BitBay OFFICIAL BITBAY Thread Smart Contracts Decentralized Markets Rolling Peg

[Munti]

Not at all

The double deposit is there to make sure both will lose if dishonest.
It can not be sent to anywhere except to the wallet it was deposited from.

I don't understand it i think. Is there some technical post about this technique? Maybe "arbiters" like in Openbazaar could be a solution?

Besides, why would buyer say he never received the phone? You are not likely to release the deposit if the deal isn't done satisfactory, are you?

Buyer could be a scammer too. But again, I have to read more about this system.

The point is to avoid arbiters. This is a fully decentralized trustless system. Arbiters are a risk.

There is a little about this technique on our site http://bitbay.market/about/smart-contracts/
David has also explained this a couple of times in this thread I believe.
Basically it goes like this:
I post my iphone for sale. I define the price, and have to send a deposit that equals the sell price to a multisig wallet.
You want to buy it, and accept the contract. In doing so you send me the Bay I was asking for, + send the same amount to the multisig.
If all goes well we both ask for the locked funds in the multisig to get released. They will get released simultaniously to both of us, and only if both of us asked for it.
If I send you an old shoe instead of my phone, you will be pissed, and you will not release the deposit. I will have gained nothing by sending you that shoe instead of my phone, and thus there is no point in doing so.
If I actually sent you my phone, but you claim I did not, I will not release the deposit. Again, that makes it pointless for you to try scamming me.

[1714638756]

1714638756

[1714638756]

1714638756

[1714638756]

1714638756

[Munti]

Why did my post get just removed.

Anyways im sure that double deposit wont work on mass scale you need an arbiter

Why do you think double deposit wont work?

(I posted the reason for deleting your post in Syscoin thread before I read your question here)

I think it will hinder adoption as vendors will not list things that they have to ensure collateral for AND not knowing if their funds will be locked indefinitely... it doesn't make much business sense although technically it is a superior implementation (however it is less work because no GUI is needed). A vendor would much rather have the piece of mind knowing an arbiter is involved that is impartial and not have to lock up funds, that really should be a discretion on the buyer side that he may have his funds locked until he receives his item(s).

It does open up a can of worms of knowing who to pick as an arbiter, because it has to be a trusted person who has incentive to do good, so you must design around that and create the incentive structure for the system to work. It cannot fully trustlessly on mass scale in this way unless you get an insurance agent involved somehow to provide the collateral for you for a charge.

That all being said, something using CLTV however may work using time locks and extending time locks somehow and I think David knows this.. however it is alot of GUI work to get this right, and more moving pieces, more complications, more unit tests.. but ultimately might be the optimal solution. But at this point 2 of 3 is probably the best way to go.

The vendors funds are not locked indefinitely. They can cancel at any time until someone enters their contract. And whoever enters a contract will have an incentive to fulfill the deal so they can get their deposit released.
The problem for vendors would be a different one. If a power seller from ebay started using our market he would have to have an enormous amount of Bay to list everything he is offering. We are discussing solutions for this. Basically we need an option to reduce the deposit for big sellers/buyers. We could make that dependent on the rep system. We can also make it possible to allow frozen Bay to be used for deposits.

The positive side for investors is of course that a lot of Bay will be tied up in transactions if the market is popular. Just imagine, how much Bay will be in double deposit if average transactions are $1000 a day. How long is average listing time (where seller has put down deposit) before someone enters the contract? 5 days? 10 days?
How long does the transaction take when buyer has entered the contract? 3 days domestic and 10 days international? Pick your numbers and do the math. We can easily have a situation where an average of $1000 daily transactions can create an average demand for $30 000 - $50 000 worth of Bay.

Once you have a contract the funds are locked indefinitely, how can you UNLOCK a locked contract that is based on double deposit?
 
You need to reduce barrier of entry as much as possible to gain network affect.  Demand for bay will come as a result of users wanting to use the system because it is easy and cheap and provides the service they want, not by reducing supply to appease investors.

There is subtly in what the users "want" as that is all up to marketing.

Yes, once both parties have entered a contract the funds are locked. But I don't see where you get indefinitely from. They will both have an incentive to get the deal done so the funds can be released.

We will not reduce supply to appease investors. As a matter of fact you need a little surplus of money in a well functioning economy. But we will use pegging to avoid the volatility you see in other coins. And just to be clear, with pegging we don't mean a fixed price forever. (Pegs have a long history of failing in fiat) Think of it as a stabilizer.

