ㅤ

[BlackHatCoiner]

What identifiable outputs?

The ones that have been mentioned tediously many times.

If you say "Pay me 1 BTC" and I send you 100,000 UTXOs for 0.00001000 BTC each, would you consider those UTXOs I sent equal to a single 1 BTC UTXO payment?

Yes. If I ask you to send me 1 BTC, and you send me 1 BTC, then I'm fine whether you remove 1, or a thousand outputs from the UTXO set. I don't care if you killed someone before, or sold cocaine, or mixed them. I only want the bitcoin.

If you mean to send me 1,000 satoshis a hundred thousand times, creating 100,000 outputs, then no. I'll ask you to consolidate them into one ideally, because I'll have to pay lots in fees. I don't see how is that relevant; I still don't care about the origins of the coins.

Like I said, the claim that coinjoin participants don't know each other is false.

No, it's true. Coinjoin participants should not know each other, because only a fool uses a privacy-enhancing tool with the precondition that they will have to expose who they are with the rest. What you seem to argue is that coinjoin participants don't necessarily feel confident not knowing who the rest are.

Where did I claim fungibility is my goal?

Your goal is irrelevant. You mean zkSNACKs who run the project? Here, here, and here.

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[Kruw]

I ALREADY PROVED YOUR CLAIM THAT THIS SORT OF LINKING IS POSSIBLE TO BE A LIE:

So you are just going to stick to the "Here is one good example, please don't look at the blockchain evidence of all the flawed ones" approach? All caps doesn't make it any less of a stupid argument, you know.

I already proved you are lying when you said WabiSabi coinjoins were critically flawed, remember? You never provided any examples of any flaws whatsoever in the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol:

For you then to provide a single example which works well does absolutely nothing to address the fact in many cases Wasabi coinjoins are critically flawed. As per my previous analogy, a car manufacturer showing a new model which works well does not excuse previous models which have randomly burst in to flames. This is an incredibly simple concept, so I can only assume you are trolling by continuing to deliberately misunderstand it.

Go on, tell me how Wasabi coinjoins are "critically flawed".  Don't hold back, I want to know what's wrong with them.

Again, I'm going to remind everyone that this is a malicious lie: You cannot surveil Wasabi Wallet users, they are made completely private due to Tor and client side block filters.

Again, I'm going to remind everyone that if you use Wasabi, you are literally paying for the privilege of having a blockchain analysis company stick their noses in to your UTXOs.

UTXOs created by ANY wallet are publicly visible to anyone with a copy of the blockchain, any blockchain analysis company can see a UTXO exists and view its history no matter what wallet you use.

What identifiable outputs?

The ones that have been mentioned tediously many times.

What do you mean "the ones that have been mentioned tediously many times"? There's no way to identify a WabiSabi output unless they are the whale.

You must be confused since the coinjoin tediously mentioned many times in this thread that has identifiable outputs is called a WHIRLPOOL coinjoin which is used by Samourai Wallet and Sparrow Wallet:

Post the tx ID of any Whirlpool transaction and I will show you the tx0 transaction that was created by each of the new entrants.

Ok, here's one: https://mempool.space/tx/ed3131b544fbf00a71709942e483b55e629312ecb181e6e819409f419ee0d226

Where exactly is the privacy loss for new entrants, splitting a single UTXO in to multiple UTXOs to join the pool?

Okay, here's all the payments that can be tracked from the two new participants of the Whirlpool coinjoin transaction:

Entrant 1: bc1q03c0443ausjjdxl2h6ud5m8c0dux0zyg3dqdj7 created 0.00170417 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1q3fduld0l3r8nclyt5p3r7ak675tekurstn55tl.  Since this UTXO is not private, the sats were marked as unspendable and have not been recovered by the wallet owner  

Entrant 2: bc1qzc8zku26ej337huw5dlt390cy2r9kgnq7dhtys created 0.00191247 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1qjlltxr443uy236wl4xhpxlr6dgsu0zltlv3m44. This UTXO was used in a second tx0 transaction, creating a huge trail of transactions that could be traced to each other  

The 2nd tx0 transaction created 0.00076348 BTC unmixed change which was sent to bc1qehd7gy8rza9mnzm9wnfjhgw82rp47wmqt7vpgy

