[ANN][DASH] Dash (dash.org) | First Self-Funding Self-Governing Crypto Currency

[salmion]

Another serious advantage we have over other coins at the moment is that we are transparent in our methods.

We actually explain how it works. As opposed to most of the others who are still "totes anon promise coming soon.."

[thunderdrum]

Holding some darks,so sad price is still low, I think it is undervalued

It's totally undervalued.

Need RC4 to come out without the 10 dark limit so we can start hitting real world applications.

+1

Bingo!

Guys, would you please just let me get more cheap DRK? 

[JGCMiner]

Well the primary idea was discussion on enhancing the anonymity levels utilizing more MNs and assess any impacts in terms of bloat etc by going this route. Fees are not really the focus and the concern is understandable but derailing the main point.

Exactly.

Far too many people jumping on this DRK is for MN owners to get rich angle which is totally untrue. People need to read and understand the discussion before commenting. That argument should be made for a proof of stake coin -- DRK is proof of service. Without the masternodes you don't have Darksend(+), without incentives people would not run masternodes, but somehow the existence of masternodes is a scam.

So frustrating.  

I have several MN. But I certainly think the fees proposals was an idiotic one nevertheless it is not like MN owners do not get already paid for the anon service.

And to get back on track, I already explained why providing different level of service is not a good one neither.

It could be an option. More mixing depth means a longer wait anyway.  If people are willing to sacrifice time for more anonymity then if it is technically possible then why not.

The fees stuff was all obviously "thinking aloud" as eltito stated. "What if people could bloat the blockchain with by using this option.... Then we should ....". Nothing to be concerned about.

[stilgars]

Well the primary idea was discussion on enhancing the anonymity levels utilizing more MNs and assess any impacts in terms of bloat etc by going this route. Fees are not really the focus and the concern is understandable but derailing the main point.

Exactly.

Far too many people jumping on this DRK is for MN owners to get rich angle which is totally untrue. People need to read and understand the discussion before commenting. That argument should be made for a proof of stake coin -- DRK is proof of service. Without the masternodes you don't have Darksend(+), without incentives people would not run masternodes, but somehow the existence of masternodes is a scam.

So frustrating.  

I have several MN. But I certainly think the fees proposals was an idiotic one nevertheless it is not like MN owners do not get already paid for the anon service.

And to get back on track, I already explained why providing different level of service is not a good one neither.

It could be an option. More mixing depth means a longer wait anyway.  If people are willing to sacrifice time for more anonymity then if it is technically possible then why not.

The fees stuff was all obviously "thinking aloud" as eltito stated. "What if people could bloat the blockchain with by using this option.... Then we should ....". Nothing to be concerned about.

Great, but let me explain why it is not a good idea that could enrich the coin features, but just a gimmick that would only cause confusion and PR damages when comparing DRK to competition.

2 things:
if normal anon procedure is not good enough for people to use it on critical transactions confidently, then instead of providing a paid wall, the community should focus on providing a good basic level of service from the start.
if it does provide a satisfying service level, then adding more options is purely gimmickal, and the additional service would be use very rarely, because of its limited interest since normal service is already good enough. Therefore, using this kind of option would be at the end some kind of big red flag bringing some specific curiosity into the transaction you are so desperate to hide. No good.

EDIT: and the fact that some fees could be required could even decrease the anonymity of the transaction potentially, in my opinion.

[luigi1111]

Two things to take away from that exchange:

Extra fees for better features is a bad idea.  It's not going to happen.

Should it become necessary for the safety of the network, we could look at ways to discourage malicious, intentional bloating of the blockchain by making it costly to do so.

Everything else was just people thinking out loud.

I don't really see it this way.

If we were literally talking about charging XX for doing extra mixing, that's silly, and I'm 100% against it. It doesn't even make sense.

To me, normal TX fees is what makes sense. You want extra anonymity:
Extra anonymity/privacy/security/whatever = extra mixing = extra transactions = extra fees (20% of which would go to MN)

Edit: to clarify, mixing is *free*. You can't then charge for multiple mixings when one is free. Doing multiple rounds of mixing absolutely improves anonymity, as more people coins get involved and the probabilities go down.

[novaboy2k]

Bitcoin Report #3 | Darkcoin, Anonymity and fungibility

DefunctEconomics Darkcoin

Edit: New URL

New Url

[AlexGR]

The fees stuff was all obviously "thinking aloud" as eltito stated. "What if people could bloat the blockchain with by using this option.... Then we should ....". Nothing to be concerned about.