Yes after talking to David I implemented a pegging feature to avoid volatility issue. Yes they have incentive to get the deal done but if the consumer really does feel he gets cheated and vendor has shipped and lost goods then they both ar eout of luck, none of which want to give in and lose their share, they will remain locked because they do not want the other to get the coins... you need an arbiter here to resolve the situation, whoever loses here has incentive to STOP using the system and look elsewhere with their business.

I was goin to implement the double deposit escrow but after thinking about it a bit and speaking with other notable people I came to the consensus that the best idea is to have an arbiter (buyer pays a fee which he gets a 0.05% cut out of the deal IFF he signs off on a refund or release, otherwise doesn't get a cut), and have done the GUI for it which took the longer than the actual feature.

And how is the arbiter able to make the right decision if the two parties involved do not agree?

[ArpFlush]

The point is to avoid arbiters. This is a fully decentralized trustless system. Arbiters are a risk.

There is a little about this technique on our site http://bitbay.market/about/smart-contracts/
David has also explained this a couple of times in this thread I believe.
Basically it goes like this:
I post my iphone for sale. I define the price, and have to send a deposit that equals the sell price to a multisig wallet.
You want to buy it, and accept the contract. In doing so you send me the Bay I was asking for, + send the same amount to the multisig.
If all goes well we both ask for the locked funds in the multisig to get released. They will get released simultaniously to both of us, and only if both of us asked for it.
If I send you an old shoe instead of my phone, you will be pissed, and you will not release the deposit. I will have gained nothing by sending you that shoe instead of my phone, and thus there is no point in doing so.
If I actually sent you my phone, but you claim I did not, I will not release the deposit. Again, that makes it pointless for you to try scamming me.

Aah, it's more clear now :-) as you say the buyer has to send the same amount to a multisig. Thanks!

[sidhujag]

Why did my post get just removed.

Anyways im sure that double deposit wont work on mass scale you need an arbiter

Why do you think double deposit wont work?

(I posted the reason for deleting your post in Syscoin thread before I read your question here)

I think it will hinder adoption as vendors will not list things that they have to ensure collateral for AND not knowing if their funds will be locked indefinitely... it doesn't make much business sense although technically it is a superior implementation (however it is less work because no GUI is needed). A vendor would much rather have the piece of mind knowing an arbiter is involved that is impartial and not have to lock up funds, that really should be a discretion on the buyer side that he may have his funds locked until he receives his item(s).

It does open up a can of worms of knowing who to pick as an arbiter, because it has to be a trusted person who has incentive to do good, so you must design around that and create the incentive structure for the system to work. It cannot fully trustlessly on mass scale in this way unless you get an insurance agent involved somehow to provide the collateral for you for a charge.

That all being said, something using CLTV however may work using time locks and extending time locks somehow and I think David knows this.. however it is alot of GUI work to get this right, and more moving pieces, more complications, more unit tests.. but ultimately might be the optimal solution. But at this point 2 of 3 is probably the best way to go.

The vendors funds are not locked indefinitely. They can cancel at any time until someone enters their contract. And whoever enters a contract will have an incentive to fulfill the deal so they can get their deposit released.
The problem for vendors would be a different one. If a power seller from ebay started using our market he would have to have an enormous amount of Bay to list everything he is offering. We are discussing solutions for this. Basically we need an option to reduce the deposit for big sellers/buyers. We could make that dependent on the rep system. We can also make it possible to allow frozen Bay to be used for deposits.

The positive side for investors is of course that a lot of Bay will be tied up in transactions if the market is popular. Just imagine, how much Bay will be in double deposit if average transactions are $1000 a day. How long is average listing time (where seller has put down deposit) before someone enters the contract? 5 days? 10 days?
How long does the transaction take when buyer has entered the contract? 3 days domestic and 10 days international? Pick your numbers and do the math. We can easily have a situation where an average of $1000 daily transactions can create an average demand for $30 000 - $50 000 worth of Bay.

Once you have a contract the funds are locked indefinitely, how can you UNLOCK a locked contract that is based on double deposit?
 
You need to reduce barrier of entry as much as possible to gain network affect.  Demand for bay will come as a result of users wanting to use the system because it is easy and cheap and provides the service they want, not by reducing supply to appease investors.

There is subtly in what the users "want" as that is all up to marketing.

Yes, once both parties have entered a contract the funds are locked. But I don't see where you get indefinitely from. They will both have an incentive to get the deal done so the funds can be released.

