[ANN][DASH] Dash (dash.org) | First Self-Funding Self-Governing Crypto Currency

[PenguinsDancing]

Evan you are not transparent enough. Having just read that you alone control the budget system and can pass all budgets with 10% of the vote bothers me. I'm sure you are a busy man but for this system to work and gain momentum you need to stop creating situations where you unfairly control portions of the system.

Otoh, I respect your right to make investments however the size of your investment in DASH gives you a lot of power. This is something I believe is holding potential investors back.

I'll add my lurker's two cents to this as well because I think emitkirby raises some important concerns.

The key point for me is not so much that large shareholders have more power, it's that voting is not public and we don't necessarily even know who the large shareholders are. It is less than ideal to have potentially large (possibly anonymous) holders or holder "cartels" shaping and passing initiatives in the name of public consent without that consent being completely observable.

- Firstly, (and I think this point as been raised, albeit inarticulately and in poor form, by resident trolls) people are likely going to be uncomfortable with the possibility of those holders directing funds to themselves through fake or misrepresented initiatives.

- Secondly, and to me the maybe the larger concern for true believers in Dash, is the possibility of large-holders actually voting against Dash's best interests in the future because they have an even larger hedge against it. So-called "empty voting" is a legitimate concern in the corporate world and should be a significant concern here.

[1714792691]

1714792691

[TanteStefana2]

Evan you are not transparent enough. Having just read that you alone control the budget system and can pass all budgets with 10% of the vote bothers me. I'm sure you are a busy man but for this system to work and gain momentum you need to stop creating situations where you unfairly control portions of the system.

Otoh, I respect your right to make investments however the size of your investment in DASH gives you a lot of power. This is something I believe is holding potential investors back.

I'll add my lurker's two cents to this as well because I think emitkirby raises some important concerns.

The key point for me is not so much that large shareholders have more power, it's that voting is not public and we don't necessarily even know who the large shareholders are. It is less than ideal to have potentially large (possibly anonymous) holders or holder "cartels" shaping and passing initiatives in the name of public consent without that consent being completely observable.

- Firstly, (and I think this point as been raised, albeit inarticulately and in poor form, by resident trolls) people are likely going to be uncomfortable with the possibility of those holders directing funds to themselves through fake or misrepresented initiatives.

- Secondly, and to me the maybe the larger concern for true believers in Dash, is the possibility of large-holders actually voting against Dash's best interests in the future because they have an even larger hedge against it. So-called "empty voting" is a legitimate concern in the corporate world and should be a significant concern here.

Well, if that's what you want, you'll have to find it elsewhere because this is a privacy centric coin and any kind of exposure like that not only invades the holder's privacy, but may endanger them, depending on what country they live in.  I believe the law of entropy will continue to be true throughout the life cycle of Dash.  Big holders will sell off their "extra" masternodes as their value goes up and up, because they'll want to use the funds for other things, such as buying a new home, paying for some other venture, etc...  And new people will step forward and run masternodes.  Even otoh sold much of his BTC and began investing elsewhere, And he's said he already has reduced his Dash holdings.  The more time goes by, the smaller original holder's holdings will become, but you'll not know for certain, unless they tell you.  And in the end, it doesn't matter, because we've gotten to the point now where no malicious entity can buy up the network and do anything bad, even if they could buy up a lot.  It was pretty impossible before, but with Evolution, it'll be impossible.

So in actuality, if you think otoh or Evan are going to vote for things that will harm Dash, as they are probably the only 2 people who can vote a proposal in that could harm or take advantage of the system, I think we could still get the rest of the MN voters to counteract it, even if they worked together.

This whole Distributed Virtual Corporation is very balanced, very tight.  I don't think it's possible to come up with a better system.  It's like toknormal said a few pages back.  He said something like he keeps trying to think of a better setup, but can't.

[moocowmoo]

Also, we don't have enough time to review proposals.  Generally, people are just giving us a couple of weeks, that's not enough to discuss and argue.  I think, for this to work best, we should do this in 2 steps.  First, gather the proposals, then spend 1 month discussing them before they're open for voting.  Then vote.  

