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[ABCbits]

The use of Wasabi Wallet is alreade a thing of the past. But I would still like to know what will happen to my Bitcoins once Wasabi Wallet claimes the Bitcoins are dirty?

IIRC you unable to participate on their CoinJoin activity. But privacy wise, blockchain analysis company now know owner of an address plan to use CoinJoin at certain time/date.

Has anyone experienced Bitcoins being blocked? From Wasabi Wallet or from an exchange?

No, but you can find people claim exchange block their mixed coin from Wasabi CoinJoin. Few examples,
https://www.reddit.com/r/Gemini/comments/usvlny/just_received_a_disturbing_requestemail_from/
https://www.reddit.com/r/WasabiWallet/comments/p3dw8q/coinjoin_inquiry_from_gemini/

[Kruw]

This is vague, can you explain to me what your concern is, exactly?

Chain analysis doesn't use IP addresses to de-anonymize Bitcoin users. It uses data coming from data brokers, as told by o_e_l_e_o, KYC-ed accounts, etc. An IP address doesn't tell much anyway.

I understand how a chain analysis business works.  I'm asking you what your concern is regarding Wasabi since Wasabi is specifically designed to defeat chain analysis businesses by coinjoining your BTC with other users, making it impossible for chain analysis businesses to trace inputs to outputs.

You are, once again, completely wrong.  The software does not spy on you.

Does the software deny outputs if the chain analysis says so? Then, it's partnership with spies, unless you don't think chain analysis is a spying service. Do you feel comfortable with using a software that uses your CoinJoin fees to fund your own spying? And be called "the best privacy service" at the same time? I don't.

No, the software does not deny outputs.  Your keys, your coins.

The use of Wasabi Wallet is alreade a thing of the past.

Wasabi Wallet just set a new all time record for coinjoin volume, so you're mistaken.

But I would still like to know what will happen to my Bitcoins once Wasabi Wallet claimes the Bitcoins are dirty?

Nothing happens if anyone calls your coins "dirty".  Your keys, your coins, you decide how to spend them, and there's nothing anyone else can do to stop you unless they have more than 51% of the Bitcoin network hashpower.

[BlackHatCoiner]

I'm asking you what your concern is regarding Wasabi since Wasabi is specifically designed to defeat chain analysis businesses by coinjoining your BTC with other users, making it impossible for chain analysis businesses to trace inputs to outputs.

If it's specially designed to defeat chain analysis businesses, why does zkSNACKs, which is the repository owner, cooperate with them and say they're likely to treat some outputs differently than others[1]?

No, the software does not deny outputs.  Your keys, your coins.

The software per se will not deny spending certain outputs, but the default coordinator (which I'm reminding you is hosted by the founder of this project) is not going to accept certain outputs from being mixed, according to their announcement.

Nothing happens if anyone calls your coins "dirty".

Apparently, it does happen. You're not allowed to mix them on the coordinator with the highest volume.

[1] https://twitter.com/wasabiwallet/status/1503091503207432193

[o_e_l_e_o]

-snip-

I'll assume the reason you are ignoring my points yet again is because I am right and you have no satisfactory answer.

If you use Wasabi, then the only coordinator with any volume is the coordinator which is run by the same people, and is anti-privacy and pro-censorship.

They are rejecting a source of good revenue by blocking those transactions.

They are protecting their revenue by implementing blacklists, not reducing it. If they are unable to run a censorship-free coordinator, then the correct thing to do would be to shut down their centralized coordinator and work towards setting up decentralized ones. Instead they opted to sacrifice their users' privacy, enforce the nonsense that is "taint", and attack bitcoin itself, in order to protect their own income stream.

I'm asking you what your concern is regarding Wasabi since Wasabi is specifically designed to defeat chain analysis businesses

Wasabi is specifically designed to defeat chain analysis businesses, and we do that by sending your money directly to them to pay for their services. Lmfao.

Your keys, your coins, you decide how to spend them, and there's nothing anyone else can do to stop you unless they have more than 51% of the Bitcoin network hashpower.

Or you use Wasabi, and then we will stop you coinjoining them because our blockchain analysis buddies spied on you on our behalf and told us that you are very naughty!


It is abundantly clear that you are part of Wasabi's team, and you have no desire to actually address our arguments but rather just repeat the same old nonsense talking points which have been thoroughly debunked on here, Twitter, Reddit, etc., many times.

Wasabi/zkSNACKs is pro-censorship, anti-fungibility, and anti-privacy.

