...If there is a fallacy in my argumentation, please help me to find it Remember that time, oh so long ago ( like last year), when there weren't enough transactions to fill all 144 blocks with 1MB worth of transactions every day...... The problem with so many of the rationalizations I see are all based on tiny, limited scopes and the fundamental change of everything that is Bitcoin. Segwit + 2MB + LN = all problems are fixed and the world is a happy, shiny new place where growth will no longer occur. Not!What if the current masses don't want their transfers "off-chain"? Then they don't use it. In fact, "off-chain" is a perfect way to connect to exchanges. LN is perfect with exchanges as central hubs, and exchange customers having their holdings in a channel with their exchange, which protects them from theft, and renders the exchanges trustless. It would turn the current exchanges in the new banks. A huge subset of crypto users are already transferring their wealth off the bitcoin chain - they use alts which are better proven than LIghtning, and render Lightning unnecessary. Basically the bitcoin fees got higher, and also it's believed that transferring from one blockchain to another also provides better privacy for bitcoin users. LN is late to the party. +1 Same I would say
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2800 at Bitstamp with Bugs Bunny gingle!
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http://www.uasfpool.comHistory repeats. So called users show they want do rather the miners business and fall back to pool -> centralization with all its problems giving up their user's power to the single pool operator? WTF should be better with this than that what we have now? Is it all about greed and power and divide and conquer? I hope if all ranters have lost their steem and learn it leads to nothing than crap we can collude and compromise.... Ok, would you rather have miner dictatorship like Jihan? In a dictatorship, people misuse their power...like Jihan is doing. They could care less about scaling problems, because they profit from it. I would rather hand over the "power" to the users, than having individuals like Jihan exploit the network for higher miners fees. How do they say? ---> Power to the people. What makes you sure same pattern will not happen after next 2-5 years after this, but with another Tycoon at some pool or hardware company been hated again from you? I still think also your called dictatorship is part of the balanced game we all are parts of, from tiny (me) up to the actual Tycoons, you name them. Bitcoin is stronger than ever, but comunity wants to fight for luxury sake, missing out the straight forward fixes needed and done by a single code line change. Humans can be naive, I cannot believe.
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http://www.uasfpool.comHistory repeats. So called users show they want do rather the miners business and fall back to pool -> centralization with all its problems giving up their user's power to the single pool operator? WTF should be better with this than that what we have now? Is it all about greed and power and divide and conquer? I hope if all ranters have lost their steem and learn it leads to nothing than crap we can collude and compromise....
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Nobody is willing to accept BU.
Incorrect. I am willing to accept BU. Indeed, I prefer its design to any other option currently under discussion. As do many others. When one needs to lie in order to argue their point, it belies a weakness in the argument. I also wd prefere the BU version - and yes this thing is already live and running ( still < 1MB and limited ), had its bugs shown up, but as bugs getting less and less with time the thing gets mature and robust. Also in terms of maintainance over years I cannot beleive that so preferres the SW Spaghetti Wrack to the protocol that is still restricted to few on chain scaling not doing the most important job here. So next if USAFails we might see a BUAHF...?
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Es wird glaube ich noch etwas dauern, bis auch die ETH-Jünger zu begreifen beginnen, dass die eigentlichen "Killer-Apps" der Kryptowährungen, inflationsgeschützte Wertaufbewahrung (= virtuelles Gold) und dezentraler Werttransfer (= virtuelles Bargeld) sind.
Smartcontracts sind schön und gut und ich will auch nicht bestreiten, dass es Anwendungsfälle dafür gibt. Jedoch erfordern die meisten dieser Verträge, egal wie "smart" sie sind, letztendlich eine realweltliche Durchsetzung der Vetragsbedingungen.
Davon abgesehen ist ETH aufgrund seiner Konstruktion als Wertaufbewahrungs- und Transfersystem ungeeignet und wegen seiner auf Smartcontracts ausgelegten Komplexität Bitcoin unterlegen. Die Bewertung von ETH ist eine Spekulationsblase (von Ripple wollen wir erst gar nicht reden...).
Wenn das neue EOS von Larimer so funktioniert, wie angepriesen bei Consensus 2017, dann muss sich ETH, Tokenbums aber auch LN warm anziehen... Spannung!
