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[BTCGalaxyA12]

Maybe I should offer this to you for further discussion regarding the information that Trezor is bringing coinjoin because of the new partnership with wasabi.
From the discussion regarding this matter, we were able to gain new knowledge from the masters who are very good at understanding hardware wallets.

https://twitter.com/BitcoinNewsCom/status/1646886894230290439

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[o_e_l_e_o]

Yeah, it's a real shame that Trezor have decided to support mass surveillance by partnering with a company which directly funds blockchain analysis, but Trezor have repeatedly shown they don't really have any respect for their users' privacy. Take, for example, them implementing KYC exchanges in to their software, or their support of AOPP last year.

Still, there are other hardware wallet manufacturers out there which are not pro-surveillance, so just buy from one of them instead.

[Kruw]

Yeah, it's a real shame that Trezor have decided to support mass surveillance by partnering with a company which directly funds blockchain analysis, but Trezor have repeatedly shown they don't really have any respect for their users' privacy. Take, for example, them implementing KYC exchanges in to their software, or their support of AOPP last year.

Still, there are other hardware wallet manufacturers out there which are not pro-surveillance, so just buy from one of them instead.

I see you were not able to find any flaws in WabiSabi coinjoins and have given up:

The transactions you claimed as evidence were proved not to show any flaws in the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol.  Your examples contained:

-Not a WabiSabi coinjoin
-Address reuse
-Address reuse

I already proved you were lying about being able identify the outputs of a WabiSabi coinjoin, remember?

I have already shown you blockchain evidence of the following:

Wasabi coinjoins creating outputs which can be 100% linked to a specific input: https://mempool.space/tx/dae13b2d015587a3033d7ab7949a7efa6d6ed7aa782168b0651ab37a2d8390f8
Wasabi coinjoins reusing addresses, leading to users being doxxed: https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872
Wasabi coinjoins using the same address on both sides of a transaction: https://mempool.space/tx/af50a27691c0f0b7b626cddb74445a0e26bb6ed7b045861067326ea173bc17d0 (address bc1qft2uze947wtdvvhdqtx00c8el954y6ekxjk73h)

At no point have you exploited "critical flaws" to show how a user receives "absolutely zero privacy" from a coinjoin if you are not the whale, because the "critical flaws" you claim exist do not exist:

You don't need to be a "whale" at all in order to receive absolutely zero privacy from a Wasabi coinjoin.

[bct_ail]

- Have you ever considered the scenario where chain analysis deliberately lies about coins being involved into illegal activity, or simply denies to give excuse about certain coins for being "tainted" according to their standards?

How can I check in advance when a coin is assessed as tainted according to their standards?

On what legal basis does chainalysis and/or wasabi define a coin as tainted?

(My question is not directly to yo but it arose because of yours.)

[o_e_l_e_o]

How can I check in advance when a coin is assessed as tainted according to their standards?

You can't.

On what legal basis does chainalysis and/or wasabi define a coin as tainted?

Their definition of taint includes anything they want, and they won't tell you why:

zkSNACKs Ltd. may suspend your UTXOs’ access to the CoinJoin services, with immediate effect for any reason - including but not limited to illicit or prohibited activities, applicable sanctions programs, or any crime or money-laundering activity - at its sole discretion and is under no obligation to disclose the details of its decision to take such action with you.

[Pmalek]

<Snip>

Just to add to what o_e_l_e_o said. Even if you "pass" all their imaginary taint security checks, there is no guarantee that other services and exchanges will consider your bitcoin "equally clean" according to whatever imaginary standards they have.

The following two scenarios can still happen.

A) You want to participate in a Wasabi coinjoin. Chainanalysis gives the green light and considers your coins as clean. You finish the process. After some time you move those coins to a CEX to exchange them for an altcoin or fiat, and there are no problems.

B) You want to participate in a Wasabi coinjoin. Chainanalysis gives the green light and considers your coins as clean. You finish the process. You deposit your "clean" BTC into a CEX, and the exchange freezes your account because you participated in a coinjoin with the Wasabi wallet. Yow now have to explain to them why you did that, the source of your funds, and whatever else they need.

It's a flawed concept where each party has its own standards and definitions of what is allowed and what isn't.   

