|
I just had an idea. Make an instawallet with a "Double or Nothing" button. Just a huge irresistible button that either doubles your balance or takes it all. Take a 1% or whatever fee by giving only 49.5% odds. Have to publish the max amount you can handle covering, maybe make it dynamic. If someone actually wants to do this I could probably put up some cash.
|
|
|
|
|
Interesting. I've been thinking about a site that would have the same sort of issues.
My plan is to hash [my guess, salt, timestamp] and give that to the player. They also give a guess and win if they are close enough depending on the specifics of the wager. If my guesses are non random it is to my detriment this way.
This avoids using a hash for the part that determines winnings since I was cautioned that the output of some hash functions will not be uniformly distributed. I haven't verified that, curious if anyone knows if/which are.
|
|
|
|
|
If your bitcoins are way more precious than your dollars you should obviously keep buying coins until they aren't.
|
|
|
|
This is important so I'll be thorough, but the most important part is: Seals never stores clear text passwords anywhere.If you download the trial version of Mavens to check it out you may rightly be worried because there is a Mavens' data field for 'password' and if a user makes an account in the Mavens software their password will indeed show in clear text in that field. That is not acceptable so users never create Mavens accounts at Seals. They create Seals accounts which triggers the creation of a Mavens account with the data we provide which never includes a password. This is why you cannot log in directly to your Mavens account at Seals like you can at some Mavens sites. You must log in to your Seals account on the web and click the "Play Now" button which generates a one time login key for access to your Mavens account. Your Seals password (your only password at Seals) is always salted and hashed. |
|
|
|
I would like this idea (if the price was right  ) Me too... this could be good for collecting debts. Lol, it was a joke. I would 'like' it. If I was paid adequately. |
|
|
|
The main problem with gox going down is no 'price' for bitcoin. Yes, we can work without a central price but it will be harder. I have not needed gox for a while now mostly doing local. I am glad they are there, but as bitcoin gets more diverse , they are needed less.
A price will emerge, if it doesn't it's free money all over the place. |
|
|
|
It might even be better for MtGox to stay big. Presumably they will then be paying a lot of tax to the Japanese govt, who might resist demands from others to shut them down.
I don't think they make a large amount of money. Last time I calculated, it was less than a million over the year, based on trading volume and the fees they take. Gox will never pay enough tax for that to matter. Maybe they'll pay off individuals with 'campaign' money. I don't know how that works in Japan. But also, Japan doesn't fight with Us gov after, uh, the incident. |
|
|
|
The end of bear trap.
Ding Ding Ding. |
|
|
|
It is quite obvious that in (maximum) few years some of world's Governments are going to start perceiving Bitcoin as a threat.
When they do, first thing they are going to try is closing the biggest players (like MtGox, which allegedly is reponsible for 80% of all BTC trade in the world) to force the currency into underground.
Taking megaupload takedown into consideration this scenario is IMHO not only probable, but inevitable.
I wonder, is the market decentralized enough currently to support transition from big players to smaller, local markets ? I mean, shouldn't we all support different (other than MtGox) services so when government shuts it down, devastating effects of the catastrophe will be smaller ?
Government will try to stop Bitcoin, that is only a matter of time. We kind of already know that is going to happen since the beginnings, so why so many people are still using MtGox ?
I reckon MtGox won't have 80% anymore if they get shut down. People will stop using them if they shut down, so that takes care of itself. Government would be dumb (yeah, ok, a distinct possibility) to shut down a big thing they can control like Gox. |
|
|
|
It seems that no matter what, the last block can be manipulated if someone really wanted. Granted, if they did, they'd only get a TINY advantage for it would be likely that someone else would submit the next block. And who's to say they'd even be the one who would get the opportunity to throw a block out. It is a small risk but I wanted my lottery to be impossible to manipulate. Getting data from outside the blockchain seemed to be the only way to accomplish this.
It is small for an ordinary user (negative really since you forfiet the block reward), but could be arranged to be larger, a pool owner with 500BTC in tickets for example. I understand using MM now, but I hope someone will come up with a a bitcoiny way. |
|
|
|
I would like this idea (if the price was right ) |
|
|
|
Whoa, I didn't know you were using Mega Millions numbers. Why not use the hash of a block 20 blocks after the draw closes?