Since this unmixed change is below the .001 pool minimum, it was consolidated in a 3rd tx0 with 3 other addresses owned by the same wallet:
31x8GPqrhzdaxiBJa9N5UisuoxbX1rAnHa
16Gw5WKjbxZmg1zhZQs19Sf61fbV2xGujx
3LZtsJfUjiV5EZkkG1fwGEpTe2QEa7CNeY

The 3rd tx0 transaction created .00200317 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1q2p7gdtyahct8rdjs2khwf0sffl64qe896ya2y5
This was spent in a 0.00190000 payment to 3B8cRYc3W5jHeS3pkepwDePUmePBoEwyp1 (a reused address)

That payment left .00008553 in change that was tracked to 3Dh7R7xoKMVfLCcAtVDyhJ66se82twyZSn and consolidated with two other inputs in a 4th tx0 transaction:
bc1qeuh6sds8exm54yscrupdk03jxphw8qwzdtxgde
3ByChGBFshzGUE5oip8YYVEZDaCP2bcBmZ

This 4th tx0 created .00533406 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1qzh699s75smwukg9jcanwnlkmkn38r79ataagd9 which was consolidated with 3 more addresses into a 5th tx0:
3F2qiWQJKQjF7XFjEo8FUYP3AU5AC6RqX8
3HAYYVKUpYbr2ARMdZJr9yVu8xi8UcxtPz
3GQtwwRK31wwCc22q6WS5sCgixUHsG5KaT

The 5th tx0 created 0.00058494 BTC in unmixed change that was sent to bc1qvh2zjcwwkj9y70xulla2semvlav3lty0p3l3w3
This was spent in a .00047290 payment to bc1qvzg8jq6wqtr5navn4e3ps4qrkk9r6n4h98gjck

That payment left .00008411 in change that was tracked to bc1qg6j0f0wfhpktt2l8uzdn48ct3um2xyur40eyzd and consolidated with another input into a 6th tx0 transaction:
31iZLXWfoywhuMZTPGxTkpzphzh2NXshpP

The 6th tx0 created .00753775 in unmixed change that was tracked to bc1qgfll2apc27yct6h2c8r8wq4kqhxjsfrudhhn5q
This was spent in a .00737000 payment to bc1q5emzer2t0sq5dez0zsrqgh6scvwn0n24xsladp (a reused address)

This payment left 0.00010896 BTC in change which has not been spent yet, but the payment only took place 11 days ago, so I assume it will eventually be spent, allowing the Whirlpool user to be tracked even further.

If you say "Pay me 1 BTC" and I send you 100,000 UTXOs for 0.00001000 BTC each, would you consider those UTXOs I sent equal to a single 1 BTC UTXO payment?

Yes. If I ask you to send me 1 BTC, and you send me 1 BTC, then I'm fine whether you remove 1, or a thousand outputs from the UTXO set. I don't care if you killed someone before, or sold cocaine, or mixed them. I only want the bitcoin.

If you mean to send me 1,000 satoshis a hundred thousand times, creating 100,000 outputs, then no. I'll ask you to consolidate them into one ideally, because I'll have to pay lots in fees. I don't see how is that relevant; I still don't care about the origins of the coins.

It's relevant because you said the coins contained in the UTXOs is the only thing that matters about them.  I'm proving to you that there are other properties of UTXOs that affect their value.

Like I said, the claim that coinjoin participants don't know each other is false.

No, it's true. Coinjoin participants should not know each other, because only a fool uses a privacy-enhancing tool with the precondition that they will have to expose who they are with the rest. What you seem to argue is that coinjoin participants don't necessarily feel confident not knowing who the rest are.

Have fun using Monero then since all coinjoin transactions on Bitcoin require a signature from all participants.  Thanks for the discussion.

Where did I claim fungibility is my goal?

Your goal is irrelevant. You mean zkSNACKs who run the project? Here, here, and here.

Oh, so then I didn't actually make a false claim like you said I did then.  Thanks for clearing that up.

[BlackHatCoiner]

Lol, stay on semantics. Anyone with minimum intelligence and consciousness can acknowledge you're blatantly repeating the same bullshit to avoid the point.

Congrats. You have successfully reinvented mixing. An inferior, questionably privacy-preserving and anti-fungibility version, but still.