There's no need to rush any vote if the budget proposal is planned correctly.
The only time constraints on a proposal's voting window are defined by the submitter.
It's perfectly valid to submit a proposal that starts getting paid at a later cycle(s).

In fact, I'd encourage future submitters to do just that, *especially* if it is a one-time payment.

Here are next years cycle start blocks and approximate dates. Set your payment-start block's accordingly.

Code:

block    date
398784 - Tue Jan  5 04:47:12 UTC 2016
415400 - Wed Feb  3 01:07:12 UTC 2016
432016 - Wed Mar  2 21:27:12 UTC 2016
448632 - Thu Mar 31 17:47:12 UTC 2016
465248 - Fri Apr 29 14:07:12 UTC 2016
481864 - Sat May 28 10:27:12 UTC 2016
498480 - Sun Jun 26 06:47:12 UTC 2016
515096 - Mon Jul 25 03:07:12 UTC 2016
531712 - Mon Aug 22 23:27:12 UTC 2016
548328 - Tue Sep 20 19:47:12 UTC 2016
564944 - Wed Oct 19 16:07:12 UTC 2016
581560 - Thu Nov 17 12:27:12 UTC 2016
598176 - Fri Dec 16 08:47:12 UTC 2016

here's the script and math

Code:

# 16616 / 576 = 28.8472 * 24 = 692.33
D0=$(TZ=UTC date --date="$(date --date="2015-12-07T08:27:12+0000")");
for block in `seq 398784 16616 $((382168 + (16616*24)))`;
    do DD=$(TZ=UTC date --date="$(date --date="$D0") +692 hours +20 minutes");
    D0=$DD;
    echo "$block - $DD";
done

Also, I'd like to remind everybody of some important differences from typical elections that Dash's voting system has:
(taken from masternode-budget.cpp)

 - Votes are counted every 16616 blocks
 - Votes can be recast at any time
 - Budget proposals remain on the network until:
    either 340 more nay votes than yay votes are cast (10% of total masternodes)
    or the proposal end block is reached
 - Approved budgets are paid in order of yay - nay votes
 - Approved budgets can be nullified at any time by recasting votes


Also, A bit of rumor control about "Evan controlling the budget system":

Evan doesn't have enough masternodes online to pass anything.
Neither do I.

Even working together we couldn't vote the required 10%.

From what I've gathered analyzing vote timestamps only otoh has enough
masternodes provisioned to cast enough votes to pass a budget item.

But even with approximately 600 masternodes (maybe less today), it would only
take 261 no votes to prevent the budget item from passing.

Additionally, the budget allocation is disbursed in order of yay - nay votes.
So, even if somebody did sneak a budget item in at the last second, it would
only be processed after all other approved budgets had been funded.

--

I hope this post helps to dispel any concern about dash being controlled by
whales.

The way the system is set up, what is good for the currency will
trump any few individuals' will to power.

[PenguinsDancing]

Evan you are not transparent enough. Having just read that you alone control the budget system and can pass all budgets with 10% of the vote bothers me. I'm sure you are a busy man but for this system to work and gain momentum you need to stop creating situations where you unfairly control portions of the system.

Otoh, I respect your right to make investments however the size of your investment in DASH gives you a lot of power. This is something I believe is holding potential investors back.

I'll add my lurker's two cents to this as well because I think emitkirby raises some important concerns.

The key point for me is not so much that large shareholders have more power, it's that voting is not public and we don't necessarily even know who the large shareholders are. It is less than ideal to have potentially large (possibly anonymous) holders or holder "cartels" shaping and passing initiatives in the name of public consent without that consent being completely observable.

- Firstly, (and I think this point as been raised, albeit inarticulately and in poor form, by resident trolls) people are likely going to be uncomfortable with the possibility of those holders directing funds to themselves through fake or misrepresented initiatives.

- Secondly, and to me the maybe the larger concern for true believers in Dash, is the possibility of large-holders actually voting against Dash's best interests in the future because they have an even larger hedge against it. So-called "empty voting" is a legitimate concern in the corporate world and should be a significant concern here.

