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[TheFascistMind]

If one views "winning" a philosophical exchange as a thing at all, wouldn't the winner would be the one that is learning something new?
Engaging in philosophy for one's ego gratification from being right, would be playing that game with a significant handicap.

Fortunately there are many "correct" answers.

[1714092715]

1714092715

[illodin]

For example, no one has solved the mining centralization dilemma yet.

Very sorry for the off-topic question, but there have been talks in Darkcoin forums about making all mining go through masternodes, i.e. every masternode would be a p2pool node. Those would be the only blocks that would be accepted. In your opinion, would this decrease the mining centralization and the 51% risk? Currently there are ~1000 masternodes, and the goal as I understand it is to get that number to 2000-3000 eventually.

What is the economic incentive for running a masternode?

Currently 20% of the block reward goes to masternodes, and the percentage is going up 5% every month until equilibrium for target number of masternodes is found. Eventually probably 50% of the block reward goes to masternodes and 50% to the miners (just my guesstimate). And will there be other services that generate value for the masternode owners, is not clear yet what ideas people can come up with.

[TheFascistMind]

To set the record straight, I must correct myself. The solution I have devised for selfish mining and rented hardware attacks is compatible Cryptonote, because can set a minimum age on tx outputs that can be mixed. Afaics, it is incompatible with Zerocash because everything is always mixed on every block.

[TheFascistMind]

For example, no one has solved the mining centralization dilemma yet.

Very sorry for the off-topic question, but there have been talks in Darkcoin forums about making all mining go through masternodes, i.e. every masternode would be a p2pool node. Those would be the only blocks that would be accepted. In your opinion, would this decrease the mining centralization and the 51% risk? Currently there are ~1000 masternodes, and the goal as I understand it is to get that number to 2000-3000 eventually.

What is the economic incentive for running a masternode?

Currently 20% of the block reward goes to masternodes, and the percentage is going up 5% every month until equilibrium for target number of masternodes is found. Eventually probably 50% of the block reward goes to masternodes and 50% to the miners (just my guesstimate). And will there be other services that generate value for the masternode owners, is not clear yet what ideas people can come up with.

GHash.io charges no fees to miners because it is subsidized by an ASIC miner which mines on it, that is why it consistently gets near or over 50% of the network hashrate.

If you charge for something, the fiat overlords can always use transfer pricing and debt to take control of that resource.

As I told rpietila in his thread, I am in the unique position of having both technical and macro economics expertise. Smooth is also very astute, as you can see. I am just beginning to get familiar with NewLiberty.

[illodin]

For example, no one has solved the mining centralization dilemma yet.

Very sorry for the off-topic question, but there have been talks in Darkcoin forums about making all mining go through masternodes, i.e. every masternode would be a p2pool node. Those would be the only blocks that would be accepted. In your opinion, would this decrease the mining centralization and the 51% risk? Currently there are ~1000 masternodes, and the goal as I understand it is to get that number to 2000-3000 eventually.

What is the economic incentive for running a masternode?

Currently 20% of the block reward goes to masternodes, and the percentage is going up 5% every month until equilibrium for target number of masternodes is found. Eventually probably 50% of the block reward goes to masternodes and 50% to the miners (just my guesstimate). And will there be other services that generate value for the masternode owners, is not clear yet what ideas people can come up with.

GHash.io charges no fees to miners because it is subsidized by an ASIC miner which mines on it, that is why it consistently gets near or over 50% of the network hashrate.

If you charge for something, the fiat overlords can always use transfer pricing and debt to take control of that resource.

As I told rpietila in his thread, I am in the unique position of having both technical and macro economics expertise. Smooth is also very astute, as you can see.

With the proposition there would be no 3rd party pools, or incentive for people to go through GHash.io or any other mining proxy, because they'd have to mine on masternodes anyway which enforce (or don't enforce) the fee. There would probably be no use for a fee anyway because the percentage of the block reward is issued to masternodes already by the protocol. Do you think this has any merit at all compared to 2-3 pools having > 50% combined?

[iCEBREAKER]

I am in the unique position of having both technical and macro economics expertise. Smooth is also very astute, as you can see. I am just beginning to get familiar with NewLiberty.

Unique?  Don't flatter yourself.   

