ㅤ

[DaveF]

I'm a contributor.

Would it have been hard to start with that? Since you are you obviously have a vested interest in them doing things the way they do you are going to presenting a certain view point that not many other people here share.

You have that backwards:  When someone contributes, that changes the way they do things.

I've mentioned it before but there's no reason I should have to start the conversation with that, the things I am saying are true regardless of whether or not I strive to make improvements to Wasabi:

I'm a contributor.

Since it's been proven that Chainanalysis is not accurate a lot of the time, in both directions, at the end of the day using it to do any form of censorship / blocking is pointless at best. As soon as it allows any 'tainted' (which is a BS thing anyway) coins through, even if it's a legitimate mistake, since there is no way to track them after that anything else coming though that coordinator is now 'tainted' since you can't know who got what.

-Dave

If that's the case, then a different WabiSabi coinjoin coordinator will end up with the liquidity that was marked as a false positive taint.  Why don't you run a coinjoin coordinator yourself to capture this market share that the default coordinator does not want to accept?

I have 2 Whirlpool instances running on my 2 Umbrel nodes.

*Actually not 100% true, I shut them both down and am going to be moving them to different cases as soon as they show up since the fans in the Argon ONE suck ass but up until the beginning of the month I was running 2 of them.

-Dave

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[Kruw]

I have 2 Whirlpool instances running on my 2 Umbrel nodes.

*Actually not 100% true, I shut them both down and am going to be moving them to different cases as soon as they show up since the fans in the Argon ONE suck ass but up until the beginning of the month I was running 2 of them.

-Dave

Whirlpool isn't anywhere near as private as WabiSabi.  It reveals common input ownership and unmixed change from the tx0 transaction.  Here's an example of a Whirlpool transaction I deanonymized using these flaws:

Post the tx ID of any Whirlpool transaction and I will show you the tx0 transaction that was created by each of the new entrants.

Ok, here's one: https://mempool.space/tx/ed3131b544fbf00a71709942e483b55e629312ecb181e6e819409f419ee0d226

Where exactly is the privacy loss for new entrants, splitting a single UTXO in to multiple UTXOs to join the pool?

Okay, here's all the payments that can be tracked from the two new participants of the Whirlpool coinjoin transaction:

Entrant 1: bc1q03c0443ausjjdxl2h6ud5m8c0dux0zyg3dqdj7 created 0.00170417 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1q3fduld0l3r8nclyt5p3r7ak675tekurstn55tl.  Since this UTXO is not private, the sats were marked as unspendable and have not been recovered by the wallet owner  

Entrant 2: bc1qzc8zku26ej337huw5dlt390cy2r9kgnq7dhtys created 0.00191247 BTC in unmixed change sent to bc1qjlltxr443uy236wl4xhpxlr6dgsu0zltlv3m44. This UTXO was used in a second tx0 transaction, creating a huge trail of transactions that could be traced to each other  

The 2nd tx0 transaction created 0.00076348 BTC unmixed change which was sent to bc1qehd7gy8rza9mnzm9wnfjhgw82rp47wmqt7vpgy

Since this unmixed change is below the .001 pool minimum, it was consolidated in a 3rd tx0 with 3 other addresses owned by the same wallet:
31x8GPqrhzdaxiBJa9N5UisuoxbX1rAnHa
16Gw5WKjbxZmg1zhZQs19Sf61fbV2xGujx
3LZtsJfUjiV5EZkkG1fwGEpTe2QEa7CNeY

The 3rd tx0 transaction created .00200317 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1q2p7gdtyahct8rdjs2khwf0sffl64qe896ya2y5
This was spent in a 0.00190000 payment to 3B8cRYc3W5jHeS3pkepwDePUmePBoEwyp1 (a reused address)

That payment left .00008553 in change that was tracked to 3Dh7R7xoKMVfLCcAtVDyhJ66se82twyZSn and consolidated with two other inputs in a 4th tx0 transaction:
bc1qeuh6sds8exm54yscrupdk03jxphw8qwzdtxgde
3ByChGBFshzGUE5oip8YYVEZDaCP2bcBmZ

