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Nachtrag:
Richtig, die Clients nehmen den gesamten Betrag aus einer Adresse (oder gar von mehreren Adressen) und senden ihn komplett weg. Falls etwas übrig bleibt, wird der Restbetrag an eine andere Adresse gesendet. An eine neue, unbekannte Adresse, die im gleichen (Sender-) Wallet ist. Von aussen kann man nun erstmal nicht unterscheiden welche von beiden Summen nach "draussen", und welche als Wechselgeld versendet wurde.
Das macht der Client alles von alleine, unsichtbar im Hintergrund.
Probleme gibt es nur, wenn Adressen exportiert, importiert, ausgedruckt werden oder ähnliches. Dann besteht große Gefahr, dass das Wechselgeld irgendwo verloren geht.
Solange man einen normalen Client so benutzt, wie man sich das gemeinhin vorstellt, und keine special Geschichten bastelt, ist alles paletti.
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Also, there are people around here running an offline Armory on a raspberry pi. It's not as polished as a laptop, but should turn out both smaller and less expensive. Ente |
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might give you a clue as to who is behind Bitcoin... who has access to this high-grade crypto hardware? Might shed some light on other mysterious factors as to the origins of Bitcoin.
It also would suggest something profound: that there is a backdoor to SHA256 and whoever has knowledge of this backdoor could bring down Bitcoin or generate coins at a fraction of the processing cost.
If the creator of bitcoin knew of a backdoor to SHA256 (whatever this might mean), he wouldn't use a whole chain of hashalgos. Besides SHS we have RIPEMD at least. And, for sure the creator wouldn't just "backdoor" the block generation and make the other functions (transferring bitcoins, for example) secure? For what, an advantage for early mining efficiency? While risking that everything blows up once, when the "backdoor" becomes public? Nah. Speaking of Occam's, I would suggest that when you have the figure of Satoshi:
* Leans toward privacy
* Masterminded a lot of what we know today
* Spent significant time on it
* Continues to be mysterious
It would negate theories such as:
* Lost access to a computer lab
* Uses public computers
* A third of the machines broke and he was like 'lol' and kept trucking
* Needed supercomputers
Though those aren't bad suggestions, they just don't seem likely. Someone bright like him wouldn't plan something this important and leave the likelihood of lost access to the wind, or ignored broken machine input. It's not as if he had a clear deadline, at least that's my thought.
As to the hardware, it's highly likely he simply had some high-end equipment, which didn't take much to achieve 7mh in 2009. Also, individuals like him often do put easter eggs into things, so a message or a simple tag of some sort, is not outside normalcy. The mystery part makes me wonder if there's a reason for it, aside from just because.
Just random thoughts off the top of my head.
This, however, I like a lot! Ente |
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Honestly, I was a little bit miffed in the beginning when seeing the leverage reduction to 2:1. But after reading about the reasons, it makes a lot of sense yo me.
I think Bitfinex has built up a good reputation in the BTC community, and that's the most important thing to keep. If too many trades get busted in turbulent times, or even worse, lenders lose their money, it's bad for all of us trading on Bitfinex: trust in lending and the overall money available for loans goes down, average interest rate goes up to make up for the higher risk. And in the end, although it may seem unlikely, all this can cost Bitfinex a lot of money, because in high-volume turbulent periods the trading engines of the big exchanges can lag real hard.
The only minor complaint that remains is the change on very short notice. I for one realized it only because an open long that was well in the profit suddenly showed negative values for tradable balance. Please make the decision process a bit more transparent in future.
Anyway, please keep up the high-quality service. Bitfinex is my favourite BTC trading platform, and it seems like you're doing a good job to keep it this way.
