line: 107 - /tmp/src/connectivity_tool/conn_tool.cpp
        if(rs.ns_rsp.v.connections_list.size()-1 != i)

Line: 163 - /tmp/src/crypto/crypto.cpp
    assert(end <= buf.output_index + sizeof buf.output_index);

Line: 68 - /tmp/src/crypto/electrum-words.cpp
      for (unsigned int i=0; i < wlist.size() / 3; i++)

Line: 210 - /tmp/src/crypto/groestl.c
  for(;i<(SIZE512/sizeof(uint32_t));i++)

Line: 50 - /tmp/src/crypto/hash.h
  static_assert(sizeof(hash) == HASH_SIZE, "Invalid structure size");

Line: 82 - /tmp/src/crypto/keccak.c
    rsiz = sizeof(state_t) == mdlen ? HASH_DATA_AREA : 200 - 2 * mdlen;

Line: 451 - /tmp/src/crypto/oaes_lib.c
        if( *buf_len > _buf_len_in )

Line: 704 - /tmp/src/crypto/oaes_lib.c
        if( _data_len_in < *data_len )

Line: 737 - /tmp/src/crypto/oaes_lib.c
        if( _data_len_in < *data_len )

Line: 1279 - /tmp/src/crypto/oaes_lib.c
        if( _c_len_in < *c_len )

Line: 1351 - /tmp/src/crypto/oaes_lib.c
        if( _m_len_in < *m_len )

Line: 1434 - /tmp/src/crypto/oaes_lib.c
                for( _i = 0; _i < _temp; _i++ )

Line: 1435 - /tmp/src/crypto/oaes_lib.c
                        if( m[*m_len - 1 - _i] != _temp - _i )

Line: 72 - /tmp/src/crypto/random.c
    if ((size_t) res == n) {

Line: 130 - /tmp/src/crypto/random.c
    if (n <= HASH_DATA_AREA) {

Line: 622 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
for (r=1;r < 2*RCNT;r+=2*SKEIN_UNROLL_256)

Line: 826 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
for (r=1;r < 2*RCNT;r+=2*SKEIN_UNROLL_512)

Line: 1074 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
for (r=1;r <= 2*RCNT;r+=2*SKEIN_UNROLL_1024)

Line: 1197 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
    Skein_Assert(hashBitLen > 0,SKEIN_BAD_HASHLEN);

Line: 1241 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
    Skein_Assert(hashBitLen > 0,SKEIN_BAD_HASHLEN);

Line: 1317 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
        if (msgByteCnt > SKEIN_256_BLOCK_BYTES)

Line: 1358 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
    for (i=0;i*SKEIN_256_BLOCK_BYTES < byteCnt;i++)

Line: 1364 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
        if (n >= SKEIN_256_BLOCK_BYTES)

Line: 1395 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
    Skein_Assert(hashBitLen > 0,SKEIN_BAD_HASHLEN);

Line: 1441 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
    Skein_Assert(hashBitLen > 0,SKEIN_BAD_HASHLEN);

Line: 1462 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
for (i=0;i<SKEIN_512_STATE_WORDS;i++)

Line: 1517 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
        if (msgByteCnt > SKEIN_512_BLOCK_BYTES)

Line: 1558 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
    for (i=0;i*SKEIN_512_BLOCK_BYTES < byteCnt;i++)

Line: 1564 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
        if (n >= SKEIN_512_BLOCK_BYTES)

Line: 1594 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
    Skein_Assert(hashBitLen > 0,SKEIN_BAD_HASHLEN);

Line: 1639 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
    Skein_Assert(hashBitLen > 0,SKEIN_BAD_HASHLEN);

Line: 1660 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
for (i=0;i<SKEIN1024_STATE_WORDS;i++)

Line: 1715 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
        if (msgByteCnt > SKEIN1024_BLOCK_BYTES)

Line: 1756 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
    for (i=0;i*SKEIN1024_BLOCK_BYTES < byteCnt;i++)

Line: 1762 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
        if (n >= SKEIN1024_BLOCK_BYTES)

