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[Kruw]

Another example of a Wasabi coinjoin completely failing: https://nitter.cz/ErgoBTC/status/1723700744576971012#m

25 stolen BTC were coinjoined in Wasabi (wait, I thought their blacklisting was supposed to prevent that? ), and has been easily traced to a variety of exchanges. Oh, and some of the stolen coins were split off as "toxic change" and combined with presumably KYCed coins from a Binance account: https://nitter.cz/coinableS/status/1723806321441710412#m. You know, the same thing Kruw has been telling us is impossible with Wasabi.

I'm sure we'll be treated to the usual litany of excuses, but the bottom line is that Wasabi does not work.

No, as usual, you are lying, any everyone can verify it for themselves since Bitcoin is public. There is no "25 stolen BTC" in this coinjoin transaction, nor is there any "toxic change": https://mempool.space/tx/bcb3df324e6cbdb850ba778021e4be31f85d94e2c99e0b0223de9c029e12fd6a

[1714611642]

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[o_e_l_e_o]

You might want to tell that to Binance, who are investigating after the attacker's failed "mixing" with Wasabi: https://nitter.cz/RMessitt/status/1724139247127425209#m

[Kruw]

You might want to tell that to Binance, who are investigating after the attacker's failed "mixing" with Wasabi: https://nitter.cz/RMessitt/status/1724139247127425209#m

Which coins were sent to Binance?

[PrivacyG]

Which coins were sent to Binance?

Foggy glasses again, Kruw?

o_e_l_e_o said,

25 stolen BTC were coinjoined in Wasabi () and has been easily traced to a variety of exchanges. Oh, and some of the stolen coins were split off as "toxic change" and combined with presumably KYCed coins from a Binance account ()

and

You might want to tell that to Binance, who are investigating ()

Where does o_e_l_e_o say any Coin was sent to Binance?

Kruw is back to deceiving again.  Who would have expected!

-----

Do you think it is morally correct to use money coming from crime, Kruw?

-----

Edit.

Oh, and some of the stolen coins were split off as "toxic change" and combined with presumably KYCed coins from a Binance account

If the Blockchain Analysis work is so accurate to avoid crime through Wasabi,

That means I can use a Mixer that provides Coins directly from Centralized Exchanges.  The Blockchain Analysis team or algorithm will never know because they come from a trusted source.  This means I can successfully launder and do crime through Wasabi.  I get a free pass by doing just that.  It means Blockchain Analysis is useless.


If the Blockchain Analysis work is not as accurate as Kruw pretends,

That means working with a Blockchain Analysis is as useful at stopping crime as it is for one to talk to a hand.


Which again goes down to my question and speculation.  If in any situation it is in fact useless and an unnecessary pain to have this BA gate then why is it there after all.  The ONLY logical reason would now be that it is easy to use it as a political tool.  Or a way to Censor who they want subjectively.  I mean.  BA analysis is subjective and very questionable in itself anyway.

[FinneysTrueVision]

You might want to tell that to Binance, who are investigating after the attacker's failed "mixing" with Wasabi: https://nitter.cz/RMessitt/status/1724139247127425209#m

That's completely misleading. If anybody failed it was the hacker who stopped the mixing process after 1 coinjoin, then merged enough outputs and reused addresses to make it easy to identify them. There wasn't any toxic change in the coinjoin, only coins with lower anonymity scores which would have undergone further mixing had they not interrupted it or used custom settings that are weaker than any of the default mixing options.

[Kruw]

That's completely misleading. If anybody failed it was the hacker who stopped the mixing process after 1 coinjoin, then merged enough outputs and reused addresses to make it easy to identify them. There wasn't any toxic change in the coinjoin, only coins with lower anonymity scores which would have undergone further mixing had they not interrupted it or used custom settings that are weaker than any of the default mixing options.

Yep, even if the attacker did not use the default minimum settings, the tracker can only claim "it looks like" the funds ended up somewhere.  There is no deterministic proof since there are other possible owners of the funds, there is only a guess:

I have no doubt law enforcement will be happy to freeze his coins based on their distaste for Bitcoin anyways, but this suspicion is not based on conclusive proof since the spent UTXO accused of belonging to the attacker was created alongside 2 identical UTXOs with the same value in the coinjoin, making it merely a guess.  I would make the same guess based on script analysis, timing analysis of peers, amount analysis, and destinations of premix and postmix funds, but this sort of "shooting in the dark" style approach of layering multiple non deterministic heuristics will eventually create collateral damage.

[o_e_l_e_o]

If anybody failed it was the hacker who stopped the mixing process after 1 coinjoin, then merged enough outputs and reused addresses to make it easy to identify them.