Well, if that's what you want, you'll have to find it elsewhere because this is a privacy centric coin and any kind of exposure like that not only invades the holder's privacy, but may endanger them, depending on what country they live in. . .

This whole Distributed Virtual Corporation is very balanced, very tight. 

I don't "want" anything in particular but I think it is important to have a discussion about the unique challenges presented by a decentralized autonomous corporation and private shareholder voting. At the moment, I'm not convinced the two goals of a functioning DAC and anonymous digital cash are satisfactorily reconcilable in the same system.

This whole Distributed Virtual Corporation is very balanced, very tight. 

The way the system is set up, what is good for the currency will trump any few individuals' will to power.

I'm sorry but I can't agree. This is not something you can guarantee now and certainly not in the future.

[moocowmoo]

The way the system is set up, what is good for the currency will trump any few individuals' will to power.

I'm sorry but I can't agree. This is not something you can guarantee now and certainly not in the future.

I'm not making guarantees, I'm extrapolating using game theory/self-interest.

Given that:
    - all budgets are public
    - budget abuse would erode public perception, and
    - the value of the currency is determined by public perception

why would a large shareholder be movitated to damage the value of their
holdings?

If we assume it is an attacker, flooding the market with cheap coins to
suppress the price would be much more effective.

[EdvinZ]

The way the system is set up, what is good for the currency will trump any few individuals' will to power.

I'm sorry but I can't agree. This is not something you can guarantee now and certainly not in the future.

I'm not making guarantees, I'm extrapolating using game theory/self-interest.

Given that:
    - all budgets are public
    - budget abuse would erode public perception, and
    - the value of the currency is determined by public perception

why would a large shareholder be movitated to damage the value of their
holdings?

If we assume it is an attacker, flooding the market with cheap coins to
suppress the price would be much more effective.

For investors not important the difference in price. It is important for them to know that there are any guarantees on the planned work of developers. This is for serious investors with large capital. Well, with less money you can search your luck on the one-day cryptocurrency with high volatility

[PenguinsDancing]

The way the system is set up, what is good for the currency will trump any few individuals' will to power.

I'm sorry but I can't agree. This is not something you can guarantee now and certainly not in the future.

I'm not making guarantees, I'm extrapolating using game theory/self-interest.

Given that:
    - all budgets are public
    - budget abuse would erode public perception, and
    - the value of the currency is determined by public perception

why would a large shareholder be movitated to damage the value of their
holdings?

Just to separate things:

1) Immediate concern - Misleading proposals pushed through with limited follow-up, essentially leading to large holders paying themselves for doing nothing. I don't agree that budget abuse will necessarily erode public perception faster than hypothetical large holders make money. (Again, not saying this is happening, just suggesting that it is a discussion worth looking into carefully.)

2) Long-term (and more significant) concern - There may be ways for Dash holders to reduce the risk in their holdings while retaining voting rights. They could vote Dash into the ground while making money. I would be in over my head if I tried to explain derivatives and empty voting in relation to DACs because I am still trying to wrap my head around the key concepts. However, I think we should be very careful about relying heavily on the "self-interest" argument. Ownership of assets does not necessarily equal proportional economic self-interest in the current corporate world and there's no reason to expect such a simple relationship in the DAC world either. In fact, I believe that anonymity compounds this issue significantly and is a problem worth discussing seriously.

[mjsrs]

Just to make sure we are all on the same page, this is how the system currently works:

From dashninja:

A budget proposal is valid if the fee was payed and it was submitted to peers successfully.

A budget proposal is established when it is older than 1 day.

A budget proposal is alloted (will get paid on next super-block and is in the budgets projection list) when Yea votes minus Nay votes is more than 10% of total masternodes.


The system is designed to resolve controversy, the way it works the yeas in the proposal have to win the nays by at least 10% of the network.  If there is a polemic proposal where 10% of the network says No then you need at least 20% of the network to say yes for it to get approved for a total 30% participation. It self adjusts and I don't think this is well understood. Hope this helps.

Also, we don't have enough time to review proposals.  Generally, people are just giving us a couple of weeks, that's not enough to discuss and argue.  I think, for this to work best, we should do this in 2 steps.  First, gather the proposals, then spend 1 month discussing them before they're open for voting.  Then vote.  