[o_e_l_e_o]

I already proved you are lying when you said WabiSabi coinjoins were critically flawed, remember? You never provided any examples of any flaws whatsoever in the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol:

Now I'm certain you are trolling. But for the avoidance of doubt:

Wasabi coinjoins creating outputs which can be 100% linked to a specific input: https://mempool.space/tx/dae13b2d015587a3033d7ab7949a7efa6d6ed7aa782168b0651ab37a2d8390f8
Wasabi coinjoins reusing addresses, leading to users being doxxed: https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872
Wasabi coinjoins using the same address on both sides of a transaction: https://mempool.space/tx/af50a27691c0f0b7b626cddb74445a0e26bb6ed7b045861067326ea173bc17d0 (address bc1qft2uze947wtdvvhdqtx00c8el954y6ekxjk73h)

There are plenty more examples of the same issues.

UTXOs created by ANY wallet are publicly visible to anyone with a copy of the blockchain, any blockchain analysis company can see a UTXO exists and view its history no matter what wallet you use.

The difference here is my wallets aren't charging me a fee which they are using to directly fund blockchain analysis companies to look as closely as possible at my UTXOs.

[Kruw]

Lol, stay on semantics. Anyone with minimum intelligence and consciousness can acknowledge you're blatantly repeating the same bullshit to avoid the point.

Congrats. You have successfully reinvented mixing. An inferior, questionably privacy-preserving and anti-fungibility version, but still.

So, for the record, you were not able to produce any evidence of a single a flaw in the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol:

What identifiable outputs?

The ones that have been mentioned tediously many times.

What do you mean "the ones that have been mentioned tediously many times"? There's no way to identify a WabiSabi output unless they are the whale.

I already proved you are lying when you said WabiSabi coinjoins were critically flawed, remember? You never provided any examples of any flaws whatsoever in the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol:

Now I'm certain you are trolling. But for the avoidance of doubt:

Wasabi coinjoins creating outputs which can be 100% linked to a specific input: https://mempool.space/tx/dae13b2d015587a3033d7ab7949a7efa6d6ed7aa782168b0651ab37a2d8390f8

That's not a WabiSabi coinjoin  

Wasabi coinjoins reusing addresses, leading to users being doxxed: https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872
Wasabi coinjoins using the same address on both sides of a transaction: https://mempool.space/tx/af50a27691c0f0b7b626cddb74445a0e26bb6ed7b045861067326ea173bc17d0 (address bc1qft2uze947wtdvvhdqtx00c8el954y6ekxjk73h)

There are plenty more examples of the same issues.

Since Wasabi Wallet is non custodial, if a user chooses to pay an address that has already been used, there's nothing Wasabi can do to stop them.  If I use Joinmarket and coinjoin to pay an address that has already been used, is that also a "critical flaw" in Joinmarket?  I already showed you address reuse in Samourai wallet, so are Whirlpool coinjoins "critically flawed" too?  

UTXOs created by ANY wallet are publicly visible to anyone with a copy of the blockchain, any blockchain analysis company can see a UTXO exists and view its history no matter what wallet you use.

The difference here is my wallets aren't charging me a fee which they are using to directly fund blockchain analysis companies to look as closely as possible at my UTXOs.

Your wallet doesn't charge you a fee, a coordinator charges a fee.  You can choose any coordinator you want in order to make sure you pay the most competitive price on the market.

[o_e_l_e_o]

That's not a WabiSabi coinjoin  

Three pages ago your excuse was that output was the whale, so it's apparently fine that user gets zero privacy. Now your excuse is it's not a coinjoin at all? Might want to decide which bullshit you are going to stick with.

Your wallet doesn't charge you a fee, a coordinator charges a fee.  You can choose any coordinator you want in order to make sure you pay the most competitive price on the market.

I do. I choose JoinMarket or Whirlpool, so my fee isn't directly funding mass surveillance of the blockchain.

[Kruw]

That's not a WabiSabi coinjoin  

Three pages ago your excuse was that output was the whale, so it's apparently fine that user gets zero privacy. Now your excuse is it's not a coinjoin at all? Might want to decide which bullshit you are going to stick with.

Your wallet doesn't charge you a fee, a coordinator charges a fee.  You can choose any coordinator you want in order to make sure you pay the most competitive price on the market.

I do. I choose JoinMarket or Whirlpool, so my fee isn't directly funding mass surveillance of the blockchain.