For such a special econometric snowflake you have a poor understanding of game theory:

the Nash Equilibrium continues to equilibrate:

[smooth]

What i have ALWAYS been bothered by in the Altcoin scene is the monstrous bold claims some coin supporters make on various coins.
and this point relates heavily to Monero !
A lot or what seems to be a lot of the Monero supporters are making grandiose claims about the coin on a regular basis
many of which i think are simply outright ridiculous and possibly fraudulent or deceptive to new users.
this behavior will inflame the alt-scene generally speaking.

I have to give you credit for clearly differentiating between the developers and "supporters" in this case. If more people did that I think there would be a lot less friction about the whole Monero phenomenon and perhaps more focus on the specific behavior that is troublesome, and who is doing it. So bravo for your clarity.

i had actually made a topic asking why ?
because i just don't get it ? why sooooo much fuss over this coin ?
what i have heard about it vs. the bold claims made about it don't match up to me.. something is not right !

I think it is a combination of genuine enthusiasm over the project and some investors who want to pump and dump their holding and some people who are acting that way because their personalities are over the top (you have a few in every group). The combination is rather inflammatory.

[TheFascistMind]

the Nash Equilibrium continues to equilibrate:

https://i.imgur.com/cNm3wgE.png

Collusion and cartel must not yet be in your vocabulary or study of economics.

Also perhaps you've forgotten the selfish mining attack only requires 25%.

[TheFascistMind]

For example, no one has solved the mining centralization dilemma yet.

Very sorry for the off-topic question, but there have been talks in Darkcoin forums about making all mining go through masternodes, i.e. every masternode would be a p2pool node. Those would be the only blocks that would be accepted. In your opinion, would this decrease the mining centralization and the 51% risk? Currently there are ~1000 masternodes, and the goal as I understand it is to get that number to 2000-3000 eventually.

What is the economic incentive for running a masternode?

Currently 20% of the block reward goes to masternodes, and the percentage is going up 5% every month until equilibrium for target number of masternodes is found. Eventually probably 50% of the block reward goes to masternodes and 50% to the miners (just my guesstimate). And will there be other services that generate value for the masternode owners, is not clear yet what ideas people can come up with.

GHash.io charges no fees to miners because it is subsidized by an ASIC miner which mines on it, that is why it consistently gets near or over 50% of the network hashrate.

If you charge for something, the fiat overlords can always use transfer pricing and debt to take control of that resource.

As I told rpietila in his thread, I am in the unique position of having both technical and macro economics expertise. Smooth is also very astute, as you can see.

With the proposition there would be no 3rd party pools, or incentive for people to go through GHash.io or any other mining proxy, because they'd have to mine on masternodes anyway which enforce (or don't enforce) the fee. There would probably be no use for a fee anyway because the percentage of the block reward is issued to masternodes already by the protocol. Do you think this has any merit at all compared to 2-3 pools having > 50% combined?

Miners who can use a pool which doesn't take some of their block reward, will have an economic advantage, thus masternodes will become unfunded and be centralized (offered for free) by whomever can gain from stealing the anonymity (or what ever value they can extract from centralizing masternodes).

Now I bet you wish you hadn't asked me. Apologies.

[iCEBREAKER]

Collusion and cartel must not yet be in your vocabulary or study of economics.

That's right, my high school econ teacher failed to mention oligopolies.  And I missed the week we spent on pricing mechanisms at university as well.

Good thing cypherdoc is here to help me out:

it looks to me that mining would be best described as being in a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium - cypherdoc


"A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is a profile of strategies such that each player’s (miner's) strategy is a best response ((results in the highest available payoff (block reward)) against the equilibrium strategies of the other players (miners).

A pure strategy Nash equilibrium only requires that the action taken by each agent (miner) be best against the actual equilibrium actions taken by the other players (miners), and not necessarily against all possible actions of the other players (miners). In other words, it's expected for some miners to be malicious.

A Nash equilibrium has the nice property that it is stable: if each player expects 'a' to be the profile of actions played, then no player (miner) has any incentive to change his or her action (no incentive to start cheating). In other words, no player (miner) regrets having played the action that he or she played in a Nash equilibrium."

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1968579

In other news, AnonyMint is having delusions of yet another whacked-out conspiracy.   

[TheFascistMind]

I think my time is better spent on productive matters than dealing with iCEBREAKER's ego.