There's no need to rush any vote if the budget proposal is planned correctly.
The only time constraints on a proposal's voting window are defined by the submitter.
It's perfectly valid to submit a proposal that starts getting paid at a later cycle(s).

In fact, I'd encourage future submitters to do just that, *especially* if it is a one-time payment.

Here are next years cycle start blocks and approximate dates. Set your payment-start block's accordingly.

Code:

block    date
382168 - Sat Jan 16 01:20:00 UTC 2016
398784 - Sat Feb 13 21:40:00 UTC 2016
415400 - Sun Mar 13 18:00:00 UTC 2016
432016 - Mon Apr 11 14:20:00 UTC 2016
448632 - Tue May 10 10:40:00 UTC 2016
465248 - Wed Jun  8 07:00:00 UTC 2016
481864 - Thu Jul  7 03:20:00 UTC 2016
498480 - Thu Aug  4 23:40:00 UTC 2016
515096 - Fri Sep  2 20:00:00 UTC 2016
531712 - Sat Oct  1 16:20:00 UTC 2016
548328 - Sun Oct 30 12:40:00 UTC 2016
564944 - Mon Nov 28 09:00:00 UTC 2016
581560 - Tue Dec 27 05:20:00 UTC 2016

here's the script and math

Code:

# 16616 / 576 = 28.8472 * 24 = 692.33
D0=$(TZ=UTC date --date="$(date --date="2015-12-07T08:27:12+0000")");
for block in `seq 382168 16616 $((382168 + (16616*24)))`;
    do DD=$(TZ=UTC date --date="$(date --date="$D0") +692 hours +20 minutes");
    D0=$DD;
    echo "$block - $DD";
done

Also, I'd like to remind everybody of some important differences from typical elections that Dash's voting system has:
(taken from masternode-budget.cpp)

 - Votes are counted every 16616 blocks
 - Votes can be recast at any time
 - Budget proposals remain on the network until:
    either 340 more nay votes than yay votes are cast (10% of total masternodes)
    or the proposal end block is reached
 - Approved budgets are paid in order of yay - nay votes
 - Approved budgets can be nullified at any time by recasting votes


Also, A bit of rumor control about "Evan controlling the budget system":

Evan doesn't have enough masternodes online to pass anything.
Neither do I.

Even working together we couldn't vote the required 10%.

From what I've gathered analyzing vote timestamps only otoh has enough
masternodes provisioned to cast enough votes to pass a budget item.

But even with approximately 600 masternodes (maybe less today), it would only
take 261 no votes to prevent the budget item from passing.

Additionally, the budget allocation is disbursed in order of yay - nay votes.
So, even if somebody did sneak a budget item in at the last second, it would
only be processed after all other approved budgets had been funded.

--

I hope this post helps to dispel any concern about dash being controlled by
whales.

The way the system is set up, what is good for the currency will
trump any few individuals' will to power.

This is valuable info and it's gonna get buried deep in this forum.
I would suggest someone includes this info in the official documentation.
The budget system wiki is very, very incomplete.

[JGCMiner]

Also, we don't have enough time to review proposals.  Generally, people are just giving us a couple of weeks, that's not enough to discuss and argue.  I think, for this to work best, we should do this in 2 steps.  First, gather the proposals, then spend 1 month discussing them before they're open for voting.  Then vote.  

There's no need to rush any vote if the budget proposal is planned correctly.
The only time constraints on a proposal's voting window are defined by the submitter.
It's perfectly valid to submit a proposal that starts getting paid at a later cycle(s).

In fact, I'd encourage future submitters to do just that, *especially* if it is a one-time payment.

Here are next years cycle start blocks and approximate dates. Set your payment-start block's accordingly.