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On a logical base core cannot really be pro UASF, since they said (?) SW is a compromise and they defined a long activation time and a high threshold to kick in absolutely safe.
They said with this: a compromise is only live with sufficient time and maximum support
Why now rush this in with a rant like style and risk split for a compromise? They feel fine doing nothing...before fuck sth up.
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Mir scheint langsam wird Ethereum Bitcoin den Rang ablaufen. Die Bitcoinproblemchen sind langsam zu Problemen geworden und eine Lösung scheint weiter entfernt als je zuvor je mehr Bitcoin benutzt wird.
Die hartnäckige Spaltung ohne aufeinander zuzugehen und dabei oftmals Argumente zu nutzen die schon lange widerlegt oder behebbar sind ist auch nicht hilfreich.
Die Coredevs haben große Macht einfach dadurch dass automatisch ein sehr großer Teil der User bei Core bleiben werden. Die Miner haben Macht weil sie forken können wenn sie wollen und die verlierende Chain wird mit heftigem Delay bei neuen Blocks rechnen müssen.
Und Lösung? Ich seh echt noch keine die man wirklich so nennen könnte und bei der entsprechende Effekte zu erwarten sind die alles wieder locker funktionieren lassen würden so dass alle zufrieden sind mit Geschwindigkeit, Preis und Verlässlichkeit.
Man sucht ja immer irgendwie Vergleiche um zu deuten: Bitcoin <-> Gold ETH <-> Methan Wenn wir das mal so hinstellen, dann ist klar, dass es es einfach mehr Methan als Gold gibt, denn z.B. Methan furzt jede Kuh. Auch der Handel / MarketCap usw ist sicher bei Methan höher + volatiler, aber wie sieht's mit der Sicherheit aus? Wer will was wozu? Die Banken-Industrie / Lobby will ja auch lieber viel Furz handeln (Vola = geil + hoher Spread) und Gold drücken (damit z.B. die eigene fiat Währung nicht so mies aussieht) . JP Morgan usw wollen m.M. nach lieber ETH hoch traden + Bitcoin dabei kaputt machen. Das sehe ich auch so und es fruchtet auch schon. Ich frage mich nur, wann der erste Funke fliegt und das Methan .. .. Dann freut sich wieder jeder Bitcoin zu haben.
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Naja, in einem operativ genutzten Geldsystem sind iterative Regeländerungen und agile Entwicklung (betreffend der Konsensregeln) - zurecht! - absolut unerwünscht.
Vergleiche: Alter Anzahl Nutzer Anzahl Konkurrenten Anzahl Leader Problemcocktail ... Im Verglich zu historischen Geldsystemen ( Muscheln, Bohnen, Gold,...) Das klärt etwas eine zu enge Perspektive.
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Wer hat den Minern denn die Macht gegeben? Bitcoin basiert stark auf spieltheoretischen Überlegungen. Hätte man einen solchen "Machtmissbrauch" nicht voraussehen können?
Niemand hat ihnen die Macht gegeben. Sie nehmen sie sich einfach - falls die Nutzer ihnen die Chance dazu geben! Ein Machtergreifung ist vorhersehbar, wenn der die entsprechende Person einen persönlichen Vorteil erlangen kann ohne irgendwelche Konsequenzen befürchten zu müssen. Es ist die Aufgabe der Nutzer, für die Konsequenzen zu sorgen. Das Bitcoin-System bietet dafür die Möglichkeiten (Select Longest Chain, UASF, Mining Algorithm Change, ...). Wenn ja, dann ist das schon (von Satoshi?) so gewollt - um die Stabilität des Systems zu erhöhen, vielleicht.
Den Archiven kann man entnehmen, dass bereits das Pool-Mining eine ungeplante Überraschung war. Die Ursprüngliche Idee war nur, dass sich Mining-Firmen herausbilden könnten, aber nicht, dass diese die Mining-Leistung von rechtlosen Hashrechner-Besitzern "geschenkt" bekommen. Wenn man den Minern überhaupt keine Macht zugestehen will, muss man eben auf PoS und ähnliche Systeme setzen.