Does anyone not understand why I think he is full of shit? Because I would rather focus on other things than deal with his simpleton shoehorn of one game strategy model into a macro economic board that is of wider scope. Nash equilibrium is not considering externalities in this case.

The Nash equilibrium doesn't factor opportunity costs of the externalities. One person's conspiracy is another person's huge pay day or downfall. Why else do people cozy up with the government?

[iCEBREAKER]

Nash equilibrium is not considering externalities in this case.

That's just like, your assertion, man. 

The distribution of hashrate among pools demonstrates that whatever unspecified externalities hide under your bed have not been able to disrupt the equilibrium.

[illodin]

For example, no one has solved the mining centralization dilemma yet.

Very sorry for the off-topic question, but there have been talks in Darkcoin forums about making all mining go through masternodes, i.e. every masternode would be a p2pool node. Those would be the only blocks that would be accepted. In your opinion, would this decrease the mining centralization and the 51% risk? Currently there are ~1000 masternodes, and the goal as I understand it is to get that number to 2000-3000 eventually.

What is the economic incentive for running a masternode?

Currently 20% of the block reward goes to masternodes, and the percentage is going up 5% every month until equilibrium for target number of masternodes is found. Eventually probably 50% of the block reward goes to masternodes and 50% to the miners (just my guesstimate). And will there be other services that generate value for the masternode owners, is not clear yet what ideas people can come up with.

GHash.io charges no fees to miners because it is subsidized by an ASIC miner which mines on it, that is why it consistently gets near or over 50% of the network hashrate.

If you charge for something, the fiat overlords can always use transfer pricing and debt to take control of that resource.

As I told rpietila in his thread, I am in the unique position of having both technical and macro economics expertise. Smooth is also very astute, as you can see.

With the proposition there would be no 3rd party pools, or incentive for people to go through GHash.io or any other mining proxy, because they'd have to mine on masternodes anyway which enforce (or don't enforce) the fee. There would probably be no use for a fee anyway because the percentage of the block reward is issued to masternodes already by the protocol. Do you think this has any merit at all compared to 2-3 pools having > 50% combined?

Miners who can use a pool which doesn't take some of their block reward, will have an economic advantage, thus masternodes will become unfunded and be centralized (offered for free) by whomever can gain from stealing the anonymity (or what ever value they can extract from centralizing masternodes).

Blocks that don't issue masternode reward are rejected, so why would people start mining on a pool whose all blocks become orphaned?

Now I bet you wish you hadn't asked me. Apologies.

I don't wish that at all. I only wish I understood it better, which will hopefully happen eventually!

[TheFascistMind]

Nash equilibrium is not considering externalities in this case.

That's just like, your assertion, man.  

The distribution of hashrate among pools demonstrates that whatever unspecified externalities hide under your bed have not been able to disrupt the equilibrium.

And the birds think their food will always be handed to them.

Humans are not good at seeing externalities, until it is too late. That is why crashes are like waterfalls.

Taleb points out that humans make judgements with incomplete information and assume they have all the information.

One example of an externality is the government can make it very costly to run a pool, unless you give them certain powers over its operation. Suddenly you can have a Nash equilibrium of compliant pools, all of which act as one. Looking at your chart, you would still think you have only a Nash equilibrium.

[TheUsualStuff]

Miners who can use a pool which doesn't take some of their block reward, will have an economic advantage, thus masternodes will become unfunded and be centralized (offered for free) by whomever can gain from stealing the anonymity (or what ever value they can extract from centralizing masternodes).

With the recent spork that was done with >90% of the network in acceptance, there are no more pools in darkcoin who can offer a block reward without paying the mns. therefore, miners who choose to mine at these pools will be at a distinct economic disadvantage to themselves. The network now rejects these blocks.

If the mn's are economically capable of offering mining for no fee, or a fee less than a non-mn pool (because of the 20% they're already allocated), then that would give them an economic edge over non mn pools. this does assume that the operational costs of the mn and the operational costs of running the pool combined are less than what it receives.

evan's latest post: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=421615.msg9103691#msg9103691

I wonder what the technical limitations are on lowering the amount required from 1000 units, to say, one or two units of the currency?