Code:

block    date
382168 - Sat Jan 16 01:20:00 UTC 2016
398784 - Sat Feb 13 21:40:00 UTC 2016
415400 - Sun Mar 13 18:00:00 UTC 2016
432016 - Mon Apr 11 14:20:00 UTC 2016
448632 - Tue May 10 10:40:00 UTC 2016
465248 - Wed Jun  8 07:00:00 UTC 2016
481864 - Thu Jul  7 03:20:00 UTC 2016
498480 - Thu Aug  4 23:40:00 UTC 2016
515096 - Fri Sep  2 20:00:00 UTC 2016
531712 - Sat Oct  1 16:20:00 UTC 2016
548328 - Sun Oct 30 12:40:00 UTC 2016
564944 - Mon Nov 28 09:00:00 UTC 2016
581560 - Tue Dec 27 05:20:00 UTC 2016

here's the script and math

Code:

# 16616 / 576 = 28.8472 * 24 = 692.33
D0=$(TZ=UTC date --date="$(date --date="2015-12-07T08:27:12+0000")");
for block in `seq 382168 16616 $((382168 + (16616*24)))`;
    do DD=$(TZ=UTC date --date="$(date --date="$D0") +692 hours +20 minutes");
    D0=$DD;
    echo "$block - $DD";
done

Also, I'd like to remind everybody of some important differences from typical elections that Dash's voting system has:
(taken from masternode-budget.cpp)

 - Votes are counted every 16616 blocks
 - Votes can be recast at any time
 - Budget proposals remain on the network until:
    either 340 more nay votes than yay votes are cast (10% of total masternodes)
    or the proposal end block is reached
 - Approved budgets are paid in order of yay - nay votes
 - Approved budgets can be nullified at any time by recasting votes


Also, A bit of rumor control about "Evan controlling the budget system":

Evan doesn't have enough masternodes online to pass anything.
Neither do I.

Even working together we couldn't vote the required 10%.

From what I've gathered analyzing vote timestamps only otoh has enough
masternodes provisioned to cast enough votes to pass a budget item.

But even with approximately 600 masternodes (maybe less today), it would only
take 261 no votes to prevent the budget item from passing.

Additionally, the budget allocation is disbursed in order of yay - nay votes.
So, even if somebody did sneak a budget item in at the last second, it would
only be processed after all other approved budgets had been funded.

--

I hope this post helps to dispel any concern about dash being controlled by
whales.

The way the system is set up, what is good for the currency will
trump any few individuals' will to power.

Thanks for this post!

There has been a lot of fearmongering related to the voting system recently with people conveniently forgetting that voting is not just YES votes but YES - NO votes.

If Otoh and/or Evan for whatever reason tried to get something sketchy passed, it would take a trivial campaign on this forum and dashtalk to get the couple hundred NO votes to shut them down.

[Otoh]

...re Evan...

Otoh, I respect your right to make investments however the size of your investment in DASH gives you a lot of power. This is something I believe is holding potential investors back.

I believe this was meant to take control away from any one person or entity and you are engineering a system where you have total control.

I will continue to hold DASH for the foreseeable future because it's simply not worth it to me to sell.

I hope you don't ruin my investment with greed or the inability to see the forest from the trees.

Emit.

So what would you like me to do, divest many of my masternodes to others, not vote on proposals, if so then you should be happy as this is exactly what I have done, I voted only on the first vote to bring in MN voting and have voted on not a single one since, not Evan's proposals or anyone's, now I will likely be rightly criticized for not voting and selling MNs P2P rather than leaving ppl to buy them on the open market, but you can't please everybody.

[ddink7]

2) Long-term (and more significant) concern - There may be ways for Dash holders to reduce the risk in their holdings while retaining voting rights. They could vote Dash into the ground while making money. I would be in over my head if I tried to explain derivatives and empty voting in relation to DACs because I am still trying to wrap my head around the key concepts. However, I think we should be very careful about relying heavily on the "self-interest" argument. Ownership of assets does not necessarily equal proportional economic self-interest in the current corporate world and there's no reason to expect such a simple relationship in the DAC world either. In fact, I believe that anonymity compounds this issue significantly and is a problem worth discussing seriously.

How?

What asset exists that rises when DASH falls?

I'll grant that this is a possible future problem, but so are asteroid impacts and supervolcanic eruptions. Can you demonstrate an asset (currently or in the near future) that will consistently and significantly rise in value when Dash falls in value?