We will not reduce supply to appease investors. As a matter of fact you need a little surplus of money in a well functioning economy. But we will use pegging to avoid the volatility you see in other coins. And just to be clear, with pegging we don't mean a fixed price forever. (Pegs have a long history of failing in fiat) Think of it as a stabilizer.

Yes after talking to David I implemented a pegging feature to avoid volatility issue. Yes they have incentive to get the deal done but if the consumer really does feel he gets cheated and vendor has shipped and lost goods then they both ar eout of luck, none of which want to give in and lose their share, they will remain locked because they do not want the other to get the coins... you need an arbiter here to resolve the situation, whoever loses here has incentive to STOP using the system and look elsewhere with their business.

I was goin to implement the double deposit escrow but after thinking about it a bit and speaking with other notable people I came to the consensus that the best idea is to have an arbiter (buyer pays a fee which he gets a 0.05% cut out of the deal IFF he signs off on a refund or release, otherwise doesn't get a cut), and have done the GUI for it which took the longer than the actual feature.

And how is the arbiter able to make the right decision if the two parties involved do not agree?

by making an impartial decision with encrypted messages of data given to him or her. He has no incentive to cheat because he will have return business if he makes the right decision. You cant make it trustless via a lock mechanism because the barrier of entry and CODB are too high.

[Munti]

Why did my post get just removed.

Anyways im sure that double deposit wont work on mass scale you need an arbiter

Why do you think double deposit wont work?

(I posted the reason for deleting your post in Syscoin thread before I read your question here)

I think it will hinder adoption as vendors will not list things that they have to ensure collateral for AND not knowing if their funds will be locked indefinitely... it doesn't make much business sense although technically it is a superior implementation (however it is less work because no GUI is needed). A vendor would much rather have the piece of mind knowing an arbiter is involved that is impartial and not have to lock up funds, that really should be a discretion on the buyer side that he may have his funds locked until he receives his item(s).

It does open up a can of worms of knowing who to pick as an arbiter, because it has to be a trusted person who has incentive to do good, so you must design around that and create the incentive structure for the system to work. It cannot fully trustlessly on mass scale in this way unless you get an insurance agent involved somehow to provide the collateral for you for a charge.

That all being said, something using CLTV however may work using time locks and extending time locks somehow and I think David knows this.. however it is alot of GUI work to get this right, and more moving pieces, more complications, more unit tests.. but ultimately might be the optimal solution. But at this point 2 of 3 is probably the best way to go.

The vendors funds are not locked indefinitely. They can cancel at any time until someone enters their contract. And whoever enters a contract will have an incentive to fulfill the deal so they can get their deposit released.
The problem for vendors would be a different one. If a power seller from ebay started using our market he would have to have an enormous amount of Bay to list everything he is offering. We are discussing solutions for this. Basically we need an option to reduce the deposit for big sellers/buyers. We could make that dependent on the rep system. We can also make it possible to allow frozen Bay to be used for deposits.

The positive side for investors is of course that a lot of Bay will be tied up in transactions if the market is popular. Just imagine, how much Bay will be in double deposit if average transactions are $1000 a day. How long is average listing time (where seller has put down deposit) before someone enters the contract? 5 days? 10 days?
How long does the transaction take when buyer has entered the contract? 3 days domestic and 10 days international? Pick your numbers and do the math. We can easily have a situation where an average of $1000 daily transactions can create an average demand for $30 000 - $50 000 worth of Bay.

Once you have a contract the funds are locked indefinitely, how can you UNLOCK a locked contract that is based on double deposit?
 
You need to reduce barrier of entry as much as possible to gain network affect.  Demand for bay will come as a result of users wanting to use the system because it is easy and cheap and provides the service they want, not by reducing supply to appease investors.

There is subtly in what the users "want" as that is all up to marketing.

Yes, once both parties have entered a contract the funds are locked. But I don't see where you get indefinitely from. They will both have an incentive to get the deal done so the funds can be released.

We will not reduce supply to appease investors. As a matter of fact you need a little surplus of money in a well functioning economy. But we will use pegging to avoid the volatility you see in other coins. And just to be clear, with pegging we don't mean a fixed price forever. (Pegs have a long history of failing in fiat) Think of it as a stabilizer.

Yes after talking to David I implemented a pegging feature to avoid volatility issue. Yes they have incentive to get the deal done but if the consumer really does feel he gets cheated and vendor has shipped and lost goods then they both ar eout of luck, none of which want to give in and lose their share, they will remain locked because they do not want the other to get the coins... you need an arbiter here to resolve the situation, whoever loses here has incentive to STOP using the system and look elsewhere with their business.

