[ANN][CLAM] CLAMs, Proof-Of-Chain, Proof-Of-Working-Stake, a.k.a. "Clamcoin"

[smooth]

Well, I hope clam stays as it is. I understand that the digger is ruining the value, but it can't last forever.  Too much supply too soon was a reality.  Sadly, the digger is damaging their own value holdings, maybe he/she doesn't care, but it's a classic tragedy of the commons scenario.  It's possible that clam may not survive this, but I'm still looking forward to the new client with the "voting" via clamspeech and whatnot.

Let us not allow the tragedy of the commons become the tyranny of the commons.

“the moment the idea is admitted into society, that property is not as sacred as the laws of God, and that there is not a force of law and public justice to protect it, anarchy and tyranny commence.” -John Adams

The way this discussion and solution seem to be winding its ways to is that early clam diggers not only have a disproportionate say in the coin network but they also have a right to exclude future stakeholders from exercising their opinions through the Clamchain.  The big one is that current stakeholders can expropriate the property of others without compensation if it is deemed in the interest of the community.  I call this the "I got mine, jack, screw you" process of policy making.  These events really expose what stakeholder democracy is and it isn't pretty.  Early adopters, special interest groups and certain individuals claim a seat at the table which ends up excluding a large portion of the citizenry as it diminishes their votes in the election and gives an out sized voice to the loudest or with the most money. 

This paragraph from navaman pretty much sums up my opinion on the matter.  It seems more like an act of tyranny than an act of democracy to allow early CLAM adopters to change the rules to screw later adopters.  That seems to break the promises made in the initial distribution.  Doing this, IMO, undermines any faith people could have in the long-term stability of this project.

Democracy and tyranny are not mutually exclusive when the community is not composed entirely of individuals possessing both freedom of thought, and truth of spirit. Such traits exist in a shocking minority in these times. This is the main issue here, and it has troubled me deeply since this matter arose. Navaman is right, but I cannot say why. The teachings of the Church of Reason elude me these days. I am convinced that this is the problem, but I can offer no solution. Even the Bastion of Liberty -- The great Constitutional Republic -- has proven to only be a stop-gap measure. I have no answers, but I do know that we must be very cautious here -- we are playing with things far greater than ourselves.

There is a solution. Don't make changes to the fundamental economic properties. Treat a coin as an experiment where these rules are "set in stone" to quote Satoshi, not subject to the whims of a potentially-tyranical (sort of) majority. If the rules turn out to be bad rules, the experiment fails and the lessons of that failure can live on in a new coin (presumably with somewhat different rules). This is messy perhaps, but less messy than all the other alternatives.

That's the whole damn (important) thing that Satoshi invented as an alternative to a politically-manipulated economy. It is very underappreciated apparently.

[DrkLvr_]

I see a lot of naive idealism in here... the lottery was initially in CLAMS... is CLAMS now tainted forever since the lottery didn't work out and the rules were changed? What happened to "set in stone" in that case?  

CLAMS is in an adapt or die situation, and the amount of cheering i see going on for what is essentially an "i'm willing to go down with this ship" mentality is astonishing.

[bearbear]

yep it is not like it was the first yet another alt crypto dying here, next.

[smooth]

I see a lot of naive idealism in here... the lottery was initially in CLAMS... is CLAMS now tainted forever since the lottery didn't work out and the rules were changed? What happened to "set in stone" in that case? 

CLAMS is in an adapt or die situation, and the amount of cheering i see going on for what is essentially an "i'm willing to go down with this ship" mentality is astonishing.

The idealism isn't naive if it is the only thing that gives something potential value. Yet another politically manipulated economic system is really quite worthless when the world is full of them already.

I'm not sure why you think going "down with the ship" is a certainty here at all. Many have expressed the view that CLAM will survive the digger and ultimately thrive. Obviously, not everyone agrees with that. I don't even have a view on whether it will survive or not (though ultimately I believe most coins won't so we may be disagreeing only on the path to failure, not the eventual destination). I do believe that if it survives without manipulation it will be worth far more than if it survives with manipulation.

