[XMR] Monero - A secure, private, untraceable cryptocurrency

[ifightformerkel]

pump starting

[eizh]

If sync time is your argument against actual anonymity rather than pretend anonymity, that's rather unconvincing.

Ok, I'm clueless.

Question: Is Anonymint clueless? Is he blind that he does not see "actual anonymity"? When he says that most of the anonymity will come from IP obfuscation, is that a vote of confidence for the protocol itself?

He bases this on 2 things:

1. He wants built-in IP obfuscation. You could also argue that it's an independent function that's already available with other software. In any case, I think CN-based coins will eventually have I2P once a dev gets around to it. It makes sense to make it easier (for the less technically-capable user), but this is not a systemic limitation and it doesn't have anything to do with CN v. Zero v. CoinJoin.

He also wants something better than Tor or I2P. I asked him what, and he said what he envisioned doesn't exist yet. AnonyMint is an idealist who will find fault in everything (not that there's anything wrong with that). You should maybe see his other post where he compared the practical aspects of the various anonymity systems and said CN probably has the best trade-off choices. gmaxwell said the same. I'm paraphrasing - neither of them are necessarily pro-CN.

2. He misunderstood the implementation of ring signatures. Outputs are broken down so matching pairs can always be found and rendered indistinguishable. He initially thought that they weren't, which would require exact matching of totals. Hence the comment that the opportunity to use ring signatures is rare. You can actually always use them with the way BCN implemented it. (It's actually CoinJoin that has this very problem, because it requires concurrent participants.)

[eizh]

I already answered that and you can use tor and i2p just fine with monero already.
You seem to have no clue about IT in general if you aren't able to route Monero through tor via tsocks or use a VM system like Whonix which has a decided TOR Gateway VM.
google: proxifier, tsocks, whonix etc...

Crypto Zoidberg is correct...

AlexGR, it would be nice if u stay in your DRK thread, we all know you are a big bagholder there and we don't care about it, this is about Monero and nothing else.

The quantum computer nonsense is also already answered.

I recommend to DRK holders that they partially diversify to put an end to this obvious insecurity. Diversification is smart financially, too.

[TTM]

Ok, I'm clueless.

Question: Is Anonymint clueless? Is he blind that he does not see "actual anonymity"? When he says that most of the anonymity will come from IP obfuscation, is that a vote of confidence for the protocol itself?

AnonyMint was not fully understanding Crytonote in that quote. And he was referring to another issue of privacy which is hiding IP address, not the point you are using to bash Cryptonote.

I don't know why Darkcoin fan boys seems to worship AnonyMint so much, they refer to him everytime they're bashing other competitors.

Have you forgotten that he critics Darkcoin even more ?

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=421615.msg5458409#msg5458409
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=421615.msg5465510#msg5465510

[smooth]

On the issue of bloat, there is a very simple way to reduce it. Just use a mixin count of 1 (mixing two outputs). This still gives deniability although it does not give great tracing resistance. But to get back tracing resistance, do multiple transactions in sequence. If you do 7 transactions each with 2-way mixing, you have tracing resistance of 128 with bloat of only 13x. In practice there is per-transaction overhead not just per signature so maybe something like 3 or 4 is better than two. But you certainly never need to use very high mixin counts. Eventually wallets can be made to do this automatically.

On pruning there are definitely solutions. An really obvious one with some equally obvious tradeoffs is to drop everything more than a year old. It means if you want to keep your coins you have to move them once a year (or use a service provider to do it), and that you don't want to choose mixins from very old transactions. I think there are other solutions as well.

[AlexGR]

He bases this on 2 things:

1. He wants built-in IP obfuscation. You could also argue that it's an independent function that's already available with other software. In any case, I think CN-based coins will eventually have I2P once a dev gets around to it. It makes sense to make it easier (for the less technically-capable user), but this is not a systemic limitation and it doesn't have anything to do with CN v. Zero v. CoinJoin.

He also wants something better than Tor or I2P. I asked him what, and he said what he envisioned that exist yet. AnonyMint is an idealist who will find fault in everything (not that there's anything wrong with that). You should maybe see his other post where he compared the practical aspects of the various anonymity systems and said CN probably has the best trade-off choices. gmaxwell said the same.