I was goin to implement the double deposit escrow but after thinking about it a bit and speaking with other notable people I came to the consensus that the best idea is to have an arbiter (buyer pays a fee which he gets a 0.05% cut out of the deal IFF he signs off on a refund or release, otherwise doesn't get a cut), and have done the GUI for it which took the longer than the actual feature.

And how is the arbiter able to make the right decision if the two parties involved do not agree?

by making an impartial decision with encrypted messages of data given to him or her. He has no incentive to cheat because he will have return business if he makes the right decision. You cant make it trustless via a lock mechanism because the barrier of entry and CODB are too high.

Let's say all arbiters are honest (We know thats not so).
How could the arbiter make the right decision in my example above with sending an old shoe instead of a phone?

[sidhujag]

Why did my post get just removed.

Anyways im sure that double deposit wont work on mass scale you need an arbiter

Why do you think double deposit wont work?

(I posted the reason for deleting your post in Syscoin thread before I read your question here)

I think it will hinder adoption as vendors will not list things that they have to ensure collateral for AND not knowing if their funds will be locked indefinitely... it doesn't make much business sense although technically it is a superior implementation (however it is less work because no GUI is needed). A vendor would much rather have the piece of mind knowing an arbiter is involved that is impartial and not have to lock up funds, that really should be a discretion on the buyer side that he may have his funds locked until he receives his item(s).

It does open up a can of worms of knowing who to pick as an arbiter, because it has to be a trusted person who has incentive to do good, so you must design around that and create the incentive structure for the system to work. It cannot fully trustlessly on mass scale in this way unless you get an insurance agent involved somehow to provide the collateral for you for a charge.

That all being said, something using CLTV however may work using time locks and extending time locks somehow and I think David knows this.. however it is alot of GUI work to get this right, and more moving pieces, more complications, more unit tests.. but ultimately might be the optimal solution. But at this point 2 of 3 is probably the best way to go.

The vendors funds are not locked indefinitely. They can cancel at any time until someone enters their contract. And whoever enters a contract will have an incentive to fulfill the deal so they can get their deposit released.
The problem for vendors would be a different one. If a power seller from ebay started using our market he would have to have an enormous amount of Bay to list everything he is offering. We are discussing solutions for this. Basically we need an option to reduce the deposit for big sellers/buyers. We could make that dependent on the rep system. We can also make it possible to allow frozen Bay to be used for deposits.

The positive side for investors is of course that a lot of Bay will be tied up in transactions if the market is popular. Just imagine, how much Bay will be in double deposit if average transactions are $1000 a day. How long is average listing time (where seller has put down deposit) before someone enters the contract? 5 days? 10 days?
How long does the transaction take when buyer has entered the contract? 3 days domestic and 10 days international? Pick your numbers and do the math. We can easily have a situation where an average of $1000 daily transactions can create an average demand for $30 000 - $50 000 worth of Bay.

Once you have a contract the funds are locked indefinitely, how can you UNLOCK a locked contract that is based on double deposit?
 
You need to reduce barrier of entry as much as possible to gain network affect.  Demand for bay will come as a result of users wanting to use the system because it is easy and cheap and provides the service they want, not by reducing supply to appease investors.

There is subtly in what the users "want" as that is all up to marketing.

Yes, once both parties have entered a contract the funds are locked. But I don't see where you get indefinitely from. They will both have an incentive to get the deal done so the funds can be released.

We will not reduce supply to appease investors. As a matter of fact you need a little surplus of money in a well functioning economy. But we will use pegging to avoid the volatility you see in other coins. And just to be clear, with pegging we don't mean a fixed price forever. (Pegs have a long history of failing in fiat) Think of it as a stabilizer.

Yes after talking to David I implemented a pegging feature to avoid volatility issue. Yes they have incentive to get the deal done but if the consumer really does feel he gets cheated and vendor has shipped and lost goods then they both ar eout of luck, none of which want to give in and lose their share, they will remain locked because they do not want the other to get the coins... you need an arbiter here to resolve the situation, whoever loses here has incentive to STOP using the system and look elsewhere with their business.

I was goin to implement the double deposit escrow but after thinking about it a bit and speaking with other notable people I came to the consensus that the best idea is to have an arbiter (buyer pays a fee which he gets a 0.05% cut out of the deal IFF he signs off on a refund or release, otherwise doesn't get a cut), and have done the GUI for it which took the longer than the actual feature.

And how is the arbiter able to make the right decision if the two parties involved do not agree?

by making an impartial decision with encrypted messages of data given to him or her. He has no incentive to cheat because he will have return business if he makes the right decision. You cant make it trustless via a lock mechanism because the barrier of entry and CODB are too high.