I agree on that. The only negative point I could ever come up with, is the communication of changes to users. It was similar with back then, when MtGox was removed from the engine, there wasn't much "official" communication. I would like: - an email goes out to all users, explaining the changes in one, two sentences. More details linked to a thread or something - a popup, once, for all users who log in Both of this a reasonable time before the change, please. Two weeks sounds about right, seeing as how quick bitcoin-time runs. Some of those changes mean real money for some of us, you know. And many users don't check in here daily neither.. Besides that: I encourage everyone I talk to to use bitfinex, as an online exchange. Where's the affiliate program? ;-)Ente |
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Also, one scenario could be that people receive (milli)bitcoins and go on send them elsewhere. When you send a transaction out, you publish your (real) public key (which is something different to your public bitcoin address). If the privat+public key pair was created insecurely, the attacker ow knows the public key and might be able to steal all funds from that address.
BUT: Why the heck does the attacker here send millibits to addresses which already did transactions? Where the public key is already published and known?
So, this can't really be the reason.
Analyzing who owns which addresses? Doesn't really make sense, with just a handfull he scraped from bitcointalk and similar.
So, my guess is it's something with tainting other coins.
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Not to be a d$%k but you said "So, the internal wallet-encryption is either secure enough, or it is not." That really does not make sense to me. A lot of people like to say your data is "secure" but really it's only secure because no one has found a way around it YET. Then one day we hear on the news that all our credit card numbers are stolen. At that point it went from "secure enough" to "not." And it changed in a flash.
I would not want to be the mark of someone far smarter and depraved than me when they obsolete the word secure for my thumb drive.
Well, that's two different kinds of "security": 1) is "low level, algorithm security". Like, if the keys in the wallet file are encrypted via AES, ECDSA or similar, with xy bits and z rounds, I consider it secure. 2) is, totally independent, "high level, operation security". No matter how good 1) is, once I use "asdf" as password, or my supersecure password is stolen via keylogger or rubberhose attack, my funds are gone. You are talking about 2). In the case you mention, most often servers are hacked (which is an entirely different attack vector than the walletstuff) and the data is stolen right out of the ram, or unencrypted active partition, or similar. 1) isn't even active in that case. I talk about 1). I want (and am sure) the parameters and algorithms which encrypt the sensitive parts of the wallet to be sound, and to be resistant against brute-force attacks of a large scale attacker for many years. That's all 1) has to do. And it's most definitely not the solution against other, higher-level attacks. And, as a note: I have long passphrase(s) or real random passwords for my wallets, have the long-term wallet rar-password-encrypted, and finally all wallets or the rar file in a password manager, encrypted with a long masterpassword. With that, I feel reasonably secure in the means of 1) to spread that file for backup. Against 2), I use different passwords, for example. So when one password and its wallet are cleared out, I wouldn't lose all of my wallets. ..and then let's get 3) in the mix: Backup all of that mess securely, but redeemable in case something happens to me :-) Ente Ente |
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Nah, I don't know, guys.. The point of an offline wallet is that the privkeys nor the wallet password is never present on the online computer. Sure, you can encrypt the wallet once again with truecrypt, ssl or rar. But then, would you send someone to the battlefield with two bullet-proof vests? Should he use two different passwords? So he has a greater risk of mixing them up or forgetting one? Or shall he use the same password twice, so the "outer" encryption is the only one needed to break? So, the internal wallet-encryption is either secure enough, or it is not. And with the encryption set to need lots of ram (against GPU-bruteforcing), and knowing Alans level of quality-of-work, I lean out of the window to say that shall be enough. BUT, don't forget you add other risks by having a plain (encrypted) wallet visible: People see it's a wallet (filename and contents), and they even see the public keys. This might, in a worst case scenario, lead to attacks (computational or physical) which wouldn't happen if the wallet was encrypted in "diary.rar". ############### Alan, any thoughts on that? Ente |
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Ente, that's why we invented this thing called a trusted platform module which lets us do crypto operations in a boxed, temper resistant environment.
Oh wow, here comes the next, even more polarizing topic! :-) Nah, I'm no friend of TPMs in their current state. Or, maybe, I lost track of the actual current state. Did "roll your own CA into your TPM" ever materialize? In fact, by now with the latest revelations I trust software much more than hardware. Be it a TPM or a PRNG. And even with software I am careful, I only use stuff Schneier was involved with for years now. Ente |
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The problem with a local wallet is: No matter how well you protect it, be it 2FA or a DNA sample of the owner: Once you do a transaction, you have to unlock it, and that's exactly the moment the malware steals your coins.