Yes, but if the protocol is giving you away if you don't use IP obfuscation, then how is that anonymous in itself?

That's why I'd not use "true anonymity", "pretend anonymity" etc so easily.

2. He misunderstood the implementation of ring signatures. Outputs are broken down so matching pairs can always be found and rendered indistinguishable. He initially thought that they weren't, which would require exact matching of totals. Hence the comment that the opportunity to use ring signatures is rare. You can actually always use them with the way BCN implemented it. (It's actually CoinJoin that has this very problem, because it requires concurrent participants.)

Ok, so in your understanding, has Anonymint been in error of judgement and that BCN offers True Anonyminity[TM] as it is right now, with no mods?

[smooth]

Have you forgotten that he critics Darkcoin even more ?

Dude, even though you seem to be on the MRO side of this debate, your post has nothing to do with MRO.

Please take it elsewhere.

If we have to we will switch to a self-moderated thread but I'd rather not do that.

[unpure]

Anyone have a mining guide on these?

[smooth]

Yes, but if the protocol is giving you away if you don't use IP obfuscation, then how is that anonymous in itself?

Anonymous is an ambiguous term, it means different things to different people, in different contexts

Look back at the first post on this thread. Monero (really Cryptonote, on which it is based) does not promise anonymity. It promises things like "blockchain analysis resistance." The Monero team in particular is not promising "anonymity" to anyone. We are saying that this technology protects your privacy much better than alternatives such as bitcoin, which it most certainly does.  

Used carefully (which includes care about revealing your IP address), it can probably maintain anonymity, but no one is promising that. Who knows what back doors there might be in any encryption algorithm, your computer's chips, etc.  IF you go far enough down the rabbit hole,  you can't promise -- nor be confident about -- anything.

So let's keep the straw men to a minimum and focus the conversation on what MRO does, is trying to do, and might do in the future.

[AlexGR]

On the issue of bloat, there is a very simple way to reduce it. Just use a mixin count of 1 (mixing two outputs). This still gives deniability although it does not give great tracing resistance. But to get back tracing resistance, do multiple transactions in sequence. If you do 7 transactions each with 2-way mixing, you have tracing resistance of 128 with bloat of only 13x. In practice there is per-transaction overhead not just per signature so maybe something like 3 or 4 is better than two. But you certainly never need to use very high mixin counts. Eventually wallets can be made to do this automatically.

Question 1: Can it be set with something like a slide-bar, on demand, per transaction? Like I want to launder it 5 times or 2 times.

Question 2: Can an evil entity attack the blockchain by artificially bloating it with tons of bogus transactions? What would be the estimated cost of the attacker in order to make the blockchain unusable?

[aminorex]

I am starting to see higher lows and higher highs on a 15 min chart, so I am starting to feel vindicated in the claim that 0.0026 was the bottom.  I expected a faster recovery to .005, which was wrong, but I am happy to wait for it in this, more sustainable, regime.

As I become more familiar with the tech and the dev team, my confidence in the likelihood that this coin will attain leadership in its market has increased continuously.  I'm unlikely to increase my stake very much, but happy to stay in once I get to 8:1 BTC:MRO, and looking forward to seeing facts on the ground which justify a more closely balanced allocation.

The number of trolls may be annoying, but it is also a kind of validation.  The devils only fight when they are able to see the angels advance.  Calm, confident, and factually sound will win the PR marathon.

[sorryforthat]

The devils only fight when they are able to see the angels advance.

Absolutly love this. I took your advice the first time you posted about prices and I do not regret it in the least. Thank you much for you input

[smooth]

On the issue of bloat, there is a very simple way to reduce it. Just use a mixin count of 1 (mixing two outputs). This still gives deniability although it does not give great tracing resistance. But to get back tracing resistance, do multiple transactions in sequence. If you do 7 transactions each with 2-way mixing, you have tracing resistance of 128 with bloat of only 13x. In practice there is per-transaction overhead not just per signature so maybe something like 3 or 4 is better than two. But you certainly never need to use very high mixin counts. Eventually wallets can be made to do this automatically.