Wait, why didn't you tell me whether or not it's a "critical flaw" when Joinmarket coinjoins and Samourai coinjoins pay to reused addresses?...  My question wasn't rhetorical:

Wasabi coinjoins reusing addresses, leading to users being doxxed: https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872
Wasabi coinjoins using the same address on both sides of a transaction: https://mempool.space/tx/af50a27691c0f0b7b626cddb74445a0e26bb6ed7b045861067326ea173bc17d0 (address bc1qft2uze947wtdvvhdqtx00c8el954y6ekxjk73h)

There are plenty more examples of the same issues.

Since Wasabi Wallet is non custodial, if a user chooses to pay an address that has already been used, there's nothing Wasabi can do to stop them.  If I use Joinmarket and coinjoin to pay an address that has already been used, is that also a "critical flaw" in Joinmarket?  I already showed you address reuse in Samourai wallet, so are Whirlpool coinjoins "critically flawed" too?  

[o_e_l_e_o]

Because Wasabi wallet automatically picks addresses?

If a JoinMarket user picks a reused address to send a coinjoin output to, that's their fault.
If a Wasabi client automatically picks a reused address to send a coinjoin output to with zero input or even awareness from the user, that's Wasabi's fault.

[Kruw]

Because Wasabi wallet automatically picks addresses?

If a JoinMarket user picks a reused address to send a coinjoin output to, that's their fault.
If a Wasabi client automatically picks a reused address to send a coinjoin output to with zero input or even awareness from the user, that's Wasabi's fault.

And what exactly do you think happens when you use the same seed on multiple clients?  Here's your answer:

https://medium.com/@thepiratewhocantbenamed/samourai-wallet-address-reuse-bug-1d64d311983d
https://twitter.com/SamouraiWallet/status/1283145015124996098
https://twitter.com/brian_trollz/status/1559018534675644418

[o_e_l_e_o]

So a user imports a Wasabi wallet in to Samourai, doesn't let it sync, and Samourai uses an address it thinks is empty? OMG, Samourai bad!
Samourai release a responsible disclosure addressing address reuse and the steps taken to fix it. OMG, Samourai bad!

Wasabi try to deny address reuse happens despite blockchain evidence of it happening, and just endlessly hand wave about other clients? This is fine.

Lmao. Do you want a hand moving those goalposts again? You must be getting tired.

[Kruw]

So a user imports a Wasabi wallet in to Samourai, doesn't let it sync, and Samourai uses an address it thinks is empty? OMG, Samourai bad!
Samourai release a responsible disclosure addressing address reuse and the steps taken to fix it. OMG, Samourai bad!

Wasabi try to deny address reuse happens despite blockchain evidence of it happening, and just endlessly hand wave about other clients? This is fine.

Lmao. Do you want a hand moving those goalposts again? You must be getting tired.

My goalposts remain exactly in the same spot- WabiSabi coinjoins cannot have the outputs matched to the inputs unless it belongs to the whale:

Or just use a coinjoin implementation which is not actively coordinating with blockchain analysis, is not anti-privacy, and is not pro-censorship.

JoinMarket remains the best but also the hardest for the average user to use. So for them they can either download Samourai on mobile or Sparrow on desktop and use Whirlpool.

Whirlpool leaks an enormous amount of information about a user's wallet that WabiSabi coinjoins hides entirely:  Whirlpool reveals common input ownership from consolidating inputs into tx0 and reveals non private change that can be tracked.  Additionally, since you are coinjoining with users who have leaked their IP address or xpub address, it's unlikely a Whirlpool coinjoin round ever gains any anonymity at all.

WabiSabi coinjoin fix these leaks so that no two addresses are ever linked to each other, eliminating the common input ownership heuristic and "toxic" change (as long as you are not a whale with more liquidity than the rest of the round combined, obviously).

You failed to prove otherwise:

you don't need to be a "whale" at all in order to receive absolutely zero privacy from a Wasabi coinjoin.

So your argument boils down to "I can show you some examples which cannot be deanonymized, therefore all your examples of Wasabi coinjoins failing spectacularly are moot". Seriously?

Hey guys, only 5% of our cars randomly explode and kill the driver, so they are perfectly safe!