PoS Systeme haben ihre eigenen Schwächen. Übrigens haben die Miner die absolute Macht über ihren eigenen Block. Daran hat auch niemand gezweifelt. Die Bestrebungen die Macht darüber hinaus auszudehnen muss und sollte allerdings niemand aktzeptieren. Nochmal: Was mich stört ist nicht der UASF, sondern der Umstand dass man lieber einen Chainsplit riskiert, als einen Millimeter auf die andere Seite zuzugehen.
Tatsächlich gibt es genug Kompromissvorschläge. Genau genommen ist bereits segwit ein Kompromiss. Allerdings gehören zu einem Kompromiss immer zwei Seiten. +++ Und wie wir gut in der Informatik oft gelernt haben, ist der erste Wurf selten der beste. Meist benötigt man mehrere Iterationen / agile Methoden, um dem Ziel näher zu kommen. Zäh - insbesondere bei open source - aber hoffentlich erfoglreich, solange das gemeinsame Ziel nicht z.B. durch Ego-Kämpfe aus den Augen verloren geht....
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Gold is Wealth for Giants; they do not need to trade it. Latest idea circulating in certain Gold bug scenes is that the Gold price is surpressed so China can obtain enough of it to warrant an equal position at the table when, not if; when the Global monetary system is re-established upon another major financial crisis hitting. I certainly hope so This is what I also assume for long time - but is there any (open) evidence for ?
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...What makes you think that 2 MB base + 6 MB witness blocks aren't going to get filled up to the 8MB max very quickly? That's a potential 40GB+ of new blockchain per month, 360GB per year...
Who cares? Are all of the people, that are spouting about how big the chain will become, still on Windows 98 "because XP took up too much HDD space", too? It's 2017, if storage space and bandwidth are your best claims for throttling a protocol, then perhaps you shouldn't be involved in the protocol. Yep - new tech is always challenging newer tech - not other way around. Our brain just cannot follow or predict this, same as most retarted never could see btc trading at 2800$ ... Rellax friends, let the parameters float and see what the markets and tech developers will do for us! Far better than artificially setting up rules/limits for the past - that's not how our world is designed to grow. It's all about disruption - and yes give it a try and try to change the 21Mio - that's the challenge but last one that is healthy to disrupt...
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For what it's worth, I quite like the combo of 2MB base size and segwit, just not the miners' agreement's alleged planned execution of it. It still only smells of a bargaining tool to me and hopefully that's all it will end up being (see chest thumping.)
[thumps cognition] What makes you think that 2 MB base + 6 MB witness blocks aren't going to get filled up to the 8MB max very quickly? That's a potential 40GB+ of new blockchain per month, 360GB per year. Are you stupid? Because it's either me or you that is i know my post will get deleted but here goes 1. to even fill the 6mb witness area. people need to first move funds over to segwit key pairs. <- most important part 2. IF EVERY tx used segwit keypairs then the 2mb base will be filled but only ~2.2mb of the 6mb witness will be filled making 4.2mb data weight 3. comparison of bip9 segwit IF EVERY tx used segwit then the 1mb base will be filled but only ~1.2mb of the 3mb weight will be filled making 2.1mb data 4. to get to that point a majority of the 46m outputs need to be on sgwit keys for the majority of users to be spending 'segwit' outputs to achieve anything close to it it would take alot of time, months/years if ever for a block to be bip9segwit 2.1mb of 4mb or BSsegwit 4.2mb of 8mb, due to the headache of moving funds across to new keypairs to dilute down the native keypairs that only utilise the base block Not so sure ...
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Sorry - could you pls elaborate a bit on that 'catch-22 in a decentralized system' ? What is the clou here?
You mean, the expression "catch-22" ? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catch-22_(logic) Jumping to another Nash equilibrium is such a case. Are you aware of the prisoners dilemma ? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemmaIt illustrates a kind of non-trivial Nash equilibrium. "tragedy of the commons" is another game-theoretical catch-22 situation. I don't know if this helps ? Tx - I had no deeper dive into that yet - interesting... It is Satoshi's genius invention: have a decentralized system that obeys game theory in such a way that the Nash equilibrium coincides with "respecting the established rules" ; if there is no central authority any more deciding on those rules and having the (moral?) authority/raw power to force the change upon someone, this *locks in* the rules for ever. In other words: Satoshi's genius invention is the notion of immutability in a decentralized system. Yes - in ideal theory this might work - but still the imbalanced incentives (only miners) lead to centralization (sure proper metric needed ...) , and repulsive forces I cannot see much except keep code & rules = protocol as simple as possible (validity of blocks) than there should be room for more (best guess).