[Kruw]

Just to add to what o_e_l_e_o said. Even if you "pass" all their imaginary taint security checks, there is no guarantee that other services and exchanges will consider your bitcoin "equally clean" according to whatever imaginary standards they have.

The following two scenarios can still happen.

A) You want to participate in a Wasabi coinjoin. Chainanalysis gives the green light and considers your coins as clean. You finish the process. After some time you move those coins to a CEX to exchange them for an altcoin or fiat, and there are no problems.

B) You want to participate in a Wasabi coinjoin. Chainanalysis gives the green light and considers your coins as clean. You finish the process. You deposit your "clean" BTC into a CEX, and the exchange freezes your account because you participated in a coinjoin with the Wasabi wallet. Yow now have to explain to them why you did that, the source of your funds, and whatever else they need.

It's a flawed concept where each party has its own standards and definitions of what is allowed and what isn't.  

This is why Wasabi also offers Payjoin transactions which cannot be identified as a coinjoin (and also do not rely on a central coordinator).  They just look like a regular 2 input 2 output transaction to chain analysis groups, but also break the common input ownership heuristic.

[BlackHatCoiner]

-Yes, have you considered the counter scenario where there are multiple chain analysis companies in a free market with different reputations for accuracy and honesty?

Yes. Do you pay multiple or one such company?

-Yes, I accept this as a drawback. If a coordinator's data provider produces false positives, the coordinator will likely stop using that data provider.

For the coordinator to verify false positives, it means the chain analysis company must share their techniques and conclusions in transparency. Do you get such information from the paid company?

If they are merely reading their own copy of the blockchain, just like any other Bitcoiner is able to do, then they are just a data analytics company.

That's the definition of surveillance: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/surveillance. The fact that the ledger is public is irrelevant. I don't expect from regular Bitcoin users to analyze my data. However, I do expect myself to be surveilled from said companies.

-Yes, but I think it's easy to realize that this is outweighed by the surveillance that is made impossible as a result of the coinjoin.

If the chain analysis company has blacklisted certain inputs, doesn't this prevent not-yet-surveilled users from having their privacy preserved?

[Kruw]

-Yes, have you considered the counter scenario where there are multiple chain analysis companies in a free market with different reputations for accuracy and honesty?

Yes. Do you pay multiple or one such company?

I don't run a coordinator.

-Yes, I accept this as a drawback. If a coordinator's data provider produces false positives, the coordinator will likely stop using that data provider.

For the coordinator to verify false positives, it means the chain analysis company must share their techniques and conclusions in transparency. Do you get such information from the paid company?

If the coordinator has verified false positives, it really doesn't matter what the chain analysis company's techniques are because they didn't work.

If they are merely reading their own copy of the blockchain, just like any other Bitcoiner is able to do, then they are just a data analytics company.

That's the definition of surveillance: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/surveillance. The fact that the ledger is public is irrelevant. I don't expect from regular Bitcoin users to analyze my data. However, I do expect myself to be surveilled from said companies.

If you don't expect your transaction data that you broadcast to everyone else's computer for permanent storage to be analyzed by anyone, you're just naive.  The solution to your problem of public transaction data exists already: WabiSabi coinjoins are purposely designed to make the data you broadcast useless to any analyzers.  

-Yes, but I think it's easy to realize that this is outweighed by the surveillance that is made impossible as a result of the coinjoin.

If the chain analysis company has blacklisted certain inputs, doesn't this prevent not-yet-surveilled users from having their privacy preserved?

Did you mean "doesn't this prevent already surveilled users from having their privacy established?"

[BlackHatCoiner]

I don't run a coordinator.

Plural you. You're a contributor, right? I presume you do have information about zkSNACKs. If you don't know, you can tell me.

If the coordinator has verified false positives, it really doesn't matter what the chain analysis company's techniques are because they didn't work.

But a coordinator is not a data analysis company. For zkSNACKs to verify that chain analysis gives false positives it has to either analyze the chain itself or pay another company to verify the chain analysis' positives. Since the former makes no sense, and the coordinator pays no other companies, I assume it simply accepts the paid company's claims without questioning anything. Is that correct?

If you don't expect your transaction data that you broadcast to everyone else's computer for permanent storage to be analyzed by anyone, you're just naive.