Line: 1847 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
    for (i=0;i*SKEIN_256_BLOCK_BYTES < byteCnt;i++)

Line: 1853 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
        if (n >= SKEIN_256_BLOCK_BYTES)

Line: 1876 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
    for (i=0;i*SKEIN_512_BLOCK_BYTES < byteCnt;i++)

Line: 1882 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
        if (n >= SKEIN_512_BLOCK_BYTES)

Line: 1905 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
    for (i=0;i*SKEIN1024_BLOCK_BYTES < byteCnt;i++)

Line: 1911 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
        if (n >= SKEIN1024_BLOCK_BYTES)

Line: 2030 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein.c
  if (r == SKEIN_SUCCESS)

Line: 203 - /tmp/src/crypto/skein_port.h
    for (n=0;n<8*wCnt;n+=8)

Line: 403 - /tmp/src/crypto/slow-hash.c
        for(i = 0; i < MEMORY / INIT_SIZE_BYTE; i++)

Line: 413 - /tmp/src/crypto/slow-hash.c
        for(i = 0; i < MEMORY / INIT_SIZE_BYTE; i++)

Line: 415 - /tmp/src/crypto/slow-hash.c
            for(j = 0; j < INIT_SIZE_BLK; j++)

Line: 431 - /tmp/src/crypto/slow-hash.c
        for(i = 0; i < ITER / 2; i++)

Line: 441 - /tmp/src/crypto/slow-hash.c
        for(i = 0; i < ITER / 2; i++)

Line: 453 - /tmp/src/crypto/slow-hash.c
        for(i = 0; i < MEMORY / INIT_SIZE_BYTE; i++)

Line: 462 - /tmp/src/crypto/slow-hash.c
        for(i = 0; i < MEMORY / INIT_SIZE_BYTE; i++)

Line: 464 - /tmp/src/crypto/slow-hash.c
            for(j = 0; j < INIT_SIZE_BLK; j++)

Line: 90 - /tmp/src/crypto/tree-hash.c
assert( cnt < max_size_t/2 );

Line: 97 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain_storage.cpp
      for (size_t height=0; height < m_blocks.size(); ++height) 

Line: 324 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain_storage.cpp
  CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(processed_tx_count <= bl.tx_hashes.size(), false, "wrong processed_tx_count in purge_block_data_from_blockchain");

Line: 433 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain_storage.cpp
  for(; offset < m_blocks.size(); offset++)

Line: 568 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain_storage.cpp
      if(count >= DIFFICULTY_BLOCKS_COUNT)

Line: 631 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain_storage.cpp
  for(size_t i = start_offset; i != from_height+1; i++)

Line: 737 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain_storage.cpp
    if (coinbase_blob_size < cumulative_size - txs_size) {

Line: 746 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain_storage.cpp
      if (cumulative_size != txs_size + get_object_blobsize(b.miner_tx)) {

Line: 749 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain_storage.cpp
        if (cumulative_size != txs_size + get_object_blobsize(b.miner_tx)) {

Line: 778 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain_storage.cpp
  size_t stop_offset = start_top_height > need_elements ? start_top_height - need_elements:0;

Line: 785 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain_storage.cpp
  }while(start_top_height != stop_offset);

Line: 937 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain_storage.cpp
  if(start_offset >= m_blocks.size())

Line: 953 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain_storage.cpp
  if(start_offset >= m_blocks.size())

Line: 1158 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain_storage.cpp
  for(size_t i = start_index; i != m_blocks.size() && i != end_index; i++)

Line: 1188 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain_storage.cpp
      for(size_t i = 0; i != vals.size(); i++)

Line: 1209 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain_storage.cpp
  for(size_t i = resp.start_height; i != m_blocks.size() && count < BLOCKS_IDS_SYNCHRONIZING_DEFAULT_COUNT; i++, count++)

Line: 1226 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain_storage.cpp
  for(size_t i = start_height; i != m_blocks.size() && count < max_count; i++, count++)

Line: 1548 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain_storage.cpp
  for(;offset!= m_blocks.size(); ++offset)