As for the lottery, as I understand it, the rate of staking (per day, per week, etc.) was essentially unchanged in eliminating the lottery. I may be wrong about that as I haven't checked the math, so if I am wrong, please correct me. That is enormously different from the idea of wiping out or significantly impairing 95% of the supply. Furthermore there is no "bug" or "expliot" having to do with digging that would motivate a fix. It is working exactly as designed.

[smooth]

But this equilibrium that you cite in your example isn't what is happening. The whale digger is obfuscating the inflationary effect by introducing non-recurring inflation on a much larger scale.

There is no "inflation" being introduced by the digger. All of those CLAMs already exist on the blockchain, and the fixed (other than staking rewards) supply number is listed on the OP. It hasn't changed.

The only thing that happened here is that investors had an incorrect view of how many of the undug CLAMs would be dug, and/or when they would be dug. That view is being reevaluated and with that reevaluation the price is adjusting accordingly.

That and perhaps all this discussion about wiping out peoples CLAMs has spooked the market and increased the likelihood that the community will fall apart and the coin will fail altogether. I don't know to what extent that is a driving the price action, but it is certainly consistent with it.

If the economy (utility) of CLAM doesn't grow as fast as staking inflation

If the economy of CLAM doesn't grow a lot the whole thing is stupid. Most of the active supply is in the JD bankroll. A (supposedly) decentralized cryptocurrency used to largely support a single site, being secured using proof-of-stake where nearly all of the stake is under the control of one individual is pointless nonsense.

The only good reason to support this project is in the hope that its economy does grow to where this currently-pointless nonsense is in the past.

[DrkLvr_]

Thanks for the level-headed responses smooth. When I look at the digging/staking graphs dooglus put up periodically, there seems to be a big difference pre and post lottery. But that's probably because the lottery coins are not reflected, i'm not sure.

I had a realization.. a major worry of mine was future big(ger) diggers.. however the more time that passes, the less digs are worth due to the 500k coins issued yearly through staking. This is a great thing. So while it's true that many won't agree on how best to proceed, i think what will most likely happen is nothing at all.. and that might not be such a bad thing after all. 

[jaysabi]

But this equilibrium that you cite in your example isn't what is happening. The whale digger is obfuscating the inflationary effect by introducing non-recurring inflation on a much larger scale.

There is no "inflation" being introduced by the digger. All of those CLAMs already exist on the blockchain, and the fixed (other than staking rewards) supply number is listed on the OP. It hasn't changed.

Oh come on mate, you're trying to make the case that it's a distinction without a difference, but there is a huge difference. Let's call them potential and actual CLAMs to differentiate, like potential and kintetic energy. Potential energy can't hurt you until it becomes kinetic energy. In the same fashion, it is clearly established that only actual CLAMs affect price. Potential CLAMs are hypothetical (potential) until they're dug and become actual. The potential CLAMs aren't undergoing inflation, but the actual CLAMs absolutely are, and they're the ones that affect price.

I agree with you on the the reset of expectations, I raised that point earlier and suggested the falling price was a foreseeable risk. That doesn't change the above though.

If the economy (utility) of CLAM doesn't grow as fast as staking inflation

If the economy of CLAM doesn't grow a lot the whole thing is stupid. Most of the active supply is in the JD bankroll. A (supposedly) decentralized cryptocurrency used to largely support a single site, being secured using proof-of-stake where nearly all of the stake is under the control of one individual is pointless nonsense.

The only good reason to support this project is in the hope that its economy does grow to where this currently-pointless nonsense is in the past.