This 4th tx0 created .00533406 in unmixed change which was sent to bc1qzh699s75smwukg9jcanwnlkmkn38r79ataagd9 which was consolidated with 3 more addresses into a 5th tx0:
3F2qiWQJKQjF7XFjEo8FUYP3AU5AC6RqX8
3HAYYVKUpYbr2ARMdZJr9yVu8xi8UcxtPz
3GQtwwRK31wwCc22q6WS5sCgixUHsG5KaT

The 5th tx0 created 0.00058494 BTC in unmixed change that was sent to bc1qvh2zjcwwkj9y70xulla2semvlav3lty0p3l3w3
This was spent in a .00047290 payment to bc1qvzg8jq6wqtr5navn4e3ps4qrkk9r6n4h98gjck

That payment left .00008411 in change that was tracked to bc1qg6j0f0wfhpktt2l8uzdn48ct3um2xyur40eyzd and consolidated with another input into a 6th tx0 transaction:
31iZLXWfoywhuMZTPGxTkpzphzh2NXshpP

The 6th tx0 created .00753775 in unmixed change that was tracked to bc1qgfll2apc27yct6h2c8r8wq4kqhxjsfrudhhn5q
This was spent in a .00737000 payment to bc1q5emzer2t0sq5dez0zsrqgh6scvwn0n24xsladp (a reused address)

This payment left 0.00010896 BTC in change which has not been spent yet, but the payment only took place 11 days ago, so I assume it will eventually be spent, allowing the Whirlpool user to be tracked even further.

[o_e_l_e_o]

Here's an example of a Whirlpool transaction I deanonymized using these flaws:

Wrong. All you've actually done is follow some unmixed change - change which is deliberately segregated so as not to impact the privacy of the coinjoin. You haven't deanonymized a single Whirlpool output.

I've mentioned it before but there's no reason I should have to start the conversation with that, the things I am saying are true regardless of whether or not I strive to make improvements to Wasabi:

It is helpful for the community to know that Wasabi contributors hold views which are so antithetical to privacy, censorship resistance, the avoidance of third parties, and the general ethos of bitcoin. It helps them to make an informed decision to not go anywhere near your permissioned, mass surveillance software.

[Kruw]

I've mentioned it before but there's no reason I should have to start the conversation with that, the things I am saying are true regardless of whether or not I strive to make improvements to Wasabi:

It is helpful for the community to know that Wasabi contributors hold views which are so antithetical to privacy, censorship resistance, the avoidance of third parties, and the general ethos of bitcoin. It helps them to make an informed decision to not go anywhere near your permissioned, mass surveillance software.

Wasabi is completely private: It uses Tor and client side block filters to protect the data of its users.  You calling Wasabi "mass surveillance software" is a malicious lie and everyone can verify that you are lying themselves since all of the code is open source:  https://github.com/zkSnacks/WalletWasabi

[o_e_l_e_o]

Do you purchase services from blockchain analysis entities?

(It's a yes or no question. No need to try to argue pointless semantics.)

[Pmalek]

You calling Wasabi "mass surveillance software" is a malicious lie and everyone can verify that you are lying themselves since all of the code is open source

Of course it's not a mass surveillance software. It's just a "privacy" service that has willingly partnered with an unnamed mass surveillance blockchain analysis company to determine who deserves privacy and who doesn't. What more could you wish for than that? I think you should ask your buddies to consider any coins of o_e_l_e_o as unfitting. You do know he is a public supporter of Stalin, right? His Bitcoin reeks of Stalin propaganda and must be censored. For the greater good, obviously. After all, you are all about fungibility and censorship resistance.

[Kruw]

Do you purchase services from blockchain analysis entities?

(It's a yes or no question. No need to try to argue pointless semantics.)

If I'm not allowed to argue semantics, then my answer is "No".

You calling Wasabi "mass surveillance software" is a malicious lie and everyone can verify that you are lying themselves since all of the code is open source

Of course it's not a mass surveillance software. It's just a "privacy" service that has willingly partnered with an unnamed mass surveillance blockchain analysis company to determine who deserves privacy and who doesn't. What more could you wish for than that? I think you should ask your buddies to consider any coins of o_e_l_e_o as unfitting. You do know he is a public supporter of Stalin, right? His Bitcoin reeks of Stalin propaganda and must be censored. For the greater good, obviously. After all, you are all about fungibility and censorship resistance.