Line: 327 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain_storage.h
      if(i >= amount_outs_vec.size() )

Line: 341 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/blockchain_storage.h
      if(count++ == absolute_offsets.size()-1 && pmax_related_block_height)

Line: 175 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_basic.h
      if(CURRENT_TRANSACTION_VERSION < version) return false;

Line: 206 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_basic.h
      for (size_t i = 0; i < vin.size(); ++i)

Line: 218 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_basic.h
        if (signature_size != signatures[i].size())

Line: 65 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_basic_impl.cpp
    if (median_size < CRYPTONOTE_BLOCK_GRANTED_FULL_REWARD_ZONE) {

Line: 69 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_basic_impl.cpp
    if (current_block_size <= median_size) {

Line: 137 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_basic_impl.cpp
    if (2 * sizeof(public_address_outer_blob) != str.size())

Line: 221 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_basic_impl.cpp
    buf.copy(reinterpret_cast<char *>(&hash), sizeof(crypto::hash));

Line: 54 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_boost_serialization.h
    a & reinterpret_cast<char (&)[sizeof(crypto::public_key)]>(x);

Line: 59 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_boost_serialization.h
    a & reinterpret_cast<char (&)[sizeof(crypto::secret_key)]>(x);

Line: 64 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_boost_serialization.h
    a & reinterpret_cast<char (&)[sizeof(crypto::key_derivation)]>(x);

Line: 69 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_boost_serialization.h
    a & reinterpret_cast<char (&)[sizeof(crypto::key_image)]>(x);

Line: 75 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_boost_serialization.h
    a & reinterpret_cast<char (&)[sizeof(crypto::signature)]>(x);

Line: 80 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_boost_serialization.h
    a & reinterpret_cast<char (&)[sizeof(crypto::hash)]>(x);

Line: 122 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_format_utils.cpp
    for (size_t no = 0; no < out_amounts.size(); no++)

Line: 184 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_format_utils.cpp
    if (std::string::npos != point_index)

Line: 286 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_format_utils.cpp
    *reinterpret_cast<crypto::public_key*>(&tx.extra[tx.extra.size() - sizeof(crypto::public_key)]) = tx_pub_key;

Line: 624 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_format_utils.cpp
    blob.append(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&tree_root_hash), sizeof(tree_root_hash));

Line: 711 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/cryptonote_format_utils.cpp
    for(size_t i = 1; i < res.size(); i++)

Line: 102 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/difficulty.cpp
    assert(length == cumulative_difficulties.size());

Line: 107 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/difficulty.cpp
    assert(length <= DIFFICULTY_WINDOW);

Line: 111 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/difficulty.cpp
    if (length <= DIFFICULTY_WINDOW - 2 * DIFFICULTY_CUT) {

Line: 184 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/miner.cpp
      for(size_t i = 0; i != extra_vec.size(); i++)

Line: 55 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/tx_extra.h
      for (size = 1; size <= TX_EXTRA_PADDING_MAX_COUNT; ++size)

Line: 72 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/tx_extra.h
      return size <= TX_EXTRA_PADDING_MAX_COUNT;

Line: 79 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/tx_extra.h
      if(TX_EXTRA_PADDING_MAX_COUNT < size)

Line: 96 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/tx_pool.cpp
    if (!kept_by_block && blob_size >= TRANSACTION_SIZE_LIMIT)

Line: 366 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/tx_pool.cpp
    for(size_t i = 0; i!= tx.vin.size(); i++)

Line: 377 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/tx_pool.cpp
    for(size_t i = 0; i!= tx.vin.size(); i++)

Line: 427 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/tx_pool.cpp
      if (max_total_size < total_size + tx.second.blob_size)

Line: 440 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/tx_pool.cpp
      if (total_size > median_size)

Line: 89 - /tmp/src/cryptonote_core/tx_pool.h
      if(version < CURRENT_MEMPOOL_ARCHIVE_VER )

Line: 242 - /tmp/src/p2p/net_peerlist.h
    if(i >= m_peers_white.size())

Line: 254 - /tmp/src/p2p/net_peerlist.h
    if(i >= m_peers_gray.size())