I agree with you. This has kinda been my point. There's talk about Doogcoin and yada yada, which baffles me because CLAM is a de facto Doogcoin. CLAM has virtually no value without JD. There are a couple other places you can gamble with it, but they only started after JD gave it legitimacy and brought the audience. No doubt that was not Doog's intention, I'm sure he liked the fair distribution model and the attributes of the coin, but by adopting such a tiny coin that was the inevitable result. I don't fault him necessarily for seeing that's the way it would turn out (that's nobody's fault), it just is what it is. Whether JD starts a new coin and abandons CLAM or keeps accepting CLAM along side it, or only accepts CLAM, CLAM's long-term prospects are terrible if all you can do with it is play at JD and stake more CLAMs. That has value in a CLAM-JD system, but not outside it.

[SuperClam]

smooth and other "No Change" advocates,

Your arguments are persuasive and well thought out.
I can see myself making some of the same arguments.

Sharpen them and target them for stakeholders.
Explain in clear language why it is in THEIR interest to make that choice.
Everyone will have a voice as this process continues.

If you want a 'benevolent dictator' this may not be the right network for you.
That said, I am personally thankful to have you participating and involved


navaman,

Thank you for the detailed response.

I believe your argument against "stakeholder democracy" could use some depth and introspection.

Fundamentally, you are correct given certain assumptions.
When actors in the system are bereft of choice, "trapped" as it were, such systems inevitably devolve into "might is right" rule.
This "might is right" rule rarely reflects the interests of small stakeholders.
These small stakeholders have no recourse.

I believe this system differs in important respects.
Let us assume that a petition takes place which severely negatively impacts a minority interest.
The outcome of the petition will likely be quite clear well before it is over, let alone implemented.
This minority interest is not trapped and can freely leave the CLAM eco-system if they so choose.
A tyranny with open immigration/emigration and a nearby "better" neighbor quickly only tyrannizes themselves.

Further, though this petition process is not binding and serves to inform development, in a way it IS publicly binding.
The results of petitions will be public and transparent.
They will signify a provable sentiment of the stakeholders of CLAM.
In the corporate world, how long does an executive retain their position if they ignore the mandates of shareholders?
If support is established publicly for a change and an alternative client is released which implements that change..
That alternative client, by definition, would likely be adopted.
This is regardless of the "tyranny" of the development team.


It isn't perfect; but, this gives the community a voice without the concern for "shills" and non-stakeholder manipulation.
I can think of no better way to inform development energy and direction.

[BayAreaCoins]

My scammy side business... How is it scammy? Last I checked we are paying the most per fresh dig on the market if dug right. (including diggin with your own CLIENT or Just-dice)

I built a service around the core of CLAM. These people have the right to dig the coins that were given to them... rights shouldn't be voted on.

I guess I have no vote in CLAM because I was smart and sold off high... there is no way I'd buy back in (via markets) with all this sclamming going on between Dooglus and pals.

It's very obvious that voting doesn't matter. So just do what yall are going to do and ppl can close their businesses/leave feedback.

[smooth]

SuperClam, coins are not corporations. In the latter case, there is a legal right to elect a board, which in turn gives control over management and ultimately the assets (shareholders can even vote to dissolve the corporation, which gives them access to the assets directly).

There are no such powers that exist on the part of coin holders. There are really only two things that coin holders can do:

1. Stake according to the network rules and their own individual best interests and without collusion, which makes the network secure provided that the stake is adequately distributed.

2. Individually or in collusion with other coin holders, stake maliciously and "51% attack" the network. This can include: a) blocking all transactions in a sort of doomsday button to destroy the coin, b) selectively blocking transactions (and/or blocks) to gain some advantage for the attacker, c) rewrite the chain to perform double spend attacks.

This idea of coin holder voting is creating a system that facilities and to an extent legitimizes #2. It makes the entire system less secure and therefore ultimately less valuable, even though it may seem expedient in the short term for the purposes of "governance", especially if you happen to be in the majority.

As I've already stated earlier, the best ways to make changes to a coin are:

1. By overwhelming consensus of the community (such that there is no significant opposition and everyone just goes along with the change). This obviously does not exist for rewriting the digging rules. It does often exist for other changes that are routinely made to coins such as bug fixes, tweaks to transaction fees, some forms of new features, etc.

2. By creating a new coin with different rules such that the people can decide via a market process which to support. This requires permission from no one since anyone can create a new coin.

