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221  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Announcements (Altcoins) / Re: [ANN] Ravencoin [RVN] PoW GPU Mining | Asset Transfer Blockchain (Updated ANN) on: April 13, 2018, 05:17:19 PM
At least it works :-P

And when you look a few posts above, payout is fine as well. Reporting is probably a thing which people sometimes like, sometimes not..
222  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Announcements (Altcoins) / Re: [ANN] [XMG] MAGI | CPU mining | mPoW | mPoS | [MagiPay] on: April 13, 2018, 07:13:01 AM
Mining is pointless atm because the attacker simply invalidates all pools blocks by making his chain the legit one
223  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Announcements (Altcoins) / Re: [ANN][ZER] ZERO - COMMUNITY TAKEOVER 2018 on: April 12, 2018, 07:08:15 PM
mmh, maybe you want to add suprnova's pool https://zero.suprnova.cc to the OP as well ?
224  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Announcements (Altcoins) / Re: [ANN] [XMG] MAGI | CPU mining | mPoW | mPoS | [MagiPay] on: April 12, 2018, 09:38:41 AM


Still looks like time hack indeed, same as we have had on PoW blocks in past.
Take it, once Joe is back, he'll adress same way as PoW was fixed.

Thnx!

yep, it's exactly the same scheme like on XVG
225  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Announcements (Altcoins) / Re: [ANN] [XMG] MAGI | CPU mining | mPoW | mPoS | [MagiPay] on: April 12, 2018, 06:09:42 AM
Someone is currenty trying / doing an attack on magi and is orphaning most blocks..


Block 1739508 BlockTime=1523350623 CurrTime=1523350475 AdjustedTime=1523350469 vtx[0].nTime=1523350623
REORGANIZE
REORGANIZE: Disconnect 29 blocks; b0cc38999e9d3757aef0..00000000852978be6e6b
REORGANIZE: Connect 2 blocks; b0cc38999e9d3757aef0..a26929a0055867b4c06b

Attackers adresses are:

9LvDoEhev9aVgskEQNrqgnXTQVb6rnaP1m
9JfhHYNXt6fmAd3j46DNfMXvbCreBWf8DF

IPs:
37.48.118.9
2001:1af8:4700:a049:2::

amongst others.. from what I see


It's the same scheme like from the XVG attack, manipulated block times:

Block 1739558 BlockTime=1523351350 CurrTime=1523351385 AdjustedTime=1523351381 vtx[0].nTime=1523351350
SetBestChain: new best=000000000f64a1ff6b14d0616db2033638cf562fc21a282f2c58ec852bb38e21  height=1739558  money supply=8514885  trust=71525804620351  date=04/10/18 09:09:10
Stake checkpoint: 922fb2cf
ProcessBlock: ACCEPTED
received block 848061254478a01574c2
Block 1739557 BlockTime=1523351343 CurrTime=1523351386 AdjustedTime=1523351382 vtx[0].nTime=1523351343
REORGANIZE
REORGANIZE: Disconnect 2 blocks; 34fe3afe4d397df8cdbf..000000000f64a1ff6b14
REORGANIZE: Connect 1 blocks; 34fe3afe4d397df8cdbf..848061254478a01574c2
REORGANIZE: done
SetBestChain: new best=848061254478a01574c2424333d72d5b2c0bb80ae97148a0ca10e4a7366f9522  height=1739557  money supply=8514804  trust=71525824597721  date=04/10/18 09:09:03
Stake checkpoint: 6711efb7



More info:


received MALICIOUS block 000000001c7041bdb201
Block 1739603 BlockTime=1523354643 CurrTime=1523354654 AdjustedTime=1523354653 vtx[0].nTime=1523354643
SetBestChain: new best=000000001c7041bdb2010e43e36eeeddb7d3e8e4e3d1867a8c27c37fc1de8d79  height=1739603  money supply=8515121  trust=71526313044852  date=04/10/18 10:04:03
Stake checkpoint: 9d13fb8a
ProcessBlock: ACCEPTED
ocminer: block received from IP [2001:1af8:4700:a049:2::]:8233
ThreadRPCServer method=submitblock
Block 1739603 BlockTime=1523354644 CurrTime=1523354656 AdjustedTime=1523354655 vtx[0].nTime=1523354644
ProcessBlock: ACCEPTED
ThreadRPCServer method=getblock
received getdata for: block 000000001c7041bdb201