These are things that have to be built in as design parameters. You can't expect the attack to happen and then patch.

Bloat = cost.

No cost = tremendous bloat for the lulz.

[stilgars]

The fees stuff was all obviously "thinking aloud" as eltito stated. "What if people could bloat the blockchain with by using this option.... Then we should ....". Nothing to be concerned about.

These are things that have to be built in as design parameters. You can't expect the attack to happen and then patch.

Bloat = cost.

No cost = tremendous bloat for the lulz.

Well the answer is quite simple, no option to bloat the blockchain at all, given current baseline anonymity is good enough for everyone, using the current safeguardings already in place in the btc protocol (transaction fees required if coin age <<)

[GhostPlayer]

Holding some darks,so sad price is still low, I think it is undervalued

It's totally undervalued.

Need RC4 to come out without the 10 dark limit so we can start hitting real world applications.

+1

Bingo!

Guys, would you please just let me get more cheap DRK?  

I would, if I had more to invest !!  
Unfortunately I don't, so hoping for the price launch sooner than later.
 In any case, community wise,

 +1

[ddink7]

{SNIP}
A medium of exchange. I think we all know how easy is to copy code when it is open source and most would agree that this project won't be successful if it the DrakSend(+) source code doesn't become availble. In this case it could be copied and the lack of anonymity fees being touted as a feature of another coin.

No offense intended, but the "clone coin" argument is the most spurious one out there. No clone has ever, ever, EVER come even remotely close to rivaling the "original" with the possible exception of some of the Cryptonote copies. Network effects are simply too strong to overcome without actual innovation. Just look at all the NXT clones!

In that case why does Darksend source need to be closed for the moment? Because we don't want a competitor reverse engineering it and stealing our features before we've gained an insurmountable lead.

[crackfoo]

Earn your own DRK coins by mining at the multipool. Not only that, you can earn DRK using your old ASIC hardware on SHA256 and SCRYPT coins!

DarkCoin by xpool - DRK Multipool

 

http://www.xpool.ca

PROP reward system

DRK Payouts

Scrypt & SHA256 & X11 Algo's

DDoS Protected

High Performance Backend

Simple setup and usage

0% Fees while in BETA

To mine:

http://www.xpool.ca/get_started

How does it work?

xpool offers 3 different sets of coins to mine. SHA256, Scrypt and X11. Each algorithm runs on a shift. Currently there is no set interval as there needs to be enough found and confirmed blocks to make trading worthwhile on the exchanges. We don't want to finish a shift only to find out, the exchanges are going to eat up the payout in fees or limit the withdraw with a large minimum. The confirmed coins are traded throughout the duration of the shift automatically to maximize the profits from exchanging them into DRK. Once enough confirmed blocked are accumulated, the shift is moved into "Trading" status while all the exchanged coins are calculated into DRK and then queued for payment. Once all the coins are confirmed as successfully traded and exchanged, the DRK payments are sent.

As the pool picks up more hashing speed and sufficient DRK can be picked up from the exchanges, the shifts will be set to a schedule and payouts more frequent and less worry about the exchanges. This is a growing phase so the more hash support the better.
If a DRK block is found, there's no exchanging or loss of fees as it can simply be moved into the X11 payout queue.

The advantage of the pool is that you can utilize your older ASIC equipment to earn you the more desired DarkCoin.

Cheers and Happy Hashing!

Donations welcome!

!

8.5011 DRK sent out for the last scrypt shift!

Cheers!

[luigi1111]

The fees stuff was all obviously "thinking aloud" as eltito stated. "What if people could bloat the blockchain with by using this option.... Then we should ....". Nothing to be concerned about.

These are things that have to be built in as design parameters. You can't expect the attack to happen and then patch.

Bloat = cost.

No cost = tremendous bloat for the lulz.

Well the answer is quite simple, no option to bloat the blockchain at all, given current baseline anonymity is good enough for everyone, using the current safeguardings already in place in the btc protocol (transaction fees required if coin age <<)

How do you know it's "good enough for everyone"? Sure, it's pretty hard/impossible to prove a link, but if there's for example only 3 senders > 3 recipients, there's still the straight probabilities in play. Someone dead set on finding out who sent money to recipient A could possibly track down all 3 senders. Anonymity/privacy *always* has caveats. You can accomplish approximately what is being suggested by Darksending to a newly generated address for yourself, then forwarding the coins from there in another Darksend transaction. It takes longer and costs more, but you get "better" anonymity.

[stilgars]

The fees stuff was all obviously "thinking aloud" as eltito stated. "What if people could bloat the blockchain with by using this option.... Then we should ....". Nothing to be concerned about.