[smooth]

Thanks for the level-headed responses smooth. When I look at the digging/staking graphs dooglus put up periodically, there seems to be a big difference pre and post lottery. But that's probably because the lottery coins are not reflected, i'm not sure.

Here's the chart I remember. It looks like eliminating the lottery slightly increased the overall staking rate. I don't see any evidence that staking during the lottery period was an advantage compared with after the lottery period. But I could be wrong, and I'm relying on information that is posted to the thread. I have not checked any of this myself.

Hint: stopping the lottery caused the supply to increase much more quickly than before.

[SuperClam]

SuperClam, coins are not corporations. In the latter case, there is a legal right to elect a board, which in turn gives control over management and ultimately the assets (shareholders can even vote to dissolve the corporation, which gives them access to the assets directly).
There are no such powers that exist on the part of coin holders. There are really only two things that coin holders can do:
1. Stake according to the network rules and their own individual best interests and without collusion, which makes the network secure provided that the stake is adequately distributed.
2. Individually or in collusion with other coin holders, stake maliciously and "51% attack" the network. This can include: a) blocking all transactions in a sort of doomsday button to destroy the coin, b) selectively blocking transactions (and/or blocks) to gain some advantage for the attacker, c) rewrite the chain to perform double spend attacks.
This idea of coin holder voting is creating a system that facilities and to an extent legitimizes #2. It makes the entire system less secure and therefore ultimately less valuable, even though it may seem expedient in the short term for the purposes of "governance", especially if you happen to be in the majority.
As I've already stated earlier, the best ways to make changes to a coin are:
1. By overwhelming consensus of the community (such that there is no significant opposition and everyone just goes along with the change). This obviously does not exist for rewriting the digging rules. It does often exist for other changes that are routinely made to coins such as bug fixes, tweaks to transaction fees, some forms of new features, etc.
2. By creating a new coin with different rules such that the people can decide via a market process which to support. This requires permission from no one since anyone can create a new coin.

SuperClam, coins are not corporations.

I agree that coins are not corporations.
I don't think that means that there cannot be parallels between the two systems.

In the latter case, there is a legal right to elect a board, which in turn gives control over management and ultimately the assets (shareholders can even vote to dissolve the corporation, which gives them access to the assets directly).
There are no such powers that exist on the part of coin holders.

I would argue, given how liquid exchange is between crypto markets and the transfer-ability of advantage between networks, that coin holders have more control.
It is a near zero fee (ignoring spread) proposition to reallocate resources.

The debacle around Bitcoin XT illustrates just how 'legal' it is to 'elect a board'.
If Bitcoin XT had dominated the nodes and stakeholders on the network, it would have been the equivalent of "electing" Gavin and Hearn to the board of directors.

There are really only two things that coin holders can do:
1. Stake according to the network rules and their own individual best interests and without collusion, which makes the network secure provided that the stake is adequately distributed.
2. Individually or in collusion with other coin holders, stake maliciously and "51% attack" the network. This can include: a) blocking all transactions in a sort of doomsday button to destroy the coin, b) selectively blocking transactions (and/or blocks) to gain some advantage for the attacker, c) rewrite the chain to perform double spend attacks.
This idea of coin holder voting is creating a system that facilities and to an extent legitimizes #2. It makes the entire system less secure and therefore ultimately less valuable, even though it may seem expedient in the short term for the purposes of "governance", especially if you happen to be in the majority.

I categorically disagree.
I do not believe there is any redeemable argument against creating a system in which network participants can express their opinion about the direction of development.
The alternative is that the development team pays no mind what-so-ever to the users of the network.

I think one of the points of contention here is a misunderstanding about what is intended by this process.
We are debating different points.

Every single soft-fork in crypto history (though there have been few) has relied on this metric.
The primary difference is that we are suggesting there be a method to expose this network intent data prior and during the development process.
This is in contrast to a change which is mandated by the development team and then evangelized to get over a threshold for activation on chain.