Line: 114 - /tmp/src/simplewallet/password_container.cpp
    for (size_t i = 0; i < max_password_size; ++i)

Line: 908 - /tmp/src/simplewallet/simplewallet.cpp
  for (size_t i = 0; i < local_args.size(); i += 2)

Line: 294 - /tmp/src/wallet/wallet2.cpp
    if(current_index >= m_blockchain.size())

Line: 302 - /tmp/src/wallet/wallet2.cpp
      THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(current_index == res.start_height, error::wallet_internal_error,

Line: 391 - /tmp/src/wallet/wallet2.cpp
  for(size_t i = i_start; i!= m_transfers.size();i++)

Line: 526 - /tmp/src/wallet/wallet2.cpp
  if(sizeof(crypto::hash) != payment_id_data.size())

Line: 712 - /tmp/src/wallet/wallet2.cpp
  for (size_t i = 0; i < m_transfers.size(); ++i)

Line: 791 - /tmp/src/wallet/wallet2.cpp
    for (size_t j=0; j < dsts.size(); j++)

Line: 403 - /tmp/src/wallet/wallet_errors.h
        for (size_t i = 0; i < m_sources.size(); ++i)

Line: 421 - /tmp/src/wallet/wallet_errors.h
        for (size_t i = 0; i < m_destinations.size(); ++i)

Line: 284 - /tmp/src/wallet/wallet_rpc_server.cpp
    if(sizeof(payment_id) != payment_id_blob.size())

Line: 328 - /tmp/src/wallet/wallet_rpc_server.cpp
      if(sizeof(payment_id) != payment_id_blob.size())

[aminorex]

a point which may help inform naive readers confused about the discussion:  blockchain forks a thousand times a day.  that's what orphans are.  in the reference software, it isn't even possible to attempt to spend coins until 10 confirmations have occurred.

[Chris001]

Like I said before I hold no xmr right now, but instead of looking for a way out, a lot of people will be watching for a way in. AM agreed with this, so I not would say hes acting like the sky is falling. Hes planning to buy, so that argument just doesn't make sense.

Also, jl777 said whatever is wrong, if anything, can be fixed, so acting like he is somehow the cause of problems is incorrect as well.

So I dont quite understand a few of the posts ive been reading here blaming them lol.

I can see if some people were in too deep, which you shouldn't have all your eggs in one basket, and if you did or currently do in xmr, then sure it would be a wise idea to lower you position you should not have been in anyway. Especially with Neos V2 coming out today which has its own unique version of anon that should work out very well with such a skillful dev. Spread your investments around and there isnt such a need to have a heart attack when something like this happens. And im not just shilling Neos, its a great addition to the anon club amd doesnt rely on cryptonote tech. But even if you MUST invest in CN there are other choices. My point is you should have more than one tech youre invested in. Or if one fails, youre left in a panic, or worse case, lose your shirt.

Following basic concepts of investing can protect you overall.

I wouldn't even repeat this, but I can see some are not doing this by the way there are 15 threads talking all about the same coin.

Thats a recipe to get burned. When you go all in, or close to it on ONE TECH, you can be right  thousand times and only have to be wrong once to lose everything, or at least more than you can afford to lose when it comes to your holdings overall.

Like I said these are the ABCs for god sakes.

I have a nice chunk of Neos on my plate, but I am still here, now looking for my way into Monero.

Smh lol wtf  

[CryptoPiero]

This thread is very interesting. I'm sure many people are now on the hunt for the exploit. I'm not a Monero investor, but I'm sure keeping my eye on this.

[From Above]

may i say that theres too little sunshine in dem Monero threads

dont forget to give a smile to those not-XMRers now and then! Let a little sunshine come thru and all gonna be better

~CfA~

[btcney]

Can't wait for this to drop to 0.
Karma is a bitch.

[cornfeedhobo]

https://i.chzbgr.com/maxW500/5159060224/hDE390510/

[Hunyadi]

 We are wasting time here even conversing with the trolls when it is better spend on continually improving our egosystem

Corrected.