If you don't like what the zkSNACKs coordinator's customer policy is, then why aren't you running your own WabiSabi coordinator to outcompete them by offering "censorship resistant coinjoins"?  All of the code is open source for you to copy and paste, so you just must not be brave enough I guess

[DaveF]

If you don't like what the zkSNACKs coordinator's customer policy is, then why aren't you running your own WabiSabi coordinator to outcompete them by offering "censorship resistant coinjoins"?  All of the code is open source for you to copy and paste, so you just must not be brave enough I guess

Create a one click install that works well, and much like all the people that are running  JoinMarket / Whirlpool on their mynodebtc / umbrel nodes and I'm sure people would run zkSNACKs too.
Probably more if you advertised it as 'all the features, none of the censorship'
For now, I tried a while ago, failed miserably, tried again, did not fail as badly but it still did not work, and gave up and clicked the install button on Whirlpool.

This is a very time consuming hobby for me, so although I do spend a lot of time per week tinkering, configuring and such. At a guess, with the numbers of people on the 'nodes in a box' discussions there are a lot of people like me.

-Dave

[Kruw]

If you don't like what the zkSNACKs coordinator's customer policy is, then why aren't you running your own WabiSabi coordinator to outcompete them by offering "censorship resistant coinjoins"?  All of the code is open source for you to copy and paste, so you just must not be brave enough I guess

Create a one click install that works well, and much like all the people that are running  JoinMarket / Whirlpool on their mynodebtc / umbrel nodes and I'm sure people would run zkSNACKs too.
Probably more if you advertised it as 'all the features, none of the censorship'
For now, I tried a while ago, failed miserably, tried again, did not fail as badly but it still did not work, and gave up and clicked the install button on Whirlpool.

This is a very time consuming hobby for me, so although I do spend a lot of time per week tinkering, configuring and such. At a guess, with the numbers of people on the 'nodes in a box' discussions there are a lot of people like me.

-Dave

I'm confused by what you mean, installation and coinjoins are dead simple on Wasabi:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fM5pVMj91D0
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UbOAbXjzBJg

And dead simple on BTCPay Server:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zGVCrwMKKn0

[o_e_l_e_o]

If I'm not allowed to argue semantics, then my answer is "No".

Haha, OK then. Whatever you need to tell yourself to justify selling out.

I'm confused by what you mean

He means a one click installer for a coordinator.

Still, why would I go through the effort of setting up a coordinator, having zero volume, trying to entice people to my coordinator, all so I can run inferior coinjoins with suffer from address reuse and identifiable outputs, when I can just run JoinMarket instead?

[BlackHatCoiner]

That's because the unique codes on the banknotes are not stored forever on a worldwide database every time the banknote changes hands.  Bitcoin UTXOs are stored forever on a worldwide database every time that UTXO changes addresses.

UTXO doesn't "change addresses", because UTXO is not money. Bitcoins are, and they are expressed as "value" in the UTXO.

Each participant has to know the entire transaction in order to produce a valid signature...

You deliberately misunderstood. Obviously participants know the inputs they sign, but they don't de-anonymize each input and approve it according to each participant's "moral score". That must be a brand new feature from Wasabi foundation.

You are very clear, I'm telling you that you are WRONG:  UTXOs have distinct origins on the blockchain.

Define me fungibility.

[Kruw]

I'm confused by what you mean

He means a one click installer for a coordinator.

Refer to the BTCPay Server installation video I posted already, you can see the 1 click installer for coordinators there.  It's the "coordinator runner" tab.

Still, why would I go through the effort of setting up a coordinator, having zero volume, trying to entice people to my coordinator, all so I can run inferior coinjoins with suffer from address reuse and identifiable outputs, when I can just run JoinMarket instead?

How are JoinMarket coinjoins superior to WabiSabi coinjoins?