All of the remaining hurdles which must be overcome to implement a change still exist.
This process does not effect network protocol consensus at all.
Changes must still be developed.
Updates must still be executed by network participants at their choice.
Services must still be informed and also choose to update.

This does not "lower the bar" for a successful forking change.
It simply provides a provable and fair means for the CLAM community and development team to propose and express support for potential changes.

We prefer to target our development energies towards propositions which have a likelihood for support.
I don't think that is unreasonable.
In fact, I think it is the only way forward that is "fair" and makes any sense whatsoever.


What is the alternative?
We take a poll of "shills" on BTTalk?

[SuperClam]

My scammy side business... How is it scammy? Last I checked we are paying the most per fresh dig on the market if dug right. (including diggin with your own CLIENT or Just-dice)
I built a service around the core of CLAM. These people have the right to dig the coins that were given to them... rights shouldn't be voted on.
I guess I have no vote in CLAM because I was smart and sold off high... there is no way I'd buy back in (via markets) with all this sclamming going on between Dooglus and pals.
It's very obvious that voting doesn't matter. So just do what yall are going to do and ppl can close their businesses/leave feedback.

An interesting side-note:

Once we get the petition system implemented you are welcome to petition that someone else controls the "SuperCLAM" account.

Can you do it without all of your sock-puppets?
Possibly.

If so, I think that is reasonable and will comply.

[beLiefs]

smooth and other "No Change" advocates,

Your arguments are persuasive and well thought out.
I can see myself making some of the same arguments.

Sharpen them and target them for stakeholders.
Explain in clear language why it is in THEIR interest to make that choice.
Everyone will have a voice as this process continues.

If you want a 'benevolent dictator' this may not be the right network for you.
That said, I am personally thankful to have you participating and involved

It is in the best interest of stakeholders to make the choice for "No Change" because it preserves the integrity of the foundational ideals of clam. Clam was founded as a "democratic" coin with "fair distribution." Deviation from this with no better reason than "self preservation" (read: greed) destroys the integrity of the coin. A coin with no integrity is a dead coin (worthless instead of worth less.)

I do not want a "benevolent dictator". I just don't want to see 51% of Clam-holdings be held by greed-based life forms, and the coin be ruined for everyone for their short-term gains. I admire the Clam devs for their actions and behavior during this ordeal, and I do not envy them. I hope to one day be so constituted.

A tyranny with open immigration/emigration and a nearby "better" neighbor quickly only tyrannizes themselves.

Yes, fundamentally changing the coin unnecessarily is a bad idea.

Further, though this petition process is not binding and serves to inform development, in a way it IS publicly binding.
The results of petitions will be public and transparent.
They will signify a provable sentiment of the stakeholders of CLAM.
In the corporate world, how long does an executive retain their position if they ignore the mandates of shareholders?
If support is established publicly for a change and an alternative client is released which implements that change..
That alternative client, by definition, would likely be adopted.
This is regardless of the "tyranny" of the development team.


It isn't perfect; but, this gives the community a voice without the concern for "shills" and non-stakeholder manipulation.
I can think of no better way to inform development energy and direction.

I would ask that certain decisions require more than a majority to offset the short comings of democracy -- to protect Clam against those who care more for themselves than ideas. Something like a change to the core as is being considered here should be unanimous IMO, or require a two-thirds majority at the very minimum.

[jaysabi]

We prefer to target our development energies towards propositions which have a likelihood for support.
I don't think that is unreasonable.
In fact, I think it is the only way forward that is "fair" and makes any sense whatsoever.

I can only speak for myself, not anyone else voicing opposition to changes. From the perspective that you have determined to make changes, obviously to be successful you have to target the propositions which have a likelihood for support. So yes, I agree with you that this is reasonable, but that doesn't mean it's fair. Tyranny by the majority is still tyranny. For me, the issue is that people want to change the rules because they don't like the benefit that one person (or a small number of people) are deriving from the rules as they stand, and that arbitrary determination undermines the legitimacy of the system. It may be politically popular to take away someone else's rights, but that's not fair.

