ㅤ

[dkbit98]

A centralized coinjoin coordinator is more censorship resistant than a centralized custodian because a coinjoin coordinator is not able to give your coins or reveal any user data to a government even if they were forced to.

That is true, but they can also shut them down at any time, accuse them for anything they want and put them in jail.
Joinmarket developers can be anonymous and it's going to be much harder to identify and stop that, similar like with torrents.
Why don't you instead contribute more to JoinMaker and projects like jamapp.org?

I know Wasabi developers were against CoinControl for their new version, to ''prevent'' user mistakes, but it looks like something changed.
Wasabi wallet just returned optional Coin Control feature with their newest version update 2.0.3 that was released few days ago, with bunch of other bug fixes:
https://github.com/zkSNACKs/WalletWasabi/releases/tag/v2.0.3

[pooya87]

If Wasabi isn't working with blockchain analysis companies and is in complete compliance with the government in deanonymizing transactions, then why haven't they been shut down already? Their company is located in a British jurisdiction and we already know that these anti-privacy/anti-freedom governments (US and UK) have been cracking down hard on anything bitcoin related that improves privacy. How is it that zkSNACKs Ltd. became an exception?

[blue Snow]

I just know that the wasabi wallet update to 2.0.3
the major update is coin control to select address transactions.
so, will this affect privacy when using coin join?

maybe, after chipmixer confiscated by government, many ppl moved and used wasabi wallet to take advantage of the coin join feature,
I was imagining and never try it before, is easy to use coin join?
if using for lot of crime, will wasabi be the next chipmixer?

[BlackHatCoiner]

The problem is that the "trustworthy" mixer gave 7TB of its users' data to government raiders.

Bring me the evidence. I only read 7 TB of data. Nowhere saw user data.

Wasabi brings privacy, privacy brings fungibility.  Non private coins are not fungible until a coordinator chooses to make them private.

And since Wasabi is the gatekeeper of fungibility, we should expect every coin to be treated equally from the default coordinator, otherwise it doesn't treat the currency as fungible. This very team that drives the project and runs the default coordinator also writes in their main page that privacy should be preserved at all times. Probably we have a different definition of "all times"; they somewhat mean at all times except those they disapprove of.

[o_e_l_e_o]

Wasabi brings privacy, privacy brings fungibility.

It is utterly beyond me how you can seriously claim that Wasabi provides fungibility while you actively discriminate against certain coins. This behavior is the antithesis of fungibility.

[ABCbits]

I just know that the wasabi wallet update to 2.0.3
the major update is coin control to select address transactions.
so, will this affect privacy when using coin join?

Their release page need a bit clarification. It's unclear whether coin control feature is available when user perform CoinJoin. But assuming this feature is available for both making payment and CoinJoin, i expect there's some privacy improvement if user use this feature correctly.

I was imagining and never try it before, is easy to use coin join?

When i tested it with testnet bitcoin, i find it's rather easy. Although you have to be patient since it'll take some time.

if using for lot of crime, will wasabi be the next chipmixer?

Looking at zkSNACKs behavior, i expect they'll use more strict blacklist or perform other drastic action to prevent government shut down development of Wasabi Wallet and WabiSabi (their CoinJoin protocol).

[pooya87]

if using for lot of crime, will wasabi be the next chipmixer?

It has nothing to do with criminal usage otherwise they would have shut down United States as a whole since the amount of money used by the US banks for all kinds of illegal activities from arms deals to terrorism is in the trillions.

It is all about control and surveillance. If they can control and surveil the service and gain access to all the data they need, it won't be shut down. Otherwise there is a centralized point of failure and if they resist cooperating with the government, they will be shut down in a blinking of an eye.

[Pmalek]

That's a pretty close metaphor, but the only thing the co host can do is glance at a people who walk through the door to see if they look identical to any mugshots of the "most wanted" criminal list posted in the town square.

I don't think Wasabi or zkSNACKs have ever released information about what is or what isn't allowed. To continue with the metaphor, your party guests don't even know who the co-host is. They can feel someone looking at them, but they don't know who it is. So, who is looking at the guests? And who wrote the list with the names of those who aren't allowed to enter? It's not public information. 