Okay then, I'll call your bluff again- Here's 20 non whale non matching outputs from WabiSabi coinjoins, try to identify the inputs owned by even a single one of the 20 outputs (which would be 5%):

01 bc1q032caguldmlrrztmrwhv5wqveyywdu2rtmd740
02 bc1q6vgwhsfkg343mmh27vc6prg3clsd4xu3p68vyd
03 bc1qre8jjpu8p9taw8j44r39z56vfr4sw64d4wyaj4
04 bc1qarharg76gfcrvskfw46f67vtqzd6hxa9pnspp5
05 bc1q4sexgt2p96x3ytnjjttp59w6mkj00kedal3xze
06 bc1qwrf50wpjws5mhdg2rhdu5hy7nqdtl8z94lp75n
07 bc1qz0tal2udfpr20x793fdw6v8lzp2qze7z5zje64
08 bc1qqw2h7fa3n8vyxgqru664fmft2trl9sqh9kz3fp
09 bc1qsud748whmum4gpt2qu52z8gqlgzcjyvhd5w2a5
10 bc1qctvxddyvxupjj8w82m8w5grzn59arstlrnaauw
11 bc1qq2fl05cmmhkr3pzg8elyr859v2fpcltynrk2j5
12 bc1qvwkrd3aecrvql5j8mqkmketvw6g6qwzt4juprq
13 bc1qhc2565fac4lrgyfq6n0mzc0l86jeptfnv2um9x
14 bc1qat6445gutyl3qdz3zhmdng9cdt92mevjlvaljs
15 bc1qk5f3mz0fetccey4nyyjedlrmqstkz2hmun96ha
16 bc1q4tpvm378a9d4n0xcnjtwfwujtr8eatjzvru8dx
17 bc1qd5epyjpj6vuejdppj24wew5n4n5rzepjx2xnay
18 bc1qgafud63me5mffn00g90ch08jjn5h20umzwxd62
19 bc1q5u3f2ldrtqa7ea79a8hcd8kssgw2gmalk4uej9
20 bc1qa6n7g7r4j3nv78gzgzmuvg56em4guppckqpz7r

[o_e_l_e_o]

My goalposts remain exactly in the same spot- WabiSabi coinjoins cannot have the outputs matched to the inputs unless it belongs to the whale:

Hahaha, again with the same example? Once again, one good coinjoin does not excuse all the flawed ones. Do you honestly not understand this?

Still, even Max Hillebrand has admitted that Wasabi suffers from address reuse. You should probably download the latest version of "Wasabi bullshit soundbites.pdf". 

[Kruw]

My goalposts remain exactly in the same spot- WabiSabi coinjoins cannot have the outputs matched to the inputs unless it belongs to the whale:

Hahaha, again with the same example? Once again, one good coinjoin does not excuse all the flawed ones. Do you honestly not understand this?

Still, even Max Hillebrand has admitted that Wasabi suffers from address reuse. You should probably download the latest version of "Wasabi bullshit soundbites.pdf".  

What "flawed ones"?  I'm still waiting:

For you then to provide a single example which works well does absolutely nothing to address the fact in many cases Wasabi coinjoins are critically flawed. As per my previous analogy, a car manufacturer showing a new model which works well does not excuse previous models which have randomly burst in to flames. This is an incredibly simple concept, so I can only assume you are trolling by continuing to deliberately misunderstand it.

Go on, tell me how Wasabi coinjoins are "critically flawed".  Don't hold back, I want to know what's wrong with them.

[o_e_l_e_o]

Step 1 - Get shown blockchain evidence of Wasabi address reuse
Step 2 - Ignore said evidence
Step 3 - Ask for the evidence you've just ignored
Step 4 - Go to Step 1

[Kruw]

Step 1 - Get shown blockchain evidence of Wasabi address reuse
Step 2 - Ignore said evidence
Step 3 - Ask for the evidence you've just ignored
Step 4 - Go to Step 1

We just agreed that address reuse is not a "critical flaw" since it can be done in any implementation like my Joinmarket and Samourai examples, and it can't be avoided by a client if a user has the same seed generating addresses asynchronously on multiple clients.

I'm asking you directly: What is wrong with the WabiSabi coinjoin implementation?  I told you exactly what was wrong with the Whirlpool coinjoin implementation and then I deanonymized the very first Whirlpool transaction ID you provided using the flaws I described, why can't you deanonymize any WabiSabi coinjoins?

