This, I cannot solve, but I have a theory.

I am speculating that Exchange's CEOs (some of them know me but didn't establish business contact) are simply confused and waiting for their bank managers to tell them that the accounts will be closed soon, meanwhile making backup plans to move to HK. The bank managers, however, was told to hold, and wait for PBOC's new decision. PBOC is watching media and trying to sense if everybody are ready to accept the fate -> Yes = Go on as planned. No = Make new strategy with the same goal. PBOC has a history of clumsy PR management, they are learning it too, so it's hard to predict their move. Notice that this time PBOC started the action (last time 18th Dec 2013, 5-ministry co-operated) so they have more room to change strategy, nevertheless the intention is clear now.

The notification required closure of 15 companies' accounts, there will be less than 100 accounts to go, there are enough time. And I agree with you that the only thing in doubt is that deposite is still possible. But I will put wage on the professionalism of Caixin this time.

As said, Caixin is the closet thing to "reputable" in China's financial sector. They said they confirmed it, I think hence there are little room to doubt.

NO ONE knew Mt.Gox was as toxic as they proved to be.

That's why we need Bitcoin Insurance. To ensure bitcoin put on exchanges up to a certain point, like 200 Bitcoin are the max that can be deposited in a exchange per person and and Not lose incase theres a bankruptcy, similar to banks...

This insurance could work on all alt coins.

I only learned about Bitcoin late last year so I know I'm late to the game. I bought my first BTC in December from CoinBase. I immediately withdrew it and now keep a few copies in an offline wallet (usb sticks and an external HD). I understand some people 'trade' and things like that, but why did so many people lose coin? What is the advantage of keeping coins on Gox other then trading? Converting back into fiat?

Just curious as to why, after all the security issues and dubious signs of Gox's incompetence did people still trust them to hold their BTC balances that were at one point worth over $1,200/each?

1. https://blockchain.info/tx/2d59ae3b68ce60e43cd53901aa8e5b3aea06283622a000d11a3ac954c35295eb

2. http://blockr.io/tx/info/2d59ae3b68ce60e43cd53901aa8e5b3aea06283622a000d11a3ac954c35295eb

3. http://blockexplorer.com/tx/2d59ae3b68ce60e43cd53901aa8e5b3aea06283622a000d11a3ac954c35295eb

Is it normal ?

aha so you want a collective revoking scheme - eg if a software Company signs malware with their signature, a crowdfunding campain can be started, collecting 2000 BTC and then we can revoke that company's key making the Company unable to spread malware for some time?

How should Bitcoin know which bitcoin adress (ECC key) belongs to a specific RSA key/certificate? (and where the Money needs to be sent to revoke the RSA key/certificate)

It is good advice for long term investors and people who buy/sell bitcoins for commerce purposes.

As others have observed, however, speculative traders need instant access to their coins with no prior warning; and they seem to be responsible for almost all the trade volume on any exchange, and most of its total account balance.  The exchange, on the other hand, needs to ensure that its clients will honor their sell offers immediately. 

See post #7 in this thread.

An audit that aims to prove that an exchange is honest cannot assume that it is honest.

There are two easy ways a dishonest exchange could fool such an audit (and they are even mentioned in Greg Maxwell's write-up).

First, the exchange could exclude some customers from the ledger given to the auditor, or list them with reduced balances.  The Merkle tree allows an ordinary customer to verify that his own account was included in the audit; but accounts that belong to the exchange owners or conniving customers (which are suspected to have existed at MtGOX) can be omitted without risk of being caught by this test.

Second, the exchange may have sold the coins to a long-term investor, who, being an accomplice to to a theft, would want to help the exchange pass the audit, and therefore provide whatever proof of bitcoin ownership that the auditor requests -- such as moving the coins in the way specified by the auditor, or some other crytography-based technique.  It seems very difficult, if not impossible, for A to prove to B that A knows the private keys, without revealing the private keys to B, in a way that cannot be simulated by the real owner C and passed off by A as having been done by himself.

I already commented on Coinbases's "audit" by Antonopoulos, which Greg compares to Ver's "audit" of MtGOX, and was flawed on both counts: according to his report, it did not verify that the total balances provided by Bitstamp were accurate (not even by the Merkle tree test above), and relied on the "move your coins" test to verify their holdings.  Bitstamp't "audit" cannot have been better than that.

Greg's paper discusses ways to fix some of those auditing flaws, but the major exchanges do not apply them yet.

In any case, an audit does not guard against the risk of a "100% honest" exchange suddenly folding, with loss of all client bitcoins.  There is currently no way to prove that an alleged hack or key theft was not done by the owners themselves, and (as the MtGOX case shows) there seem to be no effective way for the clients to recover their "stolen" bitcoins, or even to identify them in the blockchain.

Yes, these audit flaws and risks also exist for ordinary public corporations and banks; Enron, Worldcom, Madoff, Lehmann Bros and other famous failures are proof of that.  But traditional audits are much more thorough, and rely on lots of information that is known to many staff members and/or can be independently verified, such as bank statements, payrolls, tax reports and other official records, transactions with suppliers and retailers, and so on.  Moreover, it is much harder for the owners to steal half of the company's assets without being caught and having their loot seized.

And I know of no case where a hacker invaded a bank, stole all of its clients's money, and got away with it.

 机上肯定有人持有比特币 所以这也是一起i比特币坠毁事件

Maybe they are from wall street?
I wondered cause they operate since march and have a daily Dollar-volume of 4k. No word about them on bitcointalk and reddit, so they need to have some other fiat-sources (supposed they don't fake volume). This sharp rise and the operating outside this community can be a sign they have a direct link to big money