--
received VALID block 000000002a747490ce06
Block 1739604 BlockTime=1523354658 CurrTime=1523354692 AdjustedTime=1523354691 vtx[0].nTime=1523354658
SetBestChain: new best=000000002a747490ce069b9d0be21d9706dd2035a3bbfb4098b550d08055f7a8  height=1739604  money supply=8515133  trust=71526313068656  date=04/10/18 10:04:18
Stake checkpoint: a34da038
ProcessBlock: ACCEPTED
ocminer: block received from IP 213.5.36.33:52183
Flushed 15024 addresses to peers.dat  67ms
received getdata for: block 000000002a747490ce06
Flushing wallet.dat
Flushed wallet.dat 58ms
received getdata for: block 000000002a747490ce06



--
received MALICIOUS block 000000001a92c5bff0c8
Block 1739605 BlockTime=1523354620 CurrTime=1523354753 AdjustedTime=1523354752 vtx[0].nTime=1523354620
SetBestChain: new best=000000001a92c5bff0c8642fbfe0f8a5f4ab1e4dd9a35d9e804f66b055af5066  height=1739605  money supply=8515138  trust=71526313093414  date=04/10/18 10:03:40
Stake checkpoint: 7804d868
ProcessBlock: ACCEPTED
ocminer: block received from IP [2001:1af8:4700:a049:2::]:8233
received getdata for: block 000000001a92c5bff0c8
getblocks -1 to 00000000000000000000 limit 500
getblocks -1 to 00000000000000000000 limit 500
Flushing wallet.dat
Flushed wallet.dat 705ms




It looks like the attacker has several manipulated nodes which simpy exclude legit blocks and he overwrites them with his manipulated blocks. As long as he has the majority and enough hash, there's not much that I can do about it without getting the coin itself fixed... He is also sucessfull in lowering the difficulty on his chain, so the rewards on his blocks are > 40 XMG instead of the normal 8-11 XMG...

A pity..


Since this is still happening and the attackers is orphaning all pool blocks, I've stopped the pool until someone fixes it
226  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Announcements (Altcoins) / Re: Network Attack on XVG / VERGE on: April 10, 2018, 01:57:06 PM
Well from what I see at least they now followed my advice and integrated the mentioned MAX_BLOCKS_PER_ALGO commit from myriad:

https://github.com/vergecurrency/VERGE/commit/80c81aef63272231fc39c2af4b8db9f3f2e9d328

This should fix at least the issue to "takeover" the chain by abusing one algo.. If it actually works.

However of course there's still damage done, the abusers funds are mined and in the chain, that guy is pretty rich now I guess Smiley
227  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Announcements (Altcoins) / Re: [ANN] [XMG] MAGI | CPU mining | mPoW | mPoS | [MagiPay] on: April 10, 2018, 10:31:45 AM
Something is wrong the chain. Everhting tets Orphand. Look at Zpool.

https://zpool.ca

Miner 795   total has 36.5 MH/s but only Orphand blocks.

But you actually did read my post above yours, or ? Smiley

nope. wish i did as i see you have thoroughly addressed it. SO XMG seems to be doomed. The attacker has majority nodes and POW.


actualy it's fixable.. Just the reorg's need to be disallowed if X blocks time are before the last valid blocks.. As it's simply impossible.

228  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Announcements (Altcoins) / Re: [ANN] [XMG] MAGI | CPU mining | mPoW | mPoS | [MagiPay] on: April 10, 2018, 10:25:17 AM
Something is wrong the chain. Everhting tets Orphand. Look at Zpool.

https://zpool.ca

Miner 795   total has 36.5 MH/s but only Orphand blocks.

But you actually did read my post above yours, or ? Smiley
229  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Announcements (Altcoins) / Re: [ANN] [XMG] MAGI | CPU mining | mPoW | mPoS | [MagiPay] on: April 10, 2018, 08:52:24 AM
Someone is currenty trying / doing an attack on magi and is orphaning most blocks..