These are things that have to be built in as design parameters. You can't expect the attack to happen and then patch.

Bloat = cost.

No cost = tremendous bloat for the lulz.

Well the answer is quite simple, no option to bloat the blockchain at all, given current baseline anonymity is good enough for everyone, using the current safeguardings already in place in the btc protocol (transaction fees required if coin age <<)

How do you know it's "good enough for everyone"? Sure, it's pretty hard/impossible to prove a link, but if there's for example only 3 senders > 3 recipients, there's still the straight probabilities in play. Someone dead set on finding out who sent money to recipient A could possibly track down all 3 senders. Anonymity/privacy *always* has caveats. You can accomplish approximately what is being suggested by Darksending to a newly generated address for yourself, then forwarding the coins from there in another Darksend transaction. It takes longer and costs more, but you get "better" anonymity.

so you basically infer that the main feature of darkcoin, darksend/darksend+, could not provide good enough anonymity at the core level to discourage a normal attacker (not the N*A) to identify the two parties if he really wants to?

[illodin]

so you basically infer that the main feature of darkcoin, darksend/darksend+, could not provide good enough anonymity at the core level to discourage a normal attacker (not the N*A) to identify the two parties if he really wants to?

Depends on what is good enough, and what the "core level" is ultimately decided to be.

[georgem]

Thanks to uzer23 and camosoul for donating yesterday.

[dark-sailor]

Hi all

I updated my masternode to 10.11.6 yesterday around 6 oclock and I was getting

2014-07-10 16:24:19 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:19 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.79.17.203:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:19 ERROR: CTxMemPool::acceptableInputs() : inputs already spent
2014-07-10 16:24:19 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:24 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 208.98.43.115:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:24 ERROR: CTxMemPool::acceptableInputs() : inputs already spent
2014-07-10 16:24:24 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:24 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 208.98.43.115:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:24 ERROR: CTxMemPool::acceptableInputs() : inputs already spent
2014-07-10 16:24:24 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:24 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 208.98.43.115:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:24 ERROR: CTxMemPool::acceptableInputs() : inputs already spent
2014-07-10 16:24:24 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:24 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 208.98.43.115:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:24 ERROR: CTxMemPool::acceptableInputs() : inputs already spent
2014-07-10 16:24:24 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:25 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 208.98.43.115:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:25 ERROR: CTxMemPool::acceptableInputs() : inputs already spent
2014-07-10 16:24:25 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:27 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 95.141.42.164:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:27 ERROR: CTxMemPool::acceptableInputs() : inputs already spent
2014-07-10 16:24:27 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:27 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 95.141.42.164:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:27 ERROR: CTxMemPool::acceptableInputs() : inputs already spent
2014-07-10 16:24:27 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:27 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 95.141.42.164:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:27 ERROR: CTxMemPool::acceptableInputs() : inputs already spent
2014-07-10 16:24:27 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 95.141.42.164:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:28 ERROR: CTxMemPool::acceptableInputs() : inputs already spent
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 95.141.42.164:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:28 ERROR: CTxMemPool::acceptableInputs() : inputs already spent
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.183.113.43:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.183.113.43:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.183.113.43:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.183.113.43:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.183.113.43:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:28 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:42 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.215.144.238:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:42 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:42 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.215.144.238:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:42 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:42 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.215.144.238:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:42 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:42 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.215.144.238:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:42 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:42 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.215.144.238:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:42 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:46 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 209.222.30.172:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:46 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:47 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 209.222.30.172:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:47 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:47 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 209.222.30.172:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:47 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:47 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 209.222.30.172:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:47 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:47 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 209.222.30.172:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:47 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:50 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.215.194.252:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:50 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:50 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.215.194.252:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:50 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:50 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.215.194.252:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:50 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:50 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.215.194.252:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:50 dsee - Rejected masternode entry
2014-07-10 16:24:50 dsee - Got NEW masternode entry 54.215.194.252:9999
2014-07-10 16:24:50 dsee - Rejected masternode entry

So I thought I would leave it for 24 hours and Its still doing the same thing. I am showing all green on https://elbzo.net/masternodes.html my ip is 108.61.196.103 all looks fine. Is this normal

[luigi1111]

The fees stuff was all obviously "thinking aloud" as eltito stated. "What if people could bloat the blockchain with by using this option.... Then we should ....". Nothing to be concerned about.

These are things that have to be built in as design parameters. You can't expect the attack to happen and then patch.

Bloat = cost.