[SuperClam]

Further, though this petition process is not binding and serves to inform development, in a way it IS publicly binding.
The results of petitions will be public and transparent.
They will signify a provable sentiment of the stakeholders of CLAM.
In the corporate world, how long does an executive retain their position if they ignore the mandates of shareholders?
If support is established publicly for a change and an alternative client is released which implements that change..
That alternative client, by definition, would likely be adopted.
This is regardless of the "tyranny" of the development team.
It isn't perfect; but, this gives the community a voice without the concern for "shills" and non-stakeholder manipulation.
I can think of no better way to inform development energy and direction.

I would ask that certain decisions require more than a majority to offset the short comings of democracy -- to protect Clam against those who care more for themselves than ideas. Something like a change to the core as is being considered here should be unanimous IMO, or require a two-thirds majority at the very minimum.

There are at least two different issues at hand:
1. Is there a default vote? How are unvoting blocks counted?
2. Do we consider a majority as enough? A super-majority? Complete consensus?

Complete consensus is a non-starter, in my opinion.
One can not expect the entire network to vote at all, let alone support ANYTHING.
In that case, have a good day; no development team is needed at all.

The debate about default votes and what is considered a majority are underway at the moment.

I personally believe that a rather long rolling window with "No Change" as the default vote would make the most sense. This allows anyone to propose a petition and over time rally support for that change.  

I would also argue that we do not require too large of a majority, lest we get nothing done whatsoever.

Regardless, the specifics haven't been worked out yet.  
Only a passing agreement that allowing the network to voice their opinions in a verifiable way is the best, unified way forward.

We prefer to target our development energies towards propositions which have a likelihood for support.
I don't think that is unreasonable.
In fact, I think it is the only way forward that is "fair" and makes any sense whatsoever.

I can only speak for myself, not anyone else voicing opposition to changes. From the perspective that you have determined to make changes, obviously to be successful you have to target the propositions which have a likelihood for support. So yes, I agree with you that this is reasonable, but that doesn't mean it's fair. Tyranny by the majority is still tyranny. For me, the issue is that people want to change the rules because they don't like the benefit that one person (or a small number of people) are deriving from the rules as they stand, and that arbitrary determination undermines the legitimacy of the system. It may be politically popular to take away someone else's rights, but that's not fair.

It very well may.
Thank the Great CLAM this system is designed to move methodically.
Those paying attention will have plenty of time to realize that they do not agree with the opinion of others in the network.
That leaves them plenty of time to choose a network with which they have more in common.
Or, alternatively, evangelize and convince their peers otherwise.

[beLiefs]

There are at least two different issues at hand:
1. Is there a default vote? How are unvoting blocks counted?
2. Do we consider a majority as enough? A super-majority? Complete consensus?

Complete consensus is a non-starter, in my opinion.
One can not expect the entire network to vote at all, let alone support ANYTHING.
In that case, have a good day; no development team is needed at all.

The debate about default votes and what is considered a majority are underway at the moment.

I personally believe that a rather long rolling window with "No Change" as the default vote would make the most sense. This allows anyone to propose a petition and over time rally support for that change. 

I would also argue that we do not require too large of a majority, lest we get nothing done whatsoever.

Regardless, the specifics haven't been worked out yet. 
Only a passing agreement that allowing the network to voice their opinions in a verifiable way is the best, unified way forward.

1. No. Unvoting blocks are unvoting blocks, and should not be counted (either as part of the total, or as default.) Democracy entails involvement, and liberty entails responsibility.

2. Dependent on the issue being voted upon. I suggest a "scale of severity" to weigh issues against, and to determine the "weight" needed to carry said issues. This "weight" could offset the negatives of not having a default -- I think.
 
I have held two jobs where the ultimate goal was elimination of my own position, and people wonder why I prefer self-employment. 

I would tend to agree with your assessment on the default thing, but for me it comes back to the "digger." If this person's motivation is purely greed; a default vote in this manner would support that position. I think votes should only be counted for those willing to participate. The mouth should be where the money is so to speak IMO.