Block 1739508 BlockTime=1523350623 CurrTime=1523350475 AdjustedTime=1523350469 vtx[0].nTime=1523350623
REORGANIZE
REORGANIZE: Disconnect 29 blocks; b0cc38999e9d3757aef0..00000000852978be6e6b
REORGANIZE: Connect 2 blocks; b0cc38999e9d3757aef0..a26929a0055867b4c06b

Attackers adresses are:

9LvDoEhev9aVgskEQNrqgnXTQVb6rnaP1m
9JfhHYNXt6fmAd3j46DNfMXvbCreBWf8DF

IPs:
37.48.118.9
2001:1af8:4700:a049:2::

amongst others.. from what I see


It's the same scheme like from the XVG attack, manipulated block times:

Block 1739558 BlockTime=1523351350 CurrTime=1523351385 AdjustedTime=1523351381 vtx[0].nTime=1523351350
SetBestChain: new best=000000000f64a1ff6b14d0616db2033638cf562fc21a282f2c58ec852bb38e21  height=1739558  money supply=8514885  trust=71525804620351  date=04/10/18 09:09:10
Stake checkpoint: 922fb2cf
ProcessBlock: ACCEPTED
received block 848061254478a01574c2
Block 1739557 BlockTime=1523351343 CurrTime=1523351386 AdjustedTime=1523351382 vtx[0].nTime=1523351343
REORGANIZE
REORGANIZE: Disconnect 2 blocks; 34fe3afe4d397df8cdbf..000000000f64a1ff6b14
REORGANIZE: Connect 1 blocks; 34fe3afe4d397df8cdbf..848061254478a01574c2
REORGANIZE: done
SetBestChain: new best=848061254478a01574c2424333d72d5b2c0bb80ae97148a0ca10e4a7366f9522  height=1739557  money supply=8514804  trust=71525824597721  date=04/10/18 09:09:03
Stake checkpoint: 6711efb7



More info:


received MALICIOUS block 000000001c7041bdb201
Block 1739603 BlockTime=1523354643 CurrTime=1523354654 AdjustedTime=1523354653 vtx[0].nTime=1523354643
SetBestChain: new best=000000001c7041bdb2010e43e36eeeddb7d3e8e4e3d1867a8c27c37fc1de8d79  height=1739603  money supply=8515121  trust=71526313044852  date=04/10/18 10:04:03
Stake checkpoint: 9d13fb8a
ProcessBlock: ACCEPTED
ocminer: block received from IP [2001:1af8:4700:a049:2::]:8233
ThreadRPCServer method=submitblock
Block 1739603 BlockTime=1523354644 CurrTime=1523354656 AdjustedTime=1523354655 vtx[0].nTime=1523354644
ProcessBlock: ACCEPTED
ThreadRPCServer method=getblock
received getdata for: block 000000001c7041bdb201


--
received VALID block 000000002a747490ce06
Block 1739604 BlockTime=1523354658 CurrTime=1523354692 AdjustedTime=1523354691 vtx[0].nTime=1523354658
SetBestChain: new best=000000002a747490ce069b9d0be21d9706dd2035a3bbfb4098b550d08055f7a8  height=1739604  money supply=8515133  trust=71526313068656  date=04/10/18 10:04:18
Stake checkpoint: a34da038
ProcessBlock: ACCEPTED
ocminer: block received from IP 213.5.36.33:52183
Flushed 15024 addresses to peers.dat  67ms
received getdata for: block 000000002a747490ce06
Flushing wallet.dat
Flushed wallet.dat 58ms
received getdata for: block 000000002a747490ce06



--
received MALICIOUS block 000000001a92c5bff0c8
Block 1739605 BlockTime=1523354620 CurrTime=1523354753 AdjustedTime=1523354752 vtx[0].nTime=1523354620
SetBestChain: new best=000000001a92c5bff0c8642fbfe0f8a5f4ab1e4dd9a35d9e804f66b055af5066  height=1739605  money supply=8515138  trust=71526313093414  date=04/10/18 10:03:40
Stake checkpoint: 7804d868
ProcessBlock: ACCEPTED
ocminer: block received from IP [2001:1af8:4700:a049:2::]:8233
received getdata for: block 000000001a92c5bff0c8
getblocks -1 to 00000000000000000000 limit 500
getblocks -1 to 00000000000000000000 limit 500
Flushing wallet.dat
Flushed wallet.dat 705ms




It looks like the attacker has several manipulated nodes which simpy exclude legit blocks and he overwrites them with his manipulated blocks. As long as he has the majority and enough hash, there's not much that I can do about it without getting the coin itself fixed... He is also sucessfull in lowering the difficulty on his chain, so the rewards on his blocks are > 40 XMG instead of the normal 8-11 XMG...