Let's say all arbiters are honest (We know thats not so).
How could the arbiter make the right decision in my example above with sending an old shoe instead of a phone?

The shipping carrier will have weight of the parcel. Perhaps the seller takes extra steps before shipping so that he can prove to the arbiter shoudl there be an issue that he sent the device.

[damiano]

The shipping carrier will have weight of the parcel. Perhaps the seller takes extra steps before shipping so that he can prove to the arbiter shoudl there be an issue that he sent the device.

That wouldn't be hard to weigh up something the same weight as the item would it? Or the buyer placing something of that weight in the package and win the decision saying the seller sent it. Also easy for the seller to take a photo of the so called item before taking it out the box ready to ship. Arbs in the above would be less useful than useless, always on the side of the seller scammer because the provided proof that was really hard to fake. Sounds like a play ground for scammers.

[sidhujag]

The shipping carrier will have weight of the parcel. Perhaps the seller takes extra steps before shipping so that he can prove to the arbiter shoudl there be an issue that he sent the device.

That wouldn't be hard to weigh up something the same weight as the item would it? Or the buyer placing something of that weight in the package and win the decision saying the seller sent it. Also easy for the seller to take a photo of the so called item before taking it out the box ready to ship. Arbs in the above would be less useful than useless, always on the side of the seller scammer because the provided proof that was really hard to fake. Sounds like a play ground for scammers.

Double escrow minimizes risk for vendors or buyers being scammers but introduces higher upfront business costs as a result, faking documentation or proof is what every system of arbitration handles today including paypal, and it always sides on the on the sellers side unless the buyer can provide adequate proof without sellers response to that proof that the seller is in error. In the end its always still going to be buyer beware even though they have some of the piece of mind of an arbitration process that may work in their favour should the otherside be scammy. I think the tradeoff of an arbitration process outweighs higher upfront costs to try to achieve network affect.

[damiano]

The shipping carrier will have weight of the parcel. Perhaps the seller takes extra steps before shipping so that he can prove to the arbiter shoudl there be an issue that he sent the device.

That wouldn't be hard to weigh up something the same weight as the item would it? Or the buyer placing something of that weight in the package and win the decision saying the seller sent it. Also easy for the seller to take a photo of the so called item before taking it out the box ready to ship. Arbs in the above would be less useful than useless, always on the side of the seller scammer because the provided proof that was really hard to fake. Sounds like a play ground for scammers.

Double escrow minimizes risk for vendors or buyers being scammers but introduces higher upfront business costs as a result, faking documentation or proof is what every system of arbitration handles today including paypal, and it always sides on the on the sellers side unless the buyer can provide adequate proof without sellers response to that proof that the seller is in error. In the end its always still going to be buyer beware even though they have some of the piece of mind of an arbitration process that may work in their favour should the otherside be scammy. I think the tradeoff of an arbitration process outweighs higher upfront costs to try to achieve network affect.

I just popped by to play devils advocate pal. I totally understand the plus and negative of the trade off. As you must know it is always going to be hard if not impossible for a system that is fair for all. You touched upon the upfront deposit, I agree they will be a pain for medium to big sellers to begin with but after x amount of successful trades the big seller who has proven himself legit will not have to pay high deposits if any? S/he will also have the incentive to carry on the honest dealing to keep his feedback at a level where he gets the benefit of the lower deposit.

[sidhujag]

The shipping carrier will have weight of the parcel. Perhaps the seller takes extra steps before shipping so that he can prove to the arbiter shoudl there be an issue that he sent the device.

That wouldn't be hard to weigh up something the same weight as the item would it? Or the buyer placing something of that weight in the package and win the decision saying the seller sent it. Also easy for the seller to take a photo of the so called item before taking it out the box ready to ship. Arbs in the above would be less useful than useless, always on the side of the seller scammer because the provided proof that was really hard to fake. Sounds like a play ground for scammers.

Double escrow minimizes risk for vendors or buyers being scammers but introduces higher upfront business costs as a result, faking documentation or proof is what every system of arbitration handles today including paypal, and it always sides on the on the sellers side unless the buyer can provide adequate proof without sellers response to that proof that the seller is in error. In the end its always still going to be buyer beware even though they have some of the piece of mind of an arbitration process that may work in their favour should the otherside be scammy. I think the tradeoff of an arbitration process outweighs higher upfront costs to try to achieve network affect.