That's because the unique codes on the banknotes are not stored forever on a worldwide database every time the banknote changes hands.  Bitcoin UTXOs are stored forever on a worldwide database every time that UTXO changes addresses.

UTXO doesn't "change addresses", because UTXO is not money. Bitcoins are, and they are expressed as "value" in the UTXO.

Yeah, I said "Bitcoin UTXOs", there's nothing you needed to clarify about my statement 

Each participant has to know the entire transaction in order to produce a valid signature...

You deliberately misunderstood. Obviously participants know the inputs they sign, but they don't de-anonymize each input and approve it according to each participant's "moral score". That must be a brand new feature from Wasabi foundation.

I didn't deliberately misunderstand, your claim was simply wrong:

Secondly, coinjoin participants don't know each other.

You are very clear, I'm telling you that you are WRONG:  UTXOs have distinct origins on the blockchain.

Define me fungibility.

Items can be considered fungible if any single unit has the same market value as any other unit without further inquiry about its origin, destination, or unique attributes.  If a Bitcoin UTXO was not created from a coinjoin transaction, its origin can be identified with exactness, potentially changing its market value relative to other units.

[o_e_l_e_o]

How are JoinMarket coinjoins superior to WabiSabi coinjoins?

You mean apart from the address reuse and the identifiable outputs? Probably something to do with them not being run by a company which supports mass surveillance of all their users.

[Kruw]

How are JoinMarket coinjoins superior to WabiSabi coinjoins?

You mean apart from the address reuse and the identifiable outputs? Probably something to do with them not being run by a company which supports mass surveillance of all their users.

I already proved you were lying about being able identify the outputs of a WabiSabi coinjoin, remember?

You don't need to be a "whale" at all in order to receive absolutely zero privacy from a Wasabi coinjoin.

You are just posting nonsense trying to distract from the fact I proved you wrong by posting a non whale non matching output that you were not able to trace: bc1qrmmypw3g2ds4aqgh3nqc59qhdp9qk779x2zlru

So your argument boils down to "I can show you some examples which cannot be deanonymized, therefore all your examples of Wasabi coinjoins failing spectacularly are moot". Seriously?

Hey guys, only 5% of our cars randomly explode and kill the driver, so they are perfectly safe!

Okay then, I'll call your bluff again- Here's 20 non whale non matching outputs from WabiSabi coinjoins, try to identify the inputs owned by even a single one of the 20 outputs (which would be 5%):

01 bc1q032caguldmlrrztmrwhv5wqveyywdu2rtmd740
02 bc1q6vgwhsfkg343mmh27vc6prg3clsd4xu3p68vyd
03 bc1qre8jjpu8p9taw8j44r39z56vfr4sw64d4wyaj4
04 bc1qarharg76gfcrvskfw46f67vtqzd6hxa9pnspp5
05 bc1q4sexgt2p96x3ytnjjttp59w6mkj00kedal3xze
06 bc1qwrf50wpjws5mhdg2rhdu5hy7nqdtl8z94lp75n
07 bc1qz0tal2udfpr20x793fdw6v8lzp2qze7z5zje64
08 bc1qqw2h7fa3n8vyxgqru664fmft2trl9sqh9kz3fp
09 bc1qsud748whmum4gpt2qu52z8gqlgzcjyvhd5w2a5
10 bc1qctvxddyvxupjj8w82m8w5grzn59arstlrnaauw
11 bc1qq2fl05cmmhkr3pzg8elyr859v2fpcltynrk2j5
12 bc1qvwkrd3aecrvql5j8mqkmketvw6g6qwzt4juprq
13 bc1qhc2565fac4lrgyfq6n0mzc0l86jeptfnv2um9x
14 bc1qat6445gutyl3qdz3zhmdng9cdt92mevjlvaljs
15 bc1qk5f3mz0fetccey4nyyjedlrmqstkz2hmun96ha
16 bc1q4tpvm378a9d4n0xcnjtwfwujtr8eatjzvru8dx
17 bc1qd5epyjpj6vuejdppj24wew5n4n5rzepjx2xnay
18 bc1qgafud63me5mffn00g90ch08jjn5h20umzwxd62
19 bc1q5u3f2ldrtqa7ea79a8hcd8kssgw2gmalk4uej9
20 bc1qa6n7g7r4j3nv78gzgzmuvg56em4guppckqpz7r

Probably something to do with them not being run by a company which supports mass surveillance of all their users.