[ddink7]

...re Evan...

Otoh, I respect your right to make investments however the size of your investment in DASH gives you a lot of power. This is something I believe is holding potential investors back.

I believe this was meant to take control away from any one person or entity and you are engineering a system where you have total control.

I will continue to hold DASH for the foreseeable future because it's simply not worth it to me to sell.

I hope you don't ruin my investment with greed or the inability to see the forest from the trees.

Emit.

So what would you like me to do, divest many of my masternodes to others, not vote on proposals, if so then you should be happy as this is exactly what I have done, I voted only on the first vote to bring in MN voting and have voted on not a single one since, not Ewan's proposals or anyone's, now I will likely be rightly criticized for not voting and selling MNs P2P rather than leaving ppl to buy them on the open market, but you can't please everybody.

Otoh, you're fine in my opinion. I doubt seriously that you'll have as much potential voting power as you currently do when Dash reaches $100 million or $500 million in market cap. Rising prices encourage divestment, which is a point that everyone seems to miss.

[Walter_S]

]

So what would you like me to do, divest many of my masternodes to others, not vote on proposals, if so then you should be happy as this is exactly what I have done, I voted only on the first vote to bring in MN voting and have voted on not a single one since, not Ewan's proposals or anyone's, now I will likely be rightly criticized for not voting and selling MNs P2P rather than leaving ppl to buy them on the open market, but you can't please everybody.

This is completely unacceptable Otoh! It is your duty to vote  

Joking aside - I can't understand what all the fuss is about frankly. As masternode owners we've already voted.. with our wallets. If we didn't have confidence in the way the project is progressing we'd vote again with our wallets by divesting ourselves from the project. Therefore, regardless of the intricacies of DGBB, the key metric for the overall health of the project is  the total number of masternodes on the network, which continues its relentless march upwards.

The DGBB solution is designed to be a practical way of funding future development in a fair, open and accountable manner. To that end I think that it has been a success. Is it open to abuse? Potentially. However, we can say this about all systems where incentives are at play. This is just a fact of life and it's certainly no more open to abuse than a traditional corporate/government structures.

Fundamentally - if the DGBB system is abused then the masternode owners WILL do something about it, and likewise, if the system really is flawed (unlikely) then the results of this abuse will almost certainly present themselves in the masternode count as this is the ultimate veto against the project.

Walter

[Otoh]

PSA: Four months ago I had 534 masternodes, including those that I manage for others, http://imgur.com/i7udTYI

Before that I had up to 640 approx iirc.

Right now I have 429, so I have divested a lot by selling directly to private buyers who I knew wished to make masternodes, the MN count has been going up and my proportion of it has been going down, though I still hold over $1MM worth which is my sweet spot for what I consider the best investment by far in the risky but potentially high return and positively disruptive field of crypto currencies.

[DrkLvr_]

First of all:





Next, what 's up with Otoh's masternode rewards? It's not enough he's a shitcoin manipulator he also need to cheat and get extra rewards?  

[dihydrogenmonoxide]

Next, what 's up with Otoh's masternode rewards? It's not enough he's a shitcoin manipulator he also need to cheat and get extra rewards?  

Can you please go back to your playground? If you would have invested just 1 minute to look up the adresses in question, you would have noticed that these are accumulated rewards.

[dazbarlby]

This visualisation shows how much of a mess the worlds financial system is in...

http://money.visualcapitalist.com/all-of-the-worlds-money-and-markets-in-one-visualization/

[DrkLvr_]

Can you please go back to your playground? If you would have invested just 1 minute to look up the adresses in question, you would have noticed that these are accumulated rewards.

Whatever you say.

Looks like Instaminer Evan and Manipulator Otoh are milking you morons for over $1000 USD per day, each

Good thing Instaminer Evan passed a Monthly budget for the Dash team salary. I mean, it would ridiculous if he were to use the > $1000 USD he gets every single day from his instamine fraud stash  

Such greed.

[toknormal]

BTC painting itself into a corner. Will it explode up or collapse down.

[pille]

Current MN reward is 0.39 Dash per day. Calculate again DrkLvr_trd