A pity..
230  Economy / Scam Accusations / Re: [ANN] BYTEPAY [BEPAY] POW - SCAM MASTERNODES - SCAM - NEOSCRYPT SCAM on: April 08, 2018, 05:13:51 PM
Will be added to easypool.win for mining

Lol...
231  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Announcements (Altcoins) / Re: Network Attack on XVG / VERGE on: April 08, 2018, 11:12:48 AM
When does the Suprnova Pool start again with myriad-groestl?

There are only bad pools to dismantle suprnova pool was good.

The pool http://xvg-mg.idcray.com/ is constantly out of order.

Can anyone happen to tell the port for the Baikal Gaint X10 via the http://xvg-mg.idcray.com/ pool with the correct difficulty. 

Hope Suprnova will be back online soon

Won't happen.
232  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Announcements (Altcoins) / Re: Network Attack on XVG / VERGE on: April 05, 2018, 08:53:24 PM
so what will happen with the coins at supnova ? , i mined for a few weeks without withdrawn any coins
make payout manually

i tried with no luck , my account link at supnova  doesnt work

write me mail and i'll unlock you - no prob
233  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Announcements (Altcoins) / Re: Network Attack on XVG / VERGE on: April 05, 2018, 07:40:46 PM

So many newbies posting stuff here.. It's really funny Smiley

Just FYI..

Your second "fix".. Is still not working at all, the edit you have here:

https://github.com/vergecurrency/VERGE/blob/master/src/main.cpp#L2306-L2321

You also need here:

https://github.com/vergecurrency/VERGE/blob/master/src/main.cpp#L2219


One is for reading blocks from disk e.g. resyncing and the other is for accepting blocks via peers...



234  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Announcements (Altcoins) / Re: Network Attack on XVG / VERGE on: April 05, 2018, 07:38:44 PM
So many newbies posting stuff here.. It's really funny Smiley

Just FYI..

Your second "fix".. Is still not working at all, the edit you have here:

https://github.com/vergecurrency/VERGE/blob/master/src/main.cpp#L2306-L2321

You also need here:

https://github.com/vergecurrency/VERGE/blob/master/src/main.cpp#L2219


One is for reading blocks from disk e.g. resyncing and the other is for accepting blocks via peers...


235  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Announcements (Altcoins) / Re: Network Attack on XVG / VERGE on: April 05, 2018, 03:05:46 PM
Okay guys, as the shit keep hitting the fan harder and harder here I need to take a few steps to actually end that drama for me:

Suprnova will not reopen any of it's XVG/Verge pools for mining whatsoever. You can mine it freely on any different pool if you like. Withdrawals are possible of course.

The background is that the "fix" promoted by the devs simply won't fix the problem. It will just make the timeframe smaller in which the blocks can be mined / spoofed and the attack
will still work, just be a bit slower.

Also the over 20 Million XVG which were instamined by the attacker won't be blacklisted, reverted, filtered or rolled-back in anyway according to the verge-dev, so in my opinion you all (the miners and investors) got betrayed about that 20 M coins .. For some it might be only a few coins, for some it might be a lot.. For some this might all be drama for them, I see you there of course..

Just to clarify a few last things:

1. The fix won't fix it. The problem is not alone the drifttime, but also the algo variance. You have to make sure that not X blocks get mined on one algo.
    Myriad and digibyte had the same issues - they fixed it.

    Here's a possible fix for the issues: https://github.com/digibyte/digibyte/pull/15

    Please DON'T just merge the code like you see it in that commit, you need to actually find the right places in your code and merge it. It's a slightly different codebase, so it won't work
    with just copy & paste, you actually have to understand and rewrite it to fit to your needs.