[PrivacyG]

Okay, I've quoted the part where you said you have to identify yourself to register a UTXO for coinjoin:

No, you did not.  I said they allow UTXO's they trust.  I NEVER said participants have to IDENTIFY themselves.  Does Wasabi allow UTXO's they do not trust?  I thought they were trying their best to protect us against the Evil!  If I can not be trusted and they let me in, why not also let the 'criminal'.  If they do not let the criminal, why let me if you do not know my intentions.  For what is worth, I may be in the middle of the world's largest Cryptocurrency scam recorded.

Coinjoins are not "very select parties" where 10 people are "specifically chosen" to attend.  It's the exact opposite:  Coinjoins are open parties where the dancers specifically choose which party to attend.

Coin Joins are now very select parties where only the people that are allowed can attend.  If Wasabi or their very peaceful and good willing third party Blockchain Analysis partners have a black list and I am not on it, they chose to let me in.  An uncensored system does not work this way.  An uncensored Wasabi would allow every body to attend.  What do we call a Wasabi that imposes black lists?  Uncensored?

Buddy.  There is no way in between uncensored and censored.

What is your relation to Wasabi?

-
Regards,
PrivacyG

[Pmalek]

What is your relation to Wasabi?

He answered that in one of his previous posts. He said he is a contributor.

I'm a contributor.

It's too vague of an answer in my opinion and can mean many different things. Are you part of their development or engineering team? Are you someone who inspects their code for other reasons and contributes to code changes? Or are you someone that "contributes" to better the image of Wasabi and zkSNACKs on Bitcointalk? Maybe you are the mysterious co-host or part of their crew.  

[aylabadia05]

if using for lot of crime, will wasabi be the next chipmixer?

From the release I found that the Wasabi wallet update to the latest version only focuses on coin control which allows privacy to be prioritized by the developer to each user.
It has absolutely nothing to do with the ChipMixer incident or any other criminal charges.

Here is the source.

Hungarian-based Wasabi Wallet has released version 2.0.3, which includes an update bringing back Coin Control. The function allows optional insight and control of the wallet’s Smart Coin Selection Algorithm via Coin Control for sending.

Coin control, explained here by Nopara, inventor of Wasabi, has become an industry standard expectation for privacy-conscious Bitcoin users, but, according to the press release, its usage in Wasabi Wallet 1.0 demonstrated that it often caused more harm than good. With version 2.0.3, users can choose between the smart coin selection algorithm and optional coin control. Advanced users can hold down the Alt key to inspect and modify features.

According to Max Hillebrand, CEO at zkSNACKs and Wasabi Wallet contributor, “The goal of Wasabi 2.0 has always been to remove complexity and friction from the default user experience. That's the only way we can gather a large user base and offer substantial privacy. However, we can make the default even easier if we have an optional place to put the complexity, where skilled users can fine-tune their wallet’s performance to their heart’s desire.”

In addition to the update, Wasabi Wallet 2.0.3 includes an upgrade to Tor 0.4.7.12, offering improved stability for MacOS M1 users and various bug fixes.

Hillebrand added, “If we want privacy to become the default for Bitcoin transactions, we must do everything we can to reduce the fee costs falling on users for using privacy preserving technology.”

Previously, Wasabi Wallet customers were confronted with the announcement it would start preventing certain unspent transaction outputs (UTXOs) from joining its CoinJoin rounds, “sparking surprise and rebellion on Twitter as users wondered why the project would make a decision supposedly contrarian to the uncensorable ethos of Bitcoin.” Despite these hiccups, this latest update continues to focus on privacy as a stated core tenant of Wasabi’s development.

[blue Snow]

From the release I found that the Wasabi wallet update to the latest version only focuses on coin control which allows privacy to be prioritized by the developer to each user.

Yes, I know that, and I was told that update in my previous post. there is nothing to discuss because is answered. I don't know why you repeat that.

It has absolutely nothing to do with the ChipMixer incident or any other criminal charges.

yes I know that too, there is nothing to do with the Chipmixer incident or any other criminal charges., but did you know how chipmixer work and how is mixer mixing the coins?, Coin Join where wasabi use is a basic that.