Kruw has been endlessly copy and pasting a post of his and spamming it across multiple threads where a user has deliberately consolidated unmixed change outside of Whirlpool as "proof" that Whirlpool is flawed. But when someone is tracked through a Wasabi coinjoin, it's entirely the user's fault and nothing to do with Wasabi?

Peak double standards.

[Kruw]

Kruw has been endlessly copy and pasting a post of his and spamming it across multiple threads where a user has deliberately consolidated unmixed change outside of Whirlpool as "proof" that Whirlpool is flawed. But when someone is tracked through a Wasabi coinjoin, it's entirely the user's fault and nothing to do with Wasabi?

Peak double standards.

Someone wasn't "tracked through a Wasabi coinjoin".  All you have is a guy on Twitter saying what "it looks like", but merely guessing one potential outcome where the funds went does not eliminate the other possible outcomes where the funds went.  That's the point of a coinjoin, it makes it impossible to prove with certainty which inputs created which outputs.

Even UTXOs that do not have identical values to yours contribute to the crowd you are hiding in, not just the ones that have identical values.  There are 195 outputs containing a total of 44.125 BTC in the attacker's transaction, so it's even possible that the attacker with the 12.475 BTC input created zero out of the 3 outputs for 5.36870912 BTC because all of his coins were split into addresses containing smaller amounts.

This is why guessing one possible outcome without ruling out the others and calling it "deanonymization" is bad: Since there's no consequences to the accuser for accusing, why not make the accusation?

Don't trust, verify: https://oxt.me/graph/transaction/tiid/4984156801

[Wind_FURY]

Will the wallet app itself start implementing some warning/alert option to inform the receiver that the coins are "tainted"?

If a UTXO is banned from coinjoin participation (whether it is due to DoS protection or from blacklisting), the user is showed a message that says "Some Funds Are Rejected From Coinjoining" and a /!\ symbol is displayed next to the UTXO in the coin list which can be hovered over to show the unban time.

That's where it starts in my opinion, and it will open a can of worms. Because what if the most popular wallets also started implementing warnings and alerts that the inputs coming in their wallets are "possibly tainted"? How would that make the users feel and what would they do? Those coins would be sold right away, and if enough users are "warned/alerted" by their wallet app, it's probable that "tainted" Bitcoins would be valued less than "clean" Bitcoins.

I believe Lightning's real value propostion is in user privacy and fungibilty, not cheap and fast transactions. Isn't there an update that makes the opening of channels look like regular transactions? Users will value such a network and will pay the necessary fees, which will also incentivize Lightning routing nodes.

[PrivacyG]

That's completely misleading. If anybody failed it was the hacker who stopped the mixing process after 1 coinjoin, then merged enough outputs and reused addresses to make it easy to identify them. There wasn't any toxic change in the coinjoin, only coins with lower anonymity scores which would have undergone further mixing had they not interrupted it or used custom settings that are weaker than any of the default mixing options.

I do not know who you are and why you are supportive toward a deceptive pathological liar.  BUT,

The failure is not the hackers because according to Kruw there is no expertise necessary to maintain Privacy with Wasabi 2.0.  Kruw even GUARANTEES that ANY attempted Blockchain Analysis will result in a dead end because EACH Transaction you make is made FULLY private,

I would love to hear a more recent response from theymos since the development of the new WabiSabi coinjoin protocol.  His major concern was that privacy was not default and that a fair amount of expertise was needed to maintain privacy. With Wasabi 2.0, privacy is default and no expertise is needed.

I don't know what you are talking about.  When you use Wasabi 2.0, any attempted blockchain analysis is guaranteed to result in a dead end because each transaction you make is made fully private.

What would a Bitcoin newbie think reading these quotes?  Am I stupid or do they sound like 'if previously it was necessary to be careful, now when you use Wasabi 2.0 you have zero care because it is impossible to be traced no matter what you do'?

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what if the most popular wallets also started implementing warnings and alerts that the inputs coming in their wallets are "possibly tainted"? How would that make the users feel and what would they do? Those coins would be sold right away, and if enough users are "warned/alerted" by their wallet app, it's probable that "tainted" Bitcoins would be valued less than "clean" Bitcoins.

It would be so weird and sense lacking.  Think banknotes but you get less purchasing power the more used they look.  Would mean we would have to play pretend every time.  I could trade my 1 Bitcoin for some body elses 1.05 Bitcoin that were stolen from a kid.  Then I would sell my 1.05 Bitcoin for 1.5 Bitcoin used in a hitman deal.  Makes ZERO sense!  But possible in todays world and not too far from where we are now.