[witcher_sense]

I understand how a chain analysis business works.  I'm asking you what your concern is regarding Wasabi since Wasabi is specifically designed to defeat chain analysis businesses by coinjoining your BTC with other users, making it impossible for chain analysis businesses to trace inputs to outputs.

Wasabi Wallet developers and concurrent shareholders of zkSNACKs company are not that interested in being defenders of fellow bitcoiner's privacy. Not only are they not helping you obfuscate your transactions, but also directly supporting and assisting chain surveillance companies, which, as we all know, consider any attempts at protecting one's privacy a serious crime or at least an act worth peering into. Wasabi Wallet devs, who run the "default" coordinator, collect all the data you send them: all inputs, outputs, tor identities, maybe even the information about your system, and share it with chain analysis companies thereby openly betraying what they promised to protect. Many people who thought Wasabi was really about privacy have been deanonymized and arrested thanks to Wasabi's flawed CoinJoin algorithm and collaboration with surveillance firms. I am not saying you should support illegal activity, but if this wallet doesn't work for criminals, it doesn't work for normies trying to protect their privacy.

[Kruw]

I'm asking you what your concern is regarding Wasabi since Wasabi is specifically designed to defeat chain analysis businesses by coinjoining your BTC with other users, making it impossible for chain analysis businesses to trace inputs to outputs.

If it's specially designed to defeat chain analysis businesses, why does zkSNACKs, which is the repository owner, cooperate with them and say they're likely to treat some outputs differently than others[1]?

No, the software does not deny outputs.  Your keys, your coins.

The software per se will not deny spending certain outputs, but the default coordinator (which I'm reminding you is hosted by the founder of this project) is not going to accept certain outputs from being mixed, according to their announcement.

So you don't actually have any concerns about the Wasabi software?   Your complaints are entirely about a single coordinator's customer terms of service.

Nothing happens if anyone calls your coins "dirty".

Apparently, it does happen. You're not allowed to mix them on the coordinator with the highest volume.

[1] https://twitter.com/wasabiwallet/status/1503091503207432193

Yeah that's exactly what I mean.  Nothing happens if someone calls your coins dirty, your coins stay exactly where they are and remain exactly as private as they were before.

-snip-

I'll assume the reason you are ignoring my points yet again is because I am right and you have no satisfactory answer.

I don't ignore your points and you are not right.  I respond to every single one of your posts explaining in detail exactly how you are wrong, here's examples of me doing so over and over and over:

By using Wasabi, given there are no alternative non-censoring coordinators, you are directly funding blockchain analysis and paying for the privilege of being censored.

That's a hard pass from me, thanks.

Again, you are completely wrong:  You can use ANY coordinator with Wasabi Wallet, there is no requirement to use the zkSNACKS coordinator.

I already acknowledged you can use a different coordinator. But as I pointed out above and you ignored (please correct me if I'm wrong - I have no desire to download software which is going to spy on me to check),

You are, once again, completely wrong.  The software does not spy on you.  There is no data Wasabi or any of its coordinators can collect about its users, period.  When you launch the wallet, your IP address is protected by default with Tor and your wallet addresses are protected by default with client side block filters.

And why would anyone waste time launching such a coordinator on software which links mixed outputs with toxic unmixed change outputs?

Wasabi does not have "toxic unmixed change outputs", anyone can verify this for themselves by looking at the blockchain:  https://mempool.space/tx/01a1a055719129397fb8344b5a09e6cfe72868c8e1d750e621d8b580c96bf77b

If you use Wasabi, then the only coordinator with any volume is the coordinator which is run by the same people, and is anti-privacy and pro-censorship.

They are rejecting a source of good revenue by blocking those transactions.

They are protecting their revenue by implementing blacklists, not reducing it. If they are unable to run a censorship-free coordinator, then the correct thing to do would be to shut down their centralized coordinator and work towards setting up decentralized ones. Instead they opted to sacrifice their users' privacy, enforce the nonsense that is "taint", and attack bitcoin itself, in order to protect their own income stream.

I'm asking you what your concern is regarding Wasabi since Wasabi is specifically designed to defeat chain analysis businesses

Wasabi is specifically designed to defeat chain analysis businesses, and we do that by sending your money directly to them to pay for their services. Lmfao.

Your keys, your coins, you decide how to spend them, and there's nothing anyone else can do to stop you unless they have more than 51% of the Bitcoin network hashpower.

Or you use Wasabi, and then we will stop you coinjoining them because our blockchain analysis buddies spied on you on our behalf and told us that you are very naughty!


