I'm surprised and disappointed that so many people on this thread (not to mention Gavin) are telling we who value decentralization to stick it up our asses. I'm surprised and disappointed that so many techno-commies are involved with Bitcoin, to the point at which they can see problems that are an obvious result of a a lack of a price discovery mechanism and conclude that Bitcoin needs more central planning rather than more price discovery. How do you make a price discovery mechanism? Oh, I forgot we already had that conversation. |
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I'm surprised and disappointed that so many people on this thread (not to mention Gavin) are telling we who value decentralization to stick it up our asses. I'm surprised and disappointed that so many techno-commies are involved with Bitcoin, to the point at which they can see problems that are an obvious result of a a lack of a price discovery mechanism and conclude that Bitcoin needs more central planning rather than more price discovery. |
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I define "another layer of trust" as trusting anything else but the Bitcoin network.
In that regard colored coins are less decentralized than sidechains. Now you're just making up inconsistent, dishonest bullshit. |
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Is colored coins not introducing an additional layer of trust?
That depends on how you define "another layer of trust". Colored coins are inherently used for tracking things outside the blockchain - that by definition means representing obligations a.k.a counterparty risk. Any technique that tracks obligations outside the blockchain will be tracking counterparty risk. But none of that has nothing to do with the underlying technology used to create the token. Colored coins as tokens are no different from other bitcoins. A colored coin token doesn't all of a sudden become less trustworthy than a non-colored Bitcoin. |
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It's possible to build decentralized order books. Order matching does not require escrow with a third party. Orders can be executed with atomic swaps on the blockchain. At the same time, it's possible to use semi- or fully trusted third parties for any or all of those functions. I expect both models to see real world usage. But this doesn't really address the original statement you made. Originally you did not specify that you were talking about certain ways markets could be built that utilized colored coins. Without that clarification, your statement about sidechains being "more decentralized" is false. Colored coin tokens are stored on the main chain and enjoy the full security model of Bitcoin. The same can not be said for tokens created on a sidechain. |
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This is where economics in the economy come in to play risks and reward, at the moment federation/oracles/OT all are owned by the entities that want you to trust them with your Bitcoin, what happens there after is business. (And federation/oracles/OT are magnitudes more trusted than anything before) What entities do to build trust or create value, if it has any impact on miners it is catered for in the existing incentive structure. There's something important to be said here about OT (and other off-chain systems). OT is a contract processing system that operates on liabilities. You'll never be able to transact with Bitcoins anywhere except on the Bitcoin blockchain, in OT or in any other system. If we want Bitcoin to succeed as money, then we need as many Bitcoin transactions to happen as possible. |
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Did I just read a post complaining about Ripple shills by a "Monero Evangelist?"
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Its kind of curious that according to the selfish-mining paper, if that remains the conclusion, hashrate BGP is also assuming 1/3 honest hashrate (same ratio as previous BGP solutions, but just with "vote per hashrate" rather than "vote per participant". If the selfish mining paper is correct that a miner with 1/3 of the network can pull off a successful attack, does that not imply that 2/3 of the hashrate must be honest to solve BGP? |
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if memory serves I read somewhere that the cap on the block size was introduced due to DDoS attacks against the network using very large blocks, is it correct? Due to the potential for such attacks. |
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However, the mining industry is characterized by large economies of scale. In fact, these economies of scale are so large that the industry is a natural monopoly.
Why, let say, discus fish rather than ghash.io should became a monopoly if being such a thing will mean getting a btc/fiat ratio equal to 0? There's no such thing as natural monopoly. It's always been a fallacy: http://mises.org/library/myth-natural-monopoly |
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I presume be adjusted as it is just an preset value. Yes.... and no. Increasing this limit requires the entire network to upgrade. |
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If a SideChain can do more tps, that would be an incentive.
The only reason the main chain can't do as many tps as a side chain is because there's an artificial production quota written into the protocol. |
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People in each region do the vast majority of their transactions with parties in the same region, and therefore rarely do they need to have knowledge of the transaction data of other regions. A 21 st solution to 20 th century problems. |
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For every cent miners earn mining Bitcoin on a SideChain they insulate themselves from the disruption in the inevitable 50% revenue drop, and for cent of insulation we move closer to Kevin Dowd's inevitable prediction.
Miners don't need to mine sidechains in order to gain more revenue - it's just as viable to mine more transactions on the main chain. If there's a demand for 1000 tps, the main chain should be allowed to satisfy that demand. This gives the miners the revenue they need to wean themselves away from dependence on the block subsidy. |
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Crypto currencies from David Johnston have a very poor reputation.
You shouldn't use them.
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this is really encouraging. we owe it to ourselves to further investigate the capabilities of btcd as an alternative to Core.
It's certainly a better platform to develop against. |
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Civil servants do not get a cut of the money from the auction; that money goes to the Treasury (or to some general fund for the public good). They are motivated by gold stars in their resumé, that eventually lead to promotions. Catching and convicting criminals yields gold stars for all involved. Carrying out a smooth auction of a weird item, with no complaints of bad press, also yields gold stars. They do not care if the auction messes the market or gets a lousy price, but they worry about doing something stupid that could stain their resumés -- such as auctioning a bunch of seized game tickets after the game, or auctioning so much stuff at one time that they cannot get enough bidders for it.
Are you suggesting that the total value of seized assets they process has no effect on the number of gold stars on their resume? Civil asset forfeiture does not need to go directly into the pockets of civil servants to create financial incentives. |
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I was referring to Bitcoin's white paper, not Sidechains'. You know, the one were Adam Back is credited with developing the proof-of-work system that Bitcoin runs under. Adam Back figured that proof of work could be useful and not where it could most usefully be employed. He deserves credit for what he accomplished, and that credit in no way absolves him of proving his case in future endeavours. Adam Back has to show his work, just like anybody else. Even Satoshi would be in that same category. Past returns are not a guarantee of future results. |
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Thanks, and how can we monitor and foster the adoption of these alternatives?
Build businesses and products that use them. |
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What are the other implementations of the protocol besides Bitcoin Core available right now?
btcd is the most complete in that it supports new block generation. libbitcoin and bitcoinj are probably on the next tier. Bits of Proof would have made it to this list had it not been successfully executed. |
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