[o_e_l_e_o]

We agreed no such thing. You stated it because you have no better answer to Wasabi address reuse.

why can't you deanonymize any WabiSabi coinjoins?

I see you are on Step 3 of our recurring conversation. Refers to my posts above for the evidence as per Step 1.

[BlackHatCoiner]

You seem to have an answer to everything. You wouldn't mind answering to further questions.

- Have you ever considered the scenario where chain analysis deliberately lies about coins being involved into illegal activity, or simply denies to give excuse about certain coins for being "tainted" according to their standards? It's a central point of failure in the end.
- Do you accept this as drawback?
- Do you agree that the chain analysis company is a mass surveillance company?
- If yes, do you agree that mass surveillance is against the ideals of privacy?
- If yes, do you agree that funding a mass surveillance software company (for the "sake of the children" or whatever) result in more surveillance?

[Kruw]

We agreed no such thing. You stated it because you have no better answer to Wasabi address reuse.

why can't you deanonymize any WabiSabi coinjoins?

I see you are on Step 3 of our recurring conversation. Refers to my posts above for the evidence as per Step 1.

The transactions you claimed as evidence were proved not to show any flaws in the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol.  Your examples contained:

-Not a WabiSabi coinjoin
-Address reuse
-Address reuse

I already proved you were lying about being able identify the outputs of a WabiSabi coinjoin, remember?

I have already shown you blockchain evidence of the following:

Wasabi coinjoins creating outputs which can be 100% linked to a specific input: https://mempool.space/tx/dae13b2d015587a3033d7ab7949a7efa6d6ed7aa782168b0651ab37a2d8390f8
Wasabi coinjoins reusing addresses, leading to users being doxxed: https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872
Wasabi coinjoins using the same address on both sides of a transaction: https://mempool.space/tx/af50a27691c0f0b7b626cddb74445a0e26bb6ed7b045861067326ea173bc17d0 (address bc1qft2uze947wtdvvhdqtx00c8el954y6ekxjk73h)

At no point have you exploited "critical flaws" to show how a user receives "absolutely zero privacy" from a coinjoin if you are not the whale, because the "critical flaws" you claim exist do not exist:

You don't need to be a "whale" at all in order to receive absolutely zero privacy from a Wasabi coinjoin.

Since you continually fail to deanonymize any transactions, I'd suggest you just stop humiliating yourself by continually lying about flaws existing.  It's obvious you are just butthurt that I easily deanonymized your Whirlpool coinjoin transaction on the very first attempt using the critical flaws in that coinjoin protocol:

Post the tx ID of any Whirlpool transaction and I will show you the tx0 transaction that was created by each of the new entrants.

Ok, here's one: https://mempool.space/tx/ed3131b544fbf00a71709942e483b55e629312ecb181e6e819409f419ee0d226

Where exactly is the privacy loss for new entrants, splitting a single UTXO in to multiple UTXOs to join the pool?

Okay, here's all the payments that can be tracked from the two new participants of the Whirlpool coinjoin transaction:

Entrant 1: bc1q03c0443ausjjdxl2h6ud5m8c0dux0zyg3dqdj7 created 0.00170417 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1q3fduld0l3r8nclyt5p3r7ak675tekurstn55tl.  Since this UTXO is not private, the sats were marked as unspendable and have not been recovered by the wallet owner  

Entrant 2: bc1qzc8zku26ej337huw5dlt390cy2r9kgnq7dhtys created 0.00191247 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1qjlltxr443uy236wl4xhpxlr6dgsu0zltlv3m44. This UTXO was used in a second tx0 transaction, creating a huge trail of transactions that could be traced to each other  

The 2nd tx0 transaction created 0.00076348 BTC unmixed change which was sent to bc1qehd7gy8rza9mnzm9wnfjhgw82rp47wmqt7vpgy

Since this unmixed change is below the .001 pool minimum, it was consolidated in a 3rd tx0 with 3 other addresses owned by the same wallet:
31x8GPqrhzdaxiBJa9N5UisuoxbX1rAnHa
16Gw5WKjbxZmg1zhZQs19Sf61fbV2xGujx
3LZtsJfUjiV5EZkkG1fwGEpTe2QEa7CNeY