It is abundantly clear that you are part of Wasabi's team, and you have no desire to actually address our arguments but rather just repeat the same old nonsense talking points which have been thoroughly debunked on here, Twitter, Reddit, etc., many times.

Wasabi/zkSNACKs is pro-censorship, anti-fungibility, and anti-privacy.

It's clear you have no concept that Wasabi Wallet is free and open source software.  Every single one of your criticisms has absolutely nothing to do with Wasabi Wallet or its privacy guarantees, you've spent every single response on this thread complaining about zkSNACKS customer policy instead.

I understand how a chain analysis business works.  I'm asking you what your concern is regarding Wasabi since Wasabi is specifically designed to defeat chain analysis businesses by coinjoining your BTC with other users, making it impossible for chain analysis businesses to trace inputs to outputs.

Wasabi Wallet developers and concurrent shareholders of zkSNACKs company are not that interested in being defenders of fellow bitcoiner's privacy. Not only are they not helping you obfuscate your transactions, but also directly supporting and assisting chain surveillance companies, which, as we all know, consider any attempts at protecting one's privacy a serious crime or at least an act worth peering into. Wasabi Wallet devs, who run the "default" coordinator, collect all the data you send them: all inputs, outputs, tor identities, maybe even the information about your system, and share it with chain analysis companies thereby openly betraying what they promised to protect. Many people who thought Wasabi was really about privacy have been deanonymized and arrested thanks to Wasabi's flawed CoinJoin algorithm and collaboration with surveillance firms. I am not saying you should support illegal activity, but if this wallet doesn't work for criminals, it doesn't work for normies trying to protect their privacy.

This is a lie.  Coordinators cannot collect data about coinjoin participants.

[BlackHatCoiner]

So you don't actually have any concerns about the Wasabi software?

I haven't studied the source code, but no. My concern doesn't go to the software per se. It goes on zkSNACKs' customer policy, which for the third time is the team behind Wasabi.

Yeah that's exactly what I mean.  Nothing happens if someone calls your coins dirty, your coins stay exactly where they are and remain exactly as private as they were before.

Which completely conflicts with the part where Wasabi is considered to be the best at privacy protection, and the gatekeeper of fungibility. It's not when it refuses to protect the privacy of users their chain analysis partner disapproves of, at the same time when there are completely censorship resistant alternatives.

[Kruw]

So you don't actually have any concerns about the Wasabi software?

I haven't studied the source code, but no. My concern doesn't go to the software per se. It goes on zkSNACKs' customer policy, which for the third time is the team behind Wasabi.

Yeah that's exactly what I mean.  Nothing happens if someone calls your coins dirty, your coins stay exactly where they are and remain exactly as private as they were before.

Which completely conflicts with the part where Wasabi is considered to be the best at privacy protection, and the gatekeeper of fungibility. It's not when it refuses to protect the privacy of users their chain analysis partner disapproves of, at the same time when there are completely censorship resistant alternatives.

What sort of "completely censorship resistant alternatives" are you referring to?

[o_e_l_e_o]

Yawn. Since I've linked to my post where I point out definitive proof of Wasabi's address reuse twice, and you've ignored it both times, I'll just quote it here for anyone else reading this thread to look in to themselves.

Any other privacy matters that may have surfaced lately?

Wasabi has been reusing addresses, a lot, which has resulted in a lot of post-mix coins being linked back to pre-mix coins and being de-anonymized. And then the devs have been on Twitter, both defending that it is "acceptable" and also lying about it entirely.

Here's an example thread: https://nitter.it/HillebrandMax/status/1586249382097088512#m
Gets shown address reuse, claims it isn't from 2.0 and that it has never happened in 2.0. Then gets shown address reuse from 2.0, and says they've already patched it. How could they have patched it while also claiming it has never happened? They are lying somewhere.

Here's another example: https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872#m
And dozens more: https://nitter.it/wasabistats

But the devs don't care, because apparently some address reuse is "acceptable": https://nitter.it/HillebrandMax/status/1586321068129939456#m

Even Bitcoin Core devs are aware of this: https://nitter.it/1440000bytes/status/1611713687123030017

But good job of sticking to the party line of just outright denying it and gaslighting anyone who points it out.

[Kruw]

Yawn. Since I've linked to my post where I point out definitive proof of Wasabi's address reuse twice, and you've ignored it both times, I'll just quote it here for anyone else reading this thread to look in to themselves.

Any other privacy matters that may have surfaced lately?

