Such kind of scheme has been repeatedly proposed. This does not improve security at all.
If you could direct us to those proposals, we may become more helpful and less repetitive. Do you have any links? I don't keep these links as these discussions are usually not very fruitful. If you could keep the private key of 1UnlockingAddr safe (and you are not confident in the security of 1AddrToLock), why don't you just simply send your bitcoin to 1UnlockingAddr directly?
You must have missed this part: Several hardcopies of the bitcoin address QR Code are displayed to collect payments from customers at retail locations. Replacing all of them with a new address will take some time.
It is a really bad idea to use a fixed address at retail locations because you can't distinguish payments from different clients. Let say in a bar with a high turnover, many clients are paying as they are drinking, at the same time. With a fixed address it is impossible to determine whether a client has paid or not. Having a fixed address is also extremely bad for financial privacy. Now everyone knows the turnover of your bar. Reusing an address may also compromise security. https://bitcoin.org/en/alert/2013-08-11-androidSo the answer is no. There is no way in hell we are going to make bitcoin more complex to facilitate bad practice. If you want to require the private keys of both 1AddrToLock and 1UnlockingAddr to spend the bitcoin, why don't you simply use 2-of-2 multisignature?
That's a great idea! It's extra work for those who want to accept bitcoin, and I assume that the vast majority of people already accepting bitcoin payments haven't done it. Making bitcoin more secure for them seems like something that might help adoption, no? This function is available for at least 2 years (search P2SH). It's just not very commonly used but I believe it will become much more common in 2 years. |
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One day we will be able to lock an exchange to a public key and they can make addresses guaranteed for us
I like that idea very much. Could that be done without forcing the masses to learn PGP? EDIT: or at least exchanges could make it an option for those who do wish to use PGP. Actually no pgp, just a public seed Theoretically a malware could replace your public seed with the hacker's. The only bullet-proof way is to register an account with an offline pgp key (or with a bitcoin key), and sign any payment requests with the key. |
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Regarding the virus, how would one double check that I was not victim to this attack. **nervous**
Generate the new addresses on your cold system first, and then verify that the addresses you generate on the hot watch-only system match the addresses in the cold system. If a computer is infected, it is completely hopeless Let say you generated an address with the cold system, which is "1User". You send a withdrawal request to the exchange, asking them to send bitcoin to 1User. A sophisticated malware could secretly replace the address with "1Hacker" before sending the request the exchange. Extremely valid point. Some users on Reddit have actually been having this problem caused by extensions on google chrome. Though it could be any sort of malware, google chrome extensions just seem to be the thing lately. Always a good idea to send a small test transaction out of an exchange before sending the whole amount. I should be able to avoid that by noticing that I'm signing the txn to 1User on the offline rig. No, it's not about signing, it's about sending a payment request |
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Such kind of scheme has been repeatedly proposed. This does not improve security at all.
If you could keep the private key of 1UnlockingAddr safe (and you are not confident in the security of 1AddrToLock), why don't you just simply send your bitcoin to 1UnlockingAddr directly?
If you want to require the private keys of both 1AddrToLock and 1UnlockingAddr to spend the bitcoin, why don't you simply use 2-of-2 multisignature?
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I was wondering if a bitcoin script can be written to execute based on an address total balance. For example, if total balance exceeds a number of bitcoins forward it to another address. Any thoughts?
There is nothing called "balance" in the bitcoin protocol. |
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Regarding the virus, how would one double check that I was not victim to this attack. **nervous**
Generate the new addresses on your cold system first, and then verify that the addresses you generate on the hot watch-only system match the addresses in the cold system. If a computer is infected, it is completely hopeless Let say you generated an address with the cold system, which is "1User". You send a withdrawal request to the exchange, asking them to send bitcoin to 1User. A sophisticated malware could secretly replace the address with "1Hacker" before sending the request the exchange. |
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This also means new best practice is sending to offline wallet using an address created on there. Previously I got an address from the watch only copy.
Can you explain this a little further? AFAIK, the addresses generated on the offline wallet and the watch only copy are the same? Wouldn't be of much use otherwise... A virus can compromise your watch only copy to generate addresses that aren't yours. This completely bypasses all security. You could generate it then glance at the cold storage copy to make sure it's in the list. You may have to generate extra ones to get the number of addresses the same. Is that a malware, or a bug in Armory? Malware, armory is solid. So there is not much the Armory team could do. Actually this doesn't only affect Armory. For example, a malware could replace Bitpay's address on the invoice. Even payment protocol won't help as the malware could bypass the signature check. The lesson is no bitcoin address shown on an online computer is reliable. We need some simple solutions to verify bitcoin addresses and payment requests. Dedicated hardware wallet is the way to go. |
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This also means new best practice is sending to offline wallet using an address created on there. Previously I got an address from the watch only copy.
Can you explain this a little further? AFAIK, the addresses generated on the offline wallet and the watch only copy are the same? Wouldn't be of much use otherwise... A virus can compromise your watch only copy to generate addresses that aren't yours. This completely bypasses all security. You could generate it then glance at the cold storage copy to make sure it's in the list. You may have to generate extra ones to get the number of addresses the same. Is that a malware, or a bug in Armory? |
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I don't understand the Chinese system. PBOC is not a lawmaker and not a court. Is there no legal system in China? Why don't these banks and exchanges just continue to operate until they receive a court order, which they can then challenge?  Nulla poena sine lege, not in China or what?  In China, onlY the communist party matters. Lawmakers, media, PBOC and courts are all sock puppet of the communist party |
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Why could a hacker get access to the extended private key? If you can't keep the extended private key safe, how could you keep your index sequence safe? If you, with whatever method, can keep your index sequence very safe, why don't you simply do the same for your private key?
You mentioned using multiple servers. If you think multiple server could improve the security, why don't just use multisignature transactions, with each server having different keys?
Conclusion is still the same: it provides no extra security
(Side note: is your index sequence deterministic? If not, your wallet is not deterministic)
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技術是中性的, 像槍械一樣, 可以救人, 可以犯罪
有了這個就可以有去中心化的拍賣所, 人們不用受制於ebay/淘寶的規則, 也可以自選仲裁者而不需被逼付ebay/淘寶指定的服務費, 賣的東西仍然可以是完全合法的.
而且任何實物的交易都無可避免要經過郵政系統, 防止運毒是警犬的工作
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So how would you store the sequence: {617492810, 741109822, 1840569824, 1056489135}?
If you consider this sequence as a secret, then it is essentially part of the root private key. If you could protect this sequence, you could protect your private key with the same level of security.
If you consider this sequence as public information, then it is essentially part of the root public key and you should assume it is known by everyone
Conclusion: your proposal brings no extra security.
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This bear market is worse than the 2013 one  |
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1256XBT bought yesterday
April 2014 data revised with latest actual holding value
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好像看不到有什么贴和回帖被删了啊
或者版主删帖时通知一下
应该是有一些涉及政治的敏感内容被删除造成的。 你以為這是什麼地方? |
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一边是游戏机开放、上海自贸区建立，一边又是下架美剧加严网络审核，封杀比特币。 高人来指点下，zf到底想干什么?整体趋势到底是开放还是闭关?  不影響/有助獨裁統治的開放 影響獨裁統治的封閉 |
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