The 3rd tx0 transaction created .00200317 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1q2p7gdtyahct8rdjs2khwf0sffl64qe896ya2y5
This was spent in a 0.00190000 payment to 3B8cRYc3W5jHeS3pkepwDePUmePBoEwyp1 (a reused address)

That payment left .00008553 in change that was tracked to 3Dh7R7xoKMVfLCcAtVDyhJ66se82twyZSn and consolidated with two other inputs in a 4th tx0 transaction:
bc1qeuh6sds8exm54yscrupdk03jxphw8qwzdtxgde
3ByChGBFshzGUE5oip8YYVEZDaCP2bcBmZ

This 4th tx0 created .00533406 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1qzh699s75smwukg9jcanwnlkmkn38r79ataagd9 which was consolidated with 3 more addresses into a 5th tx0:
3F2qiWQJKQjF7XFjEo8FUYP3AU5AC6RqX8
3HAYYVKUpYbr2ARMdZJr9yVu8xi8UcxtPz
3GQtwwRK31wwCc22q6WS5sCgixUHsG5KaT

The 5th tx0 created 0.00058494 BTC in unmixed change that was sent to bc1qvh2zjcwwkj9y70xulla2semvlav3lty0p3l3w3
This was spent in a .00047290 payment to bc1qvzg8jq6wqtr5navn4e3ps4qrkk9r6n4h98gjck

That payment left .00008411 in change that was tracked to bc1qg6j0f0wfhpktt2l8uzdn48ct3um2xyur40eyzd and consolidated with another input into a 6th tx0 transaction:
31iZLXWfoywhuMZTPGxTkpzphzh2NXshpP

The 6th tx0 created .00753775 in unmixed change that was tracked to bc1qgfll2apc27yct6h2c8r8wq4kqhxjsfrudhhn5q
This was spent in a .00737000 payment to bc1q5emzer2t0sq5dez0zsrqgh6scvwn0n24xsladp (a reused address)

This payment left 0.00010896 BTC in change which has not been spent yet, but the payment only took place 11 days ago, so I assume it will eventually be spent, allowing the Whirlpool user to be tracked even further.

You seem to have an answer to everything. You wouldn't mind answering to further questions.

- Have you ever considered the scenario where chain analysis deliberately lies about coins being involved into illegal activity, or simply denies to give excuse about certain coins for being "tainted" according to their standards? It's a central point of failure in the end.
- Do you accept this as drawback?
- Do you agree that the chain analysis company is a mass surveillance company?
- If yes, do you agree that mass surveillance is against the ideals of privacy?
- If yes, do you agree that funding a mass surveillance software company (for the "sake of the children" or whatever) result in more surveillance?

-Yes, have you considered the counter scenario where there are multiple chain analysis companies in a free market with different reputations for accuracy and honesty?
-Yes, I accept this as a drawback. If a coordinator's data provider produces false positives, the coordinator will likely stop using that data provider.
-It depends.  If they are purposely deploying nodes and Electrum servers to log P2P network data, then that's mass surveillance.  If they are merely reading their own copy of the blockchain, just like any other Bitcoiner is able to do, then they are just a data analytics company.
-I didn't answer "Yes", but I would argue the transparency of the base layer is against the ideals of privacy and more closely aligns to the ideals of verifiability instead.  But, I'm not going to try to change Bitcoin's consensus rules, I'm just going to organize output amounts into values that match other participants in a really big transaction instead.
-Yes, but I think it's easy to realize that this is outweighed by the surveillance that is made impossible as a result of the coinjoin.

[Wind_FURY]

I've read most of the posts/replies towards Kruw, and I think that everyone is making too much commotion over nothing but a trade-off taken by a group of developers, who, believes that the best path forward for Wasabi Wallet is to make the centralized coordinator block outputs from nefarious sources. The solution, in my personal opinion is, fork the coordinator and have it accept all outputs from all sources.

[Kruw]

I've read most of the posts/replies towards Kruw, and I think that everyone is making too much commotion over nothing but a trade-off taken by a group of developers, who, believes that the best path forward for Wasabi Wallet is to make the centralized coordinator block outputs from nefarious sources. The solution, in my personal opinion is, fork the coordinator and have it accept all outputs from all sources.

Yep.  Anyone who feels brave enough to copy and paste the coordinator code can do so.  Others have already because they actually care about what they are saying: https://t.me/WasabiWallet/70611