Again, you are repeating a malicious lie.  Wasabi users cannot be surveilled because their wallet addresses are masked by client side block filters and their IP address is masked with Tor.

[o_e_l_e_o]

I already proved you were lying about being able identify the outputs of a WabiSabi coinjoin, remember?

I have already shown you blockchain evidence of the following:

Wasabi coinjoins creating outputs which can be 100% linked to a specific input: https://mempool.space/tx/dae13b2d015587a3033d7ab7949a7efa6d6ed7aa782168b0651ab37a2d8390f8
Wasabi coinjoins reusing addresses, leading to users being doxxed: https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872
Wasabi coinjoins using the same address on both sides of a transaction: https://mempool.space/tx/af50a27691c0f0b7b626cddb74445a0e26bb6ed7b045861067326ea173bc17d0 (address bc1qft2uze947wtdvvhdqtx00c8el954y6ekxjk73h)

For you then to provide a single example which works well does absolutely nothing to address the fact in many cases Wasabi coinjoins are critically flawed. As per my previous analogy, a car manufacturer showing a new model which works well does not excuse previous models which have randomly burst in to flames. This is an incredibly simple concept, so I can only assume you are trolling by continuing to deliberately misunderstand it.

Again, you are repeating a malicious lie.  Wasabi users cannot be surveilled because their wallet addresses are masked by client side block filters and their IP address is masked with Tor.

Yes yes, you've repeated this meaningless soundbite a dozen times now. You pay a blockchain analysis company for information on every single UTXO which attempts to register for a coinjoin. You actively support mass surveillance.

[Kruw]

I already proved you were lying about being able identify the outputs of a WabiSabi coinjoin, remember?

I have already shown you blockchain evidence of the following:

Wasabi coinjoins creating outputs which can be 100% linked to a specific input: https://mempool.space/tx/dae13b2d015587a3033d7ab7949a7efa6d6ed7aa782168b0651ab37a2d8390f8

Whale outputs that don't receive privacy on the blockchain aren't displayed as private in the client either, what's your point?  Where's the flaw?  You're not providing a criticism against WabiSabi coinjoins at all, your criticism is that amounts on Bitcoin are not cryptographically blinded, which means a larger amount cannot be hidden within a smaller amount no matter what coinjoin protocol is used.  Period.

Wasabi coinjoins reusing addresses, leading to users being doxxed: https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872
Wasabi coinjoins using the same address on both sides of a transaction: https://mempool.space/tx/af50a27691c0f0b7b626cddb74445a0e26bb6ed7b045861067326ea173bc17d0 (address bc1qft2uze947wtdvvhdqtx00c8el954y6ekxjk73h)

You keep repeating this and I keep having to direct you to the Bitcoin whitepaper:

Here's a lovely example of Wasabi reusing addresses, which led to the user in question being doxxed: https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872

Here's the Bitcoin whitepaper again since you seemed to miss it the first time I posted it:

Everyone already knows you shouldn't reuse addresses, it's in the Bitcoin whitepaper:

As an additional firewall, a new key pair should be used for each transaction to keep them from being linked to a common owner. Some linking is still unavoidable with multi-input transactions, which necessarily reveal that their inputs were owned by the same owner. The risk is that if the owner of a key is revealed, linking could reveal other transactions that belonged to the same owner.

For you then to provide a single example which works well does absolutely nothing to address the fact in many cases Wasabi coinjoins are critically flawed. As per my previous analogy, a car manufacturer showing a new model which works well does not excuse previous models which have randomly burst in to flames. This is an incredibly simple concept, so I can only assume you are trolling by continuing to deliberately misunderstand it.

Go on, tell me how Wasabi coinjoins are "critically flawed".  Don't hold back, I want to know what's wrong with them.

Again, you are repeating a malicious lie.  Wasabi users cannot be surveilled because their wallet addresses are masked by client side block filters and their IP address is masked with Tor.