2. It's possible to blacklist certain addresses within the blockchain. So if you know on which addresses hacked funds reside, you can simply "blacklist" them directly in the codebase of the coin.
    For example you know that the attacker has used address "123abc123acb123abc" as the root for his hacked funds. You can now - at anytime - update your wallet code and just say
    "orphan all transactions with the root address "123abc123acb123abc". So even if the hacker moves the funds NOW or in one year, it won't happen as you've blacklisted the originating address.
    This was done previously also, not on myriad but on another coin - I can also find that commit for you.


3. I was getting blamed for "judging" too early and posting this info publicly on bitcointalk. I've mixed feelings about this.. Yes, I could have spoken silently to the devs at first and tell them "hey,
    something weird is going on on your blockchain" - however in the same time my miners were asking why the pool wasn't finding blocks and I already saw the first tweets about "skimming" and    
    stuff.. So.. What to do ? Keep the info about the hacker silent with the devs and wait 3-4 days for a (non-working) fix and get my reputation killed totally or just go for a public post about it
    and shutdown the pools ? I know, it's a difficult decision and my decision might have been wrong, but hey, I'm neither the attacker nor am I the guy responsible for the coin..  Also I was a bit
    astonished that I was actually the first to report the problem.. I was expecting devs watch their coin closely and come up with fixes upfront.. or at least know about what happend.

    In my opinion the optimal handling for this problem probably would have been something like this:

   1. Contact pools and exchanges to shutdown mining and trading
   1a. Tweet/Inform miners about the problem and tell them it's been worked on but takes it's time.
   2. Talk about possible problems and mitigation practices with devs/exchanges and pools.. Create a "conference room" for this for example and invite all necessary people there.
   3. Find a resolution, roll back the chain or at least filter the malicious coins (as someone as a (big) advantage here which he shouldn't, or?? So some others have a big disadvantage, or not ?)
   4. Go back online with the resolution and back to mining.



Least but not last here's a chatlog from a few moments ago, sorry for posting the drama but I just can't let it stand like it is at the moment.. If you don't want to read drama, just skip the part:
And yes, I might be a bit upset there as well, sorry, next time I'll be more precise and "nice" Smiley