[cygan]

Something's Wrong With The Coinjoins

https://github.com/zkSNACKs/WalletWasabi/issues/10462

[Wind_FURY]

Something's Wrong With The Coinjoins

https://github.com/zkSNACKs/WalletWasabi/issues/10462

Little progress report:

The high fee unfortunately is "normal" here and that's something we're constantly improving and there's a lot of room for improvement there.

Privacy getting lost is what does not seem normal, but a bug. It'd be only normal if the users would be the largest participants in the rounds, but that's not the case.

I took a look at the only modification we've done for the release: #10100 and it does not seem to be the culprit, because it barely affects anything and I tested against some wallets.

https://github.com/zkSNACKs/WalletWasabi/issues/10462#issuecomment-1501026369

High fees for WasabiWallet = Impractical

It will currently be cheaper to accept the slippage and the fees to trade through BISQ for a coin like Monero, and get better privacy for making your transactions in it, then converting back to Bitcoin if needed.  

[o_e_l_e_o]

Or just use a coinjoin implementation which is not actively coordinating with blockchain analysis, is not anti-privacy, and is not pro-censorship.

JoinMarket remains the best but also the hardest for the average user to use. So for them they can either download Samourai on mobile or Sparrow on desktop and use Whirlpool.

[Kruw]

Or just use a coinjoin implementation which is not actively coordinating with blockchain analysis, is not anti-privacy, and is not pro-censorship.

JoinMarket remains the best but also the hardest for the average user to use. So for them they can either download Samourai on mobile or Sparrow on desktop and use Whirlpool.

Whirlpool leaks an enormous amount of information about a user's wallet that WabiSabi coinjoins hides entirely:  Whirlpool reveals common input ownership from consolidating inputs into tx0 and reveals non private change that can be tracked.  Additionally, since you are coinjoining with users who have leaked their IP address or xpub address, it's unlikely a Whirlpool coinjoin round ever gains any anonymity at all.

WabiSabi coinjoin fix these leaks so that no two addresses are ever linked to each other, eliminating the common input ownership heuristic and "toxic" change (as long as you are not a whale with more liquidity than the rest of the round combined, obviously).

[o_e_l_e_o]

Whirlpool reveals common input ownership from consolidating inputs into tx0

At the pre-mix stage, Whirlpool splits an input in to multiple inputs of the size needed to enter the corresponding pool. Each input the enters the pool separately. Where is the consolidation exactly?

and reveals non private change that can be tracked.

It sends non-private change to a completely separate account and the software prevents users from combining it with coinjoined outputs.

Additionally, since you are coinjoining with users who have leaked their IP address or xpub address, it's unlikely a Whirlpool coinjoin round ever gains any anonymity at all.

Absolutely nonsense speculation. Zero anonymity? You are suggesting that no one interested in coinjoining and privacy is running their own node?

WabiSabi coinjoin fix these leaks so that no two addresses are ever linked to each other

Except when they are linked to each other, as I've shown you evidence of three times previously and you've ignored each time: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5286821.msg61947309#msg61947309

(as long as you are not a whale with more liquidity than the rest of the round combined, obviously).

Except you have absolutely no idea what the liquidity of the rest of the round will be, and are entirely dependent on other users' inputs, meaning you don't need to be a "whale" at all in order to receive absolutely zero privacy from a Wasabi coinjoin.

[Kruw]

Whirlpool reveals common input ownership from consolidating inputs into tx0

At the pre-mix stage, Whirlpool splits an input in to multiple inputs of the size needed to enter the corresponding pool. Each input the enters the pool separately. Where is the consolidation exactly?

If I have .0007 and .0004 but Whirlpool requires a .001 standard denomination, then I must consolidate these inputs in tx0, revealing they are owned by the same wallet.  This also creates .0001 in leftovers that can continue to be traced to future transactions.

and reveals non private change that can be tracked.

It sends non-private change to a completely separate account and the software prevents users from combining it with coinjoined outputs.

Since you can't spend this leftover amount anyway, why not just add it to the mining fee?

Additionally, since you are coinjoining with users who have leaked their IP address or xpub address, it's unlikely a Whirlpool coinjoin round ever gains any anonymity at all.