[Kruw]

I believe Lightning's real value propostion is in user privacy and fungibilty, not cheap and fast transactions. Isn't there an update that makes the opening of channels look like regular transactions? Users will value such a network and will pay the necessary fees, which will also incentivize Lightning routing nodes.

Yes, I already mentioned the economic incentive compatibility of privacy before:

Wasn't there always an open debate about taint and Bitcoin's fungibilty?

Bitcoin may seem fungible within its own protocol, but external entities are applying “taint” information to coins, making Bitcoin infungible in practice. Most large exchanges are automatically performing risk assessment on incoming customer coins. While it’s easy to claim Bitcoin also has obvious plausible deniability, that doesn’t matter to Coinbase, Circle, Cash App, etc. They are applying taint with enough confidence to close your account.

https://medium.com/bitcoinerrorlog/bitcoin-is-not-fungible-should-it-be-620a28f3f8b1

Yes, that's why it's so important for technologies like Lightning and Cross Input Signature Aggregation to find adoption since it makes private transactions cheaper than non-private transactions.  With these technologies, users who aren't seeking privacy will gain it in the process of seeking cheap fees (assuming they are not foolish enough to forfeit their data/coins to a custodian).  If every Bitcoin block is filled with Taproot Lightning channels being opened/closed/spliced in coinjoin transactions (due to this being the cheapest way to use Bitcoin), then we have succeeded in turning Bitcoin from a non fungible network into a fungible network.

You misunderstood. The quoted part doesn't refer to coinjoins and Wasabi. It goes back to this post where I explained that just because blockchain analysis gives the green light that certain coins meet the requirements to participate in your coinjoins, it doesn't mean that other services (like exchanges) will agree. It's exchanges and centralized services doing the coin confiscation because they don't like the history of your coins or the lack of one.    

Ah.  Yeah, centralized exchanges will lose the ability to make this decision once they upgrade to Lightning:

We frequently notice centralized exchanges (which have partnerships with chain analysis companies) to simply deny coins coming from mixers.

I think that's why Lightning is so important:  Exchanges will be forced to adopt privacy friendly deposits and withdrawals because they can't afford to transact on the nonprivate base layer forever.

[FinneysTrueVision]

I do not know who you are and why you are supportive toward a deceptive pathological liar.  BUT,

The failure is not the hackers because according to Kruw there is no expertise necessary to maintain Privacy with Wasabi 2.0.  Kruw even GUARANTEES that ANY attempted Blockchain Analysis will result in a dead end because EACH Transaction you make is made FULLY private,

I was refuting a claim that I found to be misleading based on my own observations. It has nothing to do with supporting any individual person. The hacker didn't lose privacy because of anything having to do with Wasabi. Non-custodial software can't be blamed for actions which it has no possible control over. Nobody in their right mind would interpret Wasabi's marketing statements as a claim that they can somehow bestow you with perfect privacy invulnerability under any circumstance.

[Pmalek]

Kruw even GUARANTEES that ANY attempted Blockchain Analysis will result in a dead end because EACH Transaction you make is made FULLY private

For an outside observer, it might be. But their blockchain analysis partner, the one they don't want us talking about, might know more than us. Who knows, maybe their deal involves helping the enemy de-anonymize users of particular significance who have been targeted for de-anonymization. Oh boy, now I am going to hear about how Wasabi is open-source again.  

[Kruw]

For an outside observer, it might be. But their blockchain analysis partner, the one they don't want us talking about, might know more than us. Who knows, maybe their deal involves helping the enemy de-anonymize users of particular significance who have been targeted for de-anonymization. Oh boy, now I am going to hear about how Wasabi is open-source again.  

Blockchain analysis is also an "outside observer" just like the rest of us are, they have no special powers to deanonymize transactions.

[Pmalek]

Blockchain analysis is also an "outside observer" just like the rest of us are, they have no special powers to deanonymize transactions.

That's what you claim and want the public to think. I'm not saying the opposite is true, but I also don't trust you, Wasabi, or zkSNACKs. Blockchain analysis didn't strike this deal with zkSNACKs to be fed useless data they can't do much with and monetize. There could be something more there that the general public isn't supposed to know about. 

[Kruw]

That's what you claim and want the public to think. I'm not saying the opposite is true, but I also don't trust you, Wasabi, or zkSNACKs. Blockchain analysis didn't strike this deal with zkSNACKs to be fed useless data they can't do much with and monetize. There could be something more there that the general public isn't supposed to know about.  

