Yes, the Forum Funding System in forum.getmonero.org

The word "some" there refers to restrictions on types of medications. Xanax will be more of a problem (still allowed, in theory, but with added requirements)

There is a ample evidence of government pressure on the payments industry being used not only in this case but more generally to crack down on disfavored businesses that are legal. See Operation Chokepoint. We can't solve every problem in the world with one tool, but that that is absolutely something we can actually do something about.

Apparently confiscation is not the major issue, payments and domains/hosting/blocking of sites are:

Actually the relevant feature is not the view key but the tx-key (sometimes called the per-transaction view key). Bitsquare.io uses it in case of disputes. It allows the sender to prove payment on the blockchain beyond any doubt.

I guess it is a matter of interpretation but I consider that revenue to the blockchain (just not enough to really matter).

You mean 'obscure' including the largest and best-known one?

That would be something in the neighborhood of one person. I'm pretty sure it is larger than that.


Go easy on our friend Mast0rmind. Not everyone in cryptocurrency approaches it from a perspective of math or cryptography.

The Promoted tab earns a bit of advertising revenue but it isn't much at this point, maybe a few hundred dollars per day.

Yes and there are many more unreliable nodes now. Nodes that run major services such as exchanges, mining pools, etc. are long-uptime 24/7. When lots of people are joining the community and running nodes on their own computers there are many more connection issues. Not a problem, just sometime I've observed.

cpuid|grep AES

If you don't have the cpuid utility installed then

grep flags /proc/cpuinfo

Look for 'aes' in the list

Please continue discussion on the mining thread

Fantastic. I will soon be using this to sell off the entirety of the CKGE CKG item collection (as a single lot)

if you are interested in purchasing these items please take this time to review the holdings of the CKGE character. Details of the auction will be announced soon.

Not directly, but knowing you can use the XMR you are holding easily when you want to via xmr.to and btc is an incremental value add.

If you look at moneroblocks stats the typical transaction is about 1 KB or possible a little less meaning a typical transaction fee is 0.01 or 0.02 (10-20 USD cents). Obviously larger transactions occur (with both higher fees and higher load on the network) and require larger fees, and as you say it is being reduced.

There are poorly-designed blockchains with fees that are so low (such as one satoshi), the economics of it don't make any logical sense at all. That does not make them better than XMR, it makes them worse.

No he didn't. There was no vulnerability disclosed privately or otherwise, most likely because there was no vulnerability at all, just FUD (or, as I suspect might be the case, someone thought they had found a vulnerability but it was a mistake, and instead of retracting, it continued to be pushed as FUD).

I would like to think most people holding AEON especially longer-term are smart enough not to keep them on an exchange. Ever hear of MtGox, Bitfinex, etc., etc., etc.?

There is not much difference. The only change is enforcing mixable outputs on coinbase (mining) transactions.

Bigger changes will come in the next fork (v4) with the enablement of ringct (currently enabled only on testnet).

Security advisory regarding RPC wallets

MWR Labs reported a vulnerability to Monero (see link below). It applies to all Cryptonote-based which use simplewallet, when simplewallet is used in RPC mode. RPC mode is not the default and would have to be enabled by the command line.

The primary situation in which this would occur is running a GUI wallet wrapper which accesses simplewallet via the rpc service (several are listed in the advisory, though most are obsolete). It could also occur if simplewallet running in rpc mode were used to support a service (such as exchange back end) and the system on which the wallet is hosted is also used with a browser (it would not be a good idea to do this in any case).

The vulnerability occurs when a user:

1. Is using simplewallet in rpc mode
2. Is using a web browser on the same system as simplewallet
3. Browses to a malicious site

Monero implemented a fix for this but the fix is complex and back porting it to AEON's older code base, along with the necessary testing and careful evaluation to avoid introducing any new vulnerabilities does not make sense given that we are moving away from that codebase and simple workarounds exist. I have instead decide to issue this advisory. I may also release a simpler, partial fix that reduces the vulnerability, but caution will still be needed.

In the case of AEON, I have not determined whether the community-supported GUI wallet listed in the OP uses the rpc mode and is vulnerable, though that is most likely the case. As such I recommend not to use the community supported GUI and noted this in the OP. I'm not aware of any other wrapper wallets for AEON but if any exist the same advice would apply.

In addition, if you are using simplewallet in RPC mode for any reason, you should avoid doing so on the same system as a web browser. If you are using simplewallet in the default mode without enabling RPC, you are not affected

https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/advisories/csrf-vulnerability-allows-for-remote-compromise-of-monero-wallets/

The plan has proceeded as described above. The CK and a small amount of remaining M have been distributed. S-CKG continues to trade as shares in the ownership of the physical CKG items (and a very small amount of remaining CK).

Following the distribution, S-HODL which was previously a significant holder of S-CKG and S-CON, reinvested its M by purchasing CK on the open market. It now holds slightly more than one CK per share. S-HODL remains an attractive vehicle for passive holdings since dividends are automatically reinvested. This makes S-HODL an entirely fire-and-forget investment. You can buy it, do nothing at all until you check it later, and hopefully it is worth more.

Going forward I plan to apply a 0.1% admin fee on S-HODL reinvestments. This was previously the policy for the share vehicles (S-CKG and S-CON) that S-HODL used for its holdings (S-HODL had no ongoing management fee of its own), but since those no longer exist, S-HODL is holding the CK directly and will charge the fee directly. The fee was not applied on the reinvestment that just occurred.

S-CKG liquidation plan

S-CKG (char name CKGE) owns both the stash of CK resulting from CKG items it held at the time of the reorganization as well as the remaining items themselves.

Currently 99,430 units of CK are held by S-CKG

There are currently 1,988,600 shares of S-CKG.

The liquidation will proceed as follows:

S-CKG will be reduced by SPOILs (random controlled by the game engine) until fewer than 99,430 shares exist. That is, approximately 95% of shares will be SPOILed. If all of your shares are SPOILed you will no longer be a shareholder and will receive nothing. If you own a small number of shares this is reasonably likely. If you own a large number of shares this will likely not happen and you will end up with a smaller number.

Following this, 1 CK will be distributed to each share.

The remaining assets, consisting of the undistributed CK and the CKG items will be sold at some time in the future, either separately or in one or more lots consisting of multiple items, and the proceeds distributed to S-CKG holders. Upon the conclusion of this process S-CKG/CKGE will cease to exist. Until that time S-CKG shares will trade freely.

The liquidation will commence no earlier than 24 hours after this post. Trading will continue and those with a small number of shares who do not want to risk having their holdings eliminated by the SPOIL process may attempt to find a buyer (or alternately acquire more shares and reduce the probability of all your shares being SPOILed away).