Add: I'd like to make the point that playing with this 20% payment will likely have immediate and lasting effects on the hashrate of the network, because of the chosen emission style where the hashrate defines the block reward. Please note that with this enforcement, the hashrate dropped to levels where the nodes and miners are receiving more currency than they did before because the block reward has moved from the 5drk minimum and now sits at ~7/8drk. I observe that a 20% cut in miner pay seems to have resulted in a 40%50% increase in emission. With no real change in price, this serves to reward miners a net of 20% increase in pay/value reward compared to pre-spork.

As many miners may sell at market, this would require a 20% increase in purchasing power to keep this price. This can be countered with a price increase of 20% if someone wants to have the potential ability to collect 'anonymous' information through the masternodes in the future. The price increase should logically be met with a 20% increase in hashrate from where it's at now (which will yield the 5 DRK/block emission), where it will sit until either buying or selling power takes precedence over the other; however, the buying pressure would still need to be increased 20% value-wise in order to maintain no change. The only real benefit to raising the price from a whales perspective in this AFAICS is to keep scarcity up, so that the 50% gain in emission doesn't dilute their current holdings. Personally, I'm expecting a 20% rise in the nearish future in order to tackle this very situation.

Alternatively, the price can decrease 20%. While this seems more likely, it could easily cascade into a decreasing hashrate which will yield an even higher emission (what difficulty does it increase from 7/8 per block to whatever's higher than that?) and then a possible 'race to the bottom'. Considering that there is the financial incentive of either the currency itself, or even the incentive of potentially having the ability to collect anonymous data, I'd think that the increased cost route might be justified. Not my money to spend though, nor do I know who's making the spending decisions so it's pretty up in the air.

Alternatively again, Wolf0 has just published a nice increase in hashing power. He says it's '34.34%' overall. The increased hashrate would increase the network difficulty to where it's again sitting at 5 drk/block. economic implications of this are left to anyone that would like to consider the value of purchasing his refinement of the mining algorithm. I'm sure it's less than paying all that extra money on the market

[TheFascistMind]

For example, no one has solved the mining centralization dilemma yet.

Very sorry for the off-topic question, but there have been talks in Darkcoin forums about making all mining go through masternodes, i.e. every masternode would be a p2pool node. Those would be the only blocks that would be accepted. In your opinion, would this decrease the mining centralization and the 51% risk? Currently there are ~1000 masternodes, and the goal as I understand it is to get that number to 2000-3000 eventually.

What is the economic incentive for running a masternode?

Currently 20% of the block reward goes to masternodes, and the percentage is going up 5% every month until equilibrium for target number of masternodes is found. Eventually probably 50% of the block reward goes to masternodes and 50% to the miners (just my guesstimate). And will there be other services that generate value for the masternode owners, is not clear yet what ideas people can come up with.

GHash.io charges no fees to miners because it is subsidized by an ASIC miner which mines on it, that is why it consistently gets near or over 50% of the network hashrate.

If you charge for something, the fiat overlords can always use transfer pricing and debt to take control of that resource.

As I told rpietila in his thread, I am in the unique position of having both technical and macro economics expertise. Smooth is also very astute, as you can see.

With the proposition there would be no 3rd party pools, or incentive for people to go through GHash.io or any other mining proxy, because they'd have to mine on masternodes anyway which enforce (or don't enforce) the fee. There would probably be no use for a fee anyway because the percentage of the block reward is issued to masternodes already by the protocol. Do you think this has any merit at all compared to 2-3 pools having > 50% combined?

Miners who can use a pool which doesn't take some of their block reward, will have an economic advantage, thus masternodes will become unfunded and be centralized (offered for free) by whomever can gain from stealing the anonymity (or what ever value they can extract from centralizing masternodes).

Blocks that don't issue masternode reward are rejected, so why would people start mining on a pool whose all blocks become orphaned?

Masternodes can refund this to miners. There is an extra incentive because masternodes have all the anonymity information.

You can't stop the rich and the government from aggregating resources. They always find a way.

The only way to stop them long-term is to make the resources incompatible with aggregation, e.g. the government would have a very difficult time owning all the human actions we do as they are inherently diverse.

[PestoQuinty]

Short version of how the Monero VIRUS works..

...

These Monero Shills are crypto-offenders and should have to go door to door in their neighborhoods
and tell the communities all over crypto they are convicted offenders and are guilty of grooming their victims for the long-con !
Beware new users you don't want to be sitting in a shrinks office pointing to a doll showing what naughty parts of your wallet they violated

You actually wrote something that made laugh.  