This is not what I said. I only said that I don't expect regular Bitcoin users to switch to full scrutiny entities. I only expect surveillance companies to do that, e.g. chain analysis companies.

The solution to your problem of public transaction data exists already: WabiSabi coinjoins are purposely designed to make the data you broadcast useless to any analyzers.

Making transaction data useless to data analyzers after they have approved they don't mind, ergo that data is useless to them beforehand, doesn't seem like the solution to my problem.

Did you mean "doesn't this prevent already surveilled users from having their privacy established?"

Could be, but not necessarily. We frequently notice centralized exchanges (which have partnerships with chain analysis companies) to simply deny coins coming from mixers*. There is no excuse, there are just users who have had their privacy protected, ergo have not been surveilled, but were included in blacklists, simply because of the way tainting works; you either blacklist the entire set of unspent outputs coming from a mixer, because you can't figure out where's the "unethical money" so it's unethical to leave them unpunished, or you don't because you can't figure out where's the "ethical money" so it's unethical to punish innocents.

* to clarify, mixers that don't cooperate with chain analysis companies. I'd never expect to write this phrase as it's taken for granted, but here we are.

[Kruw]

Plural you. You're a contributor, right? I presume you do have information about zkSNACKs. If you don't know, you can tell me.

I don't know what company(s) zkSNACKs uses.

But a coordinator is not a data analysis company. For zkSNACKs to verify that chain analysis gives false positives it has to either analyze the chain itself or pay another company to verify the chain analysis' positives.

A coordinator can still detect false positives in certain cases such as a previous coinjoin or Lightning channel output being flagged.  In this event, the coordinator should prompt the chain analysis company for proof as to how they are certain these funds are owned by the accused (such as if the coinjoiner leaked their xpub address or IP address by using Samourai wallet or Sparrow wallet).

Since the former makes no sense, and (if) the coordinator pays no other companies, I assume it simply accepts the paid company's claims without questioning anything. Is that correct?

I would imagine if the paid company is going to accept liability, then I assume that would prevent the coordinator from circumventing their decisions.

If you don't expect your transaction data that you broadcast to everyone else's computer for permanent storage to be analyzed by anyone, you're just naive.

This is not what I said. I only said that I don't expect regular Bitcoin users to switch to full scrutiny entities. I only expect surveillance companies to do that, e.g. chain analysis companies.

Okay.

The solution to your problem of public transaction data exists already: WabiSabi coinjoins are purposely designed to make the data you broadcast useless to any analyzers.

Making transaction data useless to data analyzers after they have approved they don't mind, ergo that data is useless to them beforehand, doesn't seem like the solution to my problem.

No, it's not a solution to your specific problem, the solution to your specific problem is to simply use a different WabiSabi coordinator:

I've read most of the posts/replies towards Kruw, and I think that everyone is making too much commotion over nothing but a trade-off taken by a group of developers, who, believes that the best path forward for Wasabi Wallet is to make the centralized coordinator block outputs from nefarious sources. The solution, in my personal opinion is, fork the coordinator and have it accept all outputs from all sources.

Yep.  Anyone who feels brave enough to copy and paste the coordinator code can do so.  Others have already because they actually care about what they are saying: https://t.me/WasabiWallet/70611

Did you mean "doesn't this prevent already surveilled users from having their privacy established?"

Could be, but not necessarily. We frequently notice centralized exchanges (which have partnerships with chain analysis companies) to simply deny coins coming from mixers*. There is no excuse, there are just users who have had their privacy protected, ergo have not been surveilled, but were included in blacklists, simply because of the way tainting works; you either blacklist the entire set of unspent outputs coming from a mixer, because you can't figure out where's the "unethical money" so it's unethical to leave them unpunished, or you don't because you can't figure out where's the "ethical money" so it's unethical to punish innocents.

* to clarify, mixers that don't cooperate with chain analysis companies. I'd never expect to write this phrase as it's taken for granted, but here we are.

I think that's why Lightning is so important:  Exchanges will be forced to adopt privacy friendly deposits and withdrawals because they can't afford to transact on the nonprivate base layer forever.

[BlackHatCoiner]

In this event, the coordinator should prompt the chain analysis company for proof as to how they are certain these funds are owned by the accused

Still, central point of failure.

