[XMR] Monero - A secure, private, untraceable cryptocurrency

[Joshuar]

its that time again...


time for what?

MoneroWorld Weekly Digest 20150325

https://forum.getmonero.org/20/general-discussion/244/moneroworld-digest-7-3-25-2015

crazy digest ranking system proposed. Check it out!

You dont even know how valuable those are if you have really limited time!

I envision you creating the first monero news website in the future

Thanks!

Of course!

Unfortunately, these are currently MY OPINION of what is cool in moneroworld that should be reported.

Thus, to mitigate this bias, if anyone ever posts anything and they think it should be included, put somewhere in the post the string "D1G35T". During my analysis of unique forum users I can also search for that string to see if I've missed anything.

Beautiful thanks! I enjoy reading these

[Globb0]

Good job GingerAle

[Drhiggins]

Please recommend me which of the two pools is more productive and reliable? Teeter between http://monero.crypto-pool.fr and http://dwarfpool.com
Thanks for your cooperation!

Monerohash.com

[pandher]

Guys and respected devs, can we please stop with the dark talk? Its is nothing but a wastage of time imo. Crapcoins like dark come and go, do bitcoin devs waste time on them? Our community is in a different league. You guys are creating something that will be taught in universities as a milestone in crypto. Lets focus on creating another revolution, bigger than Bitcoin

[Drhiggins]

Guys and respected devs, can we please stop with the dark talk? Its is nothing but a wastage of time imo. Crapcoins like dark come and go, do bitcoin devs waste time on them? Our community is in a different league. You guys are creating something that will be taught in universities as a milestone in crypto. Lets focus on creating another revolution, bigger than Bitcoin

^^^^Yes^^^^^

I'm tired of it too and I would remind all on here to not let trolls trigger responses.  The best way to get rid of trolls is to just ignore their post.  Most of us are intelligent enough to know that they are just trying to stir the pot.  I ask that for any troll post that appear on here to just let go of the need to be right or respond.  You already know if your right and no need to fuel the fire of the troll scum that come on here spreading their filth.

 I read this thread to learn what is going on with development not to read arguments with trolls who don't know "jack squat" about this coin.

So lets continue real talk about Monero and to all trolls kindly piss off and go back to living in your van down by the river.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z7a9IF78I68

[GreekBitcoin]

Guys and respected devs, can we please stop with the dark talk? Its is nothing but a wastage of time imo. Crapcoins like dark come and go, do bitcoin devs waste time on them? Our community is in a different league. You guys are creating something that will be taught in universities as a milestone in crypto. Lets focus on creating another revolution, bigger than Bitcoin

I also agree. It is a waste of time and we should really discuss of what we can do to make monero better rather than what other coins are doing worse. That one year we had like 10 coins pledging that it was the future anon coin. Many surpassed our marketcap only to get dumped heavily.  Yet except Darkcoin only Monero have survived and looking strong. So how can we make it even stronger?

I propose, that if someone attacks Monero here in this thread, we can reply fully at one of the war threads But lets keep this one as clean as we can.

[e-coinomist]

there's always the pay 10 xmr and import your wallet into mymonero option. Just goto mymonero.org and login with your coldwallet mneumonic seed.

This joke made my day. I would not touch any online wallet with a barge pole..

Makes me want to point out a contradiction:
1) You can ballance out your risk of loosing funds by spreading across multiple online places, secure storage by high redundance.
2) The more secure you ballance out your risk of loosing funds by spreading across multiple places, the higher the likelyhood of stomping onto a Mintpal desaster, Ka-BOOM!

more secure ... higher redundance ... higher probability of loosing your funds, period. But smaller losses, too.


Last be assured you can use mymonero.org as a storage for intended dev team tips. Figure out this one on your own.

[cAPSLOCK]

there's always the pay 10 xmr and import your wallet into mymonero option. Just goto mymonero.org and login with your coldwallet mneumonic seed.

This joke made my day. I would not touch any online wallet with a barge pole..