...
[16:08:43]  <vergeDEV>   yes i put it in both branches
[16:10:11]    ed__ (319465d0@gateway/web/freenode/ip) joined the channel
[16:12:43]  <ocminer>   hmm no filtering/rollback of the attackers coins ?
[16:12:55]  <ocminer>   thats over 20 mills for him...
[16:13:08]  <vergeDEV>   we dont do rollbacks.
[16:13:16]  <vergeDEV>   we roll forward
[16:13:17]  <@Epsylon3>   i imagine the mess :p
[16:13:31]  <@Epsylon3>   the only this you can do is tracking the coins
[16:13:38]  <vergeDEV>   ocminer, would have been great if you contacted someone from our team. by you putting this on bitcointalk, you invited a ton of other people to attack as well.
[16:13:39]  <@Epsylon3>   talking with exchanges
[16:14:01]  <vergeDEV>   also your quote The vergeDEV @ Discord says "everything is okay - there's nothing to fix"..
[16:14:03]  <vergeDEV>   thats bullshit.
[16:14:05]  <vergeDEV>   i never said that
[16:14:15]  <vergeDEV>   why are you quoting me saying something i never said?
[16:14:18]  <ocminer>   -.-
[16:14:25]  <vergeDEV>   i already talked to bittrex and binance, theyre updated
[16:14:55]  <ocminer>   you just don't understand what this is all about
[16:16:02]  <vergeDEV>   how so?
[16:16:14]  <vergeDEV>   i do understand. we are having blocks injected with spoofed timestamps.
[16:16:20]  <@Epsylon3>   what the amount mined per day ?
[16:16:22]  <@Epsylon3>   is*
[16:16:24]  <vergeDEV>   and i never said "everything is okay - there's nothing to fix"
[16:16:46]  <@Epsylon3>   i need to add a script command for that :p
[16:16:54]  <ocminer>   also your commit won't fix it
[16:16:57]  <ocminer>   but ..
[16:17:12]  <ocminer>   go ahead and "move forward"
[16:17:14]  <vergeDEV>   ~4mill/day
[16:17:17]  <@Epsylon3>   XVG: current block_time set in the db 0mn35 (35 sec)
[16:17:18]  <@Epsylon3>   XVG: avg time for the last 2048 blocks = 0mn13 (13 sec)
[16:17:18]  <@Epsylon3>   XVG: avg time for the last 1024 blocks = 0mn31 (31 sec)
[16:17:35]  <@Epsylon3>   my script dont go so far :p
[16:17:51]  <ocminer>   12000 * 1560 = 18.7 mills already
[16:17:53]  <@Epsylon3>   XVG need 20x that :p
[16:18:30]  <vergeDEV>   yeah it wasnt that bad until ocminer posted it on bitcointalk, and then everyone and their mother joined in.
[16:18:51]  <vergeDEV>   and also misquoted me completely
[16:19:00]  <ocminer>   lol, now you're blaming me for an attack on your blockchain ? srsly ? Smiley
[16:19:07]  <vergeDEV>   did i blame you?
[16:19:09]  <@Epsylon3>   2026860 now... 2000000 was 2018-04-01 17:39:37
[16:19:11]  <vergeDEV>   i said the attack wasnt as bad
[16:19:14]  <ocminer>   [16:18:30]  <vergeDEV>    yeah it wasnt that bad until ocminer posted it on bitcointalk, and then everyone and their mother joined in.
[16:19:15]  <vergeDEV>   it was worse after
[16:19:20]  <@Epsylon3>   3 days..
[16:19:25]  <@Epsylon3>   4
[16:19:27]  <vergeDEV>   yes that is correct. congrats, you got a quote correct
[16:20:03]  <@Epsylon3>   so yep, maybe not 12000 blocks
[16:20:14]  <@Epsylon3>   i may create a script to check :p
[16:20:49]  <@Epsylon3>   Height:    2010000
[16:20:49]  <@Epsylon3>   Time:    2018-04-04 14:22:01
[16:21:03]  <@Epsylon3>   after first hack so
[16:21:31]  <@Epsylon3>   will do the script, i like right numbers
[16:26:22]  <ocminer>   listen.. kid... you have a absolutely trashy shitcoin pumped in heaven through that tweet from john mcafee back in that day.. you probably made a lof of money by that idiot tweeting xvg to the moon.. you should have used the chance and invested some of that money and invest it into a decent dev team, as seriously, and everyone knows that, you have not the slightest idea of coding whatsoever... If you've had done that, you could have patched your
[16:26:22]  <ocminer>    super-old codebase already to a super-recent codebase like myriad or digibyte and wallets would't have memory leaks all over, wouldn't take >30 mins until they startup and also those two drama's with the earlier tor hardforks wouldn't have happen. I'm not the guy who "keeps bullshit silent" - when I see something is happening, I report it - immediately and from my POV your users/miners have been betrayed by over 20 M coins which were injected
[16:26:22]  <ocminer>    maliciously into the blockchain... This is not a kiddo script hack and my post didn't change anyhting but just revealing what is happening at the moment (as you didn't notice yourself until I came into your hostile discord) and it's not a bad thing to post that publicly. You know see me as your enemy or whatever - I don't care, if you want to continue with your coin, go ahead, surely without me, but this should be your utmost last warning - think
[16:26:22]  <ocminer>    about yourself, think about how you make decisions and maybe come down a bit from your emperor throne and get help from professionals if you can't handle it alone... You'll see what happens after your HF - nothing, guaranteed, because you don't fix the root cause of this.
[16:26:27]    vergeDEV (~sunerok@unaffiliated/sunerok) left IRC (Ping timeout: 240 seconds)
[16:26:50]  <ocminer>   And Epsylon3 ... you
[16:27:04]  <@Epsylon3>   i slept
[16:27:09]  <@Epsylon3>   :p
[16:27:22]  <phm87>   Hi, sorry I come back late
[16:27:23]  <ocminer>   're not much better than him.. only looking for the profits here.. .your miners also lost a lof of coins during the network was stalled and the 15k blocks mined...
[16:27:34]  <phm87>   I am running unimining where there is XVG
[16:27:36]  <@Epsylon3>   you are wrong
[16:27:38]  <phm87>   (on blake2s)
[16:27:39]  <ocminer>   if you'd be honest, you'd shutdown the pool and let him fix his shit up
[16:27:41]  <@Epsylon3>   i stopped the pool the whole day
[16:28:02]  <@Epsylon3>   and answered everyone why
[16:28:08]  <ocminer>   it's up and running already, without any fix for the malicious coins
[16:28:10]  <@Epsylon3>   lot of spam
[16:28:16]  <@Epsylon3>   took the whole day
[16:28:37]  <@Epsylon3>   i pasted the fix i made this morning
[16:28:38]  <phm87>   sorry I will read what you said few minutes ago, I am late but I'll shut the pool if coin dev say so then I can explain to my miners that I follow coin dev orders
[16:28:52]  <phm87>   when a coin explodes randomly and coin dev don't care then I delist it
[16:28:58]  <@Epsylon3>   which is the commit, with proper knowledge and amount of seconds
[16:29:04]  <phm87>   but XVG risk is high for Uni so I may delist it
[16:29:07]  <ocminer>   that fix from him is just bullshit, it changes nothing, just the timespan of which they do the attacks.. .they will be slowed down a bit, but that's all