I just popped by to play devils advocate pal. I totally understand the plus and negative of the trade off. As you must know it is always going to be hard if not impossible for a system that is fair for all. You touched upon the upfront deposit, I agree they will be a pain for medium to big sellers to begin with but after x amount of successful trades the big seller who has proven himself legit will not have to pay high deposits if any? S/he will also have the incentive to carry on the honest dealing to keep his feedback at a level where he gets the benefit of the lower deposit.

Does amount of deposit required for vendor adjust according to reputation?

[damiano]

The shipping carrier will have weight of the parcel. Perhaps the seller takes extra steps before shipping so that he can prove to the arbiter shoudl there be an issue that he sent the device.

That wouldn't be hard to weigh up something the same weight as the item would it? Or the buyer placing something of that weight in the package and win the decision saying the seller sent it. Also easy for the seller to take a photo of the so called item before taking it out the box ready to ship. Arbs in the above would be less useful than useless, always on the side of the seller scammer because the provided proof that was really hard to fake. Sounds like a play ground for scammers.

Double escrow minimizes risk for vendors or buyers being scammers but introduces higher upfront business costs as a result, faking documentation or proof is what every system of arbitration handles today including paypal, and it always sides on the on the sellers side unless the buyer can provide adequate proof without sellers response to that proof that the seller is in error. In the end its always still going to be buyer beware even though they have some of the piece of mind of an arbitration process that may work in their favour should the otherside be scammy. I think the tradeoff of an arbitration process outweighs higher upfront costs to try to achieve network affect.

I just popped by to play devils advocate pal. I totally understand the plus and negative of the trade off. As you must know it is always going to be hard if not impossible for a system that is fair for all. You touched upon the upfront deposit, I agree they will be a pain for medium to big sellers to begin with but after x amount of successful trades the big seller who has proven himself legit will not have to pay high deposits if any? S/he will also have the incentive to carry on the honest dealing to keep his feedback at a level where he gets the benefit of the lower deposit.

Does amount of deposit required for vendor adjust according to reputation?

I would say yes as it should not be to difficult to implement. So it will be a pain to begin with of course but as you go and build a high enough reputation it will get cheaper? You earned your selling stripes so to speak. I'd like to hear from dev or someone close to him to confirm. I think that would be a big plus personally and should be added after thinking about the obvious, how much rep, how much reduction in deposit, aged account bonus reduction etc.

[sidhujag]

The shipping carrier will have weight of the parcel. Perhaps the seller takes extra steps before shipping so that he can prove to the arbiter shoudl there be an issue that he sent the device.

That wouldn't be hard to weigh up something the same weight as the item would it? Or the buyer placing something of that weight in the package and win the decision saying the seller sent it. Also easy for the seller to take a photo of the so called item before taking it out the box ready to ship. Arbs in the above would be less useful than useless, always on the side of the seller scammer because the provided proof that was really hard to fake. Sounds like a play ground for scammers.

Double escrow minimizes risk for vendors or buyers being scammers but introduces higher upfront business costs as a result, faking documentation or proof is what every system of arbitration handles today including paypal, and it always sides on the on the sellers side unless the buyer can provide adequate proof without sellers response to that proof that the seller is in error. In the end its always still going to be buyer beware even though they have some of the piece of mind of an arbitration process that may work in their favour should the otherside be scammy. I think the tradeoff of an arbitration process outweighs higher upfront costs to try to achieve network affect.

I just popped by to play devils advocate pal. I totally understand the plus and negative of the trade off. As you must know it is always going to be hard if not impossible for a system that is fair for all. You touched upon the upfront deposit, I agree they will be a pain for medium to big sellers to begin with but after x amount of successful trades the big seller who has proven himself legit will not have to pay high deposits if any? S/he will also have the incentive to carry on the honest dealing to keep his feedback at a level where he gets the benefit of the lower deposit.

Does amount of deposit required for vendor adjust according to reputation?

I would say yes as it should not be to difficult to implement. So it will be a pain to begin with of course but as you go and build a high enough reputation it will get cheaper? You earned your selling stripes so to speak. I'd like to hear from dev or someone close to him to confirm but I think that would be a big plus personally.

Its an interesting idea but another moving part and potentially can be gamed, however it may help mitigate running costs of double escrow.. in the blockchain one its a bit of work to validate the transaction but maybe in bitpay no need for that because contracts are relayed as the latest ones always.

[rqdxrocket]

I downloaded Bitbay client but I see 0 offers on the market. Does this mean that Bitbay is not in active usage?