Yes yes, you've repeated this meaningless soundbite a dozen times now. You pay a blockchain analysis company for information on every single UTXO which attempts to register for a coinjoin. You actively support mass surveillance.

Why does it matter if a coordinator buys data from someone else?  The objective of a privacy wallet is to prevent the coordinator from SELLING their data.  It's possible for the coordinator to collect and sell blockchain data for Samourai, Joinmarket, and all the custodial mixers you have promoted in your signature, but coordinators of Wasabi coinjoins cannot surveil their users thanks to default usage of Tor and client side block filters.

[BlackHatCoiner]

How are JoinMarket coinjoins superior to WabiSabi coinjoins?

Apart from funding mass surveillance, reusing addresses and identifiable outputs as mentioned above, JoinMarket coinjoins are also not in the fate of one authority. It's meant to be decentralized, whereas in Wasabi there is just one coordinator with the overwhelming liquidity.

Yeah, I said "Bitcoin UTXOs", there's nothing you needed to clarify about my statement

I do. You think that the UTXO is the currency. The currency is one property of the UTXO, not the UTXO itself.

I didn't deliberately misunderstand, your claim was simply wrong:

My claim wasn't wrong. I don't know the moral history of the inputs I sign when making a CoinJoin, I don't know the people who own the inputs, I'm neither supposed to spy them nor to look on their blockchain history. I'm only looking for liquidity to obfuscate mine.

Items can be considered fungible if any single unit has the same market value as any other unit without further inquiry about its origin, destination, or unique attributes.

So claiming your project makes the currency fungible is false, because you will never accomplish this goal if you deny certain UTXOs; if some are not allowed, then there will always be some coins whose history can be identified. You only want to conceal the history of the units you approve, not the history of all units, so you will never achieve making it fungible, according to your definition of fungibility of course.

[o_e_l_e_o]

Go on, tell me how Wasabi coinjoins are "critically flawed".

Oh, my bad! Apparently coinjoins failing completely at what they are designed to do and having outputs which can be 100% linked to specific inputs is not a flaw.

Why does it matter if a coordinator buys data from someone else?

Lol. You have already made it abundantly clear that you have absolutely no issue whatsoever with a so called "privacy" solution actively funding blockchain analysis, mass surveillance, and censorship. In any rational persons' book, these things are mutually exclusive.

[Kruw]

How are JoinMarket coinjoins superior to WabiSabi coinjoins?

Apart from funding mass surveillance, reusing addresses and identifiable outputs as mentioned above, JoinMarket coinjoins are also not in the fate of one authority. It's meant to be decentralized, whereas in Wasabi there is just one coordinator with the overwhelming liquidity.

What identifiable outputs?  A WabiSabi coinjoin makes all outputs private as long as it is not a whale.

Yeah, I said "Bitcoin UTXOs", there's nothing you needed to clarify about my statement

I do. You think that the UTXO is the currency. The currency is one property of the UTXO, not the UTXO itself.

If you say "Pay me 1 BTC" and I send you 100,000 UTXOs for 0.00001000 BTC each, would you consider those UTXOs I sent equal to a single 1 BTC UTXO payment?

I didn't deliberately misunderstand, your claim was simply wrong:

My claim wasn't wrong. I don't know the moral history of the inputs I sign when making a CoinJoin, I don't know the people who own the inputs, I'm neither supposed to spy them nor to look on their blockchain history. I'm only looking for liquidity to obfuscate mine.

Like I said, the claim that coinjoin participants don't know each other is false.  Your personal decision to ignore the addresses used by the other participants does not mean the other participants will choose to ignore your address.

Items can be considered fungible if any single unit has the same market value as any other unit without further inquiry about its origin, destination, or unique attributes.

So claiming your project makes the currency fungible is false, because you will never accomplish this goal if you deny certain UTXOs; if some are not allowed, then there will always be some coins whose history can be identified. You only want to conceal the history of the units you approve, not the history of all units, so you will never achieve making it fungible, according to your definition of fungibility of course.

Where did I claim fungibility is my goal?...  My goal is to achieve privacy, and Wasabi performs privacy perfectly.