Wasabi has been reusing addresses, a lot, which has resulted in a lot of post-mix coins being linked back to pre-mix coins and being de-anonymized. And then the devs have been on Twitter, both defending that it is "acceptable" and also lying about it entirely.

Here's an example thread: https://nitter.it/HillebrandMax/status/1586249382097088512#m
Gets shown address reuse, claims it isn't from 2.0 and that it has never happened in 2.0. Then gets shown address reuse from 2.0, and says they've already patched it. How could they have patched it while also claiming it has never happened? They are lying somewhere.

Here's another example: https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872#m
And dozens more: https://nitter.it/wasabistats

But the devs don't care, because apparently some address reuse is "acceptable": https://nitter.it/HillebrandMax/status/1586321068129939456#m

Even Bitcoin Core devs are aware of this: https://nitter.it/1440000bytes/status/1611713687123030017

But good job of sticking to the party line of just outright denying it and gaslighting anyone who points it out.

What am I being accused of outright denying?

[BlackHatCoiner]

What sort of "completely censorship resistant alternatives" are you referring to?

JoinMarket, ChipMixer (before it shut down), Lightning Network-- basically every other mixing method besides Wasabi by default.

[Kruw]

What sort of "completely censorship resistant alternatives" are you referring to?

JoinMarket, ChipMixer (before it shut down), Lightning Network-- basically every other mixing method besides Wasabi by default.

While Joinmarket and Lightning have better censorship resistance opportunities than centralized coinjoin coordination, ChipMixer obviously does not belong on this list. The censorship that Chipmixer was a victim of resulted in not only the government denying service to ChipMixers customers, but resulted in the confiscation of customer funds and transaction history stored by the centralized custodian.

A centralized coinjoin coordinator is more censorship resistant than a centralized custodian because a coinjoin coordinator is not able to give your coins or reveal any user data to a government even if they were forced to.

[BlackHatCoiner]

While Joinmarket and Lightning have better censorship resistance opportunities than centralized coinjoin coordination, ChipMixer obviously does not belong on this list.

ChipMixer never denied to mix coins, as long as it was alive. I think it pretty much belongs on this list.

The censorship that Chipmixer was a victim of resulted not only in the government denying service to ChipMixers customers, but resulted in the confiscation of funds and transaction history stored by the centralized custodian.

That's why I said before it shut down. There was no ChipMixer after it was seized by authorities.

A centralized coinjoin coordinator is strictly better than a centralized custodian because a coinjoin coordinator is not able to give your coins or reveal any user data to a government even if they were forced to.

Sure, and it's safer to not hand over your coins to anybody if you had the choice, but it is irrelevant to what a mixer is supposed to do; and that is mix and ensure fungibility and privacy. Two of which are now questionably offered by Wasabi's default coordinator.

[PrivacyG]

That's not how it works, you do not have to identify yourself to register a UTXO for coinjoin.

Quote the part where I said you have to identify yourself to register a UTXO for Coin Join.  Because at this point you are really conveniently interpreting what you read your own way and answering very conveniently and cunningly to very strong and valid arguments users have posted here.

Each UTXO is registered under a single use Tor identity in Wasabi to preserve your privacy from everyone, including the coordinator and other round participants.

And this has zeero to do with what I was saying.

I will organize a very select party where I will invite 10 people that I specifically choose.  But, we will all be blind folded once the party begins.  You are telling me there is no way I can know or guess with a 10% chance of being correct who is the guy dancing around me while I am blind folded?

-----

What is your relation to Wasabi?

[Wind_FURY]

They are rejecting a source of good revenue by blocking those transactions.

They are protecting their revenue by implementing blacklists, not reducing it.

It's a trade-off. They rejected a source of good revenue to protect themselves from getting into mix-ups with the government.

If they are unable to run a censorship-free coordinator, then the correct thing to do would be to shut down their centralized coordinator and work towards setting up decentralized ones.

That's a good solution, but you can't tell a centralized entity what, and what not to do. We can express your opinion, or tell our fellow users to stop using Wasabi, but it would be laughable to expect that we tell them how to run their business.

Instead they opted to sacrifice their users' privacy, enforce the nonsense that is "taint", and attack bitcoin itself, in order to protect their own income stream.

Instead of telling them what to do, show them how it's done the right way. Why not fork the coordinator and have it accept all transactions.

[o_e_l_e_o]

Instead of telling them what to do, show them how it's done the right way. Why not fork the coordinator and have it accept all transactions.