Is your wallet up to date? My guess is, is the wallet needs some more syncing to do to load up all offers in the market.

 I am not sure what is on the market right now but I can say that it does work and I had several items for sale on there a couple of months back.  I actually sold what I believe is the first publicly sold item on the Bitbay market.

  I am awaiting the next release (which hopefully will be soon) so I can relist my items.

Thanks
RQDxRocket

We should make a note of that. What was it you sold? GPU?

No its was the "Goodyear Tire Pressure Gauge" David is the one that bought it, it has been quite a while ago cant remember when, maybe David can give the timeframe on when I sold it to him.

Thanks

Do you still have the picture you used when posting it?
I would like to have it for our archive

No I am sorry I dont have it anymore, maybe David can take a picture of it if he still has it

[rqdxrocket]

Why did my post get just removed.

Anyways im sure that double deposit wont work on mass scale you need an arbiter

Why do you think double deposit wont work?

(I posted the reason for deleting your post in Syscoin thread before I read your question here)

I think it will hinder adoption as vendors will not list things that they have to ensure collateral for AND not knowing if their funds will be locked indefinitely... it doesn't make much business sense although technically it is a superior implementation (however it is less work because no GUI is needed). A vendor would much rather have the piece of mind knowing an arbiter is involved that is impartial and not have to lock up funds, that really should be a discretion on the buyer side that he may have his funds locked until he receives his item(s).

It does open up a can of worms of knowing who to pick as an arbiter, because it has to be a trusted person who has incentive to do good, so you must design around that and create the incentive structure for the system to work. It cannot fully trustlessly on mass scale in this way unless you get an insurance agent involved somehow to provide the collateral for you for a charge.

That all being said, something using CLTV however may work using time locks and extending time locks somehow and I think David knows this.. however it is alot of GUI work to get this right, and more moving pieces, more complications, more unit tests.. but ultimately might be the optimal solution. But at this point 2 of 3 is probably the best way to go.

Even thought double deposit is a MAJOR selling point for Bitbay items can be listed without using this feature.. The buyer sends payment and the seller ships the item (Ebay style) but you must trust the seller

Thanks

[Munti]

The shipping carrier will have weight of the parcel. Perhaps the seller takes extra steps before shipping so that he can prove to the arbiter shoudl there be an issue that he sent the device.

That wouldn't be hard to weigh up something the same weight as the item would it? Or the buyer placing something of that weight in the package and win the decision saying the seller sent it. Also easy for the seller to take a photo of the so called item before taking it out the box ready to ship. Arbs in the above would be less useful than useless, always on the side of the seller scammer because the provided proof that was really hard to fake. Sounds like a play ground for scammers.

Double escrow minimizes risk for vendors or buyers being scammers but introduces higher upfront business costs as a result, faking documentation or proof is what every system of arbitration handles today including paypal, and it always sides on the on the sellers side unless the buyer can provide adequate proof without sellers response to that proof that the seller is in error. In the end its always still going to be buyer beware even though they have some of the piece of mind of an arbitration process that may work in their favour should the otherside be scammy. I think the tradeoff of an arbitration process outweighs higher upfront costs to try to achieve network affect.

I just popped by to play devils advocate pal. I totally understand the plus and negative of the trade off. As you must know it is always going to be hard if not impossible for a system that is fair for all. You touched upon the upfront deposit, I agree they will be a pain for medium to big sellers to begin with but after x amount of successful trades the big seller who has proven himself legit will not have to pay high deposits if any? S/he will also have the incentive to carry on the honest dealing to keep his feedback at a level where he gets the benefit of the lower deposit.

Does amount of deposit required for vendor adjust according to reputation?

I would say yes as it should not be to difficult to implement. So it will be a pain to begin with of course but as you go and build a high enough reputation it will get cheaper? You earned your selling stripes so to speak. I'd like to hear from dev or someone close to him to confirm. I think that would be a big plus personally and should be added after thinking about the obvious, how much rep, how much reduction in deposit, aged account bonus reduction etc.

We have discussed it, and plan to do something like that. It just hasn't been on the priority list.

[Nameless Coin]

It's good to see some activity here again.
Happy to see bitbay is back on track. Let's hope we see some fast developments soon.

[ArpFlush]

Anybody knows what this Debian error means and how to correct it?

"error while loading shared libraries: libminiupnpc.so.8: cannot open shared object file: no such file or directory."

I get this error when ./bitbay-qt

[dzimbeck]

Anybody knows what this Debian error means and how to correct it?