I would imagine if the paid company is going to accept liability, then I assume that would prevent the coordinator from circumventing their decisions.

Even if they are held accountable, it's still a central point of failure, which can make wrong assumptions, assertions, decisions. Treating each coin equally eliminates this drawback.

No, it's not a solution to your specific problem, the solution to your specific problem is to simply use a different WabiSabi coordinator

Here comes the question: why would I use software whose developers completely go oppositely to my Bitcoin ideals, with much worse feature (minimum liquidity), at the very moment where developers with better intentions to my ideals work on building Bitcoin mixing without arbitrary ethic borders, in a decentralized fashion? (e.g., JoinMarket)

I think that's why Lightning is so important

I think that's why decentralized exchanges are important, not lightning per se.

[Kruw]

In this event, the coordinator should prompt the chain analysis company for proof as to how they are certain these funds are owned by the accused

Still, central point of failure. Even if they are held accountable, it's still a central point of failure, which can make wrong assumptions, assertions, decisions. Treating each coin equally eliminates this drawback.

Central how?  We already established that a coordinator can compare the data of multiple competing chain analysis companies?..

No, it's not a solution to your specific problem, the solution to your specific problem is to simply use a different WabiSabi coordinator

Here comes the question: why would I use software whose developers completely go oppositely to my Bitcoin ideals, with much worse feature (minimum liquidity), at the very moment where developers with better intentions to my ideals work on building Bitcoin mixing without arbitrary ethic borders, in a decentralized fashion? (e.g., JoinMarket)

I'd be impressed if you coordinated a JoinMarket coinjoin that was as private as a WabiSabi coinjoin.  Can you give me an example of one?

[BlackHatCoiner]

Central how?  We already established that a coordinator can compare the data of multiple competing chain analysis companies?..

Which can all be wrong, whereas if the coordinator skips this path, and doesn't enforce their moral standards, there will be no odds of such failure, because there will be no such problem acknowledged in the first place.

I'd be impressed if you coordinated a JoinMarket coinjoin that was as private as a WabiSabi coinjoin.  Can you give me an example of one?

Is this thread about WabiSabi coinjoin, yes or no? https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872

[Kruw]

Central how?  We already established that a coordinator can compare the data of multiple competing chain analysis companies?..

Which can all be wrong, whereas if the coordinator skips this path, and doesn't enforce their moral standards, there will be no odds of such failure, because there will be no such problem acknowledged in the first place.

Even if they were all right, the solution for the blacklisted user remains the same:  Switch to a different coordinator.

This same solution applies to Lightning as well- If you can't route through a channel, use a different one.

I'd be impressed if you coordinated a JoinMarket coinjoin that was as private as a WabiSabi coinjoin.  Can you give me an example of one?

Is this thread about WabiSabi coinjoin, yes or no? https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872

No.

Now can you answer my question?

I'd be impressed if you coordinated a JoinMarket coinjoin that was as private as a WabiSabi coinjoin.  Can you give me an example of one?

WabiSabi coinjoins eliminate the common input ownership heuristic and toxic change (for non whales), I'm wondering how you do this in JoinMarket.

[BlackHatCoiner]

Even if they were all right, the solution for the blacklisted user remains the same:  Switch to a different coordinator.

Would you use a privacy-preserving software whose developers don't respect your right to privacy? Not only I would not, but I would even feel offended, and would recommend to avoid. Especially at the very moment when there are software developed with better intentions.

Oh, by the way, I don't trust people who outright lie in their main page but that may just be me.

This same solution applies to Lightning as well- If you can't route through a channel, use a different one.

With the exceptions of course that lightning software developers:

- are not in favor of enforcing personal ethics when routing a transaction.
- don't hold the overwhelming liquidity on the network
- don't cooperate with chain analysis companies and fund them using users' fees.
- don't outright lie in their main page

Now can you answer my question?

I cannot answer to your question until I firstly verify claims such as this one on Twitter. Why isn't it a WabiSabi coinjoin? Is the user crazy, or is it just an old coinjoin model from Wasabi?

[Kruw]

Even if they were all right, the solution for the blacklisted user remains the same:  Switch to a different coordinator.