Question 1: Can it be set with something like a slide-bar, on demand, per transaction? Like I want to launder it 5 times or 2 times.

Sure. Currently the wallet asks for a mixin count, but it can also ask for a sequential mix count. The tradeoff here is that the wallet will need to remain active to send the sequence over time and there needs to be enough of a volume of transactions on the network in which to hide your sequence. With enormous volume on the network it might be acceptable to blast out the entire chain at once, but that won't be for a very long time. If you just blast out the sequence in an otherwise low-volume network, it is obvious what you did and the true input must come from one of the two inputs of the first in the chain.

This ends up being something in between coinjoin and a static mixin in terms of tradoffs, though I think with a somewhat less extreme example than 2x10 (say mixin of 5 done 2-3 times) the exposure to blockchain tracing is pretty small.

Question 2: Can an evil entity attack the blockchain by artificially bloating it with tons of bogus transactions? What would be the estimated cost of the attacker in order to make the blockchain unusable?

This is why there need to be transaction fees set at close to the actual cost of handling transactions, ideally using a market-based mechanism since central planning on what transcation costs "should be" will likely fail. There is such a mechanism in the cryptonote paper but it is currently not fully implemented and not at all tested (that we know -- it is possible that cryptonote did sims).

[smooth]

I am starting to see higher lows and higher highs on a 15 min chart, so I am starting to feel vindicated in the claim that 0.0026 was the bottom.  I expected a faster recovery to .005, which was wrong, but I am happy to wait for it in this, more sustainable, regime.

I love your market analysis. Please keep it coming.

[blaaaaacksuit]

As far as your IP given away, who cares?  All anyone can tell is that you used MRO and sent some amount somewhere and thats all right?

[fluffypony]

Question 1: Can it be set with something like a slide-bar, on demand, per transaction? Like I want to launder it 5 times or 2 times.

Question 2: Can an evil entity attack the blockchain by artificially bloating it with tons of bogus transactions? What would be the estimated cost of the attacker in order to make the blockchain unusable?

1: it already is, you set the mixin count per-transaction. There is no default in the CLI wallet, you are forced to set it when sending. I normally use 0 because I don't a craving for anonymity in moving coins to people or to an exchange, but I have had no problem moving largish amounts with mixins of 10.

2: exactly the same as a dust attack on the Bitcoin blockchain. Do we not remember the 1Enjoy 1Sochi dust attack? Attackers attempting this quickly run out of funds, which is kinda the point of transaction fees:)

[nzminer]

Are there any clearer instructions for using Monero?
The link for the GUI wallet seems to be broken and i am unsure how to start mining.

[surfer43]

2: exactly the same as a dust attack on the Bitcoin blockchain. Do we not remember the 1Enjoy 1Sochi dust attack? Attackers attempting this quickly run out of funds, which is kinda the point of transaction fees:)

The tx fees with Monero are extremely low compared to Bitcoin, especially considering the price difference.

I could send 1 million transactions for 2 USD right now.

[aminorex]

As far as your IP given away, who cares?  All anyone can tell is that you used MRO and sent some amount somewhere and thats all right?

When you get sufficiently paranoid (as you should if lives or even livelihoods are depending upon it) then you worry about things that most people can barely conceive, like traffic analysis, replays and men-in-the-middle, even vanEck radiation.  There's fundamentally no limit to paranoia.  It would be nice to have a user guide for various use cases.  

[smooth]

2: exactly the same as a dust attack on the Bitcoin blockchain. Do we not remember the 1Enjoy 1Sochi dust attack? Attackers attempting this quickly run out of funds, which is kinda the point of transaction fees:)

The tx fees with Monero are extremely low compared to Bitcoin, especially considering the price difference.

I could send 1 million transactions for 2 USD right now.

The level of transaction fees is definitely TBD. As I mentioned they should be somewhat close to the cost of actually processing the transaction (at which point if someone sends a million transactions, great, that's more business for miners), and right now that is likely not the case.