"error while loading shared libraries: libminiupnpc.so.8: cannot open shared object file: no such file or directory."

I get this error when ./bitbay-qt

I'm not much of a linux guy but people have had similar issues with other coins, perhaps an update to your system changed something or you are missing a library. Did you build it yourself?
https://bugs.launchpad.net/s25rttr/+bug/704324

[dzimbeck]

The shipping carrier will have weight of the parcel. Perhaps the seller takes extra steps before shipping so that he can prove to the arbiter shoudl there be an issue that he sent the device.

That wouldn't be hard to weigh up something the same weight as the item would it? Or the buyer placing something of that weight in the package and win the decision saying the seller sent it. Also easy for the seller to take a photo of the so called item before taking it out the box ready to ship. Arbs in the above would be less useful than useless, always on the side of the seller scammer because the provided proof that was really hard to fake. Sounds like a play ground for scammers.

Double escrow minimizes risk for vendors or buyers being scammers but introduces higher upfront business costs as a result, faking documentation or proof is what every system of arbitration handles today including paypal, and it always sides on the on the sellers side unless the buyer can provide adequate proof without sellers response to that proof that the seller is in error. In the end its always still going to be buyer beware even though they have some of the piece of mind of an arbitration process that may work in their favour should the otherside be scammy. I think the tradeoff of an arbitration process outweighs higher upfront costs to try to achieve network affect.

I just popped by to play devils advocate pal. I totally understand the plus and negative of the trade off. As you must know it is always going to be hard if not impossible for a system that is fair for all. You touched upon the upfront deposit, I agree they will be a pain for medium to big sellers to begin with but after x amount of successful trades the big seller who has proven himself legit will not have to pay high deposits if any? S/he will also have the incentive to carry on the honest dealing to keep his feedback at a level where he gets the benefit of the lower deposit.

Does amount of deposit required for vendor adjust according to reputation?

You are making this assumption that its an "up front cost" but its not. The deposits would be similar to your daily/weekly volume. If you did 1000 dollars of business a week, then im sure you have at least 1000 dollars around for deposits.

Also of course you CAN set custom deposits. Why do you think it has to be 1:1? If you have a 100 dollar item, followed by a 50 dollar deposit, then you still lose 50 dollars if you try to cheat the system which should be significant enough to prevent you.

Using arbiters is a terrible idea. Bitcoin is anonymous you have no accountability for arbiters. What is to prevent an arbiter from colluding with himself in the deal? Example: Arbiter is ALSO the buyer or seller in secret. Thus he has 2 keys of the 2/3. Guess what? He can just steal escrows out-right. And coins are anonymous so there is no stopping people from doing that.

Why is it that when we make extremely significant steps forward, people are still trying to force everything backwards? Third parties are the thing we are trying to avoid?

How the hell does an arbiter know who is lying? We have been over this time and time again. I'm not sure who you talked to in the industry that gave you that bad advice but I know we have talked at length about it.. I really hope you change your mind and stop trying to move society backwards?

What next? BitLAWYERS? BitJUDGE? BitJAIL? BitJURY?

Please, thats the old violence based society double deposit is trying to rid the world of.

The whole point of double deposit is to make an agreement or contract that obviates the need to use a "gun" to enforce contracts.

Arbiters are not wise, they don't know who is telling the truth and people will take advantage of that and then nobody will want to use crypto. Then explain to me why not use Ebay?? Bitbay/BitHalo/BlackHalo have the extreme advantage that you don't have to trust a third party to "judge" your deal. Ebay is fraught with scams, true they  don't happen all the time but even I've run into them.

But the debate is much deeper than Ebay. Its about International business International law.

Tell me, if I sent a wire transfer to buy Bitcoin to someone in Nigeria how will this all seeing all knowing arbiter going to know if I sent the money or not?? He wont.

THAT is why we use two party escrow. Because its the FIRST time in history contracts have been International, Trustless, no third parties, no lawyers, no judges, no bullshit!!! No more need to threaten a person with a "gun" if they hurt you in a contract because the penalty is already built in!! Its the worlds first PEACEFUL contract.

And yes there is a reputation system, so we can track how many deals youve done successfully. Trust comes when you know a person, if they have a good reputation then you may choose not to use a deposit at all! Or make it like 10% of escrow value. Even 10% is still a loss to anyone trying to default. (and if we trust them, those odds are very low)

[dzimbeck]

By the way sidhujag, did you ever get CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY to work? 

On a lighter note, I hope everything is going well with you. And please dont use arbiters in your project, or at least have Double Deposit Escrow as an option.