....



This will be my last dealing with XVG. I don't like to get cheated and blamed. As a miner myself I care for what I mine and I care for others as well - you can take it or leave it.

Rest assured there will be lots of pools you can still mine on, no problem at all will occur.


Also Congratulations to the Hacker - you've chosen the right coin for your hack (which was invented in 2014 btw:)) - don't buy too many Lambos with your > 20M Verge... so what.. About 1 Million $ now ?



236  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Announcements (Altcoins) / Re: Network Attack on XVG / VERGE on: April 05, 2018, 12:32:28 PM
Well. Will these actions help to solve the problem so that it does not arise in the future. To break the chain it became impossible and the blocks met the conditions.

Highly unlikely ...

Anyone that has enough hashpower and the knowledge to manipulate the blockchain in this way, CAN do this to almost any coin. Though I still believe that it could be miners that unwittingly set their farms to auto destruction mode and let loose.

No one can blame the devs AND expect them to be responsible for it when the hashpower is completely out of their hands. The devs only method of defense is to write code that will 'try' and combat this issue.

#crysx


This is totally wrong. This exploit has been used with myriad and digibyte already and can be patched successfully
237  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Announcements (Altcoins) / Re: Network Attack on XVG / VERGE on: April 05, 2018, 07:28:37 AM
So did I get it right: The devs just need to fix this timestamp bug and reset to the last legit block? The hacker(s) even cannot move their illegit coins? (btw: binance has blocked transfers to it, anyways)

It's actually not so hard to get it fixed and even the hackers coins removed:

Simply exclude all blocks from the blockchain mined with a "bad timestamp" e.g. don't accept blocks where the next block is more than an hour ahead of the previous one.

By doing it this way, you'd already see from the beginning which blocks "belong" to the attacker and which blocks are legit. Then you would simply set checkpoints to exclude the malicious chain and only include legit blocks again.

It's definitely possible.. it requires some work but it's possible.. Definitely better than letting one person get away with > 20 Million XVG ...
238  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Announcements (Altcoins) / Re: Network Attack on XVG / VERGE on: April 05, 2018, 07:25:39 AM
Could've just turn off scrypt algo support for now, until its all got fixed.

You can do that with every algo ... scrypt is just easy to rent at nicehash and that's probably why the attacker used it
239  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Announcements (Altcoins) / Re: Network Attack on XVG / VERGE on: April 05, 2018, 07:01:28 AM
I skimmed the logs and saw the attacker started the new attack at around block 2014060 and stopped just now at block 2026196

..

12k blocks this time Lets say 10k... so additional 10.000 + 1560 = 15.600.000  XVG
240  Alternate cryptocurrencies / Announcements (Altcoins) / Re: Network Attack on XVG / VERGE on: April 05, 2018, 06:56:31 AM
Yes but not sure how this attack works because it showed I was still earning. Just no payment happening.

The attack works like this:

The attacker replaces the legit blockchain, with legit high difficulty blocks, with his low diff blocks, invalidating all legit blocks (orphans).

That means no coins can be moved but his... He's not accepting any other transactions...

He'd need to stop in order to get the coins moved again.

The rest of the details is in post 1
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