I absolutely love this idea. If done well it will not only be good for clam, but good for crypto as a whole. Thank the Great CLAM.

[jd1959]

My scammy side business... How is it scammy? Last I checked we are paying the most per fresh dig on the market if dug right. (including diggin with your own CLIENT or Just-dice)
I built a service around the core of CLAM. These people have the right to dig the coins that were given to them... rights shouldn't be voted on.
I guess I have no vote in CLAM because I was smart and sold off high... there is no way I'd buy back in (via markets) with all this sclamming going on between Dooglus and pals.
It's very obvious that voting doesn't matter. So just do what yall are going to do and ppl can close their businesses/leave feedback.

An interesting side-note:

Once we get the petition system implemented you are welcome to petition that someone else controls the "SuperCLAM" account.

Can you do it without all of your sock-puppets?
Possibly.

If so, I think that is reasonable and will comply.

I really don't understand why someone wants to take over your account / position? Can't they just start there own coin. ......... I mean nobody is holding a gun to anyone's head making them hold Clam

Jon  

[BayAreaCoins]

Can you do it without all of your sock-puppets?
Possibly.

I don't have any sock-puppets... are you kidding me?

[smooth]

In the latter case, there is a legal right to elect a board, which in turn gives control over management and ultimately the assets (shareholders can even vote to dissolve the corporation, which gives them access to the assets directly).
There are no such powers that exist on the part of coin holders.

I would argue, given how liquid exchange is between crypto markets and the transfer-ability of advantage between networks, that coin holders have more control.
It is a near zero fee (ignoring spread) proposition to reallocate resources.

Stock in major public corporations is more liquid than cryptocurrencies (particularly smaller alts) and fees are as low or lower. Smaller corporations and private corporations are less liquid to illiquid of course.

I don't understand the relevance of what you are saying though. If stock or coins change hands, nothing about that process allows stockholders or coin holders to exercise authority over the corporation or the coin network itself. All that happens is one owner is replaced by another.

The debacle around Bitcoin XT illustrates just how 'legal' it is to 'elect a board'.
If Bitcoin XT had dominated the nodes and stakeholders on the network, it would have been the equivalent of "electing" Gavin and Hearn to the board of directors.

I don't understand this paragraph at all

There are really only two things that coin holders can do:
1. Stake according to the network rules and their own individual best interests and without collusion, which makes the network secure provided that the stake is adequately distributed.
2. Individually or in collusion with other coin holders, stake maliciously and "51% attack" the network. This can include: a) blocking all transactions in a sort of doomsday button to destroy the coin, b) selectively blocking transactions (and/or blocks) to gain some advantage for the attacker, c) rewrite the chain to perform double spend attacks.
This idea of coin holder voting is creating a system that facilities and to an extent legitimizes #2. It makes the entire system less secure and therefore ultimately less valuable, even though it may seem expedient in the short term for the purposes of "governance", especially if you happen to be in the majority.

I categorically disagree.
I do not believe there is any redeemable argument against creating a system in which network participants can express their opinion about the direction of development.
The alternative is that the development team pays no mind what-so-ever to the users of the network.

You are entitled to disagree of course, but everything I said about the mechanism by which blockchains function was correct (as far as I know -- if someone spots an error please point it out so I can correct it).

I think one of the points of contention here is a misunderstanding about what is intended by this process.
We are debating different points.

Every single soft-fork in crypto history (though there have been few) has relied on this metric.

I don't know what points we are debating. I'm making observations about how blockchains function and the dangers of 51% attacks.

Most of the soft forks I know about have happened in the context of Bitcoin where the typical threshold for activation has been 95%. This serves as a proxy for widespread, essentially universal, acceptance and adoption of the change. In no case of which I am aware has a contentious change been made as a soft fork prior to widespread acceptance of the change.

What is the alternative?

I already answered this. You don't like my answer. It did not involve shills on bitcointalk.