Would you use a privacy-preserving software whose developers don't respect your right to privacy? Not only I would not, but I would even feel offended, and would recommend to avoid. Especially at the very moment when there are software developed with better intentions.

Software doesn't run on intentions, it runs on code, and it's all open source, and you can use it with any coordinator, including your own.

Now can you answer my question?

I cannot answer to your question until I firstly verify claims such as this one on Twitter. Why isn't it a WabiSabi coinjoin? Is the user crazy, or is it just an old coinjoin model from Wasabi?

That coinjoin is the old zerolink coinjoin model.  And this case wouldn't matter even if it was a WabiSabi coinjoin because the address is being reused: Since Wasabi is a non custodial wallet, there is no way to prevent users from sending to an address twice.

Now that you have confirmed the answer to your question was "No", answer my original question:

I'd be impressed if you coordinated a JoinMarket coinjoin that was as private as a WabiSabi coinjoin.  Can you give me an example of one?

[Wind_FURY]

<Snip>

Just to add to what o_e_l_e_o said. Even if you "pass" all their imaginary taint security checks, there is no guarantee that other services and exchanges will consider your bitcoin "equally clean" according to whatever imaginary standards they have.

The following two scenarios can still happen.

A) You want to participate in a Wasabi coinjoin. Chainanalysis gives the green light and considers your coins as clean. You finish the process. After some time you move those coins to a CEX to exchange them for an altcoin or fiat, and there are no problems.

B) You want to participate in a Wasabi coinjoin. Chainanalysis gives the green light and considers your coins as clean. You finish the process. You deposit your "clean" BTC into a CEX, and the exchange freezes your account because you participated in a coinjoin with the Wasabi wallet. Yow now have to explain to them why you did that, the source of your funds, and whatever else they need.

It's a flawed concept where each party has its own standards and definitions of what is allowed and what isn't.   

The solution if you're always transacting with a centralized exchange, just don't mix/tumble your UTXOs. "Taint" doesn't exist in the blockchain. Plus from everyone's personal experience, when have users truly had a problem with "taint" regularly? The forum should be full of threads complaining about it by now.

[BlackHatCoiner]

Software doesn't run on intentions

Coordinators apparently do. I don't question Wasabi wallet for being bad software per se (although I do have concerns as mentioned repeatedly about address reuse etc.), I question the intentions of the developers who run the coordinator, which I must comply with if I need to use it. You make it sound as everything is transparent, while that's false. I have absolutely no manner to verify which outputs you consider inappropriate, and according to which standard.

Since Wasabi is a non custodial wallet, there is no way to prevent users from sending to an address twice.

But Wasabi picks addresses automatically. Is this correct?

Now that you have confirmed the answer to your question was "No", answer my original question:

Not yet. I haven't done my analysis to this. I generally don't spend hours on verifying every privacy-preserving software. I just stick with tested, peer-reviewed software, running in a decentralized fashion, and avoid pro-censorship and anti-fungibility software which is subjected to arbitrary ethic rules, and whose developers outright lie in front of me. It's a good life choice, and it has worked so far without issues.

[NotATether]

You calling Wasabi "mass surveillance software" is a malicious lie and everyone can verify that you are lying themselves since all of the code is open source

Of course it's not a mass surveillance software. It's just a "privacy" service that has willingly partnered with an unnamed mass surveillance blockchain analysis company to determine who deserves privacy and who doesn't. What more could you wish for than that? I think you should ask your buddies to consider any coins of o_e_l_e_o as unfitting. You do know he is a public supporter of Stalin, right? His Bitcoin reeks of Stalin propaganda and must be censored. For the greater good, obviously. After all, you are all about fungibility and censorship resistance.

If you don't like what the zkSNACKs coordinator's customer policy is, then why aren't you running your own WabiSabi coordinator to outcompete them by offering "censorship resistant coinjoins"?  All of the code is open source for you to copy and paste, so you just must not be brave enough I guess

You should know what when most people say "Wasabi is not privacy-friendly", they are actually referring to its coordinator zksnacks. The wallet itself does not perform the coinjoins.

The reason why more coordinators are not popping up, I have already asked that question here (somewhere). Apparently, you need so much initial capital to start with - for example, the ~6000 seized Chipmixer bitcoins would be enough - and most people who want to run a coordinator just don't have that kind of money.