Makes me want to point out a contradiction:
1) You can ballance out your risk of loosing funds by spreading across multiple online places, secure storage by high redundance.
2) The more secure you ballance out your risk of loosing funds by spreading across multiple places, the higher the likelyhood of stomping onto a Mintpal desaster, Ka-BOOM!

more secure ... higher redundance ... higher probability of loosing your funds, period. But smaller losses, too.


Last be assured you can use mymonero.org as a storage for intended dev team tips. Figure out this one on your own.

To be honest...  I would like you to go ahead and say what you mean since what you say looks like a veiled accusation... or am I feeding the troll?

[Anon136]

so i just wanted to point out that there is the potential for some small amount of information to be leaked by people using very specific mixin values. for example, for 2 transactions which both used a mixin value of 23 might be surmised that its more likely than a random sample that these two transactions were initiated by the same party. standardized mixin denominations offering a range of options might be preferable. 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, ect.... (just as an example) plenty of flexability there. its unlikey that someone who wants more than 20 mixin couldnt be happy with 25 and would feel very strongly that they wanted 22 very specifically. so in this way there would be little cost to the user in inconvenience, but potentially reasonable gain to the privacy of the network for that very small inconvenience cost.

[vokain]

so i just wanted to point out that there is the potential for some small amount of information to be leaked by people using very specific mixin values. for example, for 2 transactions which both used a mixin value of 23 might be surmised that its more likely than a random sample that these two transactions were initiated by the same party. standardized mixin denominations offering a range of options might be preferable. 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, ect.... (just as an example) plenty of flexability there. its unlikey that someone who wants more than 20 mixin couldnt be happy with 25 and would feel very strongly that they wanted 22 very specifically. so in this way there would be little cost to the user in inconvenience, but potentially reasonable gain to the privacy of the network for that very small inconvenience cost.

So in other words randomize the mixin count? How does a tx's mixin count get traced back to the initial or final tx?

[smooth]

so i just wanted to point out that there is the potential for some small amount of information to be leaked by people using very specific mixin values. for example, for 2 transactions which both used a mixin value of 23 might be surmised that its more likely than a random sample that these two transactions were initiated by the same party. standardized mixin denominations offering a range of options might be preferable. 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, ect.... (just as an example) plenty of flexability there. its unlikey that someone who wants more than 20 mixin couldnt be happy with 25 and would feel very strongly that they wanted 22 very specifically. so in this way there would be little cost to the user in inconvenience, but potentially reasonable gain to the privacy of the network for that very small inconvenience cost.

It's a good idea but people are probably going to do that anyway I would think. Who is actually going to use 23 as opposed to 20 or 25.

[Anon136]

so i just wanted to point out that there is the potential for some small amount of information to be leaked by people using very specific mixin values. for example, for 2 transactions which both used a mixin value of 23 might be surmised that its more likely than a random sample that these two transactions were initiated by the same party. standardized mixin denominations offering a range of options might be preferable. 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, ect.... (just as an example) plenty of flexability there. its unlikey that someone who wants more than 20 mixin couldnt be happy with 25 and would feel very strongly that they wanted 22 very specifically. so in this way there would be little cost to the user in inconvenience, but potentially reasonable gain to the privacy of the network for that very small inconvenience cost.

So in other words randomize the mixin count? How does a tx's mixin count get traced back to the initial or final tx?

Well its not that. Its just that an outside observer can see how many participants there are in a ring signature, that in its self leaks some amount of information. Albeit a small amount, it could be used in combination with other analytical methods we can imagine, or perhaps ones we cant. Perhaps that small ammount of information would end up being the marginal factor allowing an attacker to deobfuscate parts of the network.

And no im not suggesting random values, though that could work too, im suggesting standardized denominations. i.e. 20 is an option and 25 is an option but 21,22,23,and24 are not options.