You don't have to trust me, Wasabi, or zkSNACKs, all of the code is completely open source.  You can verify that your client never sends any data to zkSNACKs or any other third party.

[PrivacyG]

Now this discussion makes me wonder.  Is there any body who audited the code?  Some body who is not paid by Wasabi or Kruw I mean.

Pmalek, Kruw telling the truth is of course never a thing that is going to happen.  I do not believe Kruw or Wasabis team thinks BA is doing any thing good to Wasabi or Bitcoin.  Anyway.  Whether they think or not is just as bad.  If they think it is doing any good then they are straight up our enemy.  If they do not think so then they are huge liars to be avoided.

Kruw asks very malicious questions and it shows their true intentions.  He stated something and I asked two yes / no questions which he has been avoiding for a week now,

No one ever claimed that "it sucks morally to use SBF's money"[/i]

So you think it is morally correct to use money coming from crime?

It's harmless to rely on these reports even if they are inaccurate because there's no consequences for users who are mistakenly identified as "tainted".

Will they be able to enjoy private money?

And the radio silence is showing how cunning this Wasabi team can be.  I say Wasabi team including Kruw because there is no way some body spends this amount of time defending Wasabi without a correlation to their team.

I did not ever believe there would be some body in the Bitcoin world who I could put above Craig Wright on the list of people I would never trust.  It looks like I found a winner.

But maybe the questions have not been answered because Kruw either ignores my replies or put me on his Ignore List.  If some body else could ask them for me I would be appreciative.

[arabspaceship123]

I've looked but haven't found any site claiming they've audited the code. It's open source so it should've been picked up by devs who studied it for weaknesses or faults. If it hasn't been audited it wouldn't have been downloaded as often. I'm guessing devs would've posted by now if Wasabi Wallet wasn't safe.

Now this discussion makes me wonder.  Is there any body who audited the code?  Some body who is not paid by Wasabi or Kruw I mean.

[Pmalek]

My assumption:

Oh boy, now I am going to hear about how Wasabi is open-source again.  

Reality:

You don't have to trust me, Wasabi, or zkSNACKs, all of the code is completely open source.

Better late than never I guess. You missed to mention that immediately after my comment, but it's good that you remind us about the open-source nature of your software while having a love affair with the enemies of privacy. 

I say Wasabi team including Kruw because there is no way some body spends this amount of time defending Wasabi without a correlation to their team.

Of course he is connected to the team. He is on Bitcointalk to salvage the situation as best as he can and steer the conversation in directions that best suit Wasabi and himself.

But maybe the questions have not been answered because Kruw either ignores my replies or put me on his Ignore List.  If some body else could ask them for me I would be appreciative.

I don't think you are on ignore. He replies to BlackHatCoiner and o_e_l_e_o when they say something. And they were the first to be called thieves and scammers by him. He replies to me as well, and I was also a scammer and thief at some point in the future, but I am not hearing that as much lately. He probably forgets to point that out.

I've looked but haven't found any site claiming they've audited the code. It's open source so it should've been picked up by devs who studied it for weaknesses or faults. If it hasn't been audited it wouldn't have been downloaded as often. I'm guessing devs would've posted by now if Wasabi Wallet wasn't safe.

Whose devs? Wasabi's? If there was something in the code that shouldn't be there, you are not going to hear it from them. They would have put it there.

[o_e_l_e_o]

Now this discussion makes me wonder.  Is there any body who audited the code?  Some body who is not paid by Wasabi or Kruw I mean.

Who knows. I'm certainly not going to bother wasting my time. Wasabi already has a critical flaw in that it directly funds blockchain analysis and lets them censor users based on secret criteria. You can see the code for this here: https://github.com/zkSNACKs/WalletWasabi/blob/24843a7840e05056077ad46664a48f62ffb70c4f/WalletWasabi.Tests/UnitTests/WabiSabi/Backend/CoinVerifierTests.cs#L209-L211. Nobody not associated with Wasabi is going to waste their time looking for any further flaws, when this one is already more than enough to mean no one should ever use Wasabi.

Maybe that explains why Wasabi had horrendous address reuse before they finally got round to patching it: https://nitter.cz/HillebrandMax/status/1586249382097088512#m

But maybe the questions have not been answered because Kruw either ignores my replies or put me on his Ignore List.  If some body else could ask them for me I would be appreciative.

Don't take it personally. Kruw has been ignoring stuff he doesn't like or can't answer for the best part of a year now:

Step 1 - Get shown blockchain evidence of Wasabi address reuse
Step 2 - Ignore said evidence
Step 3 - Ask for the evidence you've just ignored
Step 4 - Go to Step 1