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Sorry - could you pls elaborate a bit on that 'catch-22 in a decentralized system' ? What is the clou here?
You mean, the expression "catch-22" ? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catch-22_(logic) Jumping to another Nash equilibrium is such a case. Are you aware of the prisoners dilemma ? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemmaIt illustrates a kind of non-trivial Nash equilibrium. "tragedy of the commons" is another game-theoretical catch-22 situation. I don't know if this helps ? Tx - I had no deeper dive into that yet - interesting...
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Follow-up on the game theory aspect of changing protocol:
Core had set up a very, very smart game-theoretical way of modifying the protocol that gave the impression that it was happening in a decentralized way: the signalling system. Indeed, this seemed to solve the problem of individual entities needing to leave a Nash equilibrium for another one, which is game-theoretically impossible. So how did Core defeat game theory (at first sight) ?
Well, the difficulty to leave a Nash equilibrium is that as individual entity, "changing strategy on your own" is a losing proposition (as by definition of Nash equilibrium). However, "changing together with the others" can be a winning proposition, but that supposes collusion which is absent in a decentralized system (by definition). In other words, every single entity needs to be SURE that a lot of other entities are going to switch to the new equilibrium in order for him to do this also, which is normally a catch-22 in a decentralized system ; moreover, this switch has to be simultaneous. This is where the "signalling" comes in: signalling is not a change in strategy (you can stay in the current equilibrium) but you can express your "engagement" to switch at a given moment in the future. If a very large majority engages itself into switching, then at that date, one can presume that the new equilibrium will be the one the system is in, and "remaining in the old equilibrium" is then the deviant position.
However, the caveat in this thing is that you need an *engagement* not just a *signal*. Because at the given moment, you STILL don't know if the other entities will actually do what they signalled. You might signal for something to trick some others in changing position, so that their loss is your gain. But this is where Core's monopoly comes in: their software is such that the signal also triggers the switch, and most people are USING their software, so they have no choice but to switch.
==> the signalling + engagement comes from the central authority of the software monopolist. Other software might just as well signal but not switch.
Moreover, changing something can always be done in different ways, according to different variations of the protocol: if different competing propositions are out there, none will signal an overwhelming majority, and even less will assure the engagement behind the signalling, which brings us back to the original Nash equilibrium.
Sorry - could you pls elaborate a bit on that 'catch-22 in a decentralized system' ? What is the clou here? I found this here but don't know much about the red line in it: http://ascelibrary.org/doi/10.1061/%28ASCE%290733-9372%282006%29132%3A2%28149%29Tx!
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UnApplicable Satoshi Fork (UASF) will lead to anti Satoshi PoW and unsecure hash power / ranting chain split.
I fear that s not Satoshi bitcoin...
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Genau - klassiches Trader Wissen. Allerdings ist Bitcoin ein völlig neues Asset, das ähnlich wie eMail oder facebook noch im exponentiellen (!) Wachstum steckt, hief empfehle ich auch die Zeitachse zu loggen (!) - ahhhh das is cool!
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Bei dem exponetiellen Wachstum hier seit knapp 10 Jahren und dem ganzen Rauf und Runter empfehle ich dringend allen, legt euch eine Logarithmusbrille TM zu, also alle Moves und Skalen / Axen immer mit log / log ansehen, danach làsst sich das ganze viel besser ertragen!
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<<wall o' text>>
" They vote with their CPU proof-of-worker, expressing their acceptance of valid blocks by working on extending them and rejecting invalid blocks by refusing to work on them. Any needed rules and incentives can be enforced with this consensus mechanism." - S. Nakamoto The question to me is: What exactly is an 'invalid block'. The final protocol could be very flexible here. Major rules should be: 21 Mio fix, no double spending,... ??
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