Because as I've shown above, the Wasabi wallet software itself is deeply flawed and reuses addresses on both sides of coinjoin transactions. Why fork flawed software in order to launch your own coordinator to bypass the anti-fungibility and anti-privacy ethos of Wasabi/zkSNACKs, when I can just use JoinMarket or Samourai with my own node which avoid all these issues in the first place.

[Kruw]

A centralized coinjoin coordinator is strictly better than a centralized custodian because a coinjoin coordinator is not able to give your coins or reveal any user data to a government even if they were forced to.

Sure, and it's safer to not hand over your coins to anybody if you had the choice, but it is irrelevant to what a mixer is supposed to do; and that is mix and ensure fungibility and privacy. Two of which are now questionably offered by Wasabi's default coordinator.

A centralized mixer is just someone else's wallet, it does nothing ensure fungibility or privacy because they are able to deanonymize their customers.

That's not how it works, you do not have to identify yourself to register a UTXO for coinjoin.

Quote the part where I said you have to identify yourself to register a UTXO for Coin Join.  Because at this point you are really conveniently interpreting what you read your own way and answering very conveniently and cunningly to very strong and valid arguments users have posted here.

Okay, I've quoted the part where you said you have to identify yourself to register a UTXO for coinjoin:

they only allow UTXO's they trust to enter the Coin Join process. ... If you have say 20 UTXO's but you know who each of them is.

I will organize a very select party where I will invite 10 people that I specifically choose.?

Coinjoins are not "very select parties" where 10 people are "specifically chosen" to attend.  It's the exact opposite:  Coinjoins are open parties where the dancers specifically choose which party to attend.

What is your relation to Wasabi?

I'm a contributor.

[Pmalek]

Coinjoins are not "very select parties" where 10 people are "specifically chosen" to attend.  It's the exact opposite:  Coinjoins are open parties where the dancers specifically choose which party to attend.

If they are allowed to enter. They are public parties you can freely enter if you fulfill the requirements of their co-host. The co host checks your clothes, your date, how much you weigh, how your hair smells, and the color of your eyes. If everything is OK, you can come in. Our partners will keep a close eye on you though. If we notice something iffy about you or something we don't like, you aren't coming in to our free public party. The co-host is a symbol for Wasabi's blockchain analysis partner. 

[BlackHatCoiner]

A centralized mixer is just someone else's wallet, it does nothing ensure fungibility or privacy because they are able to deanonymize their customers.

What someone is capable of doing and what is doing are two different things. If a mixer has gained users' trust, and indeed does not share the data, I don't see where's the problem with considering it privacy respecting.

Coinjoins are open parties where the dancers specifically choose which party to attend.

So solve the mystery:

• Wasabi team thrives to bring fungibility as they say.
• Wasabi team runs a coordinator which treats some inputs differently than some others, practicing blacklisting.

One of those must be false, otherwise Wasabi team contradicts themselves.

[Kruw]

Coinjoins are not "very select parties" where 10 people are "specifically chosen" to attend.  It's the exact opposite:  Coinjoins are open parties where the dancers specifically choose which party to attend.

If they are allowed to enter. They are public parties you can freely enter if you fulfill the requirements of their co-host. The co host checks your clothes, your date, how much you weigh, how your hair smells, and the color of your eyes. If everything is OK, you can come in. Our partners will keep a close eye on you though. If we notice something iffy about you or something we don't like, you aren't coming in to our free public party. The co-host is a symbol for Wasabi's blockchain analysis partner.  

That's a pretty close metaphor, but the only thing the co host can do is glance at a people who walk through the door to see if they look identical to any mugshots of the "most wanted" criminal list posted in the town square.

A centralized mixer is just someone else's wallet, it does nothing ensure fungibility or privacy because they are able to deanonymize their customers.

What someone is capable of doing and what is doing are two different things. If a mixer has gained users' trust, and indeed does not share the data, I don't see where's the problem with considering it privacy respecting.

The problem is that the "trustworthy" mixer gave 7TB of its users' data to government raiders.  This is why Wasabi is designed not to collect any data whatsoever, a government raid of any coordinator would do nothing to affect the privacy of its users.

Coinjoins are open parties where the dancers specifically choose which party to attend.

So solve the mystery:

• Wasabi team thrives to bring fungibility as they say.
• Wasabi team runs a coordinator which treats some inputs differently than some others, practicing blacklisting.

One of those must be false, otherwise Wasabi team contradicts themselves.

Wasabi brings privacy, privacy brings fungibility.  Non private coins are not fungible until a coordinator chooses to make them private.  If no coordinators want to make your coins private, then coordinate your own coinjoin and restore the fungibility yourself.