No cost = tremendous bloat for the lulz.

Well the answer is quite simple, no option to bloat the blockchain at all, given current baseline anonymity is good enough for everyone, using the current safeguardings already in place in the btc protocol (transaction fees required if coin age <<)

How do you know it's "good enough for everyone"? Sure, it's pretty hard/impossible to prove a link, but if there's for example only 3 senders > 3 recipients, there's still the straight probabilities in play. Someone dead set on finding out who sent money to recipient A could possibly track down all 3 senders. Anonymity/privacy *always* has caveats. You can accomplish approximately what is being suggested by Darksending to a newly generated address for yourself, then forwarding the coins from there in another Darksend transaction. It takes longer and costs more, but you get "better" anonymity.

so you basically infer that the main feature of darkcoin, darksend/darksend+, could not provide good enough anonymity at the core level to discourage a normal attacker (not the N*A) to identify the two parties if he really wants to?

That is not my intention, no.

Edit: I'm not trying to come at this from my "pedestal" as if I have all the answers; sorry if I'm coming off that way. Rather, I'm trying to pose valid ideas and questions.

so you basically infer that the main feature of darkcoin, darksend/darksend+, could not provide good enough anonymity at the core level to discourage a normal attacker (not the N*A) to identify the two parties if he really wants to?

Depends on what is good enough, and what the "core level" is ultimately decided to be.

This is really what it boils down to. I further submit the question: is it our responsibility to decide what is "good enough"? << not rhetorical

[fernando]

I am Mr Ricardo big holder and a person prosperous in giving away. I am helping communities here and there to stand on their ground. My wealth carefully gathered and multiplied to do giveways for each person, who are the honest adopter of his intentions and making productive activity. I will bring to your community years of experience in various branches of science and technologies, i have a smooths collaboration with genuine and high-rated persons behind me. Soon i will disclose the main goal i am here for.

----
Mr Ricardo

This guy is spamming all forums and irc. Beware

Don't be so hard, he probably has a few million usd trapped in Nigeria and needs some help to get them out.

[stilgars]

The fees stuff was all obviously "thinking aloud" as eltito stated. "What if people could bloat the blockchain with by using this option.... Then we should ....". Nothing to be concerned about.

These are things that have to be built in as design parameters. You can't expect the attack to happen and then patch.

Bloat = cost.

No cost = tremendous bloat for the lulz.

Well the answer is quite simple, no option to bloat the blockchain at all, given current baseline anonymity is good enough for everyone, using the current safeguardings already in place in the btc protocol (transaction fees required if coin age <<)

How do you know it's "good enough for everyone"? Sure, it's pretty hard/impossible to prove a link, but if there's for example only 3 senders > 3 recipients, there's still the straight probabilities in play. Someone dead set on finding out who sent money to recipient A could possibly track down all 3 senders. Anonymity/privacy *always* has caveats. You can accomplish approximately what is being suggested by Darksending to a newly generated address for yourself, then forwarding the coins from there in another Darksend transaction. It takes longer and costs more, but you get "better" anonymity.

same way some guy satoshi decided 6 confirmations was good enough to prevent double spendings.
someone just needs to do some maths and makes an executive decision based on that.

[luigi1111]

The fees stuff was all obviously "thinking aloud" as eltito stated. "What if people could bloat the blockchain with by using this option.... Then we should ....". Nothing to be concerned about.

These are things that have to be built in as design parameters. You can't expect the attack to happen and then patch.

Bloat = cost.

No cost = tremendous bloat for the lulz.

Well the answer is quite simple, no option to bloat the blockchain at all, given current baseline anonymity is good enough for everyone, using the current safeguardings already in place in the btc protocol (transaction fees required if coin age <<)

How do you know it's "good enough for everyone"? Sure, it's pretty hard/impossible to prove a link, but if there's for example only 3 senders > 3 recipients, there's still the straight probabilities in play. Someone dead set on finding out who sent money to recipient A could possibly track down all 3 senders. Anonymity/privacy *always* has caveats. You can accomplish approximately what is being suggested by Darksending to a newly generated address for yourself, then forwarding the coins from there in another Darksend transaction. It takes longer and costs more, but you get "better" anonymity.

same way some guy satoshi decided 6 confirmations was good enough to prevent double spendings.
someone just needs to do some maths and makes an executive decision based on that.

But Satoshi doesn't get to determine that. Whoever is receiving the coins can determine any number of confirms they please to. Bitpay takes 0 confirms for example. (at least in my experience using them; not sure what they have going on behind the scenes)