For one, the delay is no good -- lotto players want to know, with as little delay as possible, if they've hit the jackpot. Using a block hash means the result is one that has the poentital to be be manipulated. Mining can absord a little of this -- there's no significant harm to anyone else if a miner were to not announce a valid hash, for instance. On the other hand, if the miner with big bets on BitLotto finds a valid hash and then discards it because it doesn't also result in a winning lotto ticket, then the results are going t end up being different. The result in that case was manipulated. So by using Mega Millions numbers as data that then gets hashed then this risk of manipulation no longer exists. Right, a miner who plays more than 50 coin worth is incentivised to throw out a losing hash, seems like there should be a remedy, but I can't think of it. Using multiple block hashes still leaves the last one being the only one that matters from the player/miner point of view. It says the MM numbers come a few hours later anyway. |
|
|
|
|
Whoa, I didn't know you were using Mega Millions numbers. Why not use the hash of a block 20 blocks after the draw closes?
|
|
|
|
|
Don't be a suckkkka, don't save dollars. No excuse anymore.
|
|
|
|
|
I'd love for the addresses to come 'used' so that they have firstbits already. And of course then you could display the firstbits.
|
|
|
|
I've got a bit dime for the first person to correctly label our position on that chart. |
|
|
|
|
It's gunna bubble so so hard, probably a lot slower than last time, but eventually it will get ahead of itself again.
|
|
|
|
i think once your dead thats it.
That is what my guess is also. There is nothing to indicate otherwise. For sure. But here's a question with a slightly less obvious answer: After a caterpillar spins its cocoon, all of its body dissolves into what is essentially a soup of organic molecules, which reassemble themselves into a moth or a butterfly. Assuming the caterpillar was conscious, and that the moth or butterfly is conscious, is it the same consciousness or a different one? I'd say different. If the process was just a little bit different we might consider the caterpillar to have been eaten. |
|
|
|
|
Ah, the problem is that the minimum deposit is .01BTC. The coins you sent are not lost but won't be credited until .0095 more comes in.
|
|
|
|
iirc Gavin had a pretty good proposal that had max block size set like 110% of the average size of the last X blocks.
That guarantees, of course, a long-run equilibrium of negligible fees and negligible mining activity. But whatever, it is either high fees / secure txns OR low fees / insecure txns, whose to say which is the lessor of the two evils? No, even with unlimited size blocks there is at least one force, let me describe. Suppose all miners are negligible (less than .1% or so) and all are shortsighted and include any transaction at any price. Users will pay the minimum fee. Miners will not cover their costs and will start to drop out. Now each miner has a higher % than before. Maybe still not enough, but if not there will be no profit and more will drop out leaving a higher % still for each (in particular for the largest miner). Now this highest % miner has enough so that he individually can increase his own profits by declining some low fee transactions. This is because some users have a preference not just for getting in a block, but for a high probability of getting in the next block. A 1% miner for example can charge people for privilege of a 100% chance at inclusion in the next block, without paying what he demands the user has to settle for a 99% chance at next block inclusion. All miners will profit from the users who pay for certainty. This will start to bring some miners back in until the 'cover' the bigger miners are giving, miners who are thinking only of themselves. Simple math example: Everyone paying 1 satoshi. 1% miner rejects 10000 1 satoshi transactions and 1% of people choose to pay the 1000 satoshi min fee that one 1% miner requires. Now that miner makes 1000x100=100000 satoshis per block. Everyone else gets to continue collecting the 1 satoshi fees and the larger ones, the 1% miner doesn't give a damn about them though. It's even possible a really really small miner could have some effect, like why not pay 10 satoshis if there is even a little chance it will help. So a tiny miner expects at least 10% of people (or clients default settings will be set to) will just say whatever 10 satoshis then. No. Competition will drive fees to a negligible amount. You are not selling spaces in already found blocks (which would give you some monopoly pricing power), you are selling spaces in blocks which you might find in the future. Your services are identical to competitors' services. If not, then competitors can easily make them identical. All business goes to whoever sets the lowest price. The equilibrium price approaches zero. End of story. Ah, ok. |
|
|
|
|
Show Posts