Maybe if you keep your posts short...

ok for starters i am looking at your first few posts here right now and you have the nerve to say that to me ?
now THAT is funny LOL
read your 4th comment on this forum here..
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?action=profile;u=375762;sa=showPosts;start=500
and take note at the length.
then have a look at how much you all say it's ME that writes the walls of text.
ProTip:
Look in the fucking mirror LOL

hey i am laughing man so whatever

but now that i have your attention from the science show with smooth let me ask you a straight forward question
that i am hoping for a straight answer for ..

Should new users coming here invest in Monero or NOT ?
I'd like a definitive answer not necessarily a short one per say but one that does in fact answer the question one way or the other.

https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=745125918876146&fref=nf

[Este Nuno]

I am in the unique position of having both technical and macro economics expertise. Smooth is also very astute, as you can see. I am just beginning to get familiar with NewLiberty.

Unique?  Don't flatter yourself.   

For such a special econometric snowflake you have a poor understanding of game theory:

the Nash Equilibrium continues to equilibrate:

Funny how 'unknown' seems to have expanded.

[Spoetnik]

What i have ALWAYS been bothered by in the Altcoin scene is the monstrous bold claims some coin supporters make on various coins.
and this point relates heavily to Monero !
A lot or what seems to be a lot of the Monero supporters are making grandiose claims about the coin on a regular basis
many of which i think are simply outright ridiculous and possibly fraudulent or deceptive to new users.
this behavior will inflame the alt-scene generally speaking.

I have to give you credit for clearly differentiating between the developers and "supporters" in this case. If more people did that I think there would be a lot less friction about the whole Monero phenomenon and perhaps more focus on the specific behavior that is troublesome, and who is doing it. So bravo for your clarity.

i had actually made a topic asking why ?
because i just don't get it ? why sooooo much fuss over this coin ?
what i have heard about it vs. the bold claims made about it don't match up to me.. something is not right !

I think it is a combination of genuine enthusiasm over the project and some investors who want to pump and dump their holding and some people who are acting that way because their personalities are over the top (you have a few in every group). The combination is rather inflammatory.

Who's talking about FeatherCoin ?
or more interestingly who is NOT talking about it LOL

push it too far and some of you out there already have.. you will be talking about some other coin. LOL

know your market
do you know WHY i brought up feather coin ? or it's developers reputation ?
people in crypto know far more than a LOT of the new guys that showed up to flog us coins late to the game..
the KING Shill jamming Monero down everyone's throat said Monero was his first altcoin.
i rest my case.

edit:
oh and by the way he has since gone and deleted the part of his comment where he said that.
which was posted on the topic = "rpietila Altcoin Observer"
on the first sentence on post one out of his mouth.
I mocked him about that and he since went and deleted the comment that was there for 6 months or something LOL
and the nazi lunatic self modded forum rules that were there just before the Noob comment.
So YES he did in fact say it.. on a well known topic in the first sentence right at the beginning in his introduction right after saying hi my name is..

who should take trade advice from Noobs who spout of mega-record breaking spam and walls of text proclaiming insane shit about Monero 24/7 ?

[iCEBREAKER]

Nash equilibrium is not considering externalities in this case.

The distribution of hashrate among pools demonstrates that whatever unspecified externalities hide under your bed have not been able to disrupt the equilibrium.

And the birds think their food will always be handed to them.

Humans are not good at seeing externalities, until it is too late. That is why crashes are like waterfalls.

Taleb points out that humans make judgements with incomplete information and assume they have all the information.

One example of externality is the government can make it very costly to run a pool, unless you give them certain powers over its operation. Suddenly you can have a Nash equilibrium of compliant pools, all of which act as one. Looking at your chart, you would still think you have only a Nash equilibrium.

I asked you for examples of not singular but PLURAL externalies, because YOU alluded to the existence of at least a couple of them.

Instead of providing more than one (purported, easily overcome) example, you blather about birds and waterfalls and Martinfoil Armstrong.   

You must be new here, because we've already discussed and dismissed the 'ZOMG WUT IF POOLZ COLLUDE TOO BEE EVIL' FUD ad nauseam.

Like yourself, the 'ZOMG PULE COLLUZHUN' FUD is now the butt of jokes:

so when exactly is this 51% attack coming?