[Anon136]

so i just wanted to point out that there is the potential for some small amount of information to be leaked by people using very specific mixin values. for example, for 2 transactions which both used a mixin value of 23 might be surmised that its more likely than a random sample that these two transactions were initiated by the same party. standardized mixin denominations offering a range of options might be preferable. 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, ect.... (just as an example) plenty of flexability there. its unlikey that someone who wants more than 20 mixin couldnt be happy with 25 and would feel very strongly that they wanted 22 very specifically. so in this way there would be little cost to the user in inconvenience, but potentially reasonable gain to the privacy of the network for that very small inconvenience cost.

It's a good idea but people are probably going to do that anyway I would think. Who is actually going to use 23 as opposed to 20 or 25.

Probably only a dummy.

[Anon136]

It is probably something we should really look at if someone figures out non linear signatures. if its possible to do mixin 1000 or mixin 10,000 numbers could become very specific. probably some genius would use his favorate number 13284 every time

[Joshuar]

It is probably something we should really look at if someone figures out non linear signatures. if its possible to do mixin 1000 or mixin 10,000 numbers could become very specific. probably some genius would use his favorate number 13284

I suppose 1337 would be a popular number as well

[nioc]

so i just wanted to point out that there is the potential for some small amount of information to be leaked by people using very specific mixin values. for example, for 2 transactions which both used a mixin value of 23 might be surmised that its more likely than a random sample that these two transactions were initiated by the same party. standardized mixin denominations offering a range of options might be preferable. 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, ect.... (just as an example) plenty of flexability there. its unlikey that someone who wants more than 20 mixin couldnt be happy with 25 and would feel very strongly that they wanted 22 very specifically. so in this way there would be little cost to the user in inconvenience, but potentially reasonable gain to the privacy of the network for that very small inconvenience cost.

It's a good idea but people are probably going to do that anyway I would think. Who is actually going to use 23 as opposed to 20 or 25.

Because it's their favorite number

[eizh]

Mixin choice affects tx fee so from that perspective it should be left to the user. On the other hand, foolishly compromising your own privacy also very slightly degrades others' privacy (1 element removed from anonymity set*) so it can make sense to restrict choice. It's not very different from making everyone use only base 10 denominations like we already do.

* This is more academic than practical since the total combinatorial space is still huge.

[smooth]

so i just wanted to point out that there is the potential for some small amount of information to be leaked by people using very specific mixin values. for example, for 2 transactions which both used a mixin value of 23 might be surmised that its more likely than a random sample that these two transactions were initiated by the same party. standardized mixin denominations offering a range of options might be preferable. 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, ect.... (just as an example) plenty of flexability there. its unlikey that someone who wants more than 20 mixin couldnt be happy with 25 and would feel very strongly that they wanted 22 very specifically. so in this way there would be little cost to the user in inconvenience, but potentially reasonable gain to the privacy of the network for that very small inconvenience cost.

It's a good idea but people are probably going to do that anyway I would think. Who is actually going to use 23 as opposed to 20 or 25.

Probably only a dummy.

Well if that's the case its not really going to be significant on a system with a significant volume of transactions, so not worth worrying about. The idea is to avoid people comprising the system as a whole. If they want to compromise their own privacy they can take wallet screen shots and post them on Facebook for all we care.

I do think if higher ring signatures are made much more efficient (say like the the 1000 or 10000 examples given) due to some algorithmic improvement, then we should probably just pick some number and use that for all transactions. That doesn't exist now though. We are sort of doing this with the minimums, so what I'm saying is that maybe in some hypothetical instance the minimum becomes 1000 and everyone just uses that.

[Johnny Mnemonic]

At the same time, higher mixins, despite the increased privacy, look suspicious on their own. If everyone is using a mixin of 4, and someone decides to use a mixin of 200, they're kind of painting a target on their back.

[smooth]

At the same time, higher mixins, despite the increased privacy, look suspicious on their own. If everyone is using a mixin of 4, and someone decides to use a mixin of 200, they're kind of painting a target on their back.

You can avoid that by chaining multiple transactions (each with a "normal" mix factor such as 4) with appropriately selected time delays. After doing this you can even destroy the private keys for the intermediate outputs, a form of perfect forward secrecy.  Obviously this adds time, so may not be suitable for all use cases, but is another option, and is probably the most secure method overall.