Go on, tell me how Wasabi coinjoins are "critically flawed".

Oh, my bad! Apparently coinjoins failing completely at what they are designed to do and having outputs which can be 100% linked to specific inputs is not a flaw.

I ALREADY PROVED YOUR CLAIM THAT THIS SORT OF LINKING IS POSSIBLE TO BE A LIE:

You don't need to be a "whale" at all in order to receive absolutely zero privacy from a Wasabi coinjoin.

You are just posting nonsense trying to distract from the fact I proved you wrong by posting a non whale non matching output that you were not able to trace: bc1qrmmypw3g2ds4aqgh3nqc59qhdp9qk779x2zlru

So your argument boils down to "I can show you some examples which cannot be deanonymized, therefore all your examples of Wasabi coinjoins failing spectacularly are moot". Seriously?

Hey guys, only 5% of our cars randomly explode and kill the driver, so they are perfectly safe!

Okay then, I'll call your bluff again- Here's 20 non whale non matching outputs from WabiSabi coinjoins, try to identify the inputs owned by even a single one of the 20 outputs (which would be 5%):

01 bc1q032caguldmlrrztmrwhv5wqveyywdu2rtmd740
02 bc1q6vgwhsfkg343mmh27vc6prg3clsd4xu3p68vyd
03 bc1qre8jjpu8p9taw8j44r39z56vfr4sw64d4wyaj4
04 bc1qarharg76gfcrvskfw46f67vtqzd6hxa9pnspp5
05 bc1q4sexgt2p96x3ytnjjttp59w6mkj00kedal3xze
06 bc1qwrf50wpjws5mhdg2rhdu5hy7nqdtl8z94lp75n
07 bc1qz0tal2udfpr20x793fdw6v8lzp2qze7z5zje64
08 bc1qqw2h7fa3n8vyxgqru664fmft2trl9sqh9kz3fp
09 bc1qsud748whmum4gpt2qu52z8gqlgzcjyvhd5w2a5
10 bc1qctvxddyvxupjj8w82m8w5grzn59arstlrnaauw
11 bc1qq2fl05cmmhkr3pzg8elyr859v2fpcltynrk2j5
12 bc1qvwkrd3aecrvql5j8mqkmketvw6g6qwzt4juprq
13 bc1qhc2565fac4lrgyfq6n0mzc0l86jeptfnv2um9x
14 bc1qat6445gutyl3qdz3zhmdng9cdt92mevjlvaljs
15 bc1qk5f3mz0fetccey4nyyjedlrmqstkz2hmun96ha
16 bc1q4tpvm378a9d4n0xcnjtwfwujtr8eatjzvru8dx
17 bc1qd5epyjpj6vuejdppj24wew5n4n5rzepjx2xnay
18 bc1qgafud63me5mffn00g90ch08jjn5h20umzwxd62
19 bc1q5u3f2ldrtqa7ea79a8hcd8kssgw2gmalk4uej9
20 bc1qa6n7g7r4j3nv78gzgzmuvg56em4guppckqpz7r

Why does it matter if a coordinator buys data from someone else?

Lol. You have already made it abundantly clear that you have absolutely no issue whatsoever with a so called "privacy" solution actively funding blockchain analysis, mass surveillance, and censorship. In any rational persons' book, these things are mutually exclusive.

Again, I'm going to remind everyone that this is a malicious lie: You cannot surveil Wasabi Wallet users, they are made completely private due to Tor and client side block filters.

[o_e_l_e_o]

I ALREADY PROVED YOUR CLAIM THAT THIS SORT OF LINKING IS POSSIBLE TO BE A LIE:

So you are just going to stick to the "Here is one good example, please don't look at the blockchain evidence of all the flawed ones" approach? All caps doesn't make it any less of a stupid argument, you know.

Again, I'm going to remind everyone that this is a malicious lie: You cannot surveil Wasabi Wallet users, they are made completely private due to Tor and client side block filters.

Again, I'm going to remind everyone that if you use Wasabi, you are literally paying for the privilege of having a blockchain analysis company stick their noses in to your UTXOs.