Well, we could go on and have individual 2FA keys for every address. Then you can only lose that address you just unlocked. Technically, this would be possible. But then, instead of having a second device for the 2FA, why not have a watching only wallet on your computer and the whole wallet on your second device, to begin with?
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hmm.... ich hoffe echt, dass ich als armer student, der sich null mit mit sowas auskennt, keinen solchen Brief erhalte... und das User ausfechten können, die sich damit auskennen... kümmert sich da iwer drum, z.B bitcoin foundation oderso?
Denn es ist ja schon eine ziemlich heftige Sache, weil praktisch mindestens jeder 2te Bitcoin-Nutzer auf diese Weise "angeklagt" werden könnte, da ja auch fast jeder Miner darunter fällt.
*hust* *kaffee auf Tastatur spuck* Ente sorry ich kenne mich was sowas angeht wirklich überhaupt nicht aus  es kommt mir nur grade so vor, als könnte das den bitcoin in ganz Deutschland mächtig gefährden und ich verstehe nicht, warum ich der einzige bin, den das so in panik versetzt Na hoffentlich liegt es daran, dass alle anderen mehr wissen als ich und es nicht so schlimm ist, wie es gerade für mich aussieht  Nun ja, die Foundation ist mittlerweile kontrovers. Sie steht im Ruf sich nur für US-Amerikanische Belange einzusetzen, und dort dann mit den Regulatoren im Bett zu sein. Unwahrscheinlich, dass die sich in internationale Belange reinhängen. Ach, so dramatisch sehe ich das nicht, mit den deutschen Regulierungen. Privat kaufen und verkaufen ist kein Problem. Ggf muss der Gewinn versteuert werden. Um offiziell, gewerbsmäßig zu handeln, muss man die entsprechenden Lizenzen haben. Das ist nicht unmöglich, wie bitcoin.de bewiesen haben. Und für alle dazwischen, die privat viel handeln und Gewinn machen möchten.. naja, das gibt es bei Ebay mit normalen Waren genauso wie bei Localbitcoin mit Bitcoin ;-) Eigentlich würde ich ja erwarten, dass es mittlerweile einen Goldhändler mit Ladengeschäft gäbe, der auch Bitcoin handelt. Zumindest würde es für naive Leute wie mich wenig grundsätzlichen Unterschied zwischen Goldhandel und Bitcoinhandel geben.. Ente |
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hmm.... ich hoffe echt, dass ich als armer student, der sich null mit mit sowas auskennt, keinen solchen Brief erhalte... und das User ausfechten können, die sich damit auskennen... kümmert sich da iwer drum, z.B bitcoin foundation oderso?
Denn es ist ja schon eine ziemlich heftige Sache, weil praktisch mindestens jeder 2te Bitcoin-Nutzer auf diese Weise "angeklagt" werden könnte, da ja auch fast jeder Miner darunter fällt.
*hust* *kaffee auf Tastatur spuck* Ente |
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I wonder what wallet formats are searched on "recovery"? In fact, there's a sad Armory user trying to scan his HDD for a lost wallet. Alan just wrote what one would scan for: [..] For CircusPeanut or anyone else that would like to take a stab at raw binary searches for wallets, you can probably search for \xBAWALLET\x00 which will appear as the first eight bytes of any wallet file. After that, you can look four bytes later for the network magic bytes \xF9\xBE\xB4\xD9. Once you have that, you can use the binary map I linked above to figure out how much data to copy. Ente |
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ok i think the OP wanted something like this:
fin
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Far too many people are incapable of "being their own bank" so take that one off the list.
That only leaves one option in the poll I believe.
99% of users are incapable to read sourcecode. Still, being FOSS is an advantage for everybody, and there are enough people who will refuse closed source software altogether in some situations. Think encryption software for example. Ente |
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Sehr schön, freue mich drauf!
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