Absolutely nonsense speculation. Zero anonymity? You are suggesting that no one interested in coinjoining and privacy is running their own node?

How is it nonsense?  Since the Samourai and Sparrow clients don't use Tor or a full node by default, it causes all of the users with default wallet setups to unknowingly participate in sybil attacks against any Whirlpool users that change all of the default settings to prevent their IP address and xpub address from being leaked.

Wasabi enforces privacy by default with Tor and client side block filters, preventing any IP addresses or xpub addresses from being leaked by honest users, even by accident.

WabiSabi coinjoin fix these leaks so that no two addresses are ever linked to each other

Except when they are linked to each other, as I've shown you evidence of three times previously and you've ignored each time: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5286821.msg61947309#msg61947309

Of course I'm ignoring it because it's a stupid point, everyone already knows you shouldn't reuse addresses, it's in the Bitcoin whitepaper:

As an additional firewall, a new key pair should be used for each transaction to keep them from being linked to a common owner. Some linking is still unavoidable with multi-input transactions, which necessarily reveal that their inputs were owned by the same owner. The risk is that if the owner of a key is revealed, linking could reveal other transactions that belonged to the same owner.

As Satoshi points out, all of the inputs of a Whirlpool tx0 are revealed to be owned by the same user.  WabiSabi coinjoins prevent revealing inputs are owned by the same user.

(as long as you are not a whale with more liquidity than the rest of the round combined, obviously).

Except you have absolutely no idea what the liquidity of the rest of the round will be, and are entirely dependent on other users' inputs, meaning you don't need to be a "whale" at all in order to receive absolutely zero privacy from a Wasabi coinjoin.

If this input received absolutely no privacy then, prove it.  Tell everyone which input(s) belong to its owner: https://mempool.space/address/bc1qrmmypw3g2ds4aqgh3nqc59qhdp9qk779x2zlru

[o_e_l_e_o]

If I have .0007 and .0004 but Whirlpool requires a .001 standard denomination, then I must consolidate these inputs in tx0, revealing they are owned by the same wallet.  This also creates .0001 in leftovers that can continue to be traced to future transactions.

Lol, what? So it's Samourai's fault if users consolidate inputs together even before they go anywhere near Whirlpool in the first place?

Since you can't spend this leftover amount anyway, why not just add it to the mining fee?

You can absolutely spend it. If it's large enough, coinjoin it in a smaller denomination pool. If it's too small for that, swap it for Monero or for Lightning. Easy peasy.

How is it nonsense?  Since the Samourai and Sparrow clients don't use Tor or a full node by default, it causes all of the users with default wallet setups to unknowingly participate in sybil attacks against any Whirlpool users that change all of the default settings to prevent their IP address and xpub address from being leaked.

That's not what you said. You said that Whirpool doesn't provide "any anonymity at all", which is clearly false.

Wasabi enforces privacy by default with Tor and client side block filters, preventing any IP addresses or xpub addresses from being leaked by honest users, even by accident.

But hands all your addresses and UTXOs directly to a blockchain analysis company.

Of course I'm ignoring it because it's a stupid point, everyone already knows you shouldn't reuse addresses, it's in the Bitcoin whitepaper:

Right. So address reuse is stupid, but when Wasabi reuses addresses, that's ok?

If this input received absolutely no privacy then, prove it.  Tell everyone which input(s) belong to its owner: https://mempool.space/address/bc1qrmmypw3g2ds4aqgh3nqc59qhdp9qk779x2zlru

I really don't think you want to play the "cherry pick individual transactions" game, but since you started it, then how about this one: https://mempool.space/tx/dae13b2d015587a3033d7ab7949a7efa6d6ed7aa782168b0651ab37a2d8390f8

There is exactly one input which could have created the 6.46652537 BTC output. Zero privacy gained.
That 6.46652537 BTC output is then coinjoined a second time with Wasabi, and again, there is an output of 4.39250624 BTC which could only have come from that input. Zero privacy gained.
Great job Wasabi!

[Kruw]

If I have .0007 and .0004 but Whirlpool requires a .001 standard denomination, then I must consolidate these inputs in tx0, revealing they are owned by the same wallet.  This also creates .0001 in leftovers that can continue to be traced to future transactions.

Lol, what? So it's Samourai's fault if users consolidate inputs together even before they go anywhere near Whirlpool in the first place?

Yes, it is Samourai's fault: They sacrifice your privacy (as well as block space/transaction fees) by forcing you to do a tx0 transaction before coinjoining, which requires non private consolidation such as the example transaction I provided above where neither input can register for the minimum pool by itself. Even if you have more coins than the minimum pool size, Samourai has designed their coordinator fee to incentivize the biggest possible input consolidations since you pay a fixed pool entry fee to the coordinator instead of an amount based entry fee.

Since you can't spend this leftover amount anyway, why not just add it to the mining fee?

You can absolutely spend it. If it's large enough, coinjoin it in a smaller denomination pool.

Please refer to my example, there is no smaller pool than .001 BTC, and the leftover output is worth .0001 (minus tx and pool fees ofc).

If it's too small for that, swap it for Monero or for Lightning. Easy peasy.

This leaks your premix transaction history to your swap partner.  You know what's even easier than that?  A coinjoin making all of your Bitcoins private like Wasabi does without extra steps, extra layers, or extra shitcoins. 

How is it nonsense?  Since the Samourai and Sparrow clients don't use Tor or a full node by default, it causes all of the users with default wallet setups to unknowingly participate in sybil attacks against any Whirlpool users that change all of the default settings to prevent their IP address and xpub address from being leaked.

That's not what you said. You said that Whirpool doesn't provide "any anonymity at all", which is clearly false.

You're lying, and everyone can see you are lying - Here's the exact quote of what I said: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5286821.msg62067607#msg62067607

Additionally, since you are coinjoining with users who have leaked their IP address or xpub address, it's unlikely a Whirlpool coinjoin round ever gains any anonymity at all.

If I'm wrong, show everyone proof that the clients used by all 5 inputs and outputs in this Whirlpool transaction are using Tor and their own node instead of sending someone else's node their xpub:  https://mempool.space/tx/e3064be77edcf00d986b7c5116ad3a9b602623d4c0f940a68b9752bd450eaeac

Wasabi enforces privacy by default with Tor and client side block filters, preventing any IP addresses or xpub addresses from being leaked by honest users, even by accident.

But hands all your addresses and UTXOs directly to a blockchain analysis company.

This is a lie, all of your addresses and UTXOs are prevented from being linked to each other by blockchain analysis because Wasabi uses client side block filters to discover your wallet balance from the network.

This blockchain analysis would only be possible in Samourai wallet and Sparrow wallet since all of your previously used addresses and future unused Bitcoin addresses are sent to a third party server by default, even your equal value outputs from coinjoins.

Of course I'm ignoring it because it's a stupid point, everyone already knows you shouldn't reuse addresses, it's in the Bitcoin whitepaper:

Right. So address reuse is stupid, but when Wasabi reuses addresses, that's ok?

No, it's not okay, which is why exactly Wasabi generates a new receive address for every transaction.  Please see the Wasabi docs:

https://docs.wasabiwallet.io/why-wasabi/Coins.html#address-reuse
https://docs.wasabiwallet.io/using-wasabi/Receive.html#the-problem-with-address-reuse

If this (output) received absolutely no privacy then, prove it.  Tell everyone which input(s) belong to its owner: https://mempool.space/address/bc1qrmmypw3g2ds4aqgh3nqc59qhdp9qk779x2zlru

I really don't think you want to play the "cherry pick individual transactions" game, but since you started it, then how about this one: https://mempool.space/tx/dae13b2d015587a3033d7ab7949a7efa6d6ed7aa782168b0651ab37a2d8390f8

There is exactly one input which could have created the 6.46652537 BTC output. Zero privacy gained.
That 6.46652537 BTC output is then coinjoined a second time with Wasabi, and again, there is an output of 4.39250624 BTC which could only have come from that input. Zero privacy gained.
Great job Wasabi!

So for the record: You were not able to identify the input that created an output without other matching values in address bc1qrmmypw3g2ds4aqgh3nqc59qhdp9qk779x2zlru which proves your previous claim of "you don't need to be a 'whale' at all in order to receive absolutely zero